Scientific Ethos Research Articles

The Politicization of Science and Technology: Its Implications for Nanotechnology

The development of nanotechnology intensifies challenges to the traditional understanding of how to pursue scientific and technological knowledge. Science can no longer be construed simply as the ideal of the quest for truth (i.e., "pure science"). Science has become the source of economic power and political power. In this paper, I argue that nanotechnology is a cardinal exemplar of "this politicization." At the same time, I assert that this new scientific ethos offers the possibility of a better integration of ethical and philosophical reflections at the core of scientific and technological development.

Interactive dualism as a partial solution to the mind–brain problem for psychiatry

With the collapse of the psychoanalytic and the behaviorist models, and the failure of reductive biologism to account for mental life, psychiatry has been searching for a broad, integrative theory on which to base daily practice. The most recent attempt at such a model, Engel's 'biopsychosocial model', has been shown to be devoid of any scientific content, meaning that psychiatry, alone among the medical disciplines, has no recognised scientific basis. It is no coincidence that psychiatry is constantly under attack from all quarters. In order to develop, the discipline requires an integrative and interactive model which can take account of both the mental and the physical dimensions of human life, yet still remain within the materialist scientific ethos. This paper proposes an entirely new model of mind based in Chalmers' 'interactive dualism' which satisfies those needs. It attributes the causation of all behaviour to mental life, but proposes a split in the nature of mentality such that mind becomes a composite function with two, profoundly different aspects. Causation is assigned to a fast, inaccessible cognitive realm operating within the brain machinery while conscious experience is seen as the outcome of a higher order level of brain processing. The particular value of this model is that it immediately offers a practical solution to the mind-brain problem in that, while all information-processing takes place in the mental realm, it is not in the same order of abstraction as perception. This leads to a model of rational interaction which acknowledges both psyche and soma. It can fill the gap left by the demise of Engel's empty 'biopsychosocial model'.

Peirce on Educational Beliefs

This article contends that Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) may enhance our understanding of educational beliefs and that Peirce’s logic may be a tool to distinguish between a dogmatic and a pragmatic justification of such beliefs. The first part of the article elaborates on Peirce’s comprehension of beliefs as mediated, socially situated and future-oriented. The second part points to how Peirce promotes his “method of inquiry” as an ethos of science. The method is not judged by the conclusions it lead to or by the knowledge it may produce. Contrary, as the results are unavoidably provisional and rectifiable, Peirce holds the method productive due to the norms guiding the inquiry: (1) the pragmatic principle, (2) the social principle, (3) fallibilism and (4) abduction. In sum, when adopting a peircean conception, educational research, theory building and practice should be characterized as a mutual commitment towards shared processes of joint learning. In that, Peirce’s method of inquiry may be fruitful in sorting dogmatism from pragmatism.

Candor and Integrity in Science

In the pursuit of researches and in the reporting of their results, the individual scientist as well as the community of fellow professionals rely implicitly on the researcher embracing the habit of truthfulness, a main pillar of the ethos of science. Failure to adhere to the twin imperatives of candor and integrity will be adjudged intolerable and, by virtue of science’s self-policing mechanisms, rendered the exception to the rule. Yet both as philosophical concepts and in practice, candor and integrity are complex, difficult to define clearly, and difficult to convey easily to those entering on scientific careers. Therefore it is useful to present operational examples of two major scientists who exemplified devotion to candor and integrity in scientific research.

Scientific personae in American psychology: three case studies

This paper studies the constellations of attitudes––sentimental, moral, epistemological, and social––that three leading psychologists active in turn-of-the-twentieth-century America took to be essential to the production of scientific knowledge. William James, G. Stanley Hall, and Edward Titchener located the virtues and traits proper to the scientific frame of mind, and combined them into normative images of the man of science, or, ‘scientific personae’ as I use the term here. I argue that their competing formulations of the scientific ethos informed their psychological practice and epistemological commitments. James, Hall, and Titchener mobilized their representations of the man of science in order to reconfigure the field of psychology and redefine its boundaries, as well as to promote forms of sociability and define the proper role of scientists both within the academy and in the wider polity.

Robert K. Merton and Philosophy of Science

It has, on occasion, been noted that philosophers of science do not hold sociologists of science in universally high esteem. One sociologist of science who largely escaped the scorn of philosophers and even sometimes earned their praise was Robert Merton. Philip Kitcher, for example, in 1992, claimed that Merton's work compiled in The Sociology of Science was 'the most significant work in sociology of science' in the 20th century (Kitcher, 1992: 82).1 A likely reason for this is obvious enough: Merton's account of the ethos of science is easily read as a sociological account consistent with perhaps even partially explanatory of the success of science as the locus of reliable knowledge of nature. Since one of the major projects of philosophy of science is to explain that ability of science to achieve reliable knowledge of nature, Merton's project could be seen as no rival to, and perhaps as a resource for, philosophy of science. The terms of Merton's ethos of science disinterestedness, universality may well have been analytic terms in Merton's own usage, but they are sufficiently like the hortatory, epideictic terms of philosophy of science as to engender widespread philosophical agreement that Merton had uncovered at least some of the genuine values of science. Moreover, even a logical empiricist, such as Carl G. Hempel, could learn to speak Mertonian language of latent functions in order to vouchsafe the knowledge-status of the results of science in the absence of explicit instrumental rationality within science. Hempel had this to say about the consequences of Thomas Kuhn's quasi-Darwinian account of science in the postscript to the second edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Hempel, 2001: 370):

How to Win the Nobel Prize: An Unexpected Life in Science (review)

Reviewed by: How to Win the Nobel Prize: An Unexpected Life in Science Barbara Culliton J. Michael Bishop . How to Win the Nobel Prize: An Unexpected Life in Science. The Jerusalem—Harvard Lectures. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003. xiii + 271 pp. Ill. $27.95 (0-674-00880-4). J. Michael Bishop is a modest and generous and modestly famous man. On 9 October 1989, at 3:00 A.M., he received the call from Stockholm that leading scientists cannot help but covet: he had won the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for demonstrating that genes in otherwise normal cells can, when incited, cause cancer. Excited colleagues at the University of California, San Francisco, where Bishop (now chancellor) spent most of his academic life, scheduled a press conference for 11:00 that morning. But Bishop already had plans, and the Nobel Prize was not about to change them. He had tickets for a [End Page 752] "crucial playoff game between the Chicago Cubs and the San Francisco Giants baseball teams," he recounts in How to Win the Nobel Prize, a charming book about his life that, in turns, has been devoted to research, politics, institutional leadership, the public understanding of science, and baseball: "Let the record show that I am an ardent Giants fan. I was unflinching: the press conference was moved to 8:30 A.M. so that I could arrive at the ballpark in time for batting practice, an essential ritual for the cognoscenti" (p. 4). In an anecdote that accompanies his story about the baseball game, Bishop touches astutely on one of the things that keep people away from science and scientists—namely, complex facts: "The Giants won the game and, thus, the National League Championship when Will Clark drove a two-out single 'up the middle' off a no-balls and two-strike pitch from Mitch Williams. I will remember that piece of trivia long after I have forgotten Avogadro's number (a physical constant of some use to scientists, but that does not come readily to mind even now)" (p. 4). In a world in which scientists often seem remote or even fearsome, Bishop establishes by the fourth page of his book that it is possible to engage in highly original experiments with chicken viruses that eventually establish an important principal of cancer; to win the Nobel Prize; and to be a normal human being too. He writes with grace and ease, packing into a book of fewer than three hundred pages a comprehensive and readily accessible account of his research, the ideal social ethos of science, national politics, and the relationship between science and culture. Bishop shared the prize with Harold E. Varmus, who joined his UCSF laboratory in 1970 as a postdoctoral fellow but quickly became a colleague. As Bishop writes: "Our relationship evolved rapidly to one of equals," (p. 54) and before long "we became a hyphenated self that gave its name to a social organism—the 'Bishop-Varmus' laboratory," (p. 55) that was the center of study oncogenes. First they isolated a gene, called SRC (pronounced "sark," for sarcoma), from a chicken tumor virus. Subsequently they showed that oncogenes exist in many kinds of tumors, and established a genetic paradigm for cancer. Bishop's explication of the science of tumor genes is one of the best there is. And his description of the defining moment in the laboratory exemplifies his generosity and gentle spirit: he recalls a young scientist who, on the night of Saturday, 26 October 1974, completed a crucial experiment demonstrating that normal DNA contains gene sequences related to the SRC gene that transforms healthy cells into malignant ones. "Where was I at the moment of magic?" Bishop asks; probably home in bed, giving his student the satisfaction of not having to share the magic moment with anyone else, he says without a trace of envy. As his life in science progressed, Bishop embraced a lesson that many in the ivory tower resist: funding for science comes from Congress, members of the House and Senate are creatures of politics, and if scientists want continued support they had better become adept at speaking out in their own interest (which Bishop...

The Rhetoric of Junk Science

In this article, a biochemist and a rhetorician collaborate to define "junk science." They apply that definition as they rhetorically analyze a book that makes strong claims about endocrine disruption (Our Stolen Future) and a website developed to embarrass those claims (Our Swollen Future). This article argues that junk science and accusations of junk science evince ideologicaVeconomic motives and pronounced efforts to construct, or assail, scientific ethos.

Soviet biology, scientific ethos and political engagement: Belgian university professors and the Lysenko case

The Lysenko case has often been singled out as an extreme example of Stalinist ideology during the ‘cultural’ cold war. This Russian plant-breeder gained support from the Soviet authorities by stating that hereditary influences and characteristics of plants could be influenced by environmental factors – the opposite of the assertions of classic ‘bourgeois’ genetics. In the Soviet Union, and also in Western communist parties, scientists were asked to accept and defend Lysenkoism, and thus ‘combine’ their intellectual integrity with their political convinctions. Relations between communist parties and intellectuals have been difficult throughout the years; in Belgium, moreover, the communist party and the workers’ movement in general were among the most ouvriériste in Western Europe, with a very modest theoretical basis or intellectual tradition of dialectics. Political evolutions in the 1930–40s and war experience did however persuade quite a few academics of the Brussels University to join the Belgian Communist Party, in which they were soon to be confronted with their ambiguous intellectual position, as both communists and scientists.

Traditional healing systems and the ethos of science

This paper addresses the challenge posed to traditional Chinese medicine by the ethos of science and explores three related assumptions. First, the ethos of traditional Chinese medicine is incompatible with the ethos of science. Second, the challenge of science to traditional Chinese medicine is represented by the requirement to comply with internationally recognized standards of medical research and practice applied to biomedicine, adopted and implemented by the State. The State requires that the safety and effectiveness of traditional Chinese medicine procedures and medications be ascertained following the methodology chartered by the ethos of science. Third, traditional Chinese medicine practitioners present a third ethos, the “ethos of pragmatic healing” based on the pragmatic acculturation of clinical practice, as an alternative to the ethos of science. This third ethos is an inadequate response to the challenge because it increases the divergence between health care policy requirements of scientific scrutiny and the fostering of traditional Chinese medicine as an icon of Chinese culture. The study is based on data from personal interviews with representative samples of three ethnic populations in Singapore; secondary data from other studies; relevant official data; and documents from biomedical and traditional Chinese medicine organizations. The methods include inductive analysis, multiple correlation and regression, and factor analysis among others. The analysis indicates that the pressure to comply with official health regulations and the inability to succeed under the ethos of science lead traditional Chinese medicine practitioners to respond with an ethos of pragmatic healing that eschews conceptual analysis, ignores the paradigmatic divide with biomedicine, and focuses on “using what works”. This third ethos can only be a temporary response to the pressure to upgrade the practice of traditional Chinese medicine and it does not correspond to pragmatic acculturation commonly found in the population. The ethos of pragmatic healing leaves the challenge of science unresolved and it is likely to increase the level of conflict between the realm of biomedicine (including health care policy requirements of scientific scrutiny) and the ethos of traditional Chinese medicine.

Introduction. Scientific Ethos: Authority, Authorship, and Trust in the Sciences

Ethos is most saliently in sociology a concept of Robert K. Merton's, characterizing the social norms constitutive of science.1 Ethos is most saliently in rhetoric a concept of Aristotle's, referring to the persuasive appeal from the character of the speaker.2 While the classical rhetorical term ethos was quite self-consciously chosen by Merton, sociological accounts of ethos are not obviously compatible with rhetorical ones; the classical rhetorical term seems both peculiarly appropriate to and peculiarly appropriated by sociology of science. The problematic of the terms is not to be circumvented, though, but rather mined by an interdisciplinary scholarship, trained on, for example, the relation of the character of science to the character of those who perform it, the means by which the character of science is represented in the personae of individual speaker-scientists, and the ways [End Page 137] in which the community of scientists is linked to the larger society by virtue of shared values instantiated in the character of science. The aim of this special issue is to illuminate scientific ethos as a key term for understanding the conduct of science.

The Ethos of Science

A travers l'histoire troublee de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale et les liens scientifiques entre geneticiens allemands et danois, l'article demontre les relations dangereuses de la communaute scientifique internationale occidentale avec les scienfitiques et specialistes de la genetique nazis, a la base des theories eugenistes, au mepris d'une ethique scientifique et des normes CUDOS (communautarianisme, universalisme, impartialite et scepticisme organise) definies plus tard par Merton.

Les Nouvelles Formes de Religion dans la Société Globalisée: Un Défi à L'interprétation Sociologique

The author analyses certain forms of religion which can be characterized as “neo-magic-religion”. In the course of the shift towards post-industrial society magic has been updated and religion has been transformed. It is not a question of the “return” of magic but rather of a mutation of institutionalized religion largely in response to the scientific and technological revolution that has occurred within the context of globalization. New forms of religious belonging and of believing “in my own fashion” or “without the Church” are evidence of new types of syncretisms in which Christianity is combined with New Age and indigenous shamanism. Judging by its characteristics, the spirit of “neo-magic-religion” springs from an elective affinity with the ethos of science and post-industrial techniques. The concept of “neo-magic(s)” (in the singular or plural) should be considered as a sociological type based on empirical foundations and a large number of appearances.

The Clothing of the American Mind: The Construction of Scientific Ethos in the Science Wars

The Clothing of the American Mind: The Construction of Scientific Ethos in the Science Wars

Science or marketing at WHO? A response to Williams.

The World Health Report 2000 [1] sought tooutline, for the first time, a consistent frameworkfor assessing the performance of health systemsthat could be used by countries to monitor theirown progress over time, and which would helpcountries learn from each other. It was motivatedby the need to have the debate about appropriatehealth sector policies and reforms guided by thebest available evidence on outcomes. ProfessorWilliams describes Dr Gro Harlem Brundtland’sambition in undertaking this exercise as ‘a worthyone’ and calls the task undertaken by the Report‘ambitious, and potentially very rewarding’. Hismain criticisms focus on the quality of the dataused to measure outcomes. Yet his solution is notto seek better data or to develop better outcomeindicators, but to advocate that further attemptsto measure outcomes should cease forthwith.Moreover, he concludes his piece by impugningthe very integrity of the Organization in seekingto provide evidence for health policy.There is something inconsistent and disquietingin this. It is particularly disquieting whenWilliams claims (based on no evidence at all) that‘internal dissent is stifled’ in WHO and that theOrganization would benefit from more academicdebate. It is inconsistent to argue on the one handthat more academic debate should be stimulatedwithin the Organization while at the same timearguing that WHO’s attempts to focus healthpolicy on outcomes, and to measure these out-comes using the best evidence possible, should becensored. To stifle the search for evidence on thegrounds that current data are weak is totallyinconsistent with the scientific ethos which WHOis trying to pursue and which we believe is thehallmark of academia.Because of Williams’ attack on the integrity ofthe Organization and its management, it is impor-tant to respond to the individual technical pointsmade. They are dealt with in turn.OVERALL ATTAINMENTWilliams takes exception to producing an overallscore rather than confronting people with thetrade-offs between competing objectives. This issimply not relevant. The World Health Report(WHR) provides tables showing attainment on allof the individual components as well as the over-all score. We should not underestimate the intelli-gence of policy makers who, if they wish toexamine the trade-offs, can look at the individualtables as well as the overall scores.It is true that there are some statistically signif-icant differences between respondents from devel-oped countries and those from developingcountries in the weights assigned to health andto inequalities in responsiveness in constructionof the overall index. The difference between

A águia e os estorninhos: Galileu e a autonomia da ciência

A idéia de que a ciência é "livre de valores" pode ser reconduzida à emergência da distinção entre fato e valor no século XVII. Pode-se considerar que essa idéia tem três componentes: imparcialidade, neutralidade e autonomia. Mostramos que partes importantes dessas idéias componentes foram desenvolvidas e defendidas por Galileu, principalmente em suas cartas a Castelli e à grã-duquesa Cristina e em seus livros O ensaiador e Diálogo sobre os dois máximos sistemas do mundo. O argumento de Galileu em favor da autonomia é particularmente poderoso e, embora não tenha a generalidade introduzida por argumentos posteriores (uma vez que seu principal objetivo era o de garantir a autonomia da ciência com relação à autoridade da Igreja), permanece no cerne de todas as defesas subseqüentes da autonomia da ciência. Esse argumento está baseado em três suposições: que o entendimento científico está sujeito a critérios que são independentes da autoridade da Igreja e de qualquer perspectiva de valor; que os cientistas cultivam as virtudes do "ethos científico"; e que (porque usam linguagens diferentes - o argumento dos "dois livros") não pode existir contradição entre os juízos científicos apropriados e as declarações da Igreja. Finalmente, algumas limitações dos argumentos de Galileu são indicadas, sem serem desenvolvidas.

Athena unbound: the advancement of women in science and technology

Why are there so few women scientists? Persisting differences between women's and men's experiences in science make this question as relevant today as it ever was. This book sets out to answer this question, and to propose solutions for the future. Based on extensive research, it emphasizes that science is an intensely social activity. Despite the scientific ethos of universalism and inclusion, scientists and their institutions are not immune to the prejudices of society as a whole. By presenting women's experiences at all key career stages - from childhood to retirement - the authors reveal the hidden barriers, subtle exclusions and unwritten rules of the scientific workplace, and the effects, both professional and personal, that these have on the female scientist. This important book should be read by all scientists - both male and female - and sociologists, as well as women thinking of embarking on a scientific career.

The duality of scientific ethos: Deep and surface structures

Aristotle's concept of ethos is primarily one based on civic duty, and as such loses its specificity when extended to the scientific forum. By adapting Aristotle's traditional concept of ethos to contemporary social norms of science, a link can be established between classical theory and contemporary practice. In this essay, I use Robert Merton's theory of the normative conditions of science to perform a meta‐critique of the use of ethos in four case studies. This meta‐analysis reveals the dual structure of ethos as reflected in a surface structure of style and a deep structure of argument.

Overcoming Isolation: Women's Dilemmas in American Academic Science

Science is an intensely social activity. Professional relationships are essential forscientific success and mentors areindispensable for professional growth. Despitethe scientific ethos of universalism andinclusion, American women scientists frequentlyexperience isolation and exclusion at some timeduring their academic career. By contrast,male scientists enjoy informal but crucialsocial networks. Female scientists developnecessary strategies and defences, but manyleave or achieve less success in science whendeprived of necessary interpersonalconnections. There is indication that changewithin departments is occurring, but this isdependent upon institutional leadership.

The Clothing of the American Mind: The Construction of Scientific Ethos in the Science Wars

The Clothing of the American Mind: The Construction of Scientific Ethos in the Science Wars