Evolutionary Archaeologists Research Articles

Against Method

Against Method

Archaeology, biology, and borrowing: A critical examination of Geometric Morphometrics in Archaeology

Geometric Morphometrics (GM) is a method originally applied in Evolutionary Biology studies, using the analysis of change in size and shape in order to better understand ontogenetic sequences, phylogenetic relations, among other issues. The application of GM in archaeological materials has seen a sharp increase in the last decade, mostly associated with theoretical approaches from Evolutionary Archaeology. This is not an isolated case, since most methods used by Evolutionary Archaeologists have been borrowed from Biology, provoking discussion with regard to the future development of Evolutionary Archaeology and its methods (Lycett, 2015). This article aims to discuss some concepts that have been directly borrowed from the application of GM in Biological Sciences and that have not been subject to much thought when used in Archaeology. Such concepts include homology and landmark types, the concept of modularity, as well as the idea of allometry. As much as archaeologists using GM can learn from past discussions held by biologists regarding the above mentioned concepts, it is high time for archaeologists to further discuss ideas concerning the use of these concepts in archaeological studies.

The material dimensions of signification: Rethinking the nature and emergence of semiosis in the debate on human origins

The nature and emergence of “symbolic” material culture has long been at the forefront of the debate on modern human origins. For most evolutionary archaeologists, material signs are arbitrary artefacts that were produced by predefined brainbound representations. In reducing, however, material signification to linguistic terms, and attributing its creation to a representational mechanism, the “symbolic” paradigm commits a pair of serious category mistakes. For one, the significative meaning of material culture is not entirely arbitrary, because concepts can actually be founded on physical properties and affordances. Moreover, material signification is not the epiphenomenal product of innate cognitive modules, for the mind is not a computational device that processes internal representations before externalising them through behaviour.In this paper, I suggest that these theoretical fallacies about the nature and emergence of material signification can be overcome by combining a pragmatic semiotic theory with an enactive theory of cognition. Briefly put, a pragmatic semiotic theory describes the nature of material signification by recognising that significative concepts can be founded on physical qualities and relations, whereas an enactive theory of cognition accounts for the emergence of material signification by explaining how significative concepts are brought forth through the constitutive entwinement of mind and matter. Through the synergistic fusion of these theoretical tenets, the origins of material signification can be examined from an ontological perspective that treats the generation of significative meaning as the emergent product of material engagement. In its light, the preoccupation of most evolutionary archaeologists with the notion of “modernity” appears to be inherently problematic. It is therefore ultimately proposed that the dominant symbolic interpretation of material signification need be replaced with a pragmatic and enactive theory of cognitive semiotics that is suitably geared to trace the evolution of prehistoric material signs.

Cumulative Cultural Evolution and Demography

The idea that demographic change may spur or slow down technological change has become widely accepted among evolutionary archaeologists and anthropologists. Two models have been particularly influential in promoting this idea: a mathematical model by Joseph Henrich, developed to explain the Tasmanian loss of culture during the Holocene; and an agent-based adaptation thereof, devised by Powell et al. to explain the emergence of modern behaviour in the Late Pleistocene. However, the models in question make rather strong assumptions about the distribution of skills among social learners and about the selectivity of social learning strategies. Here I examine the behaviour of these models under more conservative and, on empirical and theoretical grounds, equally reasonable assumptions. I show that, some qualifications notwithstanding, Henrich’s model largely withstands my robustness tests. The model of Powell et al., in contrast, does not–a finding that warrants a fair amount of skepticism towards Powell et al.’s explanation of the Upper Paleolithic transition. More generally, my evaluation of the accounts of Henrich and of Powell et al. helpfully clarify which inferences their popular models do and not support.

A Unified Evolutionary Model of Archaeological Style and Function Based on the Price Equation

The style-function dichotomy lies at the heart of the evolutionary archaeology research program. It also is the source of much disagreement about how we should conceive of the processes of culture change. Evolutionary archaeologists tend to view archaeological attributes as either functional, if they respond to selection, or stylistic, if they do not. Others tend to see style and function as operating simultaneously. A resolution to this problem is proposed through development of a formal mathematical model of style- and function-based evolution using a hypothetical example of temporal patterns of ceramic decoration within a community of household-based potters. Simple replicator equations are proposed to describe the household-scale dynamics of change in the relative frequency of ceramic decoration. These low-level dynamics can be distinguished on the basis of whether or not change is correlated with some measure of performance, utility, or payoff. The replicator equations are then used to derive several versions of the Price Equation (Price 1970), a very general and powerful statement about total evolutionary change in any system. At this scale of analysis, total change is similarly partitioned into payoff-correlated (functional) and payoff-independent (stylistic) contributions and it is shown that these processes are likely to operate simultaneously. Tests of the model against simulated data show that it is possible to estimate with considerable accuracy the strength of functional and stylistic contributions to culture change under ideal conditions of site preservation. Further theoretical work is needed, however, to understand how diverse site formation and disturbance processes might impact application of the model in real archaeological settings.

Social constructionist approaches to the study of technology

My role in this exchange is to represent social constructionist approaches to the study of technology. This is not an easy task. Unlike behavioral archaeologists or evolutionary archaeologists, social constructionists do not subscribe to a common core of theory; indeed, some of those whom I cite here as social constructionists will probably not identify themselves as such. Under this umbrella I include: (1) advocates of technological style (e.g. Lechtman and Merrill 1977; Lechtman 1984; Childs 1991; Hosler 1994) and technological choice (e.g. Lemonnier 1992, 1993; Gosselain 1998); (2) proponents of practice theory (e.g. Dietler and Herbich 1998; Dobres and Hoffman 1999), agency (e.g. Dobres 2000; Dobres and Robb 2000) and materiality (Jones 2002) when applied to the study of technology; (3) much of ethnoarchaeology (David and Kramer 2001); and (4) some aspects of material culture studies (e.g. Lubar and Kingery 1993; Kingery 1996), archaeometry (e.g. Sillar and Tite 2000; Jones 2002), and industrial archaeology (e.g. Gordon 1988; Gordon and Killick 1993). Whatever else they may disagree over, all of those cited would approve of the following statements: first, that there is usually more than one technology that satisfies the minimum requirements for any given task; and, second, that the choice of a particular technology from a pool of satisfactory alternatives may be strongly influenced by the beliefs, social structure and prior choices of the society or group under study. Social constructionists reject explanations of technological change that invoke unseen hands such as selection, market forces, efficiency, adaptation or the inevitability of progress (Pfaffenberger 1992). For social constructionists, no explanation of an observed technological change is complete unless it relates the observed technology to the choices whether explicit or unconscious made by actual human beings, whether these be individuals or groups. It would be wrong to infer from this that social constructionists are necessarily 'antiscience'. (Some certainly are, but their views hold little of interest for archaeology.) Many social constructionist studies of technology are firmly grounded in evidence generated by techniques adapted from the sciences and engineering. The fact that these techniques provide excellent grist for the mills of humanistic interpretation is just beginning to be appreciated in British archaeology (e.g. Sillar and Tite 1999; Jones 2002), but has been advocated for more than two decades by historians and prehistorians of technology in north America (e.g. Smith 1982; Lechtman 1984; Gordon 1988) and France (see Lemonnier 1993; Petrequin et al. 2000 and citations to prior works therein). The claim by Dobres and Hoffman that 'it is archaeologists who have developed the most sophisticated and creative methodologies to study the empirical and physical dimensions of material

Evidence and Metaphor in Evolutionary Archaeology

Evolutionary theory and terminology are widely used in recent archaeological work, and many evolutionary archaeologists have argued that the integration of such theory and terminology is essential to the future of our field. This paper considers evolutionary archaeology from two perspectives. First, it examines substantive claims that archaeology can study the operation of Darwinian evolution, either through a reliance on optimal-foraging theory or by linking the process of natural selection to archaeological data. It concludes that there are serious problems with both of these claims on Darwin: the relation between evolution and foraging theory has never been documented, and midrange arguments linking selection and archaeological data are unsustainable. Second, it argues that archaeologists rely metaphorically on evolutionary terminology to help make sense out of archaeological data. Although the use of evolutionary metaphor can be, and has been, problematic, it also offers a powerful conceptual framework for our research. However, this framework is only of one of a number of comparable frameworks that have been offered to our field, as a comparison of systems archaeology and evolutionary archaeology shows.

Evaluating evolutionary archaeology

It has often been observed that archaeologists are adept at borrowing theory but not very good about building it. Analyses of the uptake by archaeologists of perspectives from a diversity of sources indicate that such borrowings rarely (if ever) lead to the building of archaeological theory. The return of explicit discussion of evolutionary theory within archaeology affords us the chance to explore whether the traditional pattern of borrowing is being repeated once again, and, if it is, to suggest some strategies which might help us to do better. The core of the paper comprises two case studies to support an argument that evolutionary archaeologists need to integrate the development of evaluation strategies into the process of theory building. These studies focus our attention on the need to reconcile interpretation and inference with the temporality of archaeological records, and provide good examples of how a serious consideration of problems that are revealed by this reconciliation can be a positive force in theory building.

On a Fundamental False Dichotomy in Evolutionary Archaeology: Response to Hurt, Rakita, and Leonard

My comments on evolutionary archaeology (EA) were not intended to address assumptions of the neutral model of style, but rather the readiness of evolutionary archaeologists to conclude that decorative variation is selectively neutral. In light of this misunderstanding, I welcome the opportunity to clarify my position on implications of my research for EA, as there was insufficient space in the original article to do more than hint at the issues raised by Hurt and her coauthors.

Evolutionary Archaeology: Methodological Issues.

What is the role of neo-Darwinian evolution in explaining variation in prehistoric behavior? Evolutionary Archaeology, a collection of nine papers from a variety of contributors, is the first book-length treatment of the evolutionists' position. All archaeologists, and especially those with a specific interest in method and theory, will find much here to challenge traditional theory, solidify the evolutionists' position, and stir further debate. Evolutionary archaeologists argue that Darwinian natural selection acts on human behavior, resulting in the persistence of alternative human behaviors and the material products of those behaviors. The contributors address the methodological requirements of evolutionary theory as it may apply to the nature of archaeological data. Several contributors evaluate the methodological implications of basic evolutionary principles, including the structure of explanations, the units of evolution and analysis, and the measurement of information transmission. Others explore the role of specific analytic approaches such as seriation, raw material sourcing, and comparative and engineering analyses. Still others confront the issue of reformulating archaeological problems from the point of view of evolutionary theory. By focusing on the methodological requirements of evolutionary theory, these essays go far in meeting the challenge of building new archaeological method. The work contributes to a better understanding of cultural evolution and builds toward a new, logical framework to explain variation in the archaeological record.