Euro-Mediterranean Agreements Research Articles

Social security coordination in Association Agreements

In March 2012, the European Commission adopted a Communication on the external dimension of EU social security coordination. On the one hand, the Commission explained that social security coordination between the EU and rest of the world is dealt with at a national level. On the other hand, the Commission argued that a common EU approach to social security coordination with third countries was under development. This common EU approach to social security coordination consists of a number of elements. One element relates to Association Agreements and Stabilisation and Association Agreements. These Agreements and specific Decisions taken by Association Councils (established by such Agreements) stipulate rules, which govern social security coordination for workers and their families, who move between the EU and the associated country. According to the Commission, once the Association Council Decisions are adopted, the common EU approach to social security coordination will be implemented. Six years after the publication of the 2012 European Commission Communication, questions arise as to whether or not the Association Agreements have been implemented, and the reasons for this.This article seeks to examine and contrast selected Association Agreements and Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs), which provide social security rules for the nationals of the contracting parties. These will include the Ankara Agreement concluded with Turkey, the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, and the SAAs with the Balkan countries. The aim of this article is to provide an overarching overview of the different legal positions that third-country nationals may rely on, based on their nationality, and to explore whether or not Association Agreements have been implemented in terms of social security coordination rules.

Free movement of capital between EU Member States and third countries and the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements: SECIL

Free movement of capital between EU Member States and third countries and the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements: <i>SECIL</i>

Opinion Statement ECJ-TF 1/2017 on the Decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in SECIL (Case C-464/14) Concerning the Free Movement of Capital and Third Countries

This is an Opinion Statement prepared by the CFE ECJ Task Force on SECIL (Case C-464/14), in which the 5th Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) delivered its decision on 24 November 2016, PT: ECJ, 24 Nov. 2016, Case C-464/14, SECIL – Companhia Geral de Cal e Cimento SA v. Fazenda Pública, ECJ Case Law IBFD. following the Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet of 27 January 2016. PT: Opinion of Advocate General Whatelet, 27 Jan. 2016, Case C-464/14, SECIL – Companhia Geral de Cal e Cimento SA v. Fazenda Pública, ECJ Case Law IBFD. The case concerned the discriminatory Portuguese taxation of dividends received by corporate shareholders from their subsidiaries in third states, namely in Lebanon and Tunisia. In a clear and instructive decision, the Court not only clarified the scope and impact of the Treaty provisions on the free movement of capital, but also the legal ramifications of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements with Lebanon and Tunisia.

The effect of macroeconomic instability on FDI flows: A gravity estimation of the impact of regional integration in the case of Euro-Mediterranean agreements

In order to diversify their risks, firms facing uncertainty in their domestic market may choose to increase their investment abroad by transferring production to more stable host economies. By estimating a gravity model of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows from Europe and the Mediterranean region to the four main recipients of FDI in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region from 1985 to 2009, this article tests (1) the extent to which FDI inflows are affected by macroeconomic volatility in the source country and (2) whether regional trade and investment agreements could have increased this FDI sensitivity to external macroeconomic volatility. We find that the incidence of FDI between two countries increases with source GDP instability and with host GDP stability. Moreover, FDI to MENA countries tends to be countercyclical with respect to the source country’s business cycle. We also find that although FDI reactivity to host country’s uncertainty is not conditioned by North–South trade and investment agreements, it becomes negative for South–South regional integration. Last, we show that although the source country’s instability certainly matters when explaining bilateral FDI flows in our sample, its impact may be less important when investments are driven by cost differentials, that is, for vertical investment.

The Effect of Macroeconomic Instability on FDI Flows: A Gravity Estimation of the Impact of Regional Integration in the Case of Euro-Mediterranean Agreements

In order to diversify their risks, firms facing increased demand uncertainty in their domestic market may choose to increase their investment abroad by transferring production to the more stable host economies. Using a gravity model, we test the assumption that foreign direct investment is reactive to macroeconomic instability in both source and host countries in a sample of European and MENA countries for 1985-2009. Using a gravity model form model, we show that the incidence of FDI between two countries increases with source GDP instability and with host GDP stability. We also find that although this reactivity is not conditioned by trade and investment agreements, it must be qualified with respect to the type of FDI, with North-South vertical investment being significantly affected by source country uncertainty. For the same level of cost differential, the incidence of vertical FDI thus tends to be higher when uncertainty is high than when uncertainty is low.

Why are the Trade Gains from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership so Small?

This article shows first that, despite significant trade gains expected from the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements, especially the Barcelona Agreement, actual gains are positive but small. The reasons for such small effects are investigated. They include delays in the implementation of the tariff schedule, the lack of European Union (EU) market access for agricultural products, the persistence of non-tariff barriers, the lack of regional integration in terms of services and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), the role of rules of origins, the impact of inappropriate specialization, etc. This appraisal makes it possible to suggest several policy options which are necessary to optimize the effects of the Euromed partnership. In this regard, the Arab Spring creates new opportunities to reinforce trade integration in this area.