European Union's Democratic Deficit Research Articles

Failing backward? EU citizenship, the Court of Justice, and Brexit

ABSTRACT Developments in European Union (EU) citizenship rights meet expectations of the ‘failing forward’ framework that fuses insights from liberal intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist integration theories, whereby member state disagreements produce an incomplete form of EU citizenship that fails to treat individuals equally. Legal challenges to discriminatory treatment fit neofunctionalist expectations, with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) extending social rights for EU citizens incrementally. Resulting tensions between the evolution of rights and intergovernmental contestation fuels ‘failing forward’ in the form of the de-coupling of law and practice. Despite their limited impact, expanding rights sparked politicization that suggests postfunctionalist failures of European solidarity and declining trust in the ECJ. Most damaging to integration, however, is the lack of voting rights in national elections for mobile EU citizens, which (1) enabled the British exit (Brexit) crisis, an outcome of ‘failing backward’ and (2) persists as a serious EU democratic deficit.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Its Critics

AbstractThis introduction sets the stage for a special issue devoted to evaluating the contribution and continued relevance of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) – a theory first formulated 25 years ago in this journal – in today's politicized and crisis‐ridden European Union (EU). We review the debates prompted by LI's three core claims about national preference formation, intergovernmental bargaining and institutional choice, as well as by the theory's three policy‐relevant corollaries relating to the EU's democratic deficit, its constitutional settlement and its role in the world. Liberal intergovernmentalism, we argue, remains highly relevant in today's EU, offering important insights and serving to structure much of the academic debate about the prospects of the Union in a time of crisis. Nevertheless, a revitalized LI faces the dual challenges of theorizing both the causes and consequences of mass politicization of EU politics, as well as the prospect of endogenous change in the direction of greater integration or disintegration.

The European Union democratic deficit: Substantive representation in the European Parliament at the input stage

The analysis compares voters' preferences in economic policy to political parties' economic written parliamentary questions during the 2009–2014 term of the European Parliament. The corpus of over 55,000 written questions was ideologically scaled via crowdsourcing. The analysis shows that parties are unresponsive to second-order and to disengaged voters. The results also suggest that there is no upper class bias in European Parliament political representation. The data highlight a strong tendency of EP7 political parties to cluster around the position of the average European voter, at the expense of their average supporter. The democratic deficit is therefore at most a pluralism deficit in the European Parliament, since substantive representation in the European Parliament is successful as far as the majoritarian norm is concerned.

Europe’s Other Democratic Deficit: National Authoritarianism in Europe’s Democratic Union

This article argues for a radical recasting of the European Union democratic deficit debate. Critics have long argued that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit and that growing EU power undermines national democracy. But recent backsliding on democracy and the rule of law in Hungary and Poland reminds us that grave democratic deficits can also exist at the national level in member states and that the EU may have a role in addressing them. This article will place the EU’s struggles with democratic deficits in its member states in comparative perspective, drawing on the experience of other democracies that have struggled with pockets of subnational authoritarianism. Comparative analysis suggests that considerations driven by partisan politics may allow local pockets of autocracy to persist within otherwise democratic political unions.

Does Banking Union Worsen the EU's Democratic Deficit? The Need for Greater Supervisory Data Transparency

AbstractDoes banking union exacerbate the European Union's democratic deficit? Using Scharpf's ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy concepts, it is argued in this article that its design does worsen the democratic deficit. There are good reasons to limit ‘input legitimacy’ for politically independent institutions. ‘Output legitimacy’ is then even more relevant. Transparency is a key part of ‘output legitimacy’. It enables actors to judge whether the regulator is acting in the public's interest and can improve their outputs. This article focuses on the banking data that the supervisors collect. Data available to the European public is evaluated and compared to America's banking union. European practices are not comparable in terms of availability or detail. An original survey of relevant officials is conducted, which results in the finding that only 11 of 28 Member States release any information on the banks they supervise. Both EU and national supervisors should provide publicly available, timely and consistent individual bank data.

Who lobbies the European Union? National interest groups in a multilevel polity

What explains variation across national interest groups in their amount of lobbying on legislative proposals in the European Union (EU)? We present an argument that leads to the expectation that resource-rich associations engage in more lobbying on EU legislation than other associations. Moreover, we expect business associations to have privileged access to the European Commission and national governments; and citizens' groups to parliaments. Using original data from a survey of 1,417 interest groups in Germany, Ireland and Spain, we find support for these expectations. We conclude that national associations are heavily involved in EU lobbying, but that resource-endowment and type matter for access. The article is of relevance to the literatures on interest groups in the EU, the EU's (alleged) democratic deficit, and the role of civil society in governance beyond the nation state.

The Case for Demoicracy in the European Union*

AbstractThe debate on the European Union's democratic deficit usually operates within a national‐democratic framework of analysis. This article argues for a change in methodology. It follows the thesis that the EU is a ‘demoicracy’– a polity of multiple demoi– and has to be evaluated as such. Core principles of demoicracy are developed and the EU is assessed accordingly. Such an evaluation is not only more adequate, but also provides original insights: it is found that, whereas the constitutional development of the EU has approached demoicratic standards in general, major deficits remain at the national level.

Representativity, Civil Society, and the EU Social Dialogue: Lessons from the International Labor Organization

This article addresses the representativity questions that arise from the formal insertion of private, functional groups within the European Union (EU) governance, via the EU social dialogue. It depicts the debate regarding the representation gap of the EU social dialogue, and its implications on the regulatory autonomy of the social partners, and suggests that important lessons can be learned through the examination of another institutional context in which similar questions have been raised and addressed: the International Labor Organization (ILO) tripartite structure. In addition, it ascertains that the issue of representativity of the EU social partners would further benefit from viewing it in the broader context of the EU democratic deficit. The article concludes that such an analysis underscores the need to rethink the current understanding of representativity in the EU social dialogue. In particular, it considers the benefits and disadvantages of expanding the notion of representativity to encompass the internal structural mechanisms of the EU social partners.

Representativity, Civil Society, and the EU Social Dialogue: Lessons From the International Labor Organization

This article addresses representativity questions that arise from the formal insertion of private, functional groups within the European Union (EU) governance via the EU social dialogue. It depicts the representativity debate at the EU social dialogue and suggests that important lessons can be learned through the examination of another institutional context in which similar questions have been raised and addressed: the International Labor Organization (ILO) tripartite structure. In addition, it ascertains that the issue of representativity of the EU social partners would further benefit from viewing it in the broader context of the EU democratic deficit. The article concludes that such an analysis underscores the need to rethink the current understanding of representativity in the EU social dialogue. In particular, it considers the benefits and disadvantages of expanding the notion of representativity to encompass the internal structural mechanisms of the EU social partners.

Taxation and democracy in the EU

Is corporate tax competition a threat to democracy in the European Union (EU)? The answer depends crucially on a positive analysis of the effects of tax competition on national policy autonomy. Most analyses focus on direct effects on corporate tax rates and revenues. We contend that this focus is too narrow. It overlooks the fact that corporate tax competition also has important indirect effects on the progressivity and revenue-raising potential of personal income taxation. We elaborate on these indirect effects theoretically and empirically, and explore the implications for the normative debate on the EU's democratic deficit. Our findings show that European integration can constrain national redistribution in a major way: the democratic deficit is real. Greater political contestation over the EU's policy agenda is desirable in order to mitigate this deficit.

Challenging Habermas' response to the European Union democratic deficit

Jürgen Habermas' response to the European Union democratic deficit calls for a minimal threshold of democratic legislation through an explicit constitutional founding. He defends a model of freedom as autonomous self-determination by proposing to tie basic rights in the EU to a univocal form of European-wide popular sovereignty. Instead of constructing a common European political identity, I appeal to the novel democratic potential of institutions in the EU such as the Open Method of Coordination for mediating overlapping sovereignties in accord with freedom as non-domination. The concluding example of basic rights to effective participation for immigrants and permanent minorities illustrates the strengths of Iris Young's and James Bohman's republican views of non-domination over Habermas' call for a European-wide collective willing.

Assessing EU strategies for publicity

This article shows why European Union (EU) strategies to improve democratic legitimacy by strengthening its publicity have (unnecessarily) failed. Due to an ‘under-theorized’ image of democracy, the institutional means chosen are inappropriate to draw the expected public attention and as a consequence most of the aims pursued. Most notably, it misses (in accordance with most of the literature on the EU's democratic deficit) the important distinction between mere transparency and publicity: for improving democratic legitimacy it is not enough for political acts and processes to be published (to be transparent), they also have to be sufficiently perceived by European citizens. This holds true for any democratic theory, even if there are differences in their specific expectations of publicity.

The European Union Democratic Deficit

I outline the current debate over the European Union democratic deficit in terms of differing methodological approaches towards the realization of freedom and basic rights to political participation. Federalists opt for a model of freedom as noninterference and autonomous self-determination by proposing to tie basic rights in the EU to a univocal form of European-wide popular sovereignty. Although skeptics argue that the EU lacks the fundamental basis for such European-wide democratic self-determination, they ultimately defend a similar view of freedom as noninterference with their appeal to the collective will of the member states. Democratic revisionists instead point to the novel democratic potential of institutions in the EU such as the Open Method of Coordination for mediating overlapping sovereignties. I conclude using the example of basic rights to effective participation for immigrants and minorities to illustrate the strengths of the revisionist view over views that appeal to the principle of subsidiarity.

Parliament and the Democratization of Foreign Policy: The Case of Australia's Joint Standing Committee on Treaties

There is little agreement about the degree to which parliamentary institutions can help overcome the democratic deficit in global governance. While much of the literature on the European Union's democratic deficit focuses on reforming parliament, most commentary on the subject in global governance and foreign policy holds out little hope that national parliaments could be used to mitigate the effects of the internationalization of public policy. This article examines the case of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT), established by the Australian government in 1996 in an explicit attempt to use parliamentary reform to address the democratic deficit. Although JSCOT was highly active, it did not significantly change the way in which Australian national positions in international negotiations were arrived at; the democratic deficit created in Australia by increasing internationalization has not been mitigated by the creation of this committee. While the JSCOT initiatives might have been motivated by the concerns of the government of John Howard to overcome the democratic deficit, the way in which JSCOT actually evolved departed considerably from those original intentions. Ironically, JSCOT evolved in ways not dissimilar to the evolution of NGO consultation in Canada in the 1990s: as a tool of political management, a means by which the government could channel protest, deflect opposition, and in essence legitimize its own policy preferences.

European democracy and its critique

After presenting a ‘standard version’ of the European Union's democratic deficit thesis, the European democratisation debate is broadened in four directions. First, the issue of demos and the political boundaries of the Union is considered, presenting competing notions of European peoplehood. Then European governance is presented as taking one of three forms: international, supranational and/or infranational. A differentiated democratic discourse is proposed to reflect the multiple‐form governance of the Union. The notion of democracy itself is then subjected to the same differentiated approach with a brief examination of various models of democracy and of the insight they can offer to European governance. Finally, the issue of Union competences ‐ as a form of disaggregating power ‐ is introduced as an important element in the democratisation debate.