European Security Research Articles

Chains of insecurities: constructing Ukraine’s agency in times of war

ABSTRACT This article maps how Ukraine’s international agency has been discursively constructed through juxtaposing and relating different insecurities triggered by the Russian full-scale invasion in 2022. How does Ukraine persuade its partners of the validity of its approach to these insecurities, what is the intentionality behind its strategy, and how do they contribute to the production of the Ukrainian agency? It argues that Ukraine’s agency is developed in the context of the battlefield, and therefore becomes a heavy loaded security concept with a strong normative background. By addressing numerous insecurities in energy supply, environmental and nuclear hazards, and disruption of food transportation, Ukraine builds the strategic narrative of the war as an intrinsic part of European security governance.

Alina Polyakova/Edward Lucas/Mathieu Boulègue/Catherine Sendak/Scott Kindsvater/Ivanna Kuz/Sasha Stone: A New Vision for the Transatlantic Alliance: The Future of European Security, the United States, and the World Order after Russia’s War in Ukraine. Brüssel: Center for European Policy Analyses, November 2023

<b>Alina Polyakova/Edward Lucas/Mathieu Boulègue/Catherine Sendak/Scott Kindsvater/Ivanna Kuz/Sasha Stone:</b> A New Vision for the Transatlantic Alliance: The Future of European Security, the United States, and the World Order after Russia’s War in Ukraine. Brüssel: Center for European Policy Analyses, November 2023

The racial biopolitics of humanitarianism in Africa: examining European resilience-building in the Sahel and lake Chad Basin

The racial biopolitics of humanitarianism in Africa: examining European resilience-building in the Sahel and lake Chad Basin

Zeitenwende: German Foreign Policy Change in the Wake of Russia's War Against Ukraine

Russia’s war against Ukraine has severely damaged the European security architecture. This article examines the consequences of this rupture for German foreign and security policy. Just a few months before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Germany saw the transition to an unprecedented three-party coalition government of Social Democrats, Greens, and Liberals. In a special address to the Bundestag three days after the invasion, Chancellor Olaf Scholz described Russia’s war initiation as a historical Zeitenwende (“watershed”) that called into question long-held beliefs about European security. In the wake of this, Scholz proclaimed far-reaching changes, including the announcement that military expenditure would be drastically increased, additional military capabilities would be procured, and new deployments would be committed to NATO’s eastern flank. This article argues that the Zeitenwende amounts to an international orientation change in German foreign and security policy. Apart from identifying areas of significant change, the article also documents political contestation over the Zeitenwende’s nature and extent as well as gaps between proclaimed changes and actual implementation.

Perspectives on green hydrogen in Europe—during an energy crisis and towards future climate neutrality

Abstract Hydrogen and regional energy infrastructure are significant for the European Green Deal and was the focus of the SuperP2G research Project (Synergies Utilising renewable Power Regionally by means of Power to Gas). Five national projects (Denmark, Netherlands, Germany, Austria, and Italy) cooperated to investigate power-to-gas feasibility. The energy crisis due to the war in Ukraine peaked during the project. The demand for green hydrogen increased as natural gas was reduced. In 2022, the cost of blue hydrogen was 9.5–12.6 €/kg. Higher electricity prices impacted the cost of green hydrogen less. Considering the 2021–22 level of electricity and gas prices, and the potential flexibility of electrolysers, electrolytic hydrogen was on a par with blue hydrogen. On the long term, green hydrogen is assumed to be competitive around 2030. A fast ramping up and favourable electricity cost development could halve the hydrogen production cost until 2040 with investment being the major contributor to a cost reduction. Meanwhile, the smart operation of a wind/electrolyser system might achieve 24% reduction of its operation cost. The following measures are recommended to introduce green hydrogen on a large scale: 1) certification of green and low carbon hydrogen and a uniform CO2 price; 2) ensuring a level playing field across markets; 3) enabling policies to enhance European security of supply by increasing domestic production and diversifying imports; 4) fast ramping of renewable electricity generation; and 5) coordinated planning of hydrogen, methane, and electricity infrastructures.

Image Building on European Security by France Through Military Officer Education Programme

Image Building on European Security by France Through Military Officer Education Programme

Архитектоника системы военно-политической безопасности Европейского союза: основания и стратегии реализации

The article reveals the stages of the formation of the military-political contours of the collective security of the European Union (EU). The article analyzes the regulatory and legal foundations of the Common Security and Defense Policy as a course of action for the deployment of civil and military missions to preserve peace, pre-vent conflicts and ensure the stability of the peace system. It is pointed out that in the conditions of increasing international political instability, strengthening of external challenges and civilizational contradictions the revi-sion of the basic principles of European security is required. In order to improve its effectiveness, a set of measures is proposed, providing for the formation of the European Defense Union and its integration with NATO structural units on the basis of value priorities of the EU Global Strategy. It is concluded that in modern conditions the EU is on the threshold of large-scale modernization in the field of security, which will affect all members of the association. The intensification of the process is caused by the dynamics of international rela-tions.

The Role of the Visegrad Group in the European Security System

The changes taking place in Central and Eastern Europe, which began in 1989, included pri-marily the internal and foreign policy of the four countries that make up the Visegrad Group, i.e. the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary. The transformations also concerned rela-tions with the newly formed states after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the course of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. The aim of the article is to indicate the role of the Visegrad Group in the European security system, especially in the face of the war in Ukraine or the migration crisis. An important element of the functioning of this regional organization is its cooperation with the EU or with other organizations. The research hypothesis is as follows: the future of the Visegrad Group makes sense and brings its members more benefits than losses. The article uses the analysis method. The key issue that needs to be answered will be the prospect of further activity of the Visegrad Group in the face of new threats. Will the member states of the Visegrad Group meet the challenges of the twenty-first century? Will they play an important role in shaping European security?

A “Nuclear Umbrella” for Ukraine? Precedents and Possibilities for Postwar European Security

Abstract Whatever the outcome of the Russo-Ukrainian War, in its wake Ukraine will need to choose a security policy to defend its sovereignty from future threats. Its choice holds implications for broader European security. Some observers advocate Ukraine becoming a member in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), thereby gaining protection from the U.S. “nuclear umbrella.” Others doubt the effectiveness of “extended nuclear deterrence”—the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation for attacks, including those carried out with conventional armed forces, on an ally's territory. But nuclear deterrence was never put to the test in Cold War Europe, and today extended nuclear deterrence is an unreliable and risky approach to Russian aggression. An examination of the role of nuclear deterrence during the 1961 Berlin Crisis demonstrates that Soviet military strategy against U.S. nuclear weapons posed the risk of escalation. In vulnerable NATO territories, such as the Estonian city of Narva, such a risk still exists. A Cold War–era alternative to nuclear deterrence offers the possibility of a non-nuclear defense for Ukraine. Proposals such as the “spider in the web” strategy draw on concepts of the security dilemma and non-offensive, confidence-building defense to provide for Ukrainian security in a Europe threatened by Russian expansion, without relying on the threat of nuclear war.

CHANGE IN THE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN EUROPE AS A RESULT OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE

At the beginning of the 21st century, many analysts predicted a reset in in-ternational relations and an upcoming change in terms of dominance on the inter-national arena, in which the US would lose its primacy to a multipolar world with China and Russia as key players. The economic crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic and currently the war in Ukraine have raised growing concern about the future of the European security system. Until Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, many European Union countries functioned with the belief that Europe would never suffer from war again and that the citizens of UE would always live in a free and cohesive Europe. At present, Europe needs to adapt to the changes in the European security environment and prepare accordingly, all the more that Ukraine has become a theatre of superpowers’ competition for a new European and, consequently, global order. The aim of the article is to present the change that is taking place in the European security environment in the context of the war in Ukraine.

Facebook-сторінка Анджея Дуди та імідж Польщі у період повномасштабного вторгнення російських військ в Україну

The aim of the article is to study the image of the President and the national brand of the Republic of Poland during the full-scale invasion of Russian troops into Ukraine through the prism of the informational content of Andrej Duda’s page on Facebook. Methodology of the research lies in conducting content-analysis of Andrej Duda’s Facebook page concerning the information related to the Russian-Ukrainian war and correlating it with the image of Andrzej Duda as well as with the overall image of Poland on the international arena before and during the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war. The scientific novelty lies in conducting the analysis of posts on Andrzej Duda’s official Facebook page to study whether they contain information on Ukraine and Western partners of the anti-Russian coalition as well as correlating them with the image of Andrzej Duda and the overall image of Poland on the international arena before and after the full-scale invasion of the Russian troops into Ukraine. The article studies as the team of President of Poland Andrzej Duda extensively used Facebook social network to achieve the set political and electoral goals, focusing both on the internal and external audience. Conclusions. Content analysis of President of Poland Andrzej Duda’s Facebook page has shown that during full-scale invasion of the Russian troops into Ukraine the Presidents’ team continued to actively exploit this resource as an important channel for internal political communication as well as for establishing relations with foreign partners. The study observes a priority shift from cohesion of internal traditionalist catholic electorate to shaping an international anti-Russian coalition. Looking at short-term consequences of this priority shift, it may be considered negative for “Law and Justice” as Andrej Duda’s party has lost at the Parliamentary elections in autumn 2023. However, when analyzing the situation from the perspective of Polish state interests, protection of democracy, European security and sustainability of Western civilization, Andrzej Duda achieved positive results in his international activities.

Facebook-сторінка Анджея Дуди та імідж Польщі у період повномасштабного вторгнення російських військ в Україну

The aim of the article is to study the image of the President and the national brand of the Republic of Poland during the full-scale invasion of Russian troops into Ukraine through the prism of the informational content of Andrej Duda’s page on Facebook. Methodology of the research lies in conducting content-analysis of Andrej Duda’s Facebook page concerning the information related to the Russian-Ukrainian war and correlating it with the image of Andrzej Duda as well as with the overall image of Poland on the international arena before and during the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war. The scientific novelty lies in conducting the analysis of posts on Andrzej Duda’s official Facebook page to study whether they contain information on Ukraine and Western partners of the anti-Russian coalition as well as correlating them with the image of Andrzej Duda and the overall image of Poland on the international arena before and after the full-scale invasion of the Russian troops into Ukraine. The article studies as the team of President of Poland Andrzej Duda extensively used Facebook social network to achieve the set political and electoral goals, focusing both on the internal and external audience. Conclusions. Content analysis of President of Poland Andrzej Duda’s Facebook page has shown that during full-scale invasion of the Russian troops into Ukraine the Presidents’ team continued to actively exploit this resource as an important channel for internal political communication as well as for establishing relations with foreign partners. The study observes a priority shift from cohesion of internal traditionalist catholic electorate to shaping an international anti-Russian coalition. Looking at short-term consequences of this priority shift, it may be considered negative for “Law and Justice” as Andrej Duda’s party has lost at the Parliamentary elections in autumn 2023. However, when analyzing the situation from the perspective of Polish state interests, protection of democracy, European security and sustainability of Western civilization, Andrzej Duda achieved positive results in his international activities.

Europe’s Grand Strategy (The Common Security and Defence Policy)

The paper explores the security challenges, national interests, and defense policy development of modern European countries, namely Great Britain, France, and Germany. Great Britain recently exited the European Union on February 1, 2020. Over the years, Britain has played an active role in the EU's security and defense policy. Therefore, we cannot overlook the significance of Great Britain, and while discussing it, we will first focus on the period before Brexit (until 2020) and then review the period after Brexit.&#x0D; The aforementioned states are major players in shaping Europe's security architecture today. Working together and developing a common strategy is crucial for the security of the continent. The European security policy that was established after World War II is based on the theory of interdependence. I conducted the research using discourse analysis to examine the internal national security strategies of these states, as well as their relationships with one another and with international organizations such as NATO and the European Union.

Paradigms of European Security in the Foreign Policy of France, Germany, and Great Britain (2014-2022)

Paradigms of European Security in the Foreign Policy of France, Germany, and Great Britain (2014-2022)

Is Geopolitics Still Relevant? Halford Mackinder and the War in Ukraine

This paper starts with an assumption that geopolitics, understood as one of the great schools of international relations, is not only still relevant but, indeed, should be one of the essential items in the toolkit of any student or policymaker who peruses the challenging and ever-eluding realm of international security. It draws chiefly on Sir Halford Mackinder’s Heartland theory in order to explain the dynamics of contemporary European security in general, and the ongoing war in Ukraine in particular. The analysis, which relies heavily on a historical examination of the geopolitical realities of Central and Eastern Europe, leads the author to a pair of conclusions. Firstly, the conflict in Ukraine is likely to linger on albeit with unpredictable intensity and, secondly perhaps more importantly, the outcome of the war will only be one of many steps leading to the emergence of a new, possibly multipolar, international system and consequently, and more obviously, a new security system in Europe, which will be strongly influenced by Germany rather than by the United States as before.

Эволюция военной политики Франции

The article studies the evolution of the military-political course of the French Fifth Republic. The authors provide a comprehensive analysis of the four editions of the French White Paper, which are the conceptual foundations of the country’s defense and national security strategy. Particular attention is paid to the impact of the domestic political situation, international political and economic processes, as well as membership in the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance on the formation of France’s defense policy. The methodological basis for the study of the French military policy evolution is a systematic approach: a comprehensive study of the Fifth Republic’s defense and national security strategy as parts of the global European security architecture, which consists of closely related components. In addition the authors use the concrete-historical method, as well as induction, deduction, content analysis and comparative analysis of the Fifth Republic’s regulatory and legal documentation in the field of national defense and security, which allowed identifying elements of the specifics and continuity of the military-political course of France. With the help of forecasting, as well as a statistical method based on official data from government departments and research centers, the authors assessed the state of the French Republic Armed Forces. The excessive involvement of the French armed forces in various external and internal military operations, accompanied by a reduction in the number of personnel and deterioration of their equipment, weakens of the combat potential of Paris.

‘A Decolonising Moment of Sorts’: The Baltic States’ Vicarious Identification with Ukraine and Related Domestic and Foreign Policy Developments

In a recent essay on the war in Ukraine in The Journal of Genocide Research, Maria Mälksoo argues that the ongoing war in Ukraine has become a ‘decolonising moment of sorts’ as Central and Eastern European states have started taking the ‘moral and practical lead’ in supporting Ukraine and thus asserting their own agency. Following this line of argumentation, this paper will explore the Baltic states’ vicarious identification with Ukraine, identifying multiple ways in which these actors have initiated policies to support Ukraine internationally and the ways in which solidarity with Ukraine have been received by various domestic constituencies, including ethnic minorities. By vicariously identifying with Ukraine, the Baltic states have continued their transformation from ‘policy-takers’ to ‘policy-makers’ in the European security landscape. This transformation can be traced back to 2004, when they joined the transatlantic community and the European Union. At the same time, similarly to the 2013–2014 crisis in Ukraine, the trauma of the war has become an engine of new discourses and new divisions within the Baltic states, prompting societal debates about the legacy of the Soviet Union associated with Russia (including the fate of monuments to Soviet soldiers) and the relationship with Russian culture.

Subjective Perception of Hybrid Threats in Latvia

The concept of hybrid threats plays an increasingly important role in the security studies agenda, as it raises awareness about the multidimensional nature of contemporary security. Hybrid threats are considered hostile activities that involve the simultaneous use of two or more types of threats and are controlled or coordinated by a specific actor, whether state or non-state. Some experts may argue that hybrid threats are the most prevalent type of threat in the European security landscape at present. As a result, the focus of research has shifted to an investigation into this phenomenon and the vulnerabilities that make a country weaker in the face of emerging hybrid threats. However, much less attention has been paid to the subjective perception of hybrid threats in particular societal and historical contexts, as well as their impact on security policy-making. This article analyses the perceptions of Latvian society in regard to its vulnerability to hybrid threats, as well as how these perceptions are reflected in the main security policy documents. It is concluded that the Latvian population recognises certain hybrid threats as being current in their security agenda. This is especially true of information and cyber threats. On the other hand, the analysis of the key national security documents reveals the lack of a well-defined agenda for preventing and combating hybrid threats.

NATO and European security in the context of the deteriorating situation in the Black Sea area

Euro-Atlantic security has always been a priority for the North Atlantic Alliance, especially at the beginning of the 21st century, when mankind is facing a complex, dynamic and unpredictable security environment, one of profound economic and social imbalances. The conflict in Ukraine is and will remain a hot topic of the utmost interest, due to its political-military and economic-social implications, both regionally and internationally. For some years now, the entire Black Sea region has been boiling over from a geostrategic point of view, thus becoming Europe's new powder keg. Romania is deeply interested in a stable, democratic Black Sea region, closely linked to Euro-Atlantic structures.

The European Union’s Engagement With Questions of Strategic Autonomy and Security: Do EU Courts Have a Role to Play?

The EU started as a peace project to avoid armed conflicts between its Member States. It rapidly became a success story attracting new members. Its internal market and common policies, especially its trade and common agricultural policies, yielded a power of its own protecting the EU and its Member States in a turbulent world. This unique project relies on the rule of law and innovating legal concepts that both the EU and national courts protect. In the meantime the EU and the international context have changed. Gradually but surely, the EU is becoming more assertive to protect its interests by engaging in new policy areas, including security and defence. This article concerns the question as to whether this development affects the nature of judicial protection that EU courts are supposed to grant to states, legal and natural persons. Strategic autonomy – European security – EU defence policy – EU external competences – Court of Justice of the European Union