Existence Of Alternative States Research Articles

Alternative states in microbial communities during artificial aeration: Proof of incubation experiment and development of recurrent neural network models

Artificial aeration, a widely used method of restoring the aquatic ecological environment by enhancing the re-oxygenation capacity, typically relies upon empirical models to predict ecological dynamics and determine the operating scheme of the aeration equipment. Restoration through artificial aeration is involved in oxic-anoxic transitions, whether these transitions occurred in the form of a regime shift, making the development of predictive models challenging. Here, we confirmed the existence of alternative states in microbial communities during artificial aeration through aeration incubation experiment for the first time and considered its existence in neural network modeling in order to improve model performance. By aeration incubation experiment, it was confirmed that the alternative states exist in microbial communities during artificial aeration by two independent approaches, potential analysis and “enterotyping” approach. Comparing neural network models with and without considering the existence of alternative states, it was found that considering the existence of alternative states in modeling could improve the performance of neural network model. Our study provides a reference for the prediction of systems containing time series data where the current state will have an impact on later states. The developed model could be used for optimizing the operating scheme of the artificial aeration.

A New Critique of Theological Interpretations of Physical Cosmology

This paper is a sequel to my 'Theological Misinterpretations of Current Physical Cosmology' (Foundations of Physics [1996], 26 (4); revised in Philo [10998], 1 (1)). There I argued that the Big Bang models of (classical) general relativity theory, as well as the original 1948 versions of the steady state cosmology, are each logically incompatible with the time-honored theological doctrine that perpetual divine creation (creatio continuans') is required in each of these two theorized worlds. Furthermore, I challenged the perennial theological doctrine that there must be a divine creative cause (as distinct from a transformative one) for the very existence of the world, a ratio essendi. This doctrine is the theistic reply to the question: 'Why is there something, rather than just nothing?'I begin my present paper by arguing against the response by the contemporary Oxford theist Richard Swinburne and by Leibniz to what is, in effect, my counter-question: 'But why should there by just nothing, rather than something?' Their response takes the form of claiming that the a priori probability of there being just nothing, vis-à-vis the existence of alternative states, is maximal, because the non-existence of the world is conceptually the simplest. On the basis of an analysis of the role of simplicity in scientific explanations, I show that this response is multiply flawed, and thus provides no basis for their three contentions that (i) if there is a world at all, then its 'normal', natural, spontaneous state is one of utter nothingness or total non-existence, so that (ii) the very existence of matter, energy and living beings constitutes a deviation from the allegedly 'normal', spontaneous state of 'nothingness', and (iii) that deviation must thus have a suitably potent (external) divine cause. Related defects turn out to vitiate the medieval Kalam Argument for the existence of God, as espoused by William Craig.Next I argue against the contention by such theists as Richard Swinburne and Philip L. Quinn that (i) the specific content of the scientifically most fundamental laws of nature, including the constants they contain, requires supra-scientific explanation, and (ii) a satisfactory explanation is provided by the hypothesis that the God of theism willed them to be exactly what they are.Furthermore, I contend that the theistic teleological gloss on the 'Anthropic Principle' is incoherent and explanatorily unavailing.Finally, I offer an array of considerations against Swinburne's attempt to show, via Bayes's theorem, that the existence of God is more probable than not.