Populist Parties In Europe Research Articles

The rise of populist radical right parties in Europe

After World War II, radical right parties in Europe experienced a decline, but over the last three decades, they have regained strength, becoming significant players in European politics. Since the early twenty-first century, they have secured representation at various levels, from local governments to national parliaments and the European Parliament. Nowadays, populist radical right parties rank among the top three most powerful political forces in one-third of European countries. In Austria, the FPÖ ( Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs) emerged as the leading party in the 2024 elections, winning 28.9% of the vote. In Italy, the Fratelli d’Italia coalition came to power with 25.99% of the vote in 2022. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party won its fourth consecutive election. In France, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN – Rassemblement National) achieved major victories in both the European Parliament and national elections, becoming the country’s largest party. Though initially considered marginal, populist radical right parties have become a lasting and serious force in European politics. This special issue features six carefully selected articles, each offering empirical and theoretical insights into different aspects of the rise of radical right and right-wing populist parties in Europe, contributing to a broader understanding of this phenomenon.

Transnationalism and Populist Networks in a Digital Era: Canada and the Freedom Convoy

Abstracts The growth and success of right-wing populist movements globally has been remarkable since the early 2010s. Indeed, populist parties in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and North America have received tremendous electoral success, shaping a movement for the people and by the people within the political sphere. To what extent do populist movements influence other such programs across national borders? Research has suggested that globalization has facilitated the spread of populist ideology. Transnational populism emphasizes the “people” as a “horizontal, membership-based collective with membership premised on an in/out logic between nations, allowing populist national movements to engage and share a global ideological program. This paper seeks to understand and measure to what extent populism has become a transnational movement and identify how populism moves across national borders through online political participation. To explore this question, we collected over 6.7 million digital trace data on X/Twitter during Canada’s January–February 2022 Freedom Convoy movement. Receiving support from thousands of citizens, the Freedom Convoy revealed the ability of populist ideology to move aimlessly across international borders. We used a deep-learning model applied to text analysis to implement a classification task to measure populist narratives during the movement.

Populist Party Responsiveness and Populist Party Voter Satisfaction With Democracy in Europe

<p>Voters of populist parties tend to be dissatisfied with democracy. Some scholars attribute this dissatisfaction with how our democracies function to poor representation by mainstream parties and a feeling of not being heard. We should see this representation improve with the success of populist parties. This improved representation should, in turn, have a positive impact on populist party voters’ satisfaction with democracy (SWD). Existing case studies have only looked at the link between formal populist party representation in parliament or government, and populist party voters’ SWD, with mixed findings, the most puzzling of which is that populist party voters may even become less satisfied with growing formal representation. There is no comparative study on populist parties’ actual responsiveness to populist party voters and the connection to their SWD. Thus, we ask: How well do populist parties represent populist party voters, and how does this populist party responsiveness influence populist party voters’ satisfaction with democracy? We define populist party responsiveness as issue-based agenda-responsiveness between populist party voters and populist parties and investigate the link to SWD using data on 21 countries from the 2019 European Election Studies. We find that populist parties in Europe are not generally more responsive to populist party voters than mainstream parties. Populist parties’ agenda-responsiveness has a positive effect on populist voters’ SWD while being in government does not increase the positive effect of populist party responsiveness on their voters’ SWD. They may be disenchanted by how well their parties can eventually “walk the talk.”</p>

Populist Politics in Pakistan: Case Study of Pakistan Tehreek-I- Insaf Regime

The advent of right-wing populist parties in Europe and America has given populist politics in South Asia more clout. There has been a lot of discussion among political analysts about how the rise of populist governments around the world is likely to undermine established democracies and eventually impede democratic advancement in developing countries. The research paper gives deep insights of populist regime of PTI and shedding light on frequent democratic decline in the country owing to this style of politics and also exploring that democracy has been inflicted by the populist politics is critical discourse of contemporary times and particularly in the context of Pakistan. The paper finds out that owing to its populist politics, the PTI government subverted the process of democratic development in the country, stifled the dissenting voices and curtailed the freedom of media.

Influencing People’s Populist Attitudes With Rhetoric and Emotions: An Online Experiment in the United States

Interest in populist voters has risen with the election of Donald Trump in the United States, the rise of right-wing populist parties in Europe, and the longevity of populist leaders in countries like Italy, Hungary, Turkey, and Venezuela. Yet, little attention has been given to what mechanisms may affect populist attitudes, leaving us without recommendations for media or politicians on how to mitigate populism’s known negative effects. This study investigates one such mechanism—political rhetoric working through emotional states—to determine whether grievances centered on subjective perceptions of injustice and inequities in the system operate through negative emotions to increase populist attitudes, as is often assumed in the literature, and whether an antidote to those perceptions may be found in a sense of solidarity and mutual support. For our analysis, we conducted a nationally representative online survey experiment of 2,006 respondents in the United States in November 2018. Broadly, we find evidence that negative emotional states increase populist attitudes, but positive emotions do not have an impact. Likewise, political rhetoric reinforcing a sense of unfair advantage for some people further increases populist attitudes. Importantly, we find that reducing these negative emotions by emphasizing solidarity can reduce populist attitudes. These findings not only deepen our understanding of the triggers of populism, but also take the first step in building a tested toolbox of strategies to minimize its negative effects.

The (unintended) consequences of ineffective corruption control on populism in Europe

The literature on populism in European politics contends that the inability of mainstream parties to address effectively economic challenges and immigration issues fosters protest voting for anti-establishment figures. This article proposes an alternative perspective centred on corruption control and delineates two pathways through which corruption influences support for populist parties in Europe. First, populists exploit growing public discontent with mainstream policymakers’ incapacity to advance sustainable corruption mitigation measures. They espouse an anti-corruption stance and pledge to rectify what ‘the establishment’ fails to address. The second connection arises from the European Union’s (EU) approach to combating corruption. The EU employs an ineffective anti-corruption strategy and attributes unfavourable outcomes to member states and their citizens. This flawed approach contributes to nationalist sentiments across Europe, which populist politicians leverage by adopting an anti-EU rhetoric. Drawing from an original dataset encompassing every national election across 28 European nations from 1990 to 2020, this study probes the circumstances under which populist parties expand their electoral support. Various statistical analyses reveal that the rise in corruption is a fundamental factor driving support for populism. Not only does the EU fail to assist in tackling national corruption, but its anti-corruption strategy inadvertently bolsters public approval of populist politicians. This effect is accentuated in member states where corruption becomes more pronounced post-EU accession.

Does Health Vulnerability Predict Voting for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Europe?

Abstract: Introduction: A recent article by Kavanagh et al. (2021) in American Political Science Review suggested that health vulnerability predicts voting patterns for the populist far-right. Aim: We sought to distinguish socioculturally conservative from antielite voting, expecting health vulnerability to predict only the former. Methods: We combined data from the European Social Survey (round 7) with the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (2014). We preregistered several other hypotheses regarding associations between health and voting and predetermined the smallest effect size of interest (SESOI: r = .05). Results: Health vulnerability did not predict socioculturally conservative voting, and the results for antielite voting were mixed. To investigate why our result differed from Kavanagh et al.’s, we reran their analysis employing covariate specification curve analyses. The statistical significance and the direction of the association between health vulnerability and voting depended on which covariates were included. Across 1,000 models with randomly drawn covariate specifications, 59.6% showed a positive, 29.8% a zero, and 10.6% a negative association between health vulnerability and voting for far-right populist parties. However, all effect sizes were more consistently smaller than our predetermined SESOI. Conclusions: Our study illustrates the necessity of causally justifying and preregistering all covariates and predetermining an SESOI.

All roads lead to Rome? Analysing the electoral performance of populist radical left parties in Europe (2008-2018): a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis

ABSTRACT In the last decade, there have been numerous studies on the rise, characteristics, and consequences of the emergence of populist parties in Western liberal democracies. However, most analyses of European populist parties have focused on the right-wing populist parties. Although some scholars have made valuable efforts to understand left-wing populism in Europe, these studies have paid attention to their ideological-organizational idiosyncrasies or the characteristics of their electoral bases. This paper aims to fill the gap in the economic and political contexts in which Radical Left Populist Parties have achieved significant electoral results putting into practice a fsQCA analysis and examining their uneven electoral performance in Europe. Following some previous work applying QCA techniques, this paper tests the theory on the importance of economic and political factors. Findings indicate that the electoral performance of radical left populism cannot be explained in a univocal way, highlighting the crucial role of equifinality in understanding this political phenomenon.

The Complexity of Climate Positions of Right-wing Populist Parties in Europe

The rise of anti-climate right-wing populist parties urgently threatens mainstream climate governance goals in Europe. However, it is an oversimplification to portray all right-wing populist parties as outright climate deniers. In reality, the climate positions of right-wing populist parties are complex. While some right-wing populist parties continue to deny climate science and oppose climate action, others acknowledge the evidence but distance themselves from mainstream climate policies. This complexity arises from the tension between these parties’ ideological convictions and strategic considerations. On the optimistic side, the complexity of right-wing populist parties’ climate positions could create openings for cross-party cooperation based on scientific consensus and help transform some right-wing populist parties into constructive actors on climate governance. However, most right-wing populist parties remain deeply hostile to climate action; it is hard to expect that the opportunism of such parties in their climate positions will prompt them to make real policy concessions.

The Populist Challenge to Normative and Geopolitical Europe

Populism has become a remarkable political force in contemporary European politics. Most populist parties in Europe currently have radical right leanings and stand for sovereigntism, nativism, and authoritarianism. Either in government or opposition, these parties have had various impacts on liberal democratic systems both nationally and supranationally. Drawing on the concept of geopolitical European power, the European Union has been in search of effective responses to current challenges, including populism. This research aims at grasping the populist challenge in terms of its impacts on European politics within the broader context of normative versus geopolitical European power debate. Our research shows that populism has not only corroded normative European power but has also turned into an obstacle to the EU’s aspirations for geopolitical European power.

Partisans like any other? How populist supporters assess the economy when their party is in office

AbstractPopulist supporters have been found to take cues from populist incumbents. Yet, little is known about how they incorporate party cues in their political beliefs when populists are in office. This research note argues that (1) citizens who identify with populist parties engage in partisan motivated reasoning – that is, they are driven by the desire to be consistent with their partisan allegiances – and that (2) they engage in partisan motivated reasoning more intensely than their non-populist counterparts because populist party cues strongly prompt them to process biased information. Drawing on data from the European Social Survey, it is evidenced that populist supporters express much warmer economic views when their parties hold power. Warm economic views are also found to increase significantly more in accordance with strength of partisanship and exposure to political information for populist supporters than for non-populist supporters when their respective parties govern. Results highlight a mechanism by which populist incumbents are likely to remain attractive despite their poor economic record. They have implications for our understanding of the mainstreaming of populist parties in Europe.

Populism in Times of a Pandemic

Abstract This article provides an analysis of the COVID-19 discourse within six European populist parties from Spain, Germany, and France, with the aim of shedding light on the diverse interpretations and presentations of the pandemic by these parties. While most studies focus on right-wing or far-right populism, this study looks at both right and left ideologies paired with populism. By applying the discourse-historical approach of critical discourse studies, we highlight similarities and differences across the right-left political spectrum, as well as variations within and between different countries. The study contributes thus to the existing literature on populism and extends our understanding of the relationship between populist parties and the pandemic beyond right-wing populist parties only. Results, consistent with previous research, show that the host ideology decisively shapes parties’ discourses about COVID-19 and the need to consider alternative perspectives in populism research.

An Exploration of the Reasons Why Right-Wing Populist Parties in Europe are Anti-Immigration: The Case of Italy

Populism has become a prevailing political phenomenon in Europe, as evidenced by the repeated electoral victories of right-wing populist parties, which have transitioned from the political periphery to the centre stage. These parties frequently espouse anti-immigration rhetoric, which poses significant obstacles to European integration and globalization while simultaneously fueling racism and xenophobia. Such sentiments may foster political polarization within Europe and destabilize the global political economy. Despite Italy's former status as a leading destination for migrants in Europe, it has recently implemented increasingly restrictive immigration policies and experienced notable electoral gains for right-wing populist parties. The xenophobic tenets of right-wing populism account for these developments, making it crucial to investigate the reasons for their anti-immigrant stance. Accordingly, this study will examine the interplay between the tightening of Italy's immigration policy and the rise of right-wing populist parties, specifically investigating the underlying reasons for the anti-immigration stance of such parties by analyzing the cultural dilemma and economic crisis. By scrutinizing the origins of right-wing populist anti-immigration claims, this study seeks to uncover the driving factors behind the heightened stringency of immigration policies in countries like Italy in the wake of the rightward shift in European politics.

Clustering and Analysing Relevant Policy Dimensions of Populist, Left-Wing, Centrist, and Right-Wing Parties across Europe

ABSTRACT This paper is a configurational analysis that creates a new theoretical elaboration of populist parties in Europe in terms of policy choices. The forms of populism that we can see in contemporary Europe are new, relevant and do not have a theoretical representation in the literature. This paper also provides a clearer understanding of the characteristics of populist and anti-establishment parties in Europe, which can provide valuable insights into likely responses to reformed policy environments. To do so, the paper analyses policy positions connected to the populist literature for 242 parties in Europe in 2014 and 2019 using the Chapell Hill Expert Survey and the PopuList Survey data. Groups of parties with similarly held positions in 2014 and 2019 are identified using cluster analysis to investigate whether differences in positions are defined predominately according to a national, east–west, right–left faction or other criteria. The result highlights that rather than across a classical right–left divide connotation, Europe can be divided into four clusters: right-wing populists, a moderate pro-Europe left, a pro-Europe pro-liberalism centre and an intersectional left based on identity politics. Overall, the moderate left and the centrist liberalism centre are the most common parties across Europe, and the other two factions seem to be born as a reaction to these two. However, the other two factions are growing over the years, especially the populist right-wing in Central and Eastern Europe. This brings to light serious policy implications for the future of the European Union and for considering populism simply as a discursive matter.

Civilizational Populism in Domestic and Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey

This article investigates whether Turkish populism has undergone a ‘civilizational turn’ akin to what Brubaker, Haynes, Yilmaz, and Morieson have described occurring among populist parties in Europe and North America. The article applies Yilmaz and Morieson’s definition of ‘civilizational populism’ to Turkey under the rule of the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) in order to determine whether the party conforms to this definition. The article investigates how the AKP, an Islamist and populist political party lead by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has increasingly incorporated what we term ‘civilizational populism’ into its discourse. The article shows the impact of civilizational populism on Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy under the AKP rule. The article finds that the AKP has increasingly, and especially since the 2013 Gezi Park protests and the mysterious coup attempt in 2016, construed opposition between the Turkish ‘self’ and the ‘other’ not in primarily nationalist terms, but in religious and civilizational terms, and as a conflict between the Ottoman-Islamic ‘self’ and ‘Western’ other. Furthermore, the article finds that the AKP’s domestic and foreign policies reflect its civilizational populist division of Turkish society insofar as the party is attempting to raise a ‘pious generation’ that supports its Islamizing of Turkey society, and its nostalgic neo-Ottomanist power projections in the Middle East. Finally, the paper discusses how the AKP’s civilizational populism has become a transnational populist phenomenon due to the party’s ability to produce successful television shows that reflect its anti-Western worldview and justify its neo-Ottoman imperialism in the Middle East.

Investigating the discourse of right-wing populists

Right-wing populist parties in Europe have developed an electoral agenda based on strengthening state border control. How do these parties adapt their discourse in cross-border regions characterized by strong economic interdependences? We spoke to Dr Christian Lamour and Professor Oscar Mazzoleni about their work in analysing populist discourse in cross-border regions

Initiatives opposing populist parties in Europe: types, methods, and patterns

Initiatives opposing populist parties in Europe: types, methods, and patterns

The Problem of Immigration in the Program Documents of Right-Wing Populist Parties in Europe in the First Quarter of the 21st Century

The Problem of Immigration in the Program Documents of Right-Wing Populist Parties in Europe in the First Quarter of the 21st Century

Building extreme right discourses on Twitter for non-campaign periods: insights from populist leaders across Europe

The growing success of extreme right-wing populist parties changed the political state of play in Europe, which has been widely studied by the literature. Populist parties apply a particular communication style, based on simple and non-mediated messages on social media that promote distrust in public institutions. However, the ways in which these strategies are applied for non-campaigns weeks remain little addressed by academia, as well as its development in small countries. This study examines how far-right leaders from European countries with different sizes and historical extremist backgrounds used Twitter during a non-campaign period (29 September 2020 to 28 February 2021). Specifically, we analyze the issues (issue frame), strategies (game frame), and propaganda mechanisms employed through a mixture of quantitative and qualitative approaches. The sample includes the messages posted on Twitter (n=1346) by the leaders of the main far-right parties in France (Rassemblement National), Austria (FPÖ), Germany (AfD), Spain (Vox), and Portugal (Chega!). A manual content analysis was applied, allowing comparison of countries with different traditions regarding the Extreme Right. The results show a common pattern of anti-migration messages as the main topic for their communication style, but some differences are found in terms of agenda and propaganda. The most recent parties (AfD, Vox, and Chega!) rarely use Twitter tools, which means leaving behind the interactive capacity of social media; meanwhile, the agenda is less thematic in the Austrian and Portuguese cases. Our research contributes to discussions about the communication practices of far-right populist parties in Europe, identifying trends by country as the binary opposition between the people and the elite is not expressed through the same type of propaganda.

Mainstream party agenda-responsiveness and the electoral success of right-wing populist parties in Europe

ABSTRACT Scholars link the electoral success of right-wing populist parties to a programmatic crisis of representation for mainstream parties, which arguably do not put their voters’ most important issues on the agenda. We have little knowledge about whether these two assumptions hold: To what extent is there a low agenda-responsiveness of mainstream parties, and in how far is their agenda-responsiveness related to the electoral success of right-wing populist parties in Europe? We conceptualize the programmatic crisis of representation as a lack of mainstream party agenda-responsiveness due to dwindling linkage, changing lines of political conflict, and the tension between responsiveness and responsibility. We develop a novel measure of issue-based agenda-responsiveness comparing voters’ most important problems with salient issues in party manifestos. For 109 elections in 26 member states of the European Union (EU) from 2004 to 2019, we find no lack of issue-based agenda-responsiveness between mainstream parties and average citizens, but a lower degree of responsiveness towards the so-called ‘losers of globalization’, especially compared to ‘winners of globalization’. This lower responsiveness, however, is not systematically related to the electoral success of right-wing populist parties whose mobilization contexts are arguably more complex.