Evaluation Assurance Level Research Articles

DEVELOPMENT OF PROTECTION PROFILE FOR SECOND-LEVEL E-KTP CARD READER BASED ON ISO/IEC 15408:2022 AND ISO/IEC TS 19608:2018

The second level e-KTP reader device is an electronic data reader device stored in the e-KTP chip by applying a verification device in the form of a fingerprint/face scan. The data stored in the e-KTP chip is personal data that is general and specific, as stated in Law Number 27 of 2022. Therefore, users of e-KTP readers as controllers and processors of personal data are obliged to prevent unauthorised access lawfully by using a security system reliably, safely and responsibly. Permendagri Number 76 of 2020 requires compliance with product standards by involving relevant K/L agencies in the security sector as a form of supervision. Based on BSSN Regulation 15 of 2019, implementing the evaluation process in Indonesia's common criteria scheme requires a Protection Profile document to support the evaluation of IT device security. However, there is no Protection Profile document for e-KTP reader devices that have been certified so that it can be used as a reference in developing IT devices to support the evaluation of IT device security. Therefore, in this study, developing Protection Profiles for e-KTP readers based on ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC TS 19608: 2018 was carried out to prepare functional security requirements and security guarantees by considering the protection of personal data. While the developing method used is based on ISO/IEC TR 15446:2017. The results of this study are preparing a Protection Profile document consisting of 25 functional security requirements to fulfil 8 device security objectives with a level of security assurance at Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 4. Then the design results are tested based on the Assurance Protection Profile Evaluation class (APE) ISO/IEC 18045:2022 and declared to meet the criteria based on the ISO/IEC 15408 series.

Hardware Trojan detection via rewriting logic

Hardware security studies, discovers, and classifies hardware attacks as well as defense strategies such as prevention and protection methods along the entire hardware production chain. Hardware Trojans represents a hardware attack model that emerged in the last decades in the hardware security community. In this paper, we present a methodology for achieving a scalable approach to detect hardware Trojans at the design stage using program transformation in a rewrite-based environment. We note that the hardware Trojan attack considered here assumes the vulnerability introduction during the hardware design stage while the payload is obtained as information leakage during the hardware usage. The main contribution in our work is the methodology correctness proof for a high security evaluation assurance level. We also benchmark the effectiveness of our methodology on industrial hardware designs, e.g., Advanced Encryption Standard cores, which is widely used and deployed for numerous devices and applications.

Формирование методологии разработки безопасного системного программного обеспечения на примере операционных систем

System software is a cornerstone of any software system, so building secure system software in accordance with requirements of certification authorities and state-of-the-art practices is an important scientific and technical problem. One of possible approaches to cope with the problem is to build a methodology for secure system software development including advanced scientific technologies and industry best practices. The paper presents current results achieved in building such methodology in the following directions. The first one is regulatory framework improvement including development of GOST R specifications defining requirements to formal models of access control policies and their formal verification. The second direction is design and verification of formal models of corresponding security functional requirements. The third direction is application of new and well established technologies of static and run-time analysis of systems software. The considered technologies include static analysis, fuzzing, functional and unit testing as well as testing the system software against formal models of its functional security requirements. The forth direction is development of methods for acquisition of results of all kinds of the analysis and for its analytical processing. All the directions are illustrated by practical examples of application of the methodology to development of Astra Linux operating system distribution that is certified according to the highest evaluation assurance levels.

Safety integrity level verification for safety-related functions with security aspects

Abstract The article is devoted some important issues of the functional safety analysis, in particular the safety integrity level (SIL) verification of safety functions to be implemented within the distributed control and protection systems with regard to cyber security aspects. The procedure for functional safety management includes hazard identification, risk analysis and assessment, specification of overall safety requirements and definition of safety functions. Based on risk assessment results the safety integrity level (SIL) is determined for consecutive safety function. These functions are implemented within industrial control system (ICS) that consist of the basic process control system (BPCS) and/or safety instrumented system (SIS). Determination of required SIL related to required risk mitigation is based on semi-quantitative evaluation method. Verification of SIL for considered architectures of BPCS and/or SIS is supported by probabilistic models with appropriate data and model parameters including cyber security-related and uncertainty aspects. A method based on quantitative and qualitative information is proposed for SIL verification with regard of the evaluation assurance levels (EAL), the security assurance levels (SAL) and the number of protection rings described in the SeSa methodology. A method for SIL verification, based on so called differential factor is presented.

Integrated functional safety and cyber security analysis

The chapter is devoted some important issues of the functional safety analysis, in particular the safety integrity level (SIL) verification of safety functions to be implemented within the distributed control and protection systems with regard to security aspects. A method based on quantitative and qualitative information is proposed for the SIL (IEC 61508, 61511) verification with regard of the evaluation assurance levels (EAL) (ISO/IEC 15408), the security assurance levels (SAL) (IEC 62443), and the number of protection rings described in the Secure Safety (SeSa-SINTEF) methodology. The proposed approach will be composed of the following items: process and procedure based safety and security management, integrated safety and security assessment of industrial control system (ICS) of the critical infrastructure.

How to Obtain Common Criteria Certification of Smart TV for Home IoT Security and Reliability

In the new era of IoT (Internet of Things), numerous gadgets and services include innovative IoT technologies that provide customers with convenience and improve their quality of life. Smart TVs are typical IoT devices that offer broadcasting services. However, they are susceptible to security intrusions via e-mail, media players, cameras, and internet connectivity. The frequency of hacking through malicious applications installed in Smart TV has rapidly increased. Therefore, appropriate countermeasures should be developed immediately. In April 2017, we (with LG electronics) received the ‘world-first’ Common Criteria EAL2 (Evaluation Assurance Level 2) certification for Smart TVs. As far as we know, no Smart TV has received a Common Criteria EAL2 security certification until now. This article describes our experience with the certification process and examines several security and reliability aspects of Smart TVs.

A Study on the Secure Software Development Life Cycle for Common Criteria (CC) Certification

Common Criteria (CC) is a global standard for the information technology security evaluation of IT products. IT products must obtain at least a certain Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) to be supplied to governmental institutions. The general software development life cycle (SDLC) does not provide guidelines for the removal of the weaknesses in the software development process for CC certification, and software applications developed with security weaknesses that have not been removed can lead to fatal situations. At present, CC provides only security certification for the target of evaluation (TOE) and does not provide guidelines regarding the secure software development life cycle (SSDLC), which considers the weaknesses in the development process. If a TOE that has been specialized for CC is developed by SSDLC, both evaluators and developers can undertake CC certification from an objective standpoint. This paper presents an SSDLC that is appropriate for CC by discerning weaknesses, by referring to MS-SDL, McGraw’s TouchPoints, and OWASP CLASP based on the weaknesses provided by CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration). The findings of this study can be used as guidelines for the development process of weakness-free software applications by developers aiming for CC certification.

Definition of Evaluation Assurance Levels and Estimation of Evaluation Efforts for ISO/IEC 19791 based Operational System

Advanced countries in order to protect a variety of IT environments for a variety of information security certification system (CC(Common Criteria), ISMS(Information Security Management System), PIMS(Personal Information Management System), CMVP(Cryptography Module Validation Program)) to be developed and applied. ISO/IEC 19791 cases, CC evaluation assurance level of assessment and is not defined otherwise be without. In this paper, Operation system will be introduced Evaluation of CC for certification based on the ISO/IEC 19791 Evaluation Assurance grade 7 to define the level of the relative workload was rated between each rating scale was calculated.

Security guideline tool for home users based on international standards

PurposeThe level of security of home information systems can be described as their capacity to resist all the accidental or deliberate malicious activities based on the evaluation assurance levels (EAL) as defined in international standards. The purpose of this paper is to propose a security guideline tool for home users based on the implementation of a protection profile (PP) for home user systems.Design/methodology/approachThe application was developed in three basic steps. First, a PP for home user systems was created on the basis of the international standard ISO/IEC 15408. Then, the paper created a knowledge base including the PP information, as well as a security policy including other international standards, as mentioned above. Finally, the paper created a web application tool to be used as a security guideline for home users.FindingsThis tool is developed in order to support users to understand the threats which affect their environment and select the appropriate security policy. By using this tool, users can access information about international standards in accordance to their level of knowledge.Research limitations/implicationsThe authors created a tool based on EAL4. In the future, tools based on EAL1, EAL2, and EAL3 can be created easily on the basis of the present model.Originality/valueThis PP specifies the security requirements for home user information technology (IT) environments, and makes use of the Department of Defense information assurance guidelines and policies as a basis for establishing the requirements necessary for meeting the security objectives. This PP is constructed for use as a reference for home users to create safe home IT environments. Operating systems evaluated against this PP can operate at EAL4.

Security Aspects in Verification of the Safety Integrity Level of Distributed Control and Protection Systems

Security Aspects in Verification of the Safety Integrity Level of Distributed Control and Protection SystemsThe article addresses some important issues of the functional safety analysis, namely the safety integrity level (SIL) verification of distributed control and protection systems with regard to security aspects. A quantitative method for SIL (IEC 61508) verification, based on so called differential factors, is presented. Taking into account SIL and the evaluation assurance level (EAL), which concerns the level of information security within entire system, two parametrical criterion function is defined for the SIL verification.

Developer-focused assurance requirements [Evaluation Assurance Level and Common Criteria for IT system evaluation

In 1999, the International Organization for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission jointly published the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security revaluation to provide IT security evaluation guidelines that extend to an international community. The assurance requirements, including prepackaged sets of Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) in the Common Criteria (CC), represent the paradigm that assurance equals evaluation, and more evaluation leads to more assurance. This paradigm is at odds with the commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) marketplace, neither reflecting how confidence is typically achieved nor providing a cost-effective means for supplying grounds for confidence in the security capabilities of the information technology being evaluated.

Understanding the windows EAL4 evaluation

On29 October 2002, Microsoft and Science Applications International Corporation issued press releases announcing that Windows 2000 with Service Pack 3 had received Evaluation Assurance Level 4 certification under the Common Criteria evaluation process. The Microsoft certification is sure to come up in many purchasing discussions over the next few years, so the question arises: What does this mean in plain English?.

Building an international security standard

The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation standard (CC) promises to replace scattered and often conflicting regional and national security standards. An emerging international standard, it is intended to support developers, evaluators and consumers of security products. The CC provides a framework to rate products by evaluation assurance level (EAL). Each EAL embodies a recommended set of assurance requirements: the higher the EAL, the more secure the product. You can use EALs to pick and choose which assurance requirements you want to satisfy. Think of the EALs as you would think of bandwidth or processor speed. Not everyone in your organization needs a dedicated T3 line or a 450 MHz desktop. Likewise, not every security product you use needs an EAL7 rating. The article shows how you, as a security products consumer, can use the CC to help determine if a given product meets your security needs. By rating different products according to their EALs, the CC can help you comparison shop and select an appropriately secure product. Further, the standard's international scope can help you integrate your system's security components with those in other countries-whether those components belong to customers, vendors, or other divisions of your own enterprise.