Exclusive Fishing Zones Research Articles

Discrimination of red porgy Pagrus pagrus (Sparidae) potential stocks in the south-western Atlantic by otolith shape analysis.

Otolith shape analysis is a powerful method for fish stock identification. We compared the otolith shape of Pagrus pagrus (Linnaeus 1758) along with its distribution in four south-western Atlantic regions where it is commercially fished: Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul in southern Brazil, the Argentine-Uruguayan Common Fishing Zone (UA) and the Argentinian Exclusive Fishing Zone (AR). Otolith shapes were compared by Elliptical Fourier and Wavelet coefficients among specimens in a size range with similar otoliths, morphometric parameters and ages. Four potential stocks were identified: one in the AR, a second along the UA which included specimens from southern Brazil with well-marked opaque bands in its otoliths (MRS), the third in southern Brazil with faint or absent opaque bands in its otoliths (FRS) and the fourth along Rio de Janeiro. The difference in the otolith shape among regions followed differences reported using other stock identification techniques. The similarity between otoliths from UA and MRS (ANOVA-like, P > 0.01) can be explained by seasonal short-range migrations. Otoliths shape differences between MRS and FRS (ANOVA-like, P < 0.01) suggest that P. pagrus does not form a homogeneous group in southern Brazil.

Design trade‐offs in rights‐based management of small‐scale fisheries

Small-scale fisheries collectively have a large ecological footprint and are key sources of food security, especially in developing countries. Many of the data-intensive approaches to fishery management are infeasible in these fisheries, but a strategy that has emerged to overcome these challenges is the establishment of territorial user rights for fisheries (TURFs). In this approach, exclusive fishing zones are established for groups of stakeholders, which eliminates the race to fish with other groups. A key challenge, however, is setting the size of TURFs-too large and the number of stakeholders sharing them impedes collective action, and too small and the movement of target fish species in and out of the TURFs effectively removes the community's exclusive access. We assessed the size of 137 TURFs from across the globe relative to this design challenge by applying theoretical models that predict their performance. We estimated that roughly two-thirds of these TURFs were sized ideally to overcome the challenges posed by resource movement and fisher group size. However, for most of the remaining TURFs, all possible sizes were either too small to overcome the resource-movement challenge or too large to overcome the collective action challenge. Our results suggest these fisheries, which target mobile species in densely populated regions, may need additional interventions to be successful.

Les pêches de l’URSS dans l’Atlantique du Nord-Est et l’élargissement des zones de pêche exclusive

After the last war, the USSR set it self to increase the development of its ocean fisheries from its two North-East Atlantic seaboards on the Barents Sea and the Baltic. With a modernized fleet and almost complete freedom on the seas, its catch increased six fold between 1950 and 1976, going from 0,4 to 2,5 million tons per year, and Soviet fishermen could be found roaming on all the seas bordering Europe. However, as from 1977, this expansion was fiercely curtailed when coastal nations, including the USSR, established the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or mere exclusive fishing zone (EFZ), each being alloted almost all of its living resource s. More fishing grounds were lost by the USSR than gained, to the point where production suddenly fell in 1977 and it had to turn to fish of lesser quality, often used for industrial purposes, such as the Capelin (Mallotus villosus) and the blue Whiting (Micromesistius poutassou) which today make up to 60 % of all its catch off Northern Europe. The Soviet authorities reacted with flexibility and diversity, namely by increased fishing in the national exclusive zone, particularly in the Barents Sea, through negotiations leading to access rights to foreign waters, particularly those of Norway and the Faeroe Islands, and through a policy whereby it could purchase unprocessed fish from some members of the EEC. Thus Russian factory ships came to the British coasts to process mackerel delivered to them at sea by English and Scottish fishermen. It is through such a strategy of diversification, various examples of which may be found around the world, that the Soviets have succeeded in regaining grounds lost in 1977 and in reaching an average production of 1,7 million tons from 1977 to 1983 in the North-East Atlantic, this being 3 to 4 % less than that of 1970-76, notwithstanding the few purchases of fish made directly at sea.

The Spiny‐Lobster Fishery in Cuba

The spiny‐lobster fishery, the most valuable fishery in Cuba, is unique among those in major lobster‐producing countries because of its combination of strong central control and absence of standardization and mechanization in fishing gear. Cooperation rather than competition among fishing vessels is promoted by exclusive fishing zones and fleet organization. These measures, along with the use of storage centers, simple vessels, and inexpensively constructed fishing gear, have promoted spatial rationality and cost reduction in the fishery and made it one of the most successful spiny‐lobster fisheries in the world.

The Canada‐European union turbot dispute in the northwest Atlantic: An application of the incident approach

Fisheries disputes, such as the recent one between Canada and the European Union (EU) over the right to fish on the high seas of the Northwest Atlantic, if handled badly, can escalate into armed conflict. The Canada‐EU turbot dispute has shown that there is an urgent need to resolve the conflicts between distant water fishing states’ right to fish under the traditional freedom of the high seas and the coastal state's interest in the conservation and management of fishery resources beyond and adjacent to its exclusive economic zone under customary and conventional international law. The incident approach is used to examine the dispute. The problems and facts relating to the dispute are provided, the conflicting claims and the legal norms cited by the concerned parties to support respective claims are identified, and the international reactions to the dispute are described and analyzed. The author suggests that the incident was a part of Canada's overall strategy for enhancing its interest in protecting fish stocks beyond its 200‐mile exclusive fishing zone.

Tending the achilles' heel of NAFO: Canada acts to protect the nose and tail of the Grand Banks

A number of important commercial fish stocks in the waters of eastern Canada straddle the boundary between Canada's exclusive fishing zone and the high seas. Management of these stocks by Canada and the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO) has failed to prevent stock depletion. It is argued that NAFO has faced a major problem in developing a successful management regime for these straddling stocks: lack of an effective enforcement capability to make members comply with its total allowable catches (TACs), quota allocations, and technical measures and to prevent nonmember fishing within its Regulatory Area. Long-standing Canadian concern about NAFO's ability to enforce proper management of straddling stocks in the high seas area of the Grand Banks, prompted passage of an amended Coastal Fisheries Protection Act in May 1994 which allowed Canada to arrest and fine foreign vessels fishing beyond Canada's exclusive fishing zone (EFZ) in contravention of NAFO's conservation and management regime. It appears that use of this Act in 1994 eliminated fishing by non-members on the Nose and Tail of the Bank, while action against Spanish and Portuguse vessels in March 1995 may provide the help that NAFO needs in terms of noncompliance with its management regime by member states.

Japan 1978: The Consensus Continues

IN THE EARLY part of 1978, Japan seemed to be floundering in stormy seas. There were nagging problems at home, such as unemployment, bankruptcies, and the embarrassing riots in connection with the opening of Japan's new international airport. In foreign affairs the Russians, as usual, were being difficult on a series of issues, and the long-delayed peace and friendship treaty with China seemed hopelessly deadlocked. Senior American officials were bluntly complaining to any listener about Japan's allegedly predatory trade policies. And all the world-friend and foe alike-seemed to be marking off 200-mile exclusive fishing zones that might badly injure Japan. Yet by year's end the Japanese could look back upon a generally good year.

Rockall and the limits of national jurisdiction of the UK: Part 2

Part 1 of this article, published in the July issue of Marine Policy, contained the first in a four-section examination of the Rockall question. Section I presented a survey of the law governing the delimitation of the continental shelf, the EEZ, and exclusive fishing zones, thus providing a background for sections II–IV, which constitute Part 2. In this Part, the author examines the geography and geology of the Rockall sector and the claims made by the UK, Ireland and Denmark, before drawing conclusions from the whole article.

Japan in 1977: An Emerging Consensus

FOLLOWING THE DECEMBER 1976 lower house election, Japan's attention turned outward, away from the domestic political upheavals of the Lockheed scandal and the intraparty machinations of the Liberal Democrats to a cluster of foreign policy questions-nuclear energy, the withdrawal of American military forces from South Korea, the 200-mile exclusive fishing zone, and trade-all of which are vital to Japanese national interests. One might haave expected that on each of these potentially contentious issues the opposition parties, either singly or in combination, would have sought to capitalize on a weakened LDP. Instead, with the possible exception of the Korea problem, there emerged a remarkable consensus among the opposition parties, the government, and the public. While not necessarily evidence of resurgent Japanese nationalism, such agreement, particularly on foreign affairs questions, has not surfaced often in recent years.

Management and Developement of Fisheries in the North Atlantic

The "conventional" fish species of the North Atlantic are mostly being fully utilized or nearly so, some having been overexploited in recent years. Recommendations for management are made by the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) and the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC). The factual and conceptual basis for management is provided by the scientists of many nations, coordinated by ICNAF and by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). The need in nearly every major North Atlantic fishery is to limit fishing effort, which in practical terms means allocating quotas to states. Such action has been initiated by ICNAF and is under active consideration by NEAFC. The process would have been easier if it had been begun a few years earlier, before several major stocks became depressed, but since new ground is being broken internationally the delay was almost inevitable. Regulations of mesh size in trawls have been in force in both areas for some years. These were successful in providing a greater yield from each year-class of groundfish as it appeared, but could not by themselves ensure a breeding stock adequate for optimum reproduction. Problems of allocation of quotas, of enforcement, and of national claims for the extension of exclusive fishing zones will require continued discussion and goodwill among the nations in the years ahead.