Evolution Of Punishment Research Articles

Evolution of Punishment in 21st Century: New Perspectives for Research

Evolution of Punishment in 21st Century: New Perspectives for Research

Overcoming Penal Boundaries: Exploring The Evolution of Retributive Time Through Parole Decision-Making

AbstractThe relations between sentencing and post-sentencing stages (e.g., the implementation of prison, parole or community-based sanctions) are often perceived through temporal, spatial and normative binaries. The static time of retributive calibration—as fully known at sentencing time—stands at the heart of this separation. Through qualitative findings drawn from parole-board chairpersons in Israel, the paper argues that retributive punishment may evolve with time. As the findings suggest, parole decision-makers often go beyond risk and rehabilitation and reframe, reinterpret and renegotiate the dimensions of the deserved punishment. Three temporally dynamic themes of retributive discourses were described: (1) unexpected suffering review; (2) moral character revaluation; and (3) diminished censure reassessment. The findings challenge both the static conceptualization of retributive time and the instrumental view of parole decision-making. More generally, the findings question the assumed strict boundaries between sentencing and post-sentencing stages and call for future scholarly engagement with the evolution of punishment over time.

EVOLUTION OF PUNISHMENT IN RUSSIAN CRIMINAL LAW:PROBLEMS OF CONSISTENCY AND IMPROVEMENT

The article analyzes the evolution of punishment in Russian criminal law and scientific doctrine. The article considers the dynamics of development and improvement of the definition of punishment in the Soviet and Russian criminal legislation. The refusal of punishment in punishment is analyzed, which is explained by the development of several trends of mitigation of punishment. Changes in many provisions on punishment confirm that this institution has a social and legal necessity and importance for society and the state. Is considered a long process of exclusion from the punishment uncharacteristic of regulations and the formation of the criminal code of legal structure, where the punishment has ceased to be an obligatory consequence of the crime, as embodied and other measures of criminal-legal nature, like legal consequences of the crime. The essence of criminal punishment is recognized as a historically variable category, since it is determined by the objectives of criminal policy implemented by the state. Punishment includes legal restriction of the person, its rights and freedoms, but it is caused by system interaction with other measures of criminal-legal character.

EVOLUTION OF PUNISHMENT IN RUSSIAN CRIMINAL LAW:PROBLEMS OF CONSISTENCY AND IMPROVEMENT

The article analyzes the evolution of punishment in Russian criminal law and scientific doctrine. The article considers the dynamics of development and improvement of the definition of punishment in the Soviet and Russian criminal legislation. The refusal of punishment in punishment is analyzed, which is explained by the development of several trends of mitigation of punishment. Changes in many provisions on punishment confirm that this institution has a social and legal necessity and importance for society and the state. Is considered a long process of exclusion from the punishment uncharacteristic of regulations and the formation of the criminal code of legal structure, where the punishment has ceased to be an obligatory consequence of the crime, as embodied and other measures of criminal-legal nature, like legal consequences of the crime. The essence of criminal punishment is recognized as a historically variable category, since it is determined by the objectives of criminal policy implemented by the state. Punishment includes legal restriction of the person, its rights and freedoms, but it is caused by system interaction with other measures of criminal-legal character.

No evidence for punishment in communally nursing female house mice (Mus musculus domesticus).

Punishment is claimed as an important mechanism to stabilise costly cooperation in humans, but its importance in social animals has been questioned recently due to both conceptual considerations and a lack of empirical evidence (only few published studies). We empirically tested whether there is evidence for punishment in communally nursing house mice (Mus musculus domesticus, direct descendants of “wild” animals). Communally breeding females pool their litters and raise all offspring together, indiscriminately caring for own and other offspring. Such a situation resembles a public good and provides scope for exploitation if females vary in their relative contributions to the joint nest (offspring number). We allowed two females to communally breed and conducted removal experiments both in the presence and absence of pups. We aimed to test whether reduced investment by one of the females (induced through separation from the partner and their combined offspring for 4 or 12 hours) leads to increased aggression by the other female after the reunion. We found no evidence for punishment, on the contrary, females increased socio-positive behaviours. The costs of losing a partner in a communally breeding species might be too high and hinder the evolution of punishment. Our findings add to a growing list of examples questioning the role of punishment in cooperating non-human animals and emphasise the importance of empirical testing of its assumptions and predictions.

The Effectiveness of Reward and Punishment in Spatial Social Games

Punishment and reward are usually regarded as two potential mechanisms to explain the evolution of cooperation especially among multiple participators. However, the performance of these two scenarios in spatial environment needs to be discussed. To figure out this issue, we resort to the [Formula: see text]-player Iterated Snowdrift Dilemma (ISD) game and Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game. More importantly, the evolution of punishment and reward in social network-structured populations has not been formally addressed. The numerical results show the equilibrium cooperation frequency can be influenced by cost-to-benefit ratio [Formula: see text], the punishment-to-benefit ratio [Formula: see text] and the reward-to-benefit ratio [Formula: see text]. And one intriguing observation is that under the same situation, the punishment is more effective than reward to the population. Then we further probe the effectiveness of neighborhood relationship to the cooperation, which is reflected by the random rewired probability [Formula: see text]. From the distribution of the four roles of the participator we can find that individuals can cooperate easily when they have close relationship. The results of this paper may be helpful to understand the cooperation in complex project or among industry–university–research cooperation project.

合作演化中的反馈机制

Explaining cooperative behaviors in biological and social systems is a fundamental and challenging problem. Evolutionary game theory provides a powerful framework addressing this issue. Costly punishment is proven to be a promising mechanism promoting cooperation by many experimental designs in the field of evolutionary game theory. We first give an introduction to cooperation and evolutionary games, and then review experimental and theoretical works on punishment, focusing on the evolution of punishment, its positive and detrimental effects on cooperation evolving. We further explore the dynamical influence induced by punishment evasion, and the effect of institutional punishment and reward on cooperation. Finally we summarize our conclusions and briefly outline directions for future research.

Observation enhances third-party punishment only among people who were not hot-tempered

The evolution of punishment toward norm-violators has been discussed for understanding a large-scale human cooperation. Recent studies showed that the presence of cues of surveillance makes people concern about their reputation and increase altruistic behavior. Recent study also suggests that explicit cues of observation affect punitive behavior. We examined whether both explicit (being observed by an experimenter) and implicit cues (drawing of stylized eyes) of observation enhance third-party punishment. The results of the experiments with Japanese participants showed that both type of cues of observation increased third-party punishment only among those who did not feel anger toward an unfair allocator. In contrast, the cues suppressed the punishment when participant felt stronger anger toward an allocator. Moderating effect of emotion is interpreted as a cultural norm of emotional expression. Our study suggests that we humans are endowed with the psychological system inducing third-party punishment in response to cues of being observed while its function may be moderated by cultural factors.

Sympathy and Punishment: Evolution of Cooperation in Public Goods Game

An important way to maintain human cooperation is punishing defection. However, since punishment is costly, how can it arise and evolve given that individuals who contribute but do not punish fare better than the punishers? This leads to a violation of causality, since the evolution of punishment is prior to the one of cooperation behaviour in evolutionary dynamics. Our public goods game computer simulations based on generalized Moran Process, show that, if there exists a 'behaviour-based sympathy' that compensates those who punish at a personal cost, the way for the emergence and establishment of punishing behaviour is paved. In this way, the causality violation dissipates. Among humans sympathy can be expressed in many ways such as care, praise, solace, ethical support, admiration, and sometimes even adoration; in our computer simulations, we use a small amount of transfer payment to express 'behaviour-based sympathy'. Our conclusions indicate that, there exists co-evolution of sympathy, punishment and cooperation. According to classical philosophy literature, sympathy is a key factor in morality and justice is embodied by punishment; in modern societies, both the moral norms and the judicial system, the representations of sympathy and punishment, play an essential role in stable social cooperation.

The evolution of punishment and apology: an iterated prisoner's dilemma model

Recently, behaviors that seem to function as punishment or apology have been reported among non-human primates as well as humans. Such behaviors appear to play an important role in maintaining cooperation between individuals. Therefore, the evolution of these behaviors should be examined from the viewpoint of the evolution of cooperation. The iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game is generally considered to be a standard model for the evolution of cooperation. In the present study, strategies accompanied by punishment-like attacks or apology-like behavior were introduced into the common IPD simulation. Punishment and apology were represented by the P signal and the AS signal given immediately after defection. A strategy with the P and AS signals, named the pPAS strategy, was proved to be an evolutionarily stable strategy under certain conditions. Numerical simulations were carried out according to different assigned values of the costs of punishment and apology. The simulations showed that pPAS could dominate the population (1) when the cost of giving P is relatively small, (2) when the cost of receiving P is relatively large, or (3) when the cost of giving AS is relatively large. The relative cost of giving AS had the clearest effect on the success of pPAS. pPAS can dominate the population even when a dominance asymmetry of the costs between two players was introduced. The present results suggest the possible evolution of social behaviors like punishment or apology as a means of maintaining cooperation.

The Evolution of Punishment

The Evolution of Punishment