European Security Cooperation Research Articles

Persevering with bandwagoning, not hedging: why European security cooperation still conforms to realism

ABSTRACT Over the past few years, European security cooperation has been revived. The EU has launched several defence initiatives and some member states, such as France have launched their own collaborative initiatives. The renewed activism in European security cooperation followed several years of inactivity and warrants theoretical investigation. Hedging is a concept that has been employed to make sense of renewed activism in European security cooperation. By pursuing hedging, Europeans are preparing for a future in which the US might be unwilling or unable to get involved, and to assist with, European security affairs. Advancing a neorealist analysis, this article argues that European states’ efforts to increase cooperation remain consistent with the broader trajectory of European security cooperation since the end of the Cold War. European states remain dependent on the US for their security and are still far from autonomously projecting their influence internationally. This article illustrates the argument with reference to the recent withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan and the French promise to wind down its commitment in the Sahel. The implications of this argument are discussed in detail.

Regional security cooperation against hegemonic threats: Theory and evidence from France and West Germany (1945–65)

AbstractWhy do some regional powers collectively threatened by a potential hegemon eagerly cooperate to ensure their security, while others appear reluctant to do so? I argue that robust security cooperation at the regional level is less likely when an unbalanced distribution of power exists between the prospective security partners. In such situations, regional security cooperation tends to be stunted by foot-dragging and obstructionism on the part of materially inferior states wary of facilitating the strategic expansion of neighbours with larger endowments of power resources, anticipating that much of the coalition's gains in military capabilities are likely to be achieved through an expansion of the materially superior neighbour's force levels and strategic flexibility. Evidence drawn from primary material and the latest historiography of France's postwar foreign policy towards West Germany provides considerable support for this argument. My findings offer important correctives to standard accounts of the origins of Western European security cooperation and suggest the need to rethink the difficulties the United States has encountered in promoting cooperation among local allies in key global regions.

European procurement schemes and the European Defence Fund (EDF): how should academic research develop?

ABSTRACT Because of the recent deterioration of security and stability in the world, disruption of supply chains due to COVID-19, paying attention to national security and defence industries became of supreme importance for the stable development of European defence and security within both the Allied and the European frameworks. This article addresses the current trends in European security cooperation, with a narrower focus on national military-industrial complexes and defence industrial cooperation in the European Union (EU). The article analyses a few academic books on the subject and a wider academic/professional debate in order to illustrate which aspects of coverage are beneficial, which are missing with respect to the objectives of the European Defence Fund (EDF) and which spheres need to be developed further. The primary suggestion is to increase interdisciplinarity and the empirical/military capabilities side of defence research designs. In this way, a more significant impact and participation in policy shaping and capabilities development can be achieved.

Do or die? The UK, the EU, and internal/external security cooperation after Brexit

The European Union (EU) integration project is under attack from a reassertion of national sovereignty following Brexit and the Covid-19 crisis. Our analysis examines the impact that traditional forms of sovereignty and national interests will have on the conduct of EU foreign and security policy post-Brexit. We focus on the Brexit challenge to the EU mode of regulation and diplomacy in internal/external policies in Common Foreign and Security Policy, Common Security and Defence Policy, and Justice and Home Affairs. The article also considers key scenarios for future UK-EU security cooperation to inform analysis of likely policy outcomes for the UK and the EU. The article concludes that the EU will have a greater impact through its laws and regulations on the post-Brexit UK than vice versa and that Brexit is not an immediate threat to the EU's regulatory mode of security governance. The new realities of internal/external security governance in Europe post-Brexit will mean weakened EU–UK security arrangements, which will impact the scope and quality of European security cooperation beyond traditional defence. This is both undesirable and potentially dangerous for European security cooperation and for Europe's position in the wider world.

When security elites deal with politicians: rethinking practices from the perspective of security-politics relationships

ABSTRACT This article examines how security-politics relationships play out in the routines of security elites when confronted with political decisions pertaining to European security cooperation. To do so, the article reflects upon British debates about police and judicial cooperation in a post-Brexit Europe along with debates on the 2014 opt-out from Justice and Home Affairs. How security elites respond to political decisions is investigated from a sociological lens that mobilises lessons from Norbert Elias. The article thus shows how security elites play out distinct roles and conduct distinct types of work when embedded chains of interdependence with professionals of politics that define what legitimate security cooperation is; a neglected aspect in bureaucratic politics and practice turn literature, and Critical Security Studies. It also exposes how security elites fight for EU-led cooperation because of attributes seemingly drawn from lived experiences in EU cooperation and triggered by the constraints of the relationships in which they are situated. The article thus complements existing debates on practices and security professionals by building knowledge on security elites and their routines from the angle of security-politics relationships.

European Intelligence Agendas and the Way Forward

The landscape of intelligence and security cooperation in Europe can be compared to an impressionist painting. From afar, observers can identify homogenous zones, representing the convergence of national interests and priorities that drive cooperation. Upon closer examination, this landscape reveals a variety of brushstrokes and differences. The oeuvre is complex and prone to multiple interpretations, depending on the position and predispositions of the observer. An examination of converging and diverging trends in the European intelligence landscape suggests that there is not one but multiple European intelligence agendas that partially overlap. This situation is unlikely to change in the next decade, but we can expect intelligence cooperation to deepen.

Don't Mention the War! Second World War Remembrance and Support for European Cooperation

AbstractThe notion that through increased state cooperation and dependency, national divisions can be overcome and peace can be secured, is at the core of European integration. Political elites often refer to the devastations of the Second World War (WWII) as a way to convey the added value of European cooperation today. Do references to the devastations of WWII enhance public support for European cooperation today? By presenting evidence from survey experiments conducted in the six largest member states (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the Great Britain) in July 2017, this study suggest that they do, albeit only when it comes to financial assistance for other member states in dire economic need. References to the devastations of WWII do not make respondents more willing to support free movement of people or the establishment of a European army. These findings suggest that reminding people of the devastations of WWII triggers a largely transactional response among the public: a willingness to provide financial support, but nothing more. This evidence suggests that securing public support for free movement of people or European security cooperation through historical rhetoric might be difficult to achieve.

Explaining the European Union's Security Role in Practice

AbstractEuropean states may no longer expect inter‐state violence, but they do expect complex threats emanating from storms, epidemics, terror attacks and earthquakes. The EU has answered these threats through the rapid and far‐reaching institutionalization of European security cooperation. However, member states hesitate to use their common capacities. While both intergovernmental and constructivist approaches treat this pattern as evidence of weak integration and as unimportant to the European security community, we examine this cooperation through the lens of practice theory and reveal how the growth of EU capacities is fully compatible with a critical and cautious approach to activating these resources in the everyday work of national officials. Using unique empirical data retrieved through participant observation in the first multisectoral crisis management exercise held by the EU, the findings of this analysis sketch the contours of a new type of security community.

Don’t Mention the War! Second World War Remembrance and Support for European Cooperation

At the core of the European project is the idea that through increased state cooperation and dependency, national divisions can be overcome and peace can be secured on the European continent. National and European elites often make reference to past devastations of the Second World War (WWII) in order to convey the added value of European cooperation among the public. Does WWII remembrance enhance public support for European cooperation? By presenting evidence from a set of novel survey experiments conducted in the six largest member states (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom) in July 2017, this contribution shows that reminding people of the devastations of WWII, increases support for their country’s cooperation within the European Union (EU) today. Yet, only when it comes to providing assistance for other member states in dire economic need. Reminding people of the devastations of WWII does not make people more willing to extend the rights to EU migrants or contribute to the establishment of an European army. These findings are important as they suggest that WWII remembrance triggers a largely transactional response among the public, a willingness to provide financial support combined with an unwillingness to embrace intra-EU migration or security cooperation. This evidence suggests that securing public support for further deepening of free movement of people and European security cooperation through historical rhetoric might be difficult to achieve.

Combatting terror in Europe: Euro-Israeli counterterrorism intelligence cooperation in the Club de Berne (1971–1972)

How do intelligence agencies cooperate to counter terrorism and to what extent can it be (ab)used for political purposes? This article focuses on the Club de Berne, an intelligence liaison forum that was founded in 1969 by nine Western European countries and which was also linked to the United States and Israel. This article explores the mechanisms of counterterrorism intelligence-sharing in the early 1970s and examines the motives for cooperation within this framework. On the basis of large-scale recently declassified intelligence records, the article uncovers new aspects in the history of European security cooperation with Israel and the United States, and hopes to lay the groundwork for broader theoretical reflections about counterterrorism intelligence cooperation.

Neorealism, Security Cooperation, and Europe's Relative Gains Dilemma

ABSTRACTMost neorealists argue that relative decline constitutes a systemic incentive for European security cooperation. Although this claim is broadly accepted, I argue that the relationship between relative decline and European security cooperation is complicated by a number of factors. First, European calculations about relative decline bear both a global and a regional (that is, intra-European) component. If a European country is to effectively mitigate relative decline, cooperation is not sufficient. It is just as important that cooperation develops in a way that underscores that country's comparative strengths and minimizes its weaknesses. In this regard, European countries are often in direct competition with each other. Secondly, when Europeans are thinking about their relative power position, some countries matter more than others: a given European country may accept to incur a relative loss vis-à-vis another country (European or otherwise) but not others. These calculations are further complicated by issue linkage. Some countries may accept relative losses on some issues (for example, security) in exchange for gains on others (economic). This article examines how intra-European considerations of relative gains affect the way in which Europe's main powers seek to cope with relative decline and assesses how those considerations affect security cooperation in a European Union (EU) framework. In doing so, it aims to unpack the otherwise vague notions of relative decline and European security cooperation.

European Security Cooperation and Helsinki Headline Goals: A Study on the Change of Linchpin of European Security and its Political Meaning

European Security Cooperation and Helsinki Headline Goals: A Study on the Change of Linchpin of European Security and its Political Meaning

Conceptualizing European security cooperation: Competing international political orders and domestic factors

It is commonly argued that political elites in Europe are increasingly acting in accordance with shared norms, identities and practices, thus shaping the character of international cooperation in Europe, not least in the field of security. However, in contrast to such expectations, European security cooperation often displays highly irregular and unpredictable patterns. This article offers a conceptual framework that seeks to make sense of these irregular patterns without refuting the assumption that social institutions in the sphere of international security shape cooperation in fundamental ways. Our point of departure is the observation that European states are embedded in international orders that produce norms and practices that sometimes complement and sometimes compete with each other. We contend that a general situational mechanism traceable through a number of domestic-level factors conditions the propensity of European states to coordinate national security policy. The framework, designed to make sense of the often-irregular patterns of European security cooperation, is illustrated by examples from European states’ response to the 2011 crisis in Libya.

Brexit and the Future of European Security and Defence Cooperation

The main topic of this article is the impact of Brexit on eu’s cooperation on security and defence. The British government has indicated that the uk as an important international actor wants to maintain a leading role promoting European security. nato remains in the uk perspective the most important forum for that. But since the Euro Atlantic organisation does not cover all aspects of European security, new forms of cooperation between the eu and Britain after Brexit have to be explored since both share the same ideas about a rules based international order and have common interests in maintaining security on the continent.

UK in European Security: New Opportunities or a Path to Nowhere?

Despite Britain's traditionally ambivalent attitude towards deepening the European integration, in late 1990s - early 2000s London seemed to become a key driver of European defence and security cooperation. T.Blair and J.Chirac have set ambitious goals including the development of a European Rapid Reaction Force. However most targets have never been achieved due to concerns about undermining NATO's role and Britain's as well as other EU members' unwillingness to undertake real steps to strengthen defence and security cooperation. In late 2000s the prospects of defence integration within the EU were becoming more and more vague, and the D.Cameron coalition government opted for bilateral Franco-British cooperation. Today London remains among key opponents to the European defence but the paradox is that EU defence integration without Britain - which is along with France a leading EU military power-would be at least ineffective. With US activities gradually shifting from Europe to Asia-Pacific Britain may well take the lead in European security without any damage to Transatlantic Relations.

Stepping up to reintegration: French security policy between transatlantic and European defence during and after the Cold War

This paper discusses French views of transatlantic and European defence from the late 1940s to France's ‘return’ to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2009. It argues that, while until the early 1950s the French Government viewed transatlantic and West European security cooperation as mutually reinforcing enterprises, by the end of that decade French decision-makers had developed conflicting perceptions of transatlantic and European defence. During the 1960s, the dominating political discourse in the Fifth Republic portrayed relations between Atlantic and European solidarity as a ‘zero-sum’ game: What was good for the Alliance was bad for Europe and vice versa. President Charles de Gaulle advocated the creation of a European ‘Third Force’, although links with NATO were never outright severed. During the 1970s and early 1980s, a ‘zero-sum’ attitude to Atlantic and European defence consolidated although as the Cold War came to a close, Mitterrand started a selective but steady re-engagement wi...

European security in NATO’s shadow: Party ideologies and institution building by Stephanie C Hofmann

Stephanie C Hofmann European security NATO's shadow: Party ideologies and institution building Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 264 pp., $99.00 (cloth) ISBN 978-1 107029095Historians and political scientists have long considered domestic politics an important factor the formulation of foreign policy. Demonstrating the link, however, is frequently confounded by a lack of evidence. While politicians and policy makers are keen to explain their decisions as motivated by national interests and security, leaders are often unwilling to concede (especially the documents which end up archives) that electoral concerns motivated their decisions.Stephanie Hofmann's excellent book offers a different way of understanding the causal relationship between partisan politics and foreign policy making. In European Security NATO's Shadow, she argues that party ideologies are the root cause of changes foreign and security policy because they define the perceived national interest, shape efforts at international cooperation, and facilitate international cooperation with like-minded leaders abroad (2). Ideology, Hofmann's formulation, comprises three core elements of European foreign and security policy, complicating the term beyond simple left or right leanings: a party's approach to multilateralism the use of force; its concept of sovereignty and willingness to embrace supranational institutions; and its view of the nature of Europe as a political community (4). With this contribution, Hofmann prompts a broader understanding of national preference formation which takes into account the role of political parties' complete ideologies.To support her thesis, Hofmann explores post-Cold War security institutionbuilding Western Europe. Specifically, she investigates the ongoing struggle to construct an autonomous European defence institution in NATO's imposing shadow motivated by party ideology (4). During the last decade of the twentieth century, she argues, increasing similarity between states' ruling parties' ideologies facilitated cooperation institution-building (36). Hofmann's analysis is predicated upon the reader accepting her assertion that, essentially, when it comes to European security, the only states that matter are Britain, France, and Germany by virtue of their preponderant influence the European policy ecosystem and their military strength (73). Throughout the text, Hofmann identifies and rebuts alternative explanations for the construction of European security institutions outside NATO, including rational choice institutionalism, realism, and an understanding of partisan politics predicated on the left-right dichotomy alone (57).Hofmann's ensuing chapters, however, narrow the scope of her theory from her initial assertion about the broad explanatory power of parties' political ideology to an examination of its impact on three countries' efforts on one specific issue over the span of a decade. The book's main chapters trace the evolution of European security cooperation, particular institution-building, through three key episodes: the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of 1990-1991, the 1996-1997 Amsterdam Treaty negotiations, and finally the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) from 1998 to 2000. This is the most disappointing aspect of Hofmann's analysis. Despite the strength of these three admirably researched case studies, Hofmann does not connect her conclusions with broader questions. …

Neither Realism nor Liberalism: New Directions in Theorizing EU Security Policy

Neither the realist analysis of Lorenzo Cladi and Andrea Locatelli nor the liberal approach of Benjamin Pohl offers sufficient theoretical leverage or conceptual sophistication to adequately explain a complex empirical puzzle such as European security and defence cooperation. Both articles provide some valuable insights into aspects of contemporary transatlantic relations and the CSDP, but a complex international outcome like European security cooperation cannot be attributed either to balancing or bandwagoning, or to the simple aggregation of domestic political preferences in individual member states. In order to move beyond the impasse in the debate between realism and liberalism, this article proposes an alternative theoretical approach – one that avoids reductionism and integrates both system-level and domestic factors into the analysis; provides a clearer understanding of the ontological status of agents and structures in transatlantic security relations; and gives due weight to both material and ideational factors in shaping security policy. The primary sources of this innovative theoretical approach to the study of transatlantic security relations are threefold: Colin Wight's concept of structural relationality combining depth ontology with emergence theory; the strategic-relational approach of Bob Jessop; and a discursive-materialist analysis of power, institutions, and ideas based on neo-Gramscian understandings of hegemony.

Limits of the Multilateral Security Regime: Neoliberal Institutional Approach to the European Security Cooperation in the Post-cold war Era.

Limits of the Multilateral Security Regime: Neoliberal Institutional Approach to the European Security Cooperation in the Post-cold war Era.

The Rise of European Security Cooperation. By Seth G. Jones. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 301p. $92.00 cloth, $39.99 paper. - The Search for a Common European Foreign and Security Policy: Leaders, Cognitions, and Questions of Institutional Viability. By Akan Malici. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 219p. $79.95.

The Rise of European Security Cooperation. By Seth G. Jones. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 301p. $92.00 cloth, $39.99 paper. - The Search for a Common European Foreign and Security Policy: Leaders, Cognitions, and Questions of Institutional Viability. By Akan Malici. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 219p. $79.95.