European Security Institutions Research Articles

ВОЕННЫЕ «ОТВЕТЫ» В СТРАНАХ ЛАТИНСКОЙ АМЕРИКИ И ЕВРОПЫ НА ВЫЗОВЫ ПАНДЕМИИ COVID-19: СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ

The article explores the global phenomenon of using armed forces institution in the COVID-19 pandemic prevention, from the perspectives of Latin America and Europe, selected as research objects, because both regions had suffered the strongest pandemic «blows» in terms of mortality. Using the methodology of comparative analysis, the author considers the main parameters of the Latin American and European countries military strategies to combat the spread of coronavirus infection. He detects tendencies of militarization of political leaders` discourse, most vividly manifested in official statements of European politicians. One of the basic distinctive features of Latin American experience is massive mobilization of military contingent in order to complete sanitary and epidemiological tasks in key Latin American countries, such as Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Chile, etc., while in European countries it was moderate. The article gives an overview of the key missions and activities of armed forces on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. The analysis reveals that Latin American military activities have been dominated by the repressive component, expressed in the missions to ensure social and spatial control. European security institutions concentrated on solving humanitarian, logistic and medical problems. The author shows that in the New World, the military received expanded administrative powers in order to resolve the sanitary crisis. In European countries, the civilian control level turned out to be higher, and administrative functions were delegated in Italy alone. The author compares international communication styles in the two regions, and considers the cases of mutual assistance through the military department. European countries have demonstrated much higher level of coordination and interstate interaction, in contrast to Latin American states.

No Place for Russia – European Security Institutions since 1989, written by William H. Hill

No Place for Russia – European Security Institutions since 1989, written by William H. Hill

Book Review: William H. Hill. No Place for Russia: European Security Institutions Since 1989, New York: Columbia University Press. 2018

Book Review: William H. Hill. No Place for Russia: European Security Institutions Since 1989, New York: Columbia University Press. 2018

French military careers and European security integration: How internationalisation changes military socialisation

This study uses qualitative data on the trajectories of French military officers to provide preliminary hypotheses on the internationalisation of military careers and the dynamics of international military socialisation. It is divided into three sections. The first section provides an overview of the structure of the French armed forces and gives details on the biographical qualitative methods used throughout the article. The second and third sections describe the types of internationalisation that occur during the first and second phases of military careers respectively. The article mainly contends that French officers are unprepared for the type of internationalisation they experience in the framework of European security institutions. In spite of prior experiences of international contexts, they are forced to learn most of their work on the job and to improvise in their handling of international interactions and negotiations. These findings are shown to have implications for debates in the sociology of professions and the study of European security integration.

Europe: Strategies for Co-operation and Joint Solutions

The article examines the sustainability and adaptability of European security institutions, structures and organizations in the context of the fundamental and qualitative change of the post-Helsinki European security order. Suggestions are presented for managing the Ukraine crisis by military and political restraint, the observance of the Helsinki Decalogue of principles and by upgrading executive mechanisms of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (osce). In a new European security order, the core political components would be constituted by the inviolability of frontiers and the incontestability of internal political order. In broader international change, the relative decrease of the role of old powers has to be accommodated with the growing clout of emerging powers. Since most of the conflicts take place within the States and not between them the risks and new threats have to be dealt with by transformed and upgraded security institutions adapted to the new security environment. At the same time, there is a manifested lack of interests by the great powers to rely on multilateral security institutions unless they are used as instruments in pursuing their own strategies. The new common security arrangement for the West and Russia has to reconcile the adversary national security interests within the Euro-Atlantic Security Forum.

European security in NATO’s shadow: Party ideologies and institution building by Stephanie C Hofmann

Stephanie C Hofmann European security NATO's shadow: Party ideologies and institution building Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 264 pp., $99.00 (cloth) ISBN 978-1 107029095Historians and political scientists have long considered domestic politics an important factor the formulation of foreign policy. Demonstrating the link, however, is frequently confounded by a lack of evidence. While politicians and policy makers are keen to explain their decisions as motivated by national interests and security, leaders are often unwilling to concede (especially the documents which end up archives) that electoral concerns motivated their decisions.Stephanie Hofmann's excellent book offers a different way of understanding the causal relationship between partisan politics and foreign policy making. In European Security NATO's Shadow, she argues that party ideologies are the root cause of changes foreign and security policy because they define the perceived national interest, shape efforts at international cooperation, and facilitate international cooperation with like-minded leaders abroad (2). Ideology, Hofmann's formulation, comprises three core elements of European foreign and security policy, complicating the term beyond simple left or right leanings: a party's approach to multilateralism the use of force; its concept of sovereignty and willingness to embrace supranational institutions; and its view of the nature of Europe as a political community (4). With this contribution, Hofmann prompts a broader understanding of national preference formation which takes into account the role of political parties' complete ideologies.To support her thesis, Hofmann explores post-Cold War security institutionbuilding Western Europe. Specifically, she investigates the ongoing struggle to construct an autonomous European defence institution in NATO's imposing shadow motivated by party ideology (4). During the last decade of the twentieth century, she argues, increasing similarity between states' ruling parties' ideologies facilitated cooperation institution-building (36). Hofmann's analysis is predicated upon the reader accepting her assertion that, essentially, when it comes to European security, the only states that matter are Britain, France, and Germany by virtue of their preponderant influence the European policy ecosystem and their military strength (73). Throughout the text, Hofmann identifies and rebuts alternative explanations for the construction of European security institutions outside NATO, including rational choice institutionalism, realism, and an understanding of partisan politics predicated on the left-right dichotomy alone (57).Hofmann's ensuing chapters, however, narrow the scope of her theory from her initial assertion about the broad explanatory power of parties' political ideology to an examination of its impact on three countries' efforts on one specific issue over the span of a decade. The book's main chapters trace the evolution of European security cooperation, particular institution-building, through three key episodes: the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of 1990-1991, the 1996-1997 Amsterdam Treaty negotiations, and finally the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) from 1998 to 2000. This is the most disappointing aspect of Hofmann's analysis. Despite the strength of these three admirably researched case studies, Hofmann does not connect her conclusions with broader questions. …

The European Defence Agency and EU military space policy: Whose space odyssey?

This paper analyses the growing involvement of the European Defence Agency (EA) in the field of space, suggesting that this is symptomatic of the greater importance now being placed on military space by the European Union. It charts the history of the agency in general and its role in space in particular, delineating the many synergetic relations it has with other space-related institutions at EU level. It argues that EDA is as much a response to socioeconomic as strategic considerations, and that it acts to protect European competitiveness in the arms field, thereby highlighting the rising significance of EU military space policy for European security and military institutions.

Inside the Fence but Outside the Walls

The primary focus of this article is the foreign and security policies adopted by Austria, Finland and Sweden during the first post-Cold War decade. The main aim is to examine the policy responses of these three countries in the 1989–99 interval, to the developments that occurred within the principal European security institutions. From a foreign policy standpoint, the argument is that the militarily non-allied states altered their pattern of international involvement. They did so by shifting from a historical logic of exclusion to one of inclusion directed at securing a greater measure of influence on the design of post-Cold War European security. Particularly characteristic of the latter was fully-fledged membership of the European Union, observer status in the Western European Union and the establishment of cooperative security and military relations with NATO. Yet, such a new logic of inclusion did not lead to a radical change of their security policies, since it translated exclusively into an involvement in security and military frameworks not calling for the surrender of military non-alliance. Hence the major strand of the argument revolves around the metaphor ‘inside the fence but outside the walls’ used to portray the distinctive posture of the Alpine and Nordic countries in the post-1989 European security building dynamics.

Spanish defence policy: Eurocorps and NATO reform

Spain's eagerness to play a major role in Europe's new security architecture has not been marked by complete success. Problems in transforming a large and backward military establishment have been exacerbated by a declining budget and long‐term dependence upon imported technology. On the diplomatic front this has been shown by only limited success in extending military protection to Spanish interests in the Mediterranean and only a partial fulfilment of national ambitions at the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997. However, some satisfaction has been derived from Spanish attempts to achieve a stronger regional emphasis within European security institutions.

Britain, France and the Saint‐Malo declaration: Tactical rapprochement or strategic entente?*

The December 1998 Anglo‐French summit in Saint‐Malo marked the sudden convergence of British and French policy towards European security institutions and laid the basis for EU leaders’ agreement a year later at the Helsinki summit to develop the capability to deploy a European military force. This essay argues that the Saint‐Malo Declaration represents a radical shift in British and French defence identities in response to challenges to British and French national identities and the legitimacy of both states in the post‐Cold War era. It points to the changed international security dynamic as a result of the end of the Cold War and the gradual emergence of a European security community, relative economic decline, and generational change in British and French policy élites as critical factors.

Emerging regional security co‐operation in Europe and the Asia Pacific

Abstract European and Asian‐Pacific policymakers need to shift from policies based on competition to those based on co‐operation. If European and Asian‐Pacific states are successful in implementing and strengthening new security institutions on the basis of co‐operative behaviour designed to realize absolute gains, then conflict in these two regions may decrease and regional hegemonic competition may not materialize. It is argued that three key factors will determine the viability of any regional security framework. These are reciprocity in security relations, great power support for the security arrangements and reassurance. In this study's comparative evaluation of Europe and the Asia Pacific, the pursuit of absolute gains through a security regime appears to be a better alternative to relative gains strategies which serve to intensify security dilemmas. In Europe, rules and norms for state behaviour are being extended throughout the continent through the gradual extension of the West European security institutions to Central and East European states. The NACC and the PfP offer to combine the stability of the North Atlantic Alliance with the principles of co‐operative security at a pan‐European level. In the Asia Pacific, the ASEAN Regional Forum represents a positive initial step towards greater security co‐operation among the ASEAN states and their neighbours, and the United States and China need to give the ARF their full support. The difference between the ARF and NACC and the PfP is that the former does not have a history of successful military collaboration behind it, nor a developed security agenda or structure similar to that now supporting the latter two.

From independence to cooperation: France, NATO and European security

The end of the Cold War necessarily called into question the role of Europe's security institutions, and the attitudes of the major Western powers towards them. After 40 years of monotonous stability, reform became a necessity. Yet whereas its partners (notably Britain and the United States) pressed ahead with the reform of NATO structures in order to ensure the survival of the alliance after 1989, France, although having criticized the workings of the transatlantic security system for many years, was unable to stamp its influence on the shifting European security landscape. French policies towards European security institutions are, however, undergoing a major transformation. Although the roots of this change can, in part, be traced back to previous Socialist governments, it was under the Balladur government that it became most marked. Yet belated adjustment to the security imperatives of post-Cold War Europe has come too late to aid the realization of the French vision of an independent European defence identity emerging out of the ashes of the Cold War.*

NATO's Functions after the Cold War

When the cold war ended in Europe, many observers expected that NATO's demise would soon follow. Even if the alliance did not disappear altogether, it would become an empty shell, no longer performing any useful functions. In its place would emerge either a largely institution-free anarchy characterized by much looser, shifting alliances and a significantly greater risk of conflict1 or possibly other European security institutions that were better suited to the needs of the post-cold war environment. Contrary to such expectations, however, NATO has not become moribund. Indeed, it remains the leading security organization in Europe, even as the initial flurry of post-cold war institution building winds down. As a result, few analysts now expect the alliance to wither away soon. This article seeks to clarify the reasons for NATO's continued vitality. It argues that initial analyses of the alliance's future omitted several crucial considerations: the persistence of external threats sufficient to help justify NATO's preservation, its potential for acquiring

Nationalism and ethnic conflict: threats to European security

This report provides an analysis of the significance of nationalism and ethnic conflict in the affairs of the populations of central and eastern Europe. It describes and analyses nationalist developments, particularly in the former states of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, and examines the response of European security institutions to problems of ethnic nationalism.

Après l'Europe ?

After Europe ?, by Dominique David 1993 bas broken clown to pieces every prospect on the future of Europe. The heavy uncertainties on Russian future, the Yugoslav disorder that is undermining ail European security institutions, the problems facing any progress on European Union, the emergence of a zone of constant instability in the Maghreb : ail these factors do not leave many chances of success to the construction of a United Europe, as planned four years ago. We have to undergo a complete review of our strategy knowing that a united European continent will probably remain a dream for a long time. In this period of transition, new objectives have to be set. We have to redefine our relationship to Russia, accept and organize the coexistence of multiple Europes, reinforce the Western European construction, and build up a coherent strategy toward the South.