Executive Committee Of The Communist International Research Articles

Член Президиума Исполкома Коминтерна Э. Руднянский в работах зарубежных историков

This article examines the biography of the Hungarian communist Endre Rudnyánszky, one of the leaders of the Comintern in 1919–1921 and member of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI). The paper is based on the publications of foreign historians (mainly Hungarian): György Borsányi, György Milei, Józsa Antal, Tibor Kosztolánczy, Erika Nemeskéri, Levente Sipos, Lajos Terbe, Miklós Mesterházi, Pierre Broué (France), etc. In addition, the author turned to the reminiscences of Rudnyánszky’s contemporaries, primarily his fellow party members Mátyás Rákosi and Sándor Szerényi, which shed some light on his professional qualities and certain character traits. The novelty of the research lies in the fact that these materials have not previously been used in Russian publications, although these are quite valuable sources as they fill serious gaps in Rudnyánszky’s biography. The paper dwells on the main stages in his career: life before the start of World War I; activities in Soviet Russia after his liberation from captivity, before the founding of the Comintern; work in the Comintern; disappearance, life in Romania followed by the return to the USSR, arrest, exile and release, as well as issues related to these events. The author concludes that Rudnyánszky’s biography remains one of the least studied among those of the high-ranking Comintern employees.

The VKP(b) and the Political Situation in China after the Dissolution of the Comintern

The article is devoted to the influence of the dissolution of the Comintern on the events in China, as well as to the activities of the Department of International Information (DII) formed instead of the Comintern under the Central Committee of the VKP(b). The self-dissolution of the Comintern was positively received by both political forces in China — the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang. This decision of the ECCI (Executive Committee of the Communist International) allowed Mao Zedong to secure a leading position in the party and isolate the Comintern in the Politburo from the CPC Central Committee. Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek took advantage of the disappearance of the "International Communist Headquarters" to discredit the CPC as a "foreign product" hostile to China. However, quite quickly, China found itself on the brink of civil war, threatening the collapse of the anti-Japanese national united front. Only the position of the USSR, the USA and the democratic forces in China did not allow Chiang Kai-shek to start a punitive campaign against the Special Region of China and the Communist Party. For more than two years, relations between the two parties remained extremely tense. G. Dimitrov, the actual head of the DII, had neither the authority nor the opportunity to somehow influence the political events in the neighboring country. The functions of his department were reduced mainly to the collection of information. Moreover, the main role in obtaining information was played by representatives of the Soviet special services located at the headquarters of the Central Committee of the CPC in Yan'an, as well as in Chongqing, the country's temporary capital, where the negotiations between the CPC and the Kuomintang took place. The defeat of Japan and the end of World War II changed the form and the possibilities of relations between the VKP(b) and the CPC.

Global Sounding Options for Libyan Independence. 1937

Many figures of the Libyan national liberation movement, after the defeat of the Italian fascist colonial troops were in exile where they tried to fight a political struggle. The article deals with the activities of the “League for the protection of Tripoli and Cyrenaica” with its headquarters in Damascus, headed by the Bashir Saadawi. It was created in 1928, united many members of the Libyan diasporas in the Mashriq, and in 1937 proved itself by another anti-fascist appeal, which was recorded by Comintern staffers in Moscow. This struggle is placed in the broad context of global ideological and political confrontation and the work of the Comintern in the Arab East. The article presents the international reaction to the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936-1937 of the countries of the fascist “axis” united against the “communist threat” in the context of the redistribution of the North African colonies. The article analyzes the possibility of contacts between the League and the Comintern in the wave of opposition to Italian colonialism. The fascist Alliance was gaining strength and preparing for war. Italy was no exception: if was going to fight for its possessions in North Africa, where its interests were disputed by Britain, which also tried to use the energy of Libyan patriots in exile, especially in Egypt. Thus, the League could well be seen by the Executive Committee of the Communist International as a tactical partner in opposing to both sides, namely the Italian fascists and the British imperialists.

Д. Лувсаншарав — бывший монах и партийный деятель

Introduction. In the 20th century, Mongolia witnessed the emergence of a number of party activists and statesmen whose formally differing life paths and careers largely resulted in essentially similar repressions experienced. Those included a group of party executives with monastic backgrounds and good command of foreign languages. And it is D. Luvsansharav who had spent twenty years in Mӧrӧn Monastery that attracts special attention. It is unknown what (and whether at all) he had studied at the monastic college ― a largest one in the country ― but his party comrades (and himself) considered him to be an expert in the Lamaist question. On graduation from the Communist University of the Toilers of the East (1928–1929), he begins a political career, the pinnacle of which being his work at the Lamaist Commission that primarily aimed to eradicate reactionist Lamaist elements (i.e., the whole of Buddhist clergy as such), and his participation in the Plenipotentiary Commission (a so called ‘troika’) that put to death hundreds and even thousands of citizens, destroyed some precious items of material and traditional culture. Goals. The paper seeks to reveal the ex-monk’s impact in party arrangements, interpret certain personal motives to have underlain the transformation. Materials. The work analyzes materials stored at the Central Archive of the Federal Security Service and contained in Mongolia in Documents of the Comintern (vols. 1, 2), other scholarly sources. Results. The Mongolian Revolution of 1921 uncovered the lack of competent personnel which lead to a search of ‘individuals suitable for administrative, economic, and military work’ not only among commoners but also monks and nobility, resulting in that the recruited executives differed both in skills and worldviews. The context proved favorable enough to D. Luvsansharav who ― according to archival notes ― was quite an ambiguous and contradictive figure. His party comrades and official secretaries of the Eastern Executive Committee of the Communist International characterized him as a definitely ambitious but short-tempered, awkward, and irresolute person in a supporting role. However, the ex-cleric became a leading party activist, and such a dramatic change in his life and career may have stemmed from religious underachievement, dissatisfaction with the position he had held in the large Mongolian monastery, or some psychological aspects. Still, the harsh and severe period of national history could actually give rise to changes in his ideological views and mentality (when personal benefits and career opportunities were viewed by some as priorities).

Great disappointment, shifting opportunities: a glimpse into the Comintern, Western European parties and their colonial work in the Third Period

In early 1929, Robin Page Arnot and James Ford, both sponsored by the Comintern, each set out on a trip to investigate what Western European communist parties had accomplished in their campaigns on colonialism and racial inequality. Both men issued stern reports suggesting more could be done; but following these investigations a proposed European colonial conference never happened. The League Against Imperialism petered out. The International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers formed, but consistently dealt with discrimination and received limited, if any, help from European communist parties. Using Executive Committee politsecretariat documents, this article argues that the Comintern quickly abandoned an emphasis on colonial work, instead focusing on domestic campaigns when contacting these parties between 1929 and 1935. Highlighting the migration of these ideas transnationally, while offering a comparative analysis of the Executive Committee of the Communist International's interventions into each party, this research serves as a starting point for further inquiry into why the Comintern elected to not press these European parties to do more. Was their inaction because the Comintern was always Eurocentrically-minded? Was it because Comintern leaders were only paying lip service to these concepts? Was it that the Comintern prioritized other matters, especially as the Great Depression and the rise of fascism brought new challenges to communism? This article sheds some light on these questions by exposing the way in which the Comintern instructed each party to focus on in their broader campaigns.

Scapegoating One's Comrades in the USSR, 1934-1937

AbstractThis article examines two cases of scapegoating—that of Ludwig Magyar in December 1934, and that of Gevork Alikhanov in June 1937—and applies theories of group identity and behavior to explore what motivated people to scapegoat their comrades, why the groups selected particular people for scapegoating, and what these incidences reveal about the groups that engaged in this ritual. Within political groups, such behaviors are obviously inseparable from the politics of the moment. The cases examined here illustrate some key political shifts in Stalinist party policy between late 1934 and mid-1937, as manifest in a single party organization. The changes affected its members' behavior, which offers insights into intra-party fractures. The essay confines its focus to two meetings of the party organization of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI). Whereas in December 1934 the members of the party organization unanimously voted to expel Magyar from their ranks, in June 1937 rank-and-file members of the organization re-directed efforts by the party organization's leaders to scapegoat Alikhanov and attacked the party organization's leaders. Examining how this group of Stalinists behaved allows one to view scapegoating as both a Stalinist and universal social behavior. Appreciating the prominence of universal social behavior within a Stalinist political context is essential to moving beyond many scholars' unwarranted obsession with Soviet and Stalinist exceptionalism.

Bolshevising Irish communism: the Communist International and the formation of the Revolutionary Workers’ Groups, 1927–31

During the 1920s the Communist International, or Comintern, attached exceptional importance to Ireland for the potential of its anti-imperialist forces to foment revolution at home, enlist the Irish diaspora, and encourage unrest in Britain and the Empire. In this way the Comintern might strengthen its relatively feeble bridgehead in the anglophone world and embarrass Britain, the keystone of Russia’s enemies. However, the Comintern encountered repeated frustration in attempting to direct its Irish sections until 1929 when it approved an initiative to create a Bolshevised party. At national level, Bolshevisation meant the application of the Leninist principles of unity, discipline and democratic centralism. Crucially, Bolsheviks understood their national sections to belong to a world party directed by the Executive Committee of the Communist International (E.C.C.I.) in Moscow. In the global context, it also meant the subordination of the Comintern to the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (V.K.P./b.), as the Soviet party was called, and the interests of the Soviet Union. Both levels of Bolshevisation went hand in hand in Ireland, where a new party was built from scratch between 1929 and 1933.

Bourgeois Mentality and Socialist Ideology as Exemplified by Clara Zetkin's Constructs of Femininity

Clara Zetkin (1857–1933) remains one of the most famous figures in the history of the German and international Left. She rose to prominence as a social democrat beginning in 1890 and became a Marxist and, as of 1919, a member of the high-ranking cadre of the KPD; she was an activist of the Second International, starting in 1889, and belonged to the Executive Committee of the Communist International (EKKI) in the 1920s. She is known in history primarily as the leader and chief ideologue of the socialist, and later the international communist, women's movement, but is also a popular figure in the leftist women's movement of the twentieth century. Zetkin, the founder of International Women's Day, is still widely depicted as a heroine. However, in light of recent research conducted in Berlin and Moscow and from the perspective of the history of mentalities, the tendency to mythologize her needs to be questioned. This essay on Clara Zetkin's constructs of femininity is part of a biography oriented toward a history of mentalities, in which the socialist and communist Zetkin is presented in the entire societal context of her times, perceived as a contemporary of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. From this perspective, it is precisely Zetkin's comments on the women's issue that mirror the influences of Social Darwinism and biological discussion at the turn of the century in Germany. The ideas held by the leader and theoretician of the international socialist women's movement on the “liberation of women” from “gender slavery” and “class bondage” were not aimed at pursuing an autonomous process of emancipating women for their own sake, but at pursuing a well-structured and directed process of educating them that would end up turning them into a new physically and mentally improved “consummate woman” who would efficiently serve the socialist society.

Resolution on Work in Military Affairs (Draft)

Abstract 1. In an estimate of the present political situation in the Chinese revolution and of future development, the Ninth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International pointed out: "The Party should be prepared for the upsurge of a new revolutionary tide. This upsurge most certainly will create a direct practical task for the Chinese Communist Party, which will be to organize and carry out armed insurrections of the masses, because only by means of insurrections and the overthrow of the existing regime can the revolutionary task be resolved" (see Resolution on China passed by the Ninth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International).

Nationalism and Communism in India: The Impact of the 1927 Comintern Failure in China

The Seventh Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI), which was held between November 22 and December 16, 1926, principally to consider the Chinese question, met at a crucial period in the history of the Chinese Communist movement. During the previous summer, Chiang Kai-shek had launched his famous Northern Expedition against northern militarists and the legal government in Peking. His Communist allies had participated by arousing peasant discontent behind enemy lines and by infiltration of northern armies. It was now feared that the Communists might soon become the victims of their own success. Chiang had already given evidence of his displeasure of Communist activities. In March he had staged a “coup” against his Russian advisers and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), but a reconciliation had been effected. In October Stalin had telegraphed instructions to the CCP directing them to restrain the peasant movement in order to avoid antagonizing the officer corps of the Kuomintang army, which was largely recruited from the landholding class.

The Roy-Lenin Debate on Colonial Policy: a New Interpretation

Before the opening of the Second World Congress of the Communist International (July 19–August 7, 1920) [which met on the first day in Petrograd but subsequently in Moscow], Lenin prepared a draft thesis on the national and colonial question. M. N. Roy, a young Bengali attending his first international Communist gathering, eagerly responded to Lenin's request for criticisms. As a result, Lenin invited him to write an alternative thesis. Both theses were modified as a result of discussions within the National and Colonial Commission, and both were subsequently adopted by the Congress. After his encounter with Lenin, Roy rose rapidly in the Comintern hierarchy. In 1922 he was elected a candidate member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI), and a full voting member in 1924. He became a member of the Presidium in 1924. It was in the year 1926, however, that Roy attained the peak of his influence in the Comintern. In February of that year he was appointed to the editorial staff of theCommunist International, and in the following December he was reelected to the Presidium and joined the Political Secretariat of the ECCI. At the time of the Seventh Plenum of the ECCI (November 12–December 16, 1926), Roy became Secretary of the Chinese Commission, a post he held jointly with Petrov, and a member of the Agrarian Commission. The Plenum, convened for the purpose of considering the China problem, adopted a thesis on the question and Roy was sent to China as a representative of the Comintern to carry it out. Following the events in China in 1927, Roy's influence declined precipitately, though he was not formally expelled until December, 1929.