Everyday Moral Decision-making Research Articles

Neural correlates of everyday moral decision-making: An exploratory ScanSTRESS study.

Neural correlates of everyday moral decision-making: An exploratory ScanSTRESS study.

Dissociating the Multiple Psychological Processes in Everyday Moral Decision-Making with the CAN Algorithm.

In previous research frameworks, researchers used an everyday dilemma to test people's altruistic versus egoistic inclination. However, there are at least three different psychological processes that could induce altruistic over egoistic decisions, i.e., stronger altruistic sensitivity, weaker egoistic sensitivity, and stronger overall action versus inaction preference. To dissociate these different psychological processes, we developed new materials and applied the CAN algorithm from traditional moral dilemma research in two studies. In Study 1, we designed scenarios varying with a 2 (egoistic/non-egoistic) × 2 (non-altruistic/altruistic) structure. Then, we recruited 209 participants to validate the scenarios and filtered six scene frameworks with 24 scenarios in total. In Study 2, we recruited 747 participants to judge whether they would conduct behavior that is simultaneously altruistic (or non-altruistic) and egoistic (or non-egoistic) in the filtered scenarios obtained from Study 1. They also filled in the Social Isolation Scale, Distress Disclosure Scale, and some other demographic information. As we dissociated the psychological processes using the CAN algorithm, significant correlations between social isolation and distress disclosure and three parameters (i.e., altruistic tendency, egoistic tendency, and overall action/inaction preference) underlying the altruistic choice were revealed to varying degrees. Other individual differences in the psychological processes in everyday moral decision-making were further demonstrated. Our study provided materials and methodological protocols to dissociate the multiple psychological processes in everyday moral decision-making. It promotes our insights on everyday moral decisions from a differential psychological processes perspective.

The Relationship of Shopping-Related Decisions with Materialistic Values Endorsement, Compulsive Buying-Shopping Disorder Symptoms and Everyday Moral Decision Making.

Background: Compulsive buying-shopping disorder (CBSD) is associated with high materialistic values endorsement and excessive purchasing of consumer goods. A subgroup of individuals with CBSD engage in socially unacceptable behaviors to continue shopping despite negative consequences. This investigation aimed at exploring possible links between ego-oriented shopping-related decisions, materialism, symptoms of CBSD and close-to-everyday moral decision making. Methods: In study 1, patients with CBSD were interviewed to develop a list of conflict situations, capturing typical shopping-related dilemmas. In study 2, the shopping-related dilemmas from study 1, standardized close-to-everyday moral dilemmas, the Material Values Scale and Pathological Buying Screener were administered to a web-based convenience sample (n = 274). Results: The main effects of a moderated hierarchical regression analysis revealed an association of more ego-oriented shopping-related decisions with both higher materialistic values endorsement and more CBSD symptoms, but not with everyday moral decision-making. However, a more egoistic everyday moral decision making style moderated the effect of CBSD symptoms on ego-oriented shopping related decisions. Conclusions: The findings indicate that a more egoistic everyday moral decision making style is not directly linked to domain-specific shopping-related decision making but strengthens the link between symptoms of CBSD and ego-oriented shopping-related decisions.

Effects of gender and personality on everyday moral decision-making after acute stress exposure

Exposure to acute psychosocial stress has been shown to affect moral decision-making, though little is known about potential gender differences or effects of personality. In two within-subjects design studies, 179 healthy men and women (N = 99 in Study 1, N = 80 in Study 2) were exposed to the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) and a non-stress control condition (resting period) on two testing days in random order. After stress/resting, moral decision-making was assessed by the Everyday Moral Conflict Situations (EMCS) Scale (Singer et al., 2019), which requests altruistic versus egoistic responses to everyday moral conflict scenarios with varying closeness of target persons. We investigated effects of acute stress, social closeness, participants’ gender, and the a priori selected personality traits agreeableness, empathy, and social desirability on everyday moral decision-making. Despite high statistical power, we could neither confirm the hypothesized effects of acute stress nor social closeness on EMCS scores in both samples. However, our data revealed a prosocial impact of acute stress on everyday moral decisions rather in females than males as well as effects of agreeableness and social desirability. Salivary alpha-amylase (sAA) levels in Study 1 and cortisol levels in females in Study 2 were significantly correlated with higher EMCS scores after acute stress exposure. Additionally, lower anticipatory subjective stress responses were associated with more altruistic decisions. Moreover, we found positive relationships between hypothetical moral decision-making and real prosocial behavior (opportunity for a charitable donation). In sum, due to methodological differences compared to previous between-subjects design studies, it might not be justified to rule out effects of acute stress on everyday moral decision-making based on the current within-subjects results. Nevertheless, the present data suggest that specific personality traits like agreeableness might have a stronger impact on everyday moral decision-making than short term-exposure to acute stress.

Conflicting influences of justice motivations on moral judgments

ABSTRACT Humans are motivated by justice concerns, yet vary in their reactions to observing or experiencing injustice. At a proximate level, approach and avoidance represent core fundamental motivational systems which have been proposed to be involved in two independent moral systems: a prescriptive system responsive to obligations (“shoulds”) and a proscriptive system concerned with prohibitions (“should nots”). It is unclear whether these motivational systems or personal involvement better explain the influence of justice dispositions on moral judgments. To clarify this theoretical argument, two experiments examined how dispositional self-oriented and other-oriented justice sensitivity influence condemnation of prescriptive and proscriptive violations while manipulating perspective between-subject or within-subject. Participants rated the permissibility of everyday moral transgressions, from the perspective of the victim or a neutral observer. In Study 1 (n = 235), self-oriented dispositions increased and other-oriented dispositions decreased the probability of rating prescriptive violations as permissible. Study 2 (n = 468) replicated the effect of other-oriented justice sensitivity. Overall, these results bridge the gap between motivational systems and self-other processing. They suggest that justice sensitivity is better conceptualised as distinct motivations which can exert opposing influences on moral decision-making. Moreover, personal involvement may not be as important as individual justice motivations for explaining everyday moral decision-making.

Acute psychosocial stress and everyday moral decision-making in young healthy men: The impact of cortisol

In everyday life, moral decisions must frequently be made under acute stress. Although there is increasing evidence that both stress and cortisol affect moral judgment and behavior as well as decision-making in various domains unrelated to morality, surprisingly few attempts have been made to explore the effects of stress on everyday moral decision-making. Therefore, in the present study, we exposed 50 young healthy men to the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) or its non-stressful placebo version (PTSST). We investigated the impact of acute stress exposure and stress-related cortisol levels on decision-making, decision certainty, and emotions in 28 everyday moral conflict situations with altruistic versus egoistic response alternatives. Results showed that the TSST-exposed group made more altruistic decisions than the non-stress control group, while groups did not differ in decision certainty and emotion ratings. Moreover, in correlational as well as regression analyses, additionally controlling for confounding variables, we observed significant positive associations between cortisol levels and altruistic decision-making. Further analyses revealed that altruistic decisions came along with significantly higher decision certainty and significantly more positive emotion ratings than egoistic decisions. Notably, our data also raise the idea that the personality trait agreeableness plays an important role in everyday moral decision-making. In sum, our findings provide initial evidence that both acute stress exposure and cortisol levels have prosocial effects on everyday moral decision-making in young healthy men.

Acute psychosocial stress and everyday moral decision-making in young healthy men: The impact of cortisol

In everyday life, moral decisions must frequently be made under acute stress. Although there is increasing evidence that both stress and cortisol affect moral judgment and behavior as well as decision-making in various domains unrelated to morality, surprisingly few attempts have been made to explore the effects of stress on everyday moral decision-making. Therefore, in the present study, we exposed 50 young healthy men to the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) or its non-stressful placebo version (PTSST). We investigated the impact of acute stress exposure and stress-related cortisol levels on decision-making, decision certainty, and emotions in 28 everyday moral conflict situations with altruistic versus egoistic response alternatives. Results showed that the TSST-exposed group made more altruistic decisions than the non-stress control group, while groups did not differ in decision certainty and emotion ratings. Moreover, in correlational as well as regression analyses, additionally controlling for confounding variables, we observed significant positive associations between cortisol levels and altruistic decision-making. Further analyses revealed that altruistic decisions came along with significantly higher decision certainty and significantly more positive emotion ratings than egoistic decisions. Notably, our data also raise the idea that the personality trait agreeableness plays an important role in everyday moral decision-making. In sum, our findings provide initial evidence that both acute stress exposure and cortisol levels have prosocial effects on everyday moral decision-making in young healthy men.

Moral decision-making and theory of mind in patients with idiopathic Parkinson’s disease.

Cognitive impairments in theory of mind (ToM), executive processing, and decision-making are frequent and highly relevant symptoms in patients with Parkinson's disease (PD). These functions have been related to moral decision-making. Their association to moral decision-making in PD, however, has not been studied yet. It was hypothesized that moral decisions in patients with PD differ from those in healthy control participants, and that more egoistic decisions are related to ToM as well as executive dysfunctions in patients with PD. Nineteen patients with PD and 20 healthy control participants were examined with an everyday moral decision-making task, comprised of 10 low and 10 high emotional forced-choice moral dilemma short stories with egoistic and altruistic options. All participants received an elaborate neuropsychological test battery. Electrodermal skin conductance responses were recorded to examine possible unconscious emotional reactions during moral decision-making. The groups performed comparably in total scores of moral decision-making. Although ToM did not differ between groups, it was inversely related to altruistic moral decisions in the healthy control group, but not in patients with PD. Executive functions were not related to moral decision-making. No differences were found for skin conductance responses, yet they differed from zero in both groups. Our findings indicate that moral decisions do not differ between patients with PD and healthy control participants. However, different underlying processes in both groups can be presumed. While healthy control participants seem to apply ToM to permit egoistic moral decisions in low emotional dilemmas, patients with PD seem to decide independently from ToM. These mechanisms as well as neuropsychological and neurophysiological correlates are discussed.

Does stress alter everyday moral decision-making?

Recent studies in the field of neuropsychological decision-making as well as moral psychology emphasize the role of emotions in decision-making. The current study examines whether stress affects moral decision-making. We induced stress in 20 participants with the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) and also examined 20 participants in a control condition (Placebo TSST). The level of stress was assessed with questionnaires and endocrine markers (salivary cortisol and alpha-amylase). All participants performed a moral decision-making task in which everyday moral dilemmas were described. Dilemmas varied in emotional intensity and each offered a rather egoistic and a rather altruistic option. Results show that groups did not differ significantly in everyday moral decision-making. However, cortisol responses and egoistic decision-making in emotional dilemmas were positively correlated. Our results indicate that stress per se does not cause more egoistic decision-making in the current setting but suggest an association between the individual's cortisol stress response and egoistic decision-making in high-emotional situations.

Casuistry as bioethical method: an empirical perspective

This paper examines the role that casuistry, a model of bioethical reasoning revived by Jonsen and Toulmin, plays in ordinary moral reasoning. I address the question: ‘What is the evidence for contemporary casuistry's claim that every-day moral reasoning is casuistic in nature?’ The paper begins with a description of the casuistic method, and then reviews the empirical arguments Jonsen and Toulmin offer to show that every-day moral decision-making is casuistic. Finally, I present the results of qualitative research conducted with 15 general practitioners (GPs) in South Australia, focusing on the ways in which these GP participants used stories and anecdotes in their own moral reasoning. This research found that the GPs interviewed did use a form of casuistry when talking about ethical dilemmas. However, the GPs’ homespun casuistry often lacked one central element of casuistic reasoning — clear paradigm cases on which to base comparisons. I conclude that casuistic reasoning does appear to play a role in every-day moral decision-making, but that it is a more subdued role than perhaps casuists would like.