This study adopts a realist approach to explore how geopolitical factors influence the European Union’s (EU) decision to expand into neighbouring regions of strategic importance or vulnerability to major powers’ influence. It specifically examines the obstacles posed by the absence of a unanimous stance on „pre-scheduled” accessions, as seen in the earlier „eastern enlargement” rounds. It is argued that the present geopoliticized EU enlargement policy seems to be guided by realist factors, although it is characterized by an incongruity between strategic rhetoric and strategic actions. This inconsistency between expressed intentions and actual measures is more evident in the Western Balkans than in the Eastern neighbourhood. Through the selected, broadly set realist elements – groupism, egoism and power-centrism – the EU’s foreign policy strategy and behaviour are examined, searching for a gap between the discursive and practical domains in both regions. The research considers that the EU’s response has not predominantly been strategic but rather tactical, reflecting the enlargement policy’s longstanding deficiencies, coupled with the urgent need to extend commitments to the eastern partners facing immediate security threats. Such tendencies are disadvantageous for the Western Balkans, which became a lower priority for the EU despite its chronological precedence in the enlargement domain. While ideally, both enlargement regions should be granted an „accession timetable” along with on-ground democratic reforms, the authors highlight that due to differing geopolitical dynamics and pressure, the outcomes for the two regions may either diverge in terms of potential favouring of the new candidates or, perhaps more likely, converge – meaning that the accession of either region might be postponed once the geopolitical urgency subsides.