Ethnic Russian Population Research Articles

Euroscepticism in the Discourse of “Russian Parties” in Estonia

Introduction. The party-political system of Estonia, with traditionally Euro-optimistic elites leading it, was previously characterized by the presence of a number of so-called “Russian political parties”, which traditionally professed Euroscepticism and criticized the European Union as whole or certain areas of its activities. The purpose of the article is to determine the specific features of the Eurosceptic party discourse of “Russian parties” in Estonia. Materials and Methods. The information basis of the paper consisted of the results obtained using a combination of the comparative method (method of comparative analysis) and the method of discourse analysis. A single case study design was chosen for the paper. The data obtained as a result of using the discourse analysis method made it possible to study the indicators of the Eurosceptic discourse of “Russian parties” and process their programs, manifestos, electoral platforms, as well as statements of their high-ranking representatives. Results. It was revealed that the use of Euroscepticism by the analyzed “Russian parties” when targeting the Russian-speaking diaspora of the state in a number of cases (for example, in case of the Estonian Center Party) has shown some efficacy, allowing it to mobilize the electorate among Russian-speaking citizens. However, it was found that for small marginal “Russian parties” in Estonia this did not demonstrate productivity and benefit, since such efforts did not bring them a significant number of votes in elections at various levels. Most of them, adhering to Eurosceptic protest declarations, were never able to take part in “mainstream politics” of Estonia; thereby they failed to implement their Eurosceptic political agenda. Discussion and Conclusion. The results allow us to conclude that a specific characteristic of the Eurosceptic party discourse of the majority of “Russian parties” in Estonia is its focus on pragmatism for ethnic Russian residents living in this state in the form of concrete results that are useful for them: the desire to improve the existing discriminatory position of ethnic Russian population in Estonia through appealing to Brussels, to solve the problem of so called non-citizens, and, finally, to establish good relations between Estonia and its eastern neighbor state – Russia. The results of this study can find application in the academic activities of universities in our country, may be of interest to political and regional scientists studying political processes in the Baltic States.

“Soft Power” of Orthodox Church in Kazakhstan: Narratives, Objectives, Potential

This paper examines the role and potential of the Orthodox Church in Kazakhstan as an instrument of “soft power”. It analyzes the religious landscape in Kazakhstan, the history and resources of Orthodoxy in the country, narratives promoted by the Orthodox Church, and its relationship to the Russian state’s foreign policy interests. Statistical data shows steady growth of Orthodox churches in Kazakhstan despite an overall decline in the ethnic Russian population. Interviews with clergy provide insights into Orthodoxy’s social outreach and cultivation of Russian culture. The paper argues that the Orthodox Church advances narratives that align with Russia’s ideological emphasis on traditional values, inter-faith dialogue, and pan-Russian identity. While Orthodoxy retains significant soft power capabilities, its effectiveness is constrained by wariness of its associations with Russia.

Discrimination Against the Ethnic Russian Population in Latvia: An International Legal Analysis

Discrimination Against the Ethnic Russian Population in Latvia: An International Legal Analysis

Discrimination Against the Ethnic Russian Population in Latvia: An International Legal Analysis

Discrimination Against the Ethnic Russian Population in Latvia: An International Legal Analysis

Russian Foreign Policy in Eurasia and Re-Sovietisation of Ukraine under Putin

This research study analyzes Putin's leadership and its efforts for Russianresurgence as a great power. In its desire to achieve its great power statusback; Russia has formed a more assertive foreign policy. Hence, it deemednecessary for Russian policy makers to re-Sovietize its former republics togain its desired objectives. Ukraine appears to be an important state for thecontemporary grand strategy of the Russian Federation. The annexation ofCrimea in 2014, have certain key drivers, such as the large ethnic Russianpopulation with the real grievances that had created instability, which madeRussia step in and intervene. Putin desired to enhance Russia’s internationalstature and deterring Western involvement in its sphere of influence. Russia'sforeign policy goals under Putin have been formulated upon the militaryadventures of the country, especially in its near abroad to engage the postSoviet periphery in geo-economic and geo-political ties with the RussianFederation. Putin seems determined to achieve a central position for Russiaby using his political ideology and leadership as a source of his vertical powerto affluence in the new geostrategic and economic pole of Eurasia. This studyhighlights Putin's keen interest in the former republic of Ukraine that holds avital position that escalated after annexing Crimea while consideringUkraine's importance in the geopolitics of Eurasia simultaneously.

The Rebuilding of “Greater Russia”: From Kievan Rus’ to the Eurasian Union (Note 1)

The purpose of the present examination is 1) to summarize briefly the evolution of historical Russia as the amalgam of multiple ethnic and cultural communities into a growing imperial domain; 2) to outline more specifically the policies pursued by the tsarist and communist regimes to integrate minority communities into the Russian majority; 3) to examine the impact on Russia of the collapse of the former USSR; and 4) to trace current efforts by the Russian government to reintegrate the disparate parts of the former USSR, including especially regions of other post-Soviet states with a significant ethnic Russian population, into a new “Greater Russia.” Although it will touch on Soviet integration policies that targeted national minorities who, by 1989, represented half of the population, the focus will be on recent and current policies intended to “Greater Russia.”

CACNA1C rs1006737 SNP increases the risk of essential hypertension in both Chinese Han and ethnic Russian people of Northeast Asia.

Voltage-gated Ca2+ channels play a key role in the regulation of arterial tone and blood pressure. The aim of this study was to determine whether the association of calcium voltage-gated channel subunit alpha1 C (CACNA1C) rs1006737 with essential hypertension (EH) exists in both Chinese Han and ethnic Russian populations of Northeast Asia. We used a case-control study of 2 ethnic groups in the same latitude geographical area to investigate the association between the susceptibility of EH and rs1006737 polymorphism. A total of 1512 EH patients and 1690 controls in Chinese Han people (Heilongjiang Provence, China), 250 EH patients, and 250 controls in ethnic Russian people (Chita, Russia), participated in this study. All participants were genotyped using the TaqMan SNP genotyping assay (Agena Company). Baseline characteristics and the minor allele frequencies of rs1006737 vary substantially among common Chinese Han and ethnic Russian people. Allele A was found to be a risk factor for EH in Chinese Han [(odds ratio) OR 1.705, (confidence interval) 95% CI: 1.332–2.182, P < .001] and ethnic Russian (OR 1.437; 95% CI: 1.110–1.860, P = .006). The GA genotype was significantly associated with an increased risk of hypertension (OR 1.538, 95% CI: 1.188–1.991, P = .001) for Chinese Han people, and the AA genotype (OR 2.412, 95% CI: 1.348–4.318, P = .003) for ethnic Russian people. The results of this study indicate that the A allele of the variant rs1006737 in the CACNA1C gene may be a useful genetic marker for EH risk prediction in Chinese Han and ethnic Russian populations.

Religious Policy in Late Imperial Russia: State and Orthodox Church in the Buryat Spiritual Space

The paper analyses the situation that took the most expressed forms since the late 19th century and reflected strengthening criticism from the Orthodox Church against both the Buddhist clergy and the Russian state. The contradictions between the state and the Orthodox policies were caused by differences in principles, since when giving Buddhism some legitimacy the government was guided by the interests of Russia in the east of the Empire, while the Orthodox Church saw its task in suppressing the influence of the Buddhist clergy through the soonest religious and ideological homogenisation of Buryats with the ethnic Russian population

Russia–Kazakhstan Relations in the Early Post-Soviet Era: Explaining the Roots of Cooperation

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan was faced with domestic conditions that made cooperation with Russia rational. Kazakhstan inherited a large ethnic Russian population and a severe economic depression. These conditions affected other countries emerging from the Soviet Union, but only Belarus matched Kazakhstan’s level of strategic cooperation with Russia. President Nursultan Nazarbaev’s dominance of Kazakhstan’s national security agenda offers a partial explanation for the cooperation, but we still need to ask what makes him different from the leaders of other post-Soviet countries that faced the same conditions. Kazakhstan’s pattern of historical development provides the key to understanding the cooperation. The timing of the country’s contact and experiences with the Russian-led empires led to a ‘dominant ally’ image of Russia that continues to decide the two countries’ relationship to the present day.

Why Isn’t Latvia the “Next” Crimea? Reconsidering Ethnic Integration

In the aftermath of Russia's military incursion in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, a flurry of articles predicted the next territorial conquest of President Vladimir Putin's Russian revanchism. High on the list were the Baltic countries, which sit precariously on the edge of Europe and historically have been the “bloodlands” between East and West in author Timothy Snyder's phrasing. More specifically, journalists and analysts pointed to the “Russian enclaves” in northeastern Estonia and southeastern Latvia, where, by many accounts, large ethnic Russian populations were prepared to rise up against Baltic governments with a bit of provocation from across the eastern border. However, six years on, there is little indication that Russian speakers in the Baltic countries are on the brink of causing an internal uprising. While there are multiple factors that can help explain the Baltic “dog that didn’t bark,” this essay considers an often overlooked variable in the equation: the depth of civic and cultural integration among Russian speakers in Latvia.

Parkinson's disease and polymorphisms of the glutamatergic system genes GRIN2A, SLC1A2, and GRIK4

Parkinson's disease (PD) is now increasingly considered as a multi-system disorder associated with multi-neurotransmitter dysfunction, so it is important to search for genetic risk factors that determine different clinical types of this disease. Objective : to investigate the associations of PD with the polymorphic variants of glutamatergic system genes, such as GRIN2A encoding the N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptor; SLC1A2 encoding the glial glutamate transporter; and GRIK4 encoding the ionotropic glutamate kainate receptor. Patients and methods . Examinations were made in 222 patients diagnosed with Parkinson's disease and 318 healthy individuals, who were an ethnic Russian population from the Siberian Region. Genotyping using one single-nucleotide polymorphism was performed in three glutamatergic system genes: the polymorphisms were rs2650427 in the GRIN2A gene, rs4354668 in the SLC1A2 gene, and rs1954787 in the GRIK4 gene. The results were statistically processed using the SPSS Statistics 23.0. Results and discussion . In the group of patients with tremor-dominant PD, the GRIK4 polymorphism rs1954787 showed a considerable increase in frequency of the T allele (66.7%) and a reduction in that of the C allele (33.3%) as compared to their distribution in the control group (42.1 and 57.9%, respectively; χ 2 =7.70; p=0.006). The odds ratio (OR) was calculated for all of the genotypes and alleles of the investigated polymorphisms; the ratio showed that the C allele of the GRIK4 polymorphism rs1954787 had a protective effect (OR, 0.36; 95% CI, 0.17–0.76), whereas the T allele (OR, 2.75; 95% CI, 1.32–5.75) and the homozygous TT genotype (OR, 3.40; 95% CI, 1.21–9.53) were found to predispose to the development of tremor-dominant PD. Conclusion . The found significant association of the GRIK4 polymorphism rs1954787 with the tremor-dominant PD may suggest that abnormalities in the glutamatergic system play a role in the pathophysiological processes of the disease.

Gene pool of the Novgorod population: Between the north and the south

We studied the Y-chromosome pool of the ethnic Russian population of Novgorod oblast (Russia) by 49 SNP and 17 STR markers. The total sample (N = 191) consists of four populations of the Novgorod region, including its southwestern (Shelon Pyatina) and eastern (Bezhetsk Pyatina) parts. Altogether, these four populations represent both the area of the Sopki archaeological culture (supposedly linked with the Novgorod Slovens tribe known from the chronicles) and the area of the Long Barrows culture (supposedly linked with the Krivichi Slavic tribe or with Balts). The pronounced genetic differences between southern and northern Russian populations are well known from previous studies; however, the Novgorod gene pool turned out to be neither northern nor southern, but a representative of the intermediate buffer zone. This zone was identified in this study and included a set of regional Russian populations from Pskov in the west to Kostroma in the east. All four studied populations of Novgorod region are genetically similar. The minor differences among them might represent the medieval Slavic migrations along the rivers, which survived despite the massive demographic shifts during the following history. Haplogroup N3 comprises one-fifth of the Novgorod pool of paternal lineages, with conditionally “Finnic” N3a4 and conditionally “East Baltic Sea Coast” N3a3 clades being almost equally frequent. The N3a3 phylogenetic network revealed the specific “Balto-Slavic” cluster of STR haplotypes, which is frequent in Baltic-speaking Lithuanians but infrequent in Finno-Ugric speaking Estonians. The Novgorod haplotypes lie outside this cluster, indicating that the Novgorod population received both N3a3 and N3a4 from Finno-Ugric speaking populations of the region, which, in turn, acquired the Mesolithic gene pool of the Northeastern Europe.

POLYMORPHISM OF VITAMIN D RECEPTOR (VDR) GENE IN SAMPLING OF EUROPEAN RUSSIA AND PRIURALIYE POPULATION

Aim. To assess the genotype frequencies of VDR BsmI (rs1544410) and FokI (rs10735810) in ethnic Russian population and in different groups of the population of Volgo-Kamsky region and Priuraliye. Materials and methods. Samplings of Russians of the European part of RF ( n = 96) and Eastern Finns including Komi-Permyaks ( n = 71), Komis ( n = 190) and Udmurts ( n = 86) were examined. Genotype frequencies were determined using the method of PCR-amplification. Results. Russians differ for the inhabitants of Moscow (without taking into account ethnic origin) by the distribution of VDR FokI ( p = 0,09001), but not BsmI. Eastern Finns in the regions of their historical residence do not differ by VDR FokI and BsmI, but they differ from Russians by BsmI frequencies ( p = 0,0856). Conclusions. The obtained results agree with the assumption about the specificity of VDR allel frequencies in different ethnic groups.

Operation Baltic Fortress, 2016

The Russian intervention in Ukraine can be seen not as an isolated incident, but as part of a larger strategy aimed at re-establishing Russian control and influence over its near abroad – a sphere of influence severely diminished with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Building on its success in Georgia, the Russian Federation moved aggressively in 2014 to seize Crimea and destabilise eastern Ukraine. In each case, Russia leveraged ethnic Russian populations to encourage separatist movements, introducing Russian paramilitaries, intelligence operatives, special forces and eventually conventional forces. In this hypothetical scenario, written as a ‘historical perspective’, Richard D Hooker, Jr examines a possible next move against the Baltic States, where similar conditions apply. Should Russia move against the Baltics, NATO will face its most challenging test in a generation.

Analysis of genetic diversity of Russian regional populations based on STR markers used in DNA identification

We conducted the first genetic analysis of a wide a range of rural Russian populations in European Russia with a panel of common DNA markers commonly used in criminalistics genetic identification. We examined a total of 647 samples from indigenous ethnic Russian populations in Arkhangelsk, Belgorod, Voronezh, Kursk, Rostov, Ryazan, and Orel regions. We employed a multiplex genotyping kit, COrDIS Plus, to genotype Short Tandem Repeat (STR) loci, which included the genetic marker panel officially recommended for DNA identification in the Russian Federation, the United States, and the European Union. In the course of our study, we created a database of allelic frequencies, examined the distribution of alleles and genotypes in seven rural Russian populations, and defined the genetic relationships between these populations. We found that, although multidimensional analysis indicated a difference between the Northern gene pool and the rest of the Russian European populations, a pairwise comparison using 19 STR markers among all populations did not reveal significant differences. This is in concordance with previous studies, which examined up to 12 STR markers of urban Russian populations. Therefore, the database of allelic frequencies created in this study can be applied for forensic examinations and DNA identification among the ethnic Russian population over European Russia. We also noted a decrease in the levels of heterozygosity in the northern Russian population compared to ethnic populations in southern and central Russia, which is consistent with trends identified previously using classical gene markers and analysis of mitochondrial DNA.

Правовое положение русского населения в Республике Казахстан в конце XX — начале XXI в.

Правовое положение русского населения в Республике Казахстан в конце XX — начале XXI в.

Ethnic demography of western siberia At the end of the 20th century

This article presents data and analysis, summarizing the materials of the general censuses, mainly of 1989 and 2002. Special attention is paid to the dynamics of demographic composition and linguistic processes among the indigenous peoples of Western Siberia. The size and the distribution of 38 ethnic groups belonging to the multinational environment of the former USSR (with a size of not less than one thousand people) are presented for every region of Western Siberia (from the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District to the Altai Republic). Different patterns of distribution, clusters of territories with similar ethnic composition, shares of indigenous, migrant non-Russian, and ethnic Russian population in each region are reported. At the end of the 20th century, the most remote territories of the Far North (Yamal) and the mountainous region of the Altai show the greatest specifi city.

Imagined Communities in an Integrating Baltic Region

In December 2006, the Estonian government ordered a bronze statue of a Soviet soldier moved from a square in Tallinn to a more obscure location. The statue, which had been erected in 1947, was regarded by ethnic Estonians as a symbol of Soviet occupation and had become an icon of what Benedict Anderson would call old space.1 The statue was perceived to be a symbol of an earlier imperialistic and colonial Soviet occupying force. However, the large ethnic-Russian population in Estonia perceived it as a symbol of liberation from the Nazis, and the Russian Duma responded by denouncing the move. As might be true of a newspaper or a museum, many saw the statue as a tool in promoting an illegitimate identity for many ethnic Estonians.2 The statue's removal would more easily permit the creation (or re-creation) of a new space and a new time for Estonia. Ethnic Estonians, both politicians and the voters who elect them, would consolidate their own imagined community.Investigating Baltic Manifestations of Imagined CommunitiesThe entry of several former Warsaw Pact states into NATO and the EU has made national and ethnic identity issues within these countries more visible and politically sensitive. The nine former Communist societies (with the exception of Slovenia) have a unique perspective on this rapid and large-scale governance and economic change after having spent decades under the political and military tutelage of the Soviet Union. How imagined communities affect the larger European integration movement is not exactly clear. However, public opinion in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia demonstrates that there are differences based on several factors, making the Baltic states an even more distinct part of the former Warsaw Pact countries. Survey data indicate that not every ethnic group within these societies supports joining the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). One factor of possible importance might be the manifestation of imagined communities. Baltic societies are characterized as having pervasive ethnic divisions, with Russians being the dominant minority. Because the region has been considered an important part of the by tsarist Russian, Soviet, and modern Russian policymakers, any further loss of Moscow's political and economic influence caused by integration with Europe would conceivably put greater pressure on the Russian government to react. Concomitantly, minority ethnic Russians living in the near abroad might experience greater hardship, as they are politically and culturally separated from their homeland. In these cases, there is a two-way dynamic as Baltic imagined communities interact not only in a state and regional context but also in an international one.According to surveys, up to the point of accession, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians all saw membership in the EU and NATO differently from other ethnic groups and might have taken a different electoral stance if given the chance. In other words, individual economic and social circumstances, as well as political histories, would have influenced voters' attitudes if plebiscites had been held.In this article, I address why voters in the Baltic countries of the EU may have preferred membership in the EU and NATO-organizations with somewhat different objectives. First, I briefly consider the manifestation of imagined communities in Europe, including the Baltics, before and during the Cold War. Next, I discuss the role that the EU and NATO might have played in reference to imagined communities in the Baltics after the Cold War. After that, I briefly discuss the Baltic experience of economic and military integration. Next, I introduce survey data and several empirical analyses expressing how the existence of imagined communities may have impacted public opinion leading to the accessions of the Baltic countries to NATO. Other economic and political factors, such as personal income and satisfaction with democracy, are controlled for and included in these analyses. …

Nazarbaev and the north: State‐building and ethnic relations in Kazakhstan

Abstract Of all the former Soviet republics, Kazakhstan has what may well be the most untenable interethnic predicament ‐ an ethnic Russian population that is nearly as large as the ethnic Kazakh population. The Russians, moreover, constitute a majority of the population in the northern part of the country, which borders the Russian republic. Having the unenviable task of nation‐building in an increasingly fragmented multi‐ethnic environment, Nazarbaev has made his strategy clear: build a strong unitary Kazakh state by steadily increasing control over the Russian‐dominated provinces of the north. Kazakh action in the north, and Russian response, will determine whether there is a future for a multinational Kazakhstan.