âthe view advanced by H. W. Everett (1957)âthat there simply is no reductionâquite fails to account for the actual phenomena of physics, which we may summarize as the appearance of reduction: namely, our experience of definite observations.â (Stein 1983, p. 573.)In an interesting recent paper, Geroch (1984) has sought to state the content of, âand to some extent to advocateâ a view toward quantum mechanics which is at least closely akin to the view advanced by Everett, known popularly (but, arguably, misleadingly) as the many-worlds interpretation. While sensitive to objections along the lines of that by Stein quoted above, Geroch believes that these can adequately be answered. The key to answering such objections is to argue that physics is not responsible for accounting for our experience of physical phenomenaâit is enough that it account for the physical phenomena themselves. It is this last argument that I wish to examine in this paper, both in general, and specifically in its application to Everett's interpretation of quantum mechanics.
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