European Union Fisheries Research Articles

A roadmap to reduce the risk of overexploiting EU marine living resources in a changing ocean

We provide a balanced overview of how risk assessment and management is being tackled in the European Union (EU) and beyond to address the challenges of overexploiting marine living resources in EU waters. We aim to guide EU fisheries and aquaculture policymakers towards key actions to foster the transition to responsible, sustainable, clean energy, and resilient fisheries and aquaculture sectors, aligning with EU environmental objectives under the European Green Deal and the Common Fisheries Policy. Despite progress in reducing fishing pressure on some stocks in recent years, most of the stated (single-stock) sustainability objectives still need to be met. The risk of overexploiting marine resources remains high, especially when combined with other pressures such as pollution and climate change. Risk is defined as the probability of an adverse event arising from natural or human activities and excessive pressures. Scientists have documented these pressures, proposing regional risk assessments to support adequate risk-based management of human activities impacting marine and coastal regions. As a next step, we recall actionable short- to long-term recommendations to reduce the risks associated with exploiting these natural resources and ensure their sustainability and resilience. This includes actions the EU can take to improve and implement fisheries policy while prioritising less harmful alternatives among current fishing methods and considering the three pillars of sustainability i.e. environmental, economic and social. Such actions include capturing in scientific advice the strong, causal links between pressures induced by human activities, natural disturbances and ecosystem states; such understanding can be used in an uncertain and changing environment, with ocean productivity possibly trending towards new levels. Finally, we restate that conserving by reducing pressures and restoring the integrity of marine ecosystems is crucial for minimising the risk of overexploitation and ensuring future fishing and farming opportunities. This is the aim of an Ecosystem Approach to fisheries and aquaculture – it should safeguard the long-term economic and social capital already invested by the public and private sectors in exploiting marine living resources to continue delivering healthy, low-carbon, low-impact seafood to EU citizens and beyond.

Aligning top‐down and bottom‐up modes of governance? How EU Fisheries Local Action Groups support small‐scale fisheries and coastal community development in Sweden

AbstractSmall‐scale fisheries and coastal communities experienced dramatic downward trends over recent decades impacting rural development on European coastlines. Fisheries governance in the European Union (EU) follows exogenous top‐down regulations steering fishing practices through detailed regulations. In contrast, the EU's structural funding system of Fisheries Local Action Groups (FLAGs) involves an endogenous approach consisting of more participatory bottom‐up processes. This article explores these approaches by investigating the capacity of Swedish FLAGs to support small‐scale fisheries and coastal communities. Using document analyses and interviews, we show that, in principle, the FLAG approach has the capacity to support local fisheries developments and to foreground small‐scale fisheries interests in combination with community interests. However, the unique Swedish FLAG experience reveals a diminished scope for including small‐scale fisheries’ and coastal communities’ interests on a structural basis. The Swedish FLAG experience, we conclude, mirrors a path‐dependent trajectory of marginalisation and disempowerment of local fisheries interests hampering the potential of endogenous development.

Knowing the fishery to know the bycatch: bias-corrected estimates of harbour porpoise bycatch in gillnet fisheries.

Incidental captures (bycatch) remain a key global conservation threat for cetaceans. Bycatch of harbour porpoise Phocoena phocoena in set gillnets is routinely monitored in European Union fisheries, but generally relies on data collected at low spatio-temporal resolution or over short periods. In Denmark, a long-term monitoring programme started in 2010 using electronic monitoring to collect data on porpoise bycatch and gillnet fishing effort at a fine spatial and temporal scale, including time and position of each fishing operation, together with every associated bycatch event. We used these observations to model bycatch rates, given the operational and ecological characteristics of each haul observed in Danish waters. Data on fishing effort from the Danish and Swedish gillnet fleets were collected to predict fleet-wide porpoise bycatch in gillnets at regional level. Between 2010 and 2020, yearly total bycatch averaged 2088 animals (95% Cl: 667-6798). For the Western Baltic assessment unit, bycatch levels were above sustainability thresholds. These results demonstrate that fishing characteristics are key determinants of porpoise bycatch and that classical approaches ignoring these features would produce biased estimates. It emphasizes the need for efficient and informative monitoring methods to understand possible conservation impacts of marine mammal bycatch and to implement tailored mitigation techniques.

Comparative analysis of first and second stage data envelopment approaches: Performance of marine capture fisheries in the European Union

AbstractI explored harvest productivity and economic efficiency of marine fisheries across European Union member states using comparative first and second‐stage data envelopment analyses, linear programming, and econometric models, based on a panel data set of technical, social, and economic data between 2008 and 2020 when the first implications of the global Covid‐19 outbreak began in the European Union. During the period, harvest productivity increased for 52 percent of the 21 member states between 2008 and 2020, with an average economic efficiency of 0.76. The economic efficiency and harvest productivity of European Union member states' fisheries fluctuated, with noticeable declines throughout the study period. Gross domestic product per capita, population size, and aquaculture production were related to performance metrics. The results are aimed to guide European Union fisheries managers to better understand how improvements in harvest productivity and economically efficient performance are achieved without constant reliance on subsidization, over‐allocation, and overexploitation.

Turbot Survivability, Catches and Gillnet-Caused Injuries. Scientific Support for the Exemption from the Landing Obligation in EU Black Sea Countries

The European Common Fisheries Policy aims to gradually eliminate discards in all European Union fisheries through the introduction of a landing obligation for all catches of species subject to catch limits (turbot and sprat for the Black Sea). In 2016, the Commission established a discard plan for turbot fisheries in the Black Sea, that provided for a survivability exemption of turbot caught with bottom-set gillnets, applied from 1 January 2017 until 31 December 2019. Subsequently, Romania and Bulgaria submitted an updated Joint Recommendation to the Commission, requesting the renewal of the discard plan and the survivability exemption based on the high survival rates of this species. The Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) acknowledged the existence of data demonstrating the high survivability of turbot caught by vessels from non-EU countries using the same gears, however they requested that Member States concerned should submit additional data on survival estimates relating to the gillnet fishery for turbot. In this context, NIMRD “Grigore Antipa“ was commissioned by the Romanian National Agency for Fisheries and Aquaculture (NAFA) to perform a pilot study aiming at obtaining scientific evidence for the exemption of turbot from the landing obligation, carried-out during January-April 2022. Scientific fishing was performed in the Romanian marine area with specialized gears - turbot gillnets on board of NIMRD’s boat. The methodology consisted of launching the gillnets in established locations and recovering them after a soaking time depending on weather conditions. After each operation to recover the nets from the water, all turbot specimens caught were retained on board, parked in a fiber-reinforced polymer (FRP) container filled with seawater and equipped with an aeration system. The specimens were kept in the tank for 1 hour, during which time they were monitored from the point of view of their condition (dead, alive, injuries, other negative effects produced by the fishing gear). Subsequently, all turbot specimens declared viable were released back into the sea. The results indicate high survivability rates of turbot caught in gillnets (81.67%). Some injuries were reported in the dead specimens, probably caused by the mechanical action of the gear.

Enhancing onboard post-catch vitality of discard Norway lobster (Nephrops norvegicus) for more sustainable Mediterranean trawl fishery

The current European Union fisheries policy encourages improving handling practices to increase the survival of discards. Trawling on the Mediterranean upper slope often generates over 30% of discards of the total catch. Among other species, Nephrops norvegicus juveniles are abundantly returned to the sea, sometimes exceeding 40% of discarded biomass. N. norvegicus discard survival probability has been recently shown to be related to vitality on board and to vary seasonally, being especially low during the summer (0.06). Environmental characteristics (especially, high on-deck temperature in summer) make it necessary to improve vitality on board in order to increase discard survival. We therefore tested new discard handling methodologies for a Mediterranean mixed trawl fishery, with N. norvegicus as the target species. The results showed a survival rate on board higher than 0.8 resulting from vitality status improvements achieved by immersing N. norvegicus in cooled seawater on board during the catch selection and discard time. The implementation of this method would make an important contribution to more sustainable Mediterranean trawl fisheries.

Ten lessons on the resilience of the EU common fisheries policy towards climate change and fuel efficiency - A call for adaptive, flexible and well-informed fisheries management

To effectively future-proof the management of the European Union fishing fleets we have explored a suite of case studies encompassing the northeast and tropical Atlantic, the Mediterranean, Baltic and Black Seas. This study shows that European Union (EU) fisheries are likely resilient to climate-driven short-term stresses, but may be negatively impacted by long-term trends in climate change. However, fisheries’ long-term stock resilience can be improved (and therefore be more resilient to increasing changes in climate) by adopting robust and adaptive fisheries management, provided such measures are based on sound scientific advice which includes uncertainty. Such management requires regular updates of biological reference points. Such updates will delineate safe biological limits for exploitation, providing both high long-term yields with reduced risk of stock collapse when affected by short-term stresses, and enhanced compliance with advice to avoid higher than intended fishing mortality. However, high resilience of the exploited ecosystem does not necessarily lead to the resilience of the economy of EU fisheries from suffering shocks associated with reduced yields, neither to a reduced carbon footprint if fuel use increases from lower stock abundances. Fuel consumption is impacted by stock development, but also by changes in vessel and gear technologies, as well as fishing techniques. In this respect, energy-efficient fishing technologies already exist within the EU, though implementing them would require improving the uptake of innovations and demonstrating to stakeholders the potential for both reduced fuel costs and increased catch rates. A transition towards reducing fuel consumption and costs would need to be supported by the setup of EU regulatory instruments. Overall, to effectively manage EU fisheries within a changing climate, flexible, adaptive, well-informed and well-enforced management is needed, with incentives provided for innovations and ocean literacy to cope with the changing conditions, while also reducing the dependency of the capture fishing industry on fossil fuels. To support such management, we provide 10 lessons to characterize ‘win-win’ fishing strategies for the European Union, which develop leverages in which fishing effort deployed corresponds to Maximum Sustainable Yield targets and Common Fisheries Policy minimal effects objectives. In these strategies, higher catch is obtained in the long run, less fuel is spent to attain the catch, and the fisheries have a higher resistance and resilience to shock and long-term factors to face climate-induced stresses.

Towards the integration of ecophysiology with fisheries stock assessment for conservation policy and evaluating the status of the Mediterranean Sea.

Recent European Union (EU) regulations have been introduced to discourage the capture of undersized specimens with the aim of reducing the bycatch mortality imposed by commercial fisheries. We argue that we still lack accurate data regarding basic information required to properly implement these regulations for most Mediterranean ecosystems, including the true mortality imposed by fisheries, escape rates from fishing gears and the capability of specimens to survive following discard. We suggest that additional reliance on physiological biomarkers could assist in all aspects of the data collection required to support implementation of the EU discard ban (aka landing obligation), particularly in determining which species should receive special dispensation from this policy. Ideally, this new approach, here termed the ‘Fisheries Environmental and Physiological Stress Analysis’ (FEPSA), would become an important step for any fish stock assessment within the ecosystem approach to fisheries management and the recognition of Good Environmental Status, as established by the EU in the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (2008/56/EC). In particular, the main goal of FEPSA would be applying the study of physiological stressors to exploited stocks to estimate the so-called collateral fishing mortality, which includes the mortality experienced by fish that escape after interacting with fishing gears or that are discarded, with some degree of injury or physiological stress. The approach outlined here, which is described for bottom trawls but adaptable to any other type of fishing gear, is not a trivial undertaking but is a requirement for collecting the data required by recent EU fisheries policies. While we agree that the threats to marine biodiversity posed by fishing and associated discard practices require strong policy interventions, we emphasize that the research programs needed to support such initiatives, including the landing obligation, should be given equal priority. This is particularly true for Mediterranean fisheries, which are at a complex intersection of jurisdictional boundaries, numerous additional ecosystem threats including widespread pollution, thermal variation and hypoxia, and are historically understudied as compared to fisheries and species in more northern climates.

Strengthening European Union fisheries by removing harmful subsidies

Harmful fisheries subsidies have historically contributed to fleet overcapacity and continue to be allocated to the fishing industry to artificially maintain its profitability. However, in this contribution we show that removing harmful subsidies and reducing overfishing will help to recover the resource biomass, subsequently leading to increased levels of sustainable catches, income and well-being of fishers, and reduces inequities in income and consumption when fish stocks are not effectively managed. Maintaining harmful fisheries subsidies is socially and economically inefficient. Taking the example of the EU fishing fleet, one of the largest fishing fleets in the world, we use the total factor productivity to show that small-scale fishing fleet's productivity is almost two-fold in the North Atlantic and 16% higher in the Mediterranean and Black seas compared to large-scale vessels. This result is explained because the harmful fisheries subsidies disproportionately allocated to large-scale vessels introduce distortions in the efficient allocation of inputs. With critical WTO negotiations ongoing regarding the global rules on fisheries subsidies, the EU must take advantage of the opportunity to lead a desirable transformative change while also supporting developing nations to truly achieve global sustainable and equitable fisheries.

The role of production factors on landings heterogeneity between EU countries

Distribution of natural resources is considered to be a key aspect in ensuring the success of conservation policies. The Common Fisheries Policy, implemented by the European Union (EU), is an example of long-term international cooperation for sustainability of the marine environment. Nonetheless, continued enforcement of the policy is threatened by its insufficient effectiveness in restoring fish stocks and the tensions that have arisen over unequal distribution of benefits. Recent adoption of the Blue Growth Strategy represents an additional challenge for EU fisheries, since it encourages new alternative economic activities. The present analysis aims to identify ways of enhancing the sustainability of EU fisheries while achieving greater equity in resource distribution and maintaining the activity of the fishing industry, an important staple of many coastal communities in the EU. To this end, the study decomposes heterogeneity amongst per capita landing rates of EU Member States. A number of findings from the decompositions used may be highlighted. Firstly, most of the heterogeneity in per-capita landing rates between Member States occurs within the main EU fishing areas, especially FAO Areas 27 and 37. Secondly, fishing production factors affect per-capita landing heterogeneity to a different extent in Areas 27 and 37. The only exception is the number of fishers, the factor contributing most to heterogeneity in both areas. Technological factors appear to diminish heterogeneity in Area 27 whilst positively contributing to heterogeneity in Area 37. More efficient fleet adjustments could be designed taking into account these contributions by production factors to heterogeneity within fisheries.

The unintended impact of the European discard ban

Abstract The European Union (EU) discard ban, called the landing obligation (LO), was initiated in 2015 to reduce unwanted catches by EU fisheries. To ease the transition to a system where total allowable catches (TACs) refer to catches rather than landings only, the majority of EU TACs was increased to account for the part of the catch that was previously discarded and would now be landed. The analysis shows an average annual upward adjustment of 36% in TACs since 2015, but these percentages were considerably higher in 2019 and 2020 (reaching 43 and 50%, respectively), when the LO was fully applicable to all fisheries, and particularly for TACs of demersal species (reaching 51 and 60%). These results demonstrate the significant impact that the discard ban has had on the quantities of EU fishing opportunities. Since discarding has not declined in EU fisheries at any significant level, the magnitude of these increases may likely have resulted in a substantial widespread increase in fishing mortality being exerted on European stocks, and thus likely lead to an implosion of the EU TAC system, the Common Fisheries Policy central instrument to manage fisheries in the EU.

Pulling mechanisms and pushing strategies: How to improve Ecosystem Approach Fisheries Management advice within the European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy

While European policies have progressed towards an Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management (EAFM), limited attention has been paid to the implications for its advisory system. This paper analyses the advisory landscape in the European Union (EU) by addressing two questions: to what extent can the needed advice be provided? how prepared is the management system to integrate ecosystem advice? We provide a systematic analysis of the relevant advisory bodies, explore gaps related to the requested and delivered advice, and identify paths for improvement. The findings confirm earlier observations of lack of a formalized process to provide and integrate advice in support of an ecosystem approach into EU fisheries management. Instead of enabling existing capacities to embed ecosystem components (e.g. investments and initiatives made by stakeholders (and authorities) to move to EAFM -pushing strategies), the system relies heavily on mandatory requests from policy makers (pulling mechanisms). Furthermore, social and economic dimensions are the weakest aspects in the advisory process, which hampers the balancing of objectives that represent one of the hallmarks of EAFM. The policy framework has adopted EAFM for European fisheries, but the advisory processes have not yet been adapted to substantially support EAFM.

Sustainable natural resource governance under interest group competition in policy-making.

Non-state actors play an increasingly important role in environmental policy. Lobbying by interest groups has been associated with policy stagnation and environmental degradation as well as with sustainable governance. However, little is known about how competition between economic and environmental interests influences the ability of governance systems to avoid undesirable outcomes. We investigate how competing interest group behaviour affects sustainable resource management by tracing the policy change process in a case study of the European Union fisheries policy and analysing its dynamics with an agent-based model. We find that formation of interest group coalitions in response to a perceived crisis can delay or prevent collapses, even when the competing interests have unequal resources. We attribute such outcomes to the emergence and timing of a 'tug of war' mechanism between competing interest group coalitions. We argue that attempts to improve sustainable resource management must account for feedbacks from environmental change to behaviours of political actors.

How much is the fish? When foreign policy meets fishing interests in the EU’s Arctic endeavour

This article explores the interaction between European Union (EU) foreign policy and the external dimension of fisheries policy in a specific case: a dispute over snow crab fisheries around the Norwegian Arctic Archipelago of Svalbard. We do two things: first, we examine a specific case that concerns both EU foreign policy and fisheries policy in order to understand the workings of the EU regarding these two policy domains. Second, we connect the dots between the EU’s external fisheries policy and the EU as a foreign policy actor in general, examining how intra-institutional dynamics matter when studying policy and its related developments in Brussels. This analysis of the snow-crab dispute between the EU and Norway illustrates how a relatively minor issue in fisheries policies is also relevant to the study of the foreign policy of the EU, and more generally for the links between foreign policy and fisheries as a nexus that is increasingly relevant in international politics.

Introduction: External Aspects of the European Union Common Fisheries Policy

The European Union (EU) is a unique international organisation. Its constituent treaties establish a regional legal order separate from international law but also integral to the legal systems of its Member States. EU law has supremacy over the domestic laws of the Member States. The EU also possesses international legal personality and is empowered to enter exclusively into binding legal relations with non-EU States (hereinafter third States) on behalf of its twenty-seven Member States in respect of those matters over which it enjoys competence. The exclusive competence of the EU extends to the conservation and management of marine living resources, which has allowed it to play a significant role in the development of fisheries law and policy. The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is a set of rules agreed by Member States for regulating the conservation and management of stocks in so-called Union waters – the combined waters of the EU’s constituent Member States – as well as the regulation of fishing vessels flying the flag of an EU Member State in the waters under the jurisdiction of third States or on the high seas. In broad terms, it treats the waters and resources therein as a common resource and EU nationals enjoy equal access to waters and fishing opportunities, subject to some legally defined exceptions or conditions. The CFP was introduced in 1970, and been subject to periodic reviews and reform. he CFP has four main policy areas: fisheries management, market and trade policy, structural funding, and international policy. Alongside internal rules harmonising regulations between Member States, the CFP also has an important external dimension. It is this aspect of EU fisheries law which is the focus of this special issue. This introduction provides necessary context on the EU external fisheries policy and identifies some key issues that are explained in more detail in the other papers to this special issue.

Countering a climate of instability: the future of relative stability under the Common Fisheries Policy

Abstract European fisheries are at a critical juncture. The confluence of political change and environmental change, along with the challenges of past Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) reforms such as the landing obligation, creates a once in a generation opportunity for a paradigm shift in fisheries management in the region. This paper sets out a series of arguments for why the status quo situation for the governance of European Union fisheries, especially for shared Northeast Atlantic fisheries is very likely unsustainable under these new circumstances. At stake is confidence in, and support for the management of the regions shared fisheries, the economic viability of fisheries and sustainability of stocks. Brexit is an additional incentive to unlock the potential of existing, but little used mechanisms within the CFP to allow the reimagining of fisheries management and governance in the Northeast Atlantic. Three of these tools and mechanisms are (i) Quota swapping, (ii) Article 16 quota uplift provisions, (iii) and Article 15 flexibility mechanisms. These mechanisms can be adopted by individual Member States for fleets in their waters or in the case of quota swapping be applied across Member States and may help stabilize fisheries under these stressors.

Public subsidies have supported the development of electric trawling in Europe

In the 2000s, the Dutch beam trawl fleet was in chronic deficit and under pressure to reduce its environmental impact. Instead of converting to selective fishing gears, it successfully lobbied the European Commission with the support of public authorities and scientists to obtain derogations against formal scientific advice to practice a prohibited technique: electric trawling. Since then, electric trawling has expanded beyond regulatory threshold: 84 large trawlers now catch the vast majority of the Dutch flatfish quota, causing detrimental socio-environmental impacts. To assess whether the European Union's fisheries policies fulfilled legal objectives and implemented the 2030 Agenda, it appeared crucial to quantify how much public financial aid had been provided to the Dutch fishing sector for its conversion to electric trawling. The financial information enabling this evaluation was first concealed but was eventually obtained. We show that the institutional opacity surrounding electric trawling was not serendipitous and has served to dissimulate allocations of public monies to a prohibited fishing method (otter trawl), illegal licenses, and falsely ‘scientific’ fishing. In breach of EU laws, 20.8 million EUR of structural funds have so far been granted to this sector in the form of direct subsidies, i.e. over 30 times the amount acknowledged by the fishing industry. The findings presented here lift part of the veil surrounding electric trawling, but the complete reconstruction of the impacts of this fishing method can only be done when decision-makers and scientists disclose all data in full transparency and become the warrants of the public interest.

A call for a blue degrowth: Unravelling the European Union's fisheries and maritime policies

Terms like blue growth (as well as the blue economy) have become the new buzzword inscribing a new era where the seas are recognized as potential drivers for the European economy. It is nevertheless, through this same logic of limitless economic growth, marine resources have been unsustainably exploited despite numerous institutional attempts to tackle overfishing. The aim of this paper is to point at the contradictions inherent in the objectives of the blue economy, and question the belief that ecological, social and economic targets can be achieved under (blue) growth-centred policies. An analysis of the (failing) policies for a ‘sustainable use of marine resources’ will be conducted and exemplified through an analysis of the main tools the EU has promoted as solutions to the fisheries crisis (sustainable consumption, privatisation of fish, fishing in waters of third countries and marine aquaculture). Additionally, the sectors promoted by the EU's Blue Growth strategy (marine aquaculture, coastal tourism, marine biotechnology, ocean energy and seabed mining) will also be evaluated in order to question this new vision for the seas and the coast. Through the introduction of the concept blue degrowth, this article aims to open up a more critical discussion around the blue growth strategy by highlighting the inherent dangers which lie in such economic strategies.

Setting of total allowable catches in the 2013 EU common fisheries policy reform: possible impacts

Fisheries in the European Union (EU) are managed through the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), which has been revised in 2013 to achieve Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) for all commercial exploited stocks and ban discards, amongst other aims. One of its core instruments to achieve stock conservation objectives in the North-East Atlantic are Total Allowable Catches (TACs). These are agreed annually by the Council of the EU, informed by scientific advice but usually based on perceived short-term socioeconomic impacts. The objective of this study was to analyse the influence of major policy decisions and consequent changes in the basis of scientific advice on TAC decisions. TACs set were compared to maximum advised catch levels between 2010 and 2017, in order to determine to what extent the EU adheres to scientific advice. The results show that EU fisheries ministers persistently set fishing opportunities above those given by MSY based scientific advice. Since 2010, 60% of the TACs analysed were constantly set above the advised levels, but departure from the advised tonnes peaked at around 40% in 2013, during the CFP negotiation, and again in 2017 due to the introduction of the landing obligation. More importantly, the observed decreasing trend of overfishing that had been achieved in Europe has been halted since 2011–2012. Finally, there was no impact of ICES’ adoption of the MSY approach in EU TACs decision-making.

Landing the blame: The influence of EU Member States on quota setting

Fisheries in European Union (EU) waters have been managed under the Common Fisheries Policy since 1983. The main regulatory tool in EU fisheries management is the use of Total Allowable Catches (TACs). In principle, TACs are set according to biological scientific advice provided by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) which recommends catch limits with the objective of maximising catches in a sustainable manner. The objective of this paper is to compare TACs set by the EU and its Member States between 2001 and 2015 with those recommended by ICES in their annual scientific advice in order to (a) investigate the level of compliance with scientific advice by the European Council and, (b) consider whether particular Member States have received more TACs above advice than others. For the time-series analysed, the European Council set TACs above scientific advice by an average of 20% per year, with around 7 out of every 10 TACs exceeding advice. Of all Member States, Denmark and the United Kingdom received the highest TACs in volume above scientific advice. Relative to the size of their TAC however, Spain and Portugal exceeded advice by the greatest percentage. Greater transparency is required to determine what takes place during the closed door negotiations and to improve the fishery sustainability credentials of the EU and its Member States.