Evolution Of Financial Institutions Research Articles

Study on the evolution of collaborative innovation in marine economy considering the participation of financial institutions and two types of cooperation

In the realm of significant technological research and innovation within the marine economy, enterprises and academic research institutions often grapple with a lack of innovation motivation due to financial constraints. This paper introduces the factor of "capital constraints" into the marine innovation chain, establishing a technological innovation chain within the marine economy. Utilizing a three-party evolutionary game model, the study delves into the strategy selection and evolution of financial institutions, marine enterprises, and academic research institutions. In contrast to previous studies, this paper categorizes technological innovation cooperation into two types: "cooperative tackling type" and "market-oriented promotion type." Additionally, it posits that collaboration between academic research institutions and marine enterprises establishes an implicit guarantee relationship, facilitating access to higher loan amounts for both parties. The research reveals that the behavior of governments and marine enterprises is influenced by the initial willingness of participants. Higher basic benefits of cooperation and innovation between academic research institutions and marine enterprises lead to a quicker attainment of an evolutionary stable state. Moreover, in collaborations between marine enterprises and research institutions, an excessively high proportion of funds occupied by marine enterprises proves disadvantageous. The paper suggests that pure market-oriented promotion innovation cooperation could serve as a supplementary approach to traditional cooperation and innovation. Finally, numerical examples are presented to elucidate the outcomes of the theoretical model, accompanied by policy suggestions.

The Remaking of Wall Street

This Article critically examines the transformation of the financial services industry during and since the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009. This transformation has been marked by the demise of the major investment banks and the related rise of a set of powerful players known as private equity firms. First, this Article argues that private equity firms now mirror investment banks in their mix of activities; ethos of entrepreneurialism, innovation, and risk-taking; role as “shadow banks”; and overall power and influence. These similarities might suggest that private equity firms pose financial risks similar to those caused by their now-defunct predecessors. But this Article suggests that private equity firms, as currently structured, are more financially stable and pose less systemic risk to the global economy. These firms are structured and funded in ways that may address the basic shortcoming that led to investment banks’ downfall – specifically, the use of short-term debt to fund longer-duration assets. It thus argues that, in the face of onerous post-Crisis reforms, Wall Street has evolved to displace investment banks with more financially resilient institutions. Importantly, however, the Article cautions that ongoing changes in private equity firms’ broker-dealer activities raise systemic concerns that require active regulatory monitoring. The Article also identifies systemic and financial stability concerns arising from the funds that these firms manage, particularly their hedge and credit funds, about which little detailed information is publicly available. Finally, the Article explores other implications of these developments, including for the effectiveness of post-Crisis regulation, the popular backlash against Wall Street, the incidence of misconduct, and the evolution of financial institutions.

The evolution of financial institutions in the Ottoman Empire, 1600–1914

For most of its 600-year existence, the economic institutions and policies of the Ottoman Empire were shaped to a large degree by the priorities and interests of a central bureaucracy. The influence of landowners, merchants and moneychangers remained limited. The central bureaucracy managed to contain the many challenges it faced with pragmatism, flexibility and negotiation. This study examines long-term changes in Ottoman fiscal, monetary and financial institutions from this perspective of pragmatism, flexibility and adaptiveness. Ottoman institutions of private and public finance retained their Islamic lineage until the end of the seventeenth century. European financial institutions began to grow in influence during the eighteenth century. With the onset of the Ottoman reform movement and greater economic interaction with Europe during the nineteenth century, institutional change accelerated. Ultimately, however, Ottoman pragmatism and flexibility remained selective and was utilised for the defence of a traditional order led by the central bureaucracy. Many of the key institutions of the traditional order such as state ownership of land, urban guilds and restrictions on private capital accumulation remained intact until the nineteenth century.

Reviews of Books

Reviews of Books

Governance and efficiency in emerging financial markets

This paper describes how the principles underlying the economics of governance may be useful in examining the evolution of financial institutions and the role of the state in the financial markets of developing and transitional economies. The concepts of allocational efficiency and market failure are shown to be useful in evaluating the efficiency with which financial functions are performed and in the design of regulatory policy. The social costs of active financial regulation are described in terms of the implementation of such regulation in the presence of endogenous information in financial exchange. A direction for future research is suggested, in which emphasis is placed on the resolution of market failure by private financial institutions through financial innovation and market creation. The paper, intended to suggest an agenda for future research in the regulation of emerging financial markets, is descriptive rather than technical and is explicitly intended for a wide audience of policy makers, in...

The Evolution of Financial Institutions and the Performance of the Economy

Jack Gurley punctured the pretensions of Friedmanian monetary theory some twenty-five years ago when he characterized it as holding that 6money is a veil, but when the veil flutters, real output sputters.' Gurley's words exposed the contradiction of monetarism-that money is neutral but that monetary changes are the main causal factors in the real income and employment changes of business cycles. The proposition that money is neutral and the axiom of reals that underlie neoclassical theory are inconsistent with the view that money matters in anything besides the determination of the nominal price level.2 Gurley's paradox was the inspiration for Robert E. Lucas's key neutrality-of-money paper. As is well known, the fundamental construct of the neoclassical tradition is a labor market represented by supply and demand curves in which the quantities supplied or demanded are functions of the real wage and employment. Lucas, and Milton Friedman before him, construct mechanisms by which those who supply and those who demand, interpret, or perceive nominal price and wage changes (which to both Lucas and Friedman are due to changes in the money supply) in different ways. Because of these imperfections, changes in the money supply will lead to changes in real output. In Lu

The Evolution of Financial Institutions and the Ineffectiveness of Modern Monetary Policy

The Evolution of Financial Institutions and the Ineffectiveness of Modern Monetary Policy

Comments on the Session on the Evolution of Financial Institutions

Comments on the Session on the Evolution of Financial Institutions

Two Decades of Evolution of Financial Institutions and Public Policy

Two Decades of Evolution of Financial Institutions and Public Policy