Evolutionary Cognitive Archaeology Research Articles

Theoretical plurality, the extended evolutionary synthesis, and archaeology

The study of cultural evolution now includes multiple theoretical frameworks. Despite common influence from Darwinian evolutionary theory, there is considerable diversity. Thus, we recognize those most influenced by the tenets of the Modern Synthesis (evolutionary archaeology, cultural transmission theory, and human behavioral ecology) and those most aligned more closely with concepts emerging in the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (cultural macroevolution and evolutionary cognitive archaeology). There has been substantial debate between adherents of these schools of thought as to their appropriateness and priority for addressing the fundamentals of cultural evolution. I argue that theoretical diversity is necessary to address research questions arising from a complex archaeological record. Concepts associated with the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis may offer unique insights into the cultural evolutionary process.

Replacing Epiphenomenalism: a Pluralistic Enactive Take on the Metaplasticity of Early Body Ornamentation

In the domain of evolutionary cognitive archaeology, the early body ornaments from the Middle Stone Age/Palaeolithic are generally treated as mere by-products of an evolved brain-bound cognitive architecture selected to cope with looming social problems. Such adaptive artefacts are therefore taken to have been but passive means of broadcasting a priori envisaged meanings, essentially playing a neutral role for the human mind. In contrast to this epiphenomenalist view of material culture, postphenomenology and the Material Engagement Theory (MET) have been making a case for the active role of artefacts on the count that they can actually shape and restructure the human mind. By bringing these dissenting voices together, the paper at hand employs an enactive way of thinking in order to challenge the epiphenomenalist take on early body ornaments. In fact, two variants of enactivism are presented, each advancing a unique explanation of how the engagement of early humans with body ornaments transformed their minds along the two postphenomenological categories of embodied and hermeneutic cognition. Our theoretical frameworks specifically seek to explore how early beadworks could have scaffolded the creation of semiotic categories and the development of cognitive processes. Despite relying on inherently different premises, both theories suggest that beads fostered the emergence of an epistemic apparatus which thoroughly transformed the way humans engaged with the world. Having concurred on the ornaments’ transformative effects, we ultimately conclude that the epiphenomenalist paradigm best be replaced with an enactive approach grounded on the dictates of postphenomenology and the MET.

RECkoning with representational apriorism in evolutionary cognitive archaeology

In evolutionary cognitive archaeology, the school of thought associated with the traditional framework has been deeply influenced by cognitivist intuitions, which have led to the formulation of mentalistic and disembodied cognitive explanations to address the emergence of artifacts within the archaeological record of ancient hominins. Recently, some approaches in this domain have further enforced this view, by arguing that artifacts are passive means to broadcast/perpetuate meanings that are thoroughly internal to the mind. These meanings are conveyed either in the form of a Language of Thought, constituted by sub-personal, content-bearing mental representations, or in that of a natural language. In both cases, however, material culture stands as the physical derivative of computations run over representations, which include abstract concepts, semantic relationships, and meta-representations about intensional states, a conception hereby indicated as “representational apriorism”. In this paper, I will argue that such mentalistic models are plagued by the fundamental problems of content, substance, and origin, which affect the representational substrates required for the production of artifacts. At the same time, these models fail the criterion of minimalism at the crux of conditional cognitive archaeology, because they propose overly costly explanations which are insufficiently constrained by material evidence. An alternative proposal, based on the principles of radical enactive cognitive science, is hereby introduced in order to counter this mentalistic drift. It is concluded that a radical enactive cognitive archaeology is able to dissolve the deep problems confronting the mentalistic paradigm, while providing minimalistic cognitive explanations about the emergence of Paleolithic artifacts.

Holistic Mapping: Towards an Epistemological Foundation for Evolutionary Cognitive Archaeology

Evolutionary cognitive archaeology (ECA) is an emerging discipline that attempts to reconstruct the properties of ancient cognitive systems from the study of the material remains found in the archaeological record. Although there has been substantial interest in this area in recent years, scholars have tended to pay little attention to the methodologies used to formulate their theories. This has fostered an unfortunate situation of incommensurability between competing lines of argument. In this paper, I will attempt to provide a way out of this stagnation, using the methodology of “holistic mapping,” which represents a rational tool for theory validation in ECA. The lack of a shared methodology is a symptom of the wider neglect of deeper epistemological aspects of ECA, which in turn has given rise to the even more problematic questioning of the very foundations of the whole ECA enterprise. The absence of direct access to the ancient mind is associated with barriers to empirical testability, which fosters the production of “just so stories,” therefore evoking the specter of relativism. Building upon the previous methodological considerations, I will attempt to defend the epistemic validity of ECA, by discussing how holistic mapping can lead to the acquisition of reliable knowledge even if the object of science can only be indirectly reconstructed. Firmer epistemological foundations for ECA will be established by contextualizing this methodology within a middle-ground position in archaeological theory defined as “realism.” This epistemological perspective allows rejecting both the narrow empiricism and corrosive relativism currently threatening ECA.

On the Phylogenesis of Executive Functions and Their Connection with Language Evolution.

T term Executive Functions (EFs; also executive control or cognitive control) refers to the higher order cognitive processes involved in the regulation of goal-oriented actions in complex contexts and non-routine situations (Gilbert and Burgess, 2008). EFs are crucial for the temporal organization of purposive behaviors, language and reasoning (Fuster, 2008). There is no single taxonomy of EFs that scholars generally agree upon (Jurado and Rosselli, 2007). The various models proposed in the literature suggest that EFs capacities entail several key components, including flexibility, planning, monitoring, working memory, and inhibition (Ardila, 2008). Although a dynamic and flexible network involving several cortical and subcortical brain regions mediates EFs, there is a consensus that their main neural substrate is the prefrontal cortex (PFC) (Fuster, 2008). Specifically, the dorsolateral region of PFC is generally involved in classic EFs such as planning, problem-solving and some working memory operations, whereas the orbitofrontal region is more closely associated with the regulation of emotions and social behavior. Neuroscientific (Barkley, 2001) and comparative (Hills, 2011; Volter and Call, 2014) studies have dealt with the issue of the evolution of EFs. The evolution of EFs for the later PFC regions and their connections with language origins has been the subject of particular interest (Risberg, 2006). Some studies have suggested that the emergence of EFs occurred recently in the evolution of Homo sapiens (Ardila, 2008; Coolidge and Wynn, 2009). According to Coolidge and Wynn (2009) and Wynn and Coolidge (2007), modern humans evolved an enhanced working memory capacity that fostered EFs 32,000 years ago, enabling complex contingency planning, abstract reasoning and innovation. Ardila (2008) has proposed that EFs appeared 150,000 years ago in connection with the advent of language grammar. According to Ardila (2016), the temporal organization of behavior (the core function of EFs) comes from the perception of actions that is correlated with the grammatical ability to use verbs and represent these actions: Temporality means “before” and “after,” that is, something that changes, or develops or moves, that is, an action. (…) the “perception of actions” would represent a single preadaptation both for grammatical language and for meta-cognitive executive functions (Ardila, 2016, p. 2). In this paper, I advocate a different scenario for the phylogenesis of EFs and their connection with language evolution. By reviewing studies coming from Evolutionary Cognitive Archaeology (ECA), I suggest that EFs evolved in the context of toolmaking before the appearance of Homo sapiens. By virtue of this, I treat the issue of the relationship between EFs and language evolution in a different manner to the models that assigned a prominent role to grammar. I hypothesize that language could have had a narrative origin and that the study of the evolution of EFs together with the investigation of the role of EFs in language processing can corroborate this hypothesis.

LITHIC ANALYSIS AS A COGNITIVE SCIENCE: A FRAMEWORK

Research into the cognitive foundations of lithic technology has been increasingly prolific and productive over the last 30 years. However, Evolutionary Cognitive Archaeology (ECA) lacks an explicit theoretical framework. In this paper, I selectively review past work and propose a theoretical framework to open discussion amongst researchers. First, I distinguish between the two components of cognition: knowledge and the intelligent systems that make that knowledge possible. The chaîne opératoire approach provides a powerful method for describing and analyzing technical knowledge. Thomas Wynn's (1993) three-layer model of tool behavior provides a useful heuristic for organizing research into the underlying neurocognitive processes that make technical knowledge possible. Contemporary work by Wynn, Gowlett, Bril, Moore, Stout, and Uomini are placed within this framework. Notable findings are reviewed to describe the current state of knowledge in ECA. Without an adequate theoretical framework, ECA will continue to produce intriguing results without relating them to each other. It will also lack a medium within which to pose and resolve theoretical and empirical debates.

Artifactual Symbols: The Catalytic Role of Material Culture in the Emergence of Symbolic Thought

The emergence of symbolic representation during human evolution is a central topic for evolutionary cognitive archaeology. Symbols appear to be intimately related to the behavioral modernity that emerges in human groups after c.500,000 years ago. Archaeologists have traditionally applied theoretical conceptualizations of symbolic representation borrowed from semiotics or cognitive science. I argue that these concepts are not applicable in Pleistocene archaeology. In fact, they also neglect the essential characteristic of symbols: tangibility or potential tangibility. Symbols are artifacts. I propose an artifactual symbol concept. A focus on tangibility provides insight into how symbols scaffolded an enhancement of analytical thinking that ultimately supported the traits associated with behavioral modernity.

Hohlenstein-Stadel and the Evolution of Human Conceptual Thought

Cognitive neuroscience provides a powerful perspective on the brain and cognition from which archaeologists can begin to document the evolution of the human mind. The following essay uses the Hohlenstein-Stadel figurine as a starting point to demonstrate the two kinds of conclusion open to an evolutionary cognitive archaeology: first, describing features of the cognitive life-world at specific points in human evolution, in this case central Europe 32,000 years ago, and second identifying the evolutionary timing and contexts for specific cognitive abilities, in this case various components of concept formation. We argue that the abstract concept underpinning the Hohlenstein-Stadel figurine resulted initially from an effortful (attentive) linking of ‘animal’ and ‘person’ concepts via the working memory network of the frontal and parietal lobes. These ‘animal’ and ‘person’ concepts themselves were largely unconscious folk biological categories generated by a parietal network that had evolved earlier, probably by the time of the earliest Homo sapiens. These in turn rest on even older, basic ontological categories of ‘animate’ and ‘manipulable’ objects that are temporal lobe networks, and which evolved much earlier still, perhaps with the advent of Homo erectus.