Evolution Of Spite Research Articles

Evolution of spite in an n-player game with an opting-out option

The evolution of altruism and spite is facilitated by positive and negative assortments, respectively. Animals repeatedly meet the same opponents and can choose to keep or terminate the interaction. Previous studies have showed that if the probability that the interaction stops depends on how the pairs are, then a positive assortment can emerge, encouraging the evolution of altruism in dyadic interactions and in interactions involving more than two individuals. In contrast, according to another previous study if the probability that the interaction stops depends on how the pairs are, then a negative assortment can emerge, encouraging the evolution of spite in dyadic interactions. Is the evolution of spite facilitated by interactions involving more than two individuals, in addition to dyadic interactions? The present study shows that the evolution of spite in interactions involving many individuals is possible by studying the repeated n-player game played using spiteful and nonspiteful strategies with opting-out options. These results suggest that spite in large groups may evolve through an opt-out mechanism. It also promotes the investigation about whether there are any examples of spiteful behavior in large groups that have evolved through negative assortment in opt-out options in nature.

Signals and Spite in Fluctuating Populations

Abstract Spite (in the biological or evolutionary sense) is behavior that harms others at a cost to the actor. The presence of spite in human and animal populations presents an evolutionary puzzle. Recent work has suggested small populations and pre-play signaling can have a significant effect on the evolution of spite. Here, we use computational methods to explore these factors in fluctuating populations that may go extinct. We find that the presence of spite can make a population significantly more likely to go extinct, but that this does not preclude the possibility of spite reliably evolving. Additionally, we find that the stochastic effects of small fluctuating populations allow for the evolution and predominance of signal-mediated conditional spite across a wide range of conditions. These results suggest that directed harm, even if costly, can play a significant early role in the evolution of social behaviors and this provides a possible origin for punishment.

The Evolution of Spite, Recognition, and Morality

Recognition of and responsiveness to the behavioral dispositions of others are key features of moral systems for facilitating social cooperation and the mediation of punishment. Here we investigate the coevolutionary possibilities of recognition and conditional social behavior with respect to both altruism and spite. Using two evolutionary models, we find that recognition abilities can support both spite and altruism but that some can only coevolve with spite. These results show that it is essential to consider harmful social behaviors as both a product of and an influence on the core features of our moral systems.

Correction for Johnstone and Bshary, Evolution of spite through indirect reciprocity

Correction for ‘Evolution of spite through indirect reciprocity’ by R. A. Johnstone and R. Bshary (Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 271 , 1917–1922. (doi: 10.1098/rspb.2003.2581)). The digital object identifier (doi) on the print version of this paper was incorrect. The correct version is doi:10.1098/rspb.2003.2581.

Relativity of Behavioral Interactions in Socially Structured Populations

Mammals form a variety of inter-individual associations within populations. Because associations between individuals usually are typified by different degrees of genetic correlations within and among groups, evolution of behaviors appropriate to each type will differ also. I reviewed alternative types of behavior and examined conditions favorable for the evolution of social groups. F -statistics are fundamental to evolution of social behaviors and estimation of spatial and temporal dynamics of gene frequencies. Therefore, mating and dispersal tactics within populations establish the genetic background which, in turn, influences selection of other behavioral characteristics. Because evolution of social behaviors is relative to proportions of gene diversity among groups, conditions favoring evolutionary change may remain relatively constant despite continuous losses in genetic variance over time. Evolution of spite and behaviors favoring family groups may be limited by low reproductive rates in many mammals. Low reproductive potential also may be a primary reason that many mammalian social groupings are formed among offspring of related families. Mating behaviors most conducive to the formation of inter-family social groups are discussed.