Essentialist Reasoning Research Articles

The development of social essentialist reasoning in Iran: Insight into biological perception, cultural input, and motivational factors.

People express essentialist beliefs about social categories from an early age, but essentialist beliefs about specific social categories vary over development and in different contexts. Adapting two paradigms used with Western samples to measure social essentialism, we examined the development of essentialist beliefs about seven social categories (gender, race, nationality, religion, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and team fan bases) among 5- to 10-year-old children (N = 88) and adults (N = 273) in Iran, a population that is underrepresented in psychology research. Focusing on natural-kind reasoning, we investigated the relative contribution of biological perception of social categories as well as cultural and motivational factors in the development of essentialist beliefs about these categories. Our findings suggest that biological perception of social categories plays a key role and that cultural and motivational factors become more relevant in essentialist reasoning about social categories that are not perceived as biologically marked. The developmental patterns of essentialist reasoning in our study also closely parallel those found in other cultures, namely the United States and Turkey, further suggesting the primary role of biological perception of social categories in natural-kind reasoning about the social world. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Supplemental Material for The Development of Social Essentialist Reasoning in Iran: Insight Into Biological Perception, Cultural Input, and Motivational Factors

Supplemental Material for The Development of Social Essentialist Reasoning in Iran: Insight Into Biological Perception, Cultural Input, and Motivational Factors

Can essences mix? An essentialist theory of genetic hybrids in the human and animal domain

This paper reviews research on biological essentialist beliefs and what these entail for perceiving genetic hybrids. It is suggested that hybrid perception results from the characteristics of essentialist reasoning, according to which living beings are endowed with a specific identity as a member of a natural kind. The most important elements of attributing an essence onto an individual are its perceived causal power to determine group membership, being immutable, discrete with regard to an individual's membership in exactly one category, making members of a category appear homogeneous, and ensuring intergenerational stability. Mixing two essences as in genetic engineering strips the hybrid of an unambiguous identity in perception, and results in its devaluation. Such devaluation seems to occur on a non-conscious level and across cultures. The basic claims not only hold for animals but also apply to the human domain and to inter-ethnic procreation, primarily for respondents with conservative worldviews.

How essentialist reasoning about language acquisition relates to educational myths and policy endorsements

How people conceptualize learning is related to real-world educational consequences across many domains of education. Despite its centrality to the educational system, we know little about how the public reasons about language acquisition, and the potential consequences for their thinking about real-world issues (e.g., policy endorsements). The current studies examined people’s essentialist beliefs about language acquisition (e.g., that language is innate and biologically based), then investigated how individual differences in these beliefs related to the endorsement of educational myths and policies. We probed several dimensions of essentialist beliefs, including that language acquisition is innate, genetically based, and wired in the brain. In two studies, we tested specific hypotheses regarding the extent to which people use essentialist thinking when reasoning about: learning a specific language (e.g., Korean), learning a first language more generally, and learning two or more languages. Across studies, participants were more likely to essentialize the ability to learn multiple languages than one’s first language, and more likely to essentialize the learning of multiple languages and one’s first language than the learning of a particular language. We also found substantial individual differences in the degree to which participants essentialized language acquisition. In both studies, these individual differences correlated with an endorsement of language-related educational neuromyths (Study 1 and pre-registered Study 2), and rejection of educational policies that promote multilingual education (Study 2). Together, these studies reveal the complexity of how people reason about language acquisition and its corresponding educational consequences.

Beyond Biological Essentialism: White Nationalism, Health Disparities Data, and the Cultivation of Lay Agnotology

ABSTRACT Scholars and practitioners position health disparities research as an important tool for redressing race-based inequities and re-conceptualizing racialized health outcomes in non-essentialist terms. Given this context, we explore a peculiar phenomenon, which is the circulation of such research among white nationalists. We discover that white nationalists incorporate and respond to health disparities research not solely to defend racist and essentialist reasoning, but also to project a discourse that indicts the science establishment for ostensibly incorporating liberal politics, corrupting inquiry, and obfuscating understanding of biology in the name of anti-racism or social constructionism. We term this practice “lay agnotology,” as it involves white nationalists capitalizing on their role as non-specialists to charge the health disparities field and its expert contributors with an alleged set of institutionalized biases that produce ignorance about the “truth” of race. We connect this finding to the literature on racialized ignorance, as it demonstrates how stories about the institutional nature of science can be as central to myth-making about race as stories about the scientific nature of people.

Türkiye’den Bir Örneklemde Cinsiyet, Irk ve Dile Dayalı Esasçı Düşüncenin Gelişimi

Developmental studies suggest that children think in essentialist terms about social categories and view social category membership as natural and stable. This study aims to examine 6-to-10-year-old children’s essentialist views about gender, race, and language in a sample from Turkey. These are all categories with underlying perceptual markers, but they are likely to differ in terms of their cultural relevance within this context. In addition to these categories, essentialist beliefs about sports team fans were also examined as a reference category. A measure that captures different aspects of essentialist thinking including biology, change, and environment, and was previously used to study essentialist beliefs about different social categories in the same cultural context with a similar age group, was used. The results showed that around the age of 6 years, children did not distinguish among various social categories in their essentialist reasoning; however, with age, they gradually distinguished among some categories. Despite the differences in their cultural relevance within the context of Turkey, gender and race showed very similar patterns in how they were essentialized over age, both overall, and also with respect to different individual dimensions related to essentialist thinking. Essentialist thinking about both of these categories remained relatively stable across age. In terms of language, while overall essentialism scores remained stable across age, a substantial decrease in beliefs about capacity for changing one’s group membership was observed across age, when membership is based on language. Finally, children’s essentialist thinking about sports team fans decreased considerably with age. These findings are discussed in light of previous studies focusing on these categories in contexts, where the cultural saliency of the categories likely differ, in an attempt to offer a better understanding of the mechanisms contributing to the development of social essentialism.

Object Individuation in the Absence of Kind-specific Surface Features: Evidence for a Primordial Essentialist Stance?

ABSTRACT It has been suggested that due to functional similarity, sortal object individuation might be a primordial form of psychological essentialism. For example, the relative independence of identity judgment from perceived surface features is a characteristic of essentialist reasoning. Also, infants engaging in sortal object individuation pay more attention to kind than surface feature information when judging the identity of objects (e.g.). Indeed, previous research found that 14-month-old infants can judge trans-temporal identity even in complete absence of kind-specific surface features. Here, we used another more demanding non-linguistic paradigm to test the limits of these abilities in 14-, 18-, 23- and 36-month-old infants, comparing their performance to recent great ape data. Particularly, we presented infants with two food kinds, whose surface features were then fully transformed to make them look identical. If reasoning according to essentialist principles, participants should select the preferred item despite superficial manipulations. However, only 36-month-olds reliably tracked the preferred item after superficial manipulations. This suggests that, although basic psychological essentialism may emerge early in infancy, more complex forms require domain-general cognitive prerequisites, which only develop in more protracted form.

Intuitive biology, moral reasoning, and engineering life: Essentialist thinking and moral purity concerns shape risk assessments of synthetic biology technologies

The field of synthetic biology heralds a new era in our relationship with nature, as organisms are engineered to meet human goals. But little attention has been paid to potential cognitive constraints on reasoning about such technologies. Across four studies with American adults (N = 649), the present research investigates the proposal that essentialist reasoning and moral purity concerns conspire to shape risk assessments of engineered organisms. Moral purity concerns but not moral harm concerns predict moral wrongness judgments of adding a foreign gene to a plant (Studies 1, 2 & 4), as well as assessments of risk (Studies 1 and 2), and risk of harm from eating (Study 4). Adding a gene from a taxonomically distant organism is considered more morally wrong (Studies 2, 3 and 4), more risky (Studies 2 & 3), and more risky to eat (Study 4), than adding either a gene from a similar organism or a new-to-nature gene. Assessments of the risk of gene spread follow a different pattern, with the new-to-nature gene considered safest (Study 4). The findings support the proposal that gene change is reasoned about as essence change that threatens notions of moral purity, with direct implications for certain types of risk perceptions (eating), but not others (gene spread). The findings elucidate cognitive constraints on risk perceptions of synthetic biology, shed fresh light on essentialist and moral reasoning in a novel biological context, and demonstrate the need to differentiate between both risk context and risk type in cognitive accounts of risk perception.

Why do people believe in a "true self"? The role of essentialist reasoning about personal identity and the self.

Why do many people come to believe that they and others have a true self? We hypothesized that this belief emerges because people routinely rely on essentialist reasoning to understand personal identity and the self. Across eight studies, we found that (a) the features that participants attributed to the true self resembled the features typically attributed to essences (e.g., immutability, informativeness, inherence; Studies 1-4); (b) endorsement of belief in true selves correlated with endorsement of other essentialist beliefs (Study 5); and (c) experimental manipulations of essentialist beliefs in domains other than the self spilled over and affected participants' endorsement of belief in true selves (Studies 6-8). These findings advance theory on the origins and functions of beliefs about the true self, suggesting that these beliefs are, in part, a specific downstream consequence of the broader tendency to explain phenomena in the world in terms of underlying essences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Intuitions about personal identity are rooted in essentialist thinking across development

What aspects of a person determine whether they are the same person they were in the past? This is one of the fundamental questions of research on personal identity. To date, this literature has focused on identifying the psychological states (e.g., moral beliefs, memories) that people rely on when making identity judgments. But the notion of personal identity depends on more than just psychological states. Most people also believe that the physical matter that makes up an individual is an important criterion for judging identity; changes to the physical stuff in a person’s body, even if they are not accompanied by any psychological changes, are judged to change who the person is at some level. Here, we investigate the sources of these beliefs and propose that they stem from the broader cognitive tendency to assume that unseen physical essences make things what they are—psychological essentialism. Four studies provided support for this claim. In Studies 1 and 2, exposing participants to essentialist reasoning led to stronger endorsement of physical continuity as a criterion for personal identity. Similarly, individual differences in participants’ essentialist thinking predicted the extent of their reliance on physical continuity (Study 3), and this relationship was observed even among 6- to 9-year-old children (Study 4). These studies advance theory on the psychology of personal identity by identifying a reason why people assign a central role to physical composition when judging identity.

Bio-logics of Jewishness: media constructions of the nuances of race and ethnicity

ABSTRACT The specific ethno-racial position of Jewishness offers an ideal case study for contemporary U.S. racialisation processes. Despite a proclaimed end to biologisation in a supposed ‘post-racial’ era, essentialist reasoning remains central to U.S. race-making. Employing a content analysis of the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times (2000–2010), I find that biologically rooted constructions of Jewishness occur through appeals to (1) physical definitions based on DNA or phenotype, and (2) subtle biologisation vis-à-vis ancestral claims. Demonstrating both explicit and subtle biologisation expands social scientists’ understanding of race, ethnicity, and Jewish identities.

Development of essentialist thinking about religion categories in Northern Ireland (and the United States).

Social essentialism, the belief that members of certain social categories share unobservable properties, licenses expectations that those categories are natural and a good basis for inference. A challenge for cognitive developmental theory is to give an account of how children come to develop essentialist beliefs about socially important categories. Previous evidence from Israel suggests that kindergarteners selectively engage in essentialist reasoning about culturally salient (ethnicity) categories, and that this is attenuated among children in integrated schools. In 5 studies (N = 718) we used forced-choice (Study 1) and unconstrained (Studies 2-4) category-based inference tasks, and a questionnaire (Study 5) to study the development of essentialist reasoning about religion categories in Northern Ireland (Studies 1-3 & 5) and the U.S. (Study 4). Results show that, as in Israel, Northern Irish children selectively engage in essentialist reasoning about culturally salient (religion) categories, and that such reasoning is attenuated among children in integrated schools. However, the development trajectory of essentialist thinking and the patterns of attenuation among children attending integrated schools in Northern Ireland differ from the Israeli case. Meta-analysis confirmed this claim and ruled out an alternative explanation of the results based on community diversity. Although the Northern Irish and Israeli case studies illustrate that children develop selective essentialist beliefs about socially important categories, and that these beliefs are impacted by educational context, the differences between them emphasize the importance of historical, cultural, and political context in understanding conceptual development, and suggest that there may be more than one developmental route to social essentialism. (PsycINFO Database Record

My Heart Made Me Do It: Children's Essentialist Beliefs About Heart Transplants.

Psychological essentialism is a folk theory characterized by the belief that a causal internal essence or force gives rise to the common outward behaviors or attributes of a category's members. In two studies, we investigated whether 4- to 7-year-old children evidenced essentialist reasoning about heart transplants by asking them to predict whether trading hearts with an individual would cause them to take on the donor's attributes. Control conditions asked children to consider the effects of trading money with an individual. Results indicated that children reasoned according to essentialism, predicting more transfer of attributes in the transplant condition versus the non-bodily money control. Children also endorsed essentialist transfer of attributes even when they did not believe that a transplant would change the recipient's category membership (e.g., endorsing the idea that a recipient of a pig's heart would act pig-like, but denying that the recipient would become a pig). This finding runs counter to predictions from a strong interpretation of the "minimalist" position, an alternative to essentialism.

Are apes essentialists? Scope and limits of psychological essentialism in great apes.

Human reasoning is characterized by psychological essentialism (Gelman in The essential child: origins of essentialism in everyday thought. Oxford University Press, New York, 2003): when reasoning about objects, we distinguish between deep essential properties defining the object's kind and identity, and merely superficial features that can be changed without altering the object's identity. To date, it is unclear whether psychological essentialism is based on the acquisition of linguistic means (such as kind terms) and therefore uniquely human, or whether it is a more fundamental cognitive capacity which might be present also in the absence of language. In the present study, we addressed this question by testing whether, and if so, under which circumstances non-human apes also rely on psychological essentialism to identify objects. For this purpose, we adapted classical verbal transformation scenarios used in research on psychological essentialism (Keil in Concepts, kinds, and cognitive development. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1989) and implemented them in two nonverbal tasks: first, a box task, typically used to test object individuation (Experiment 1), and second, an object choice task, typically used to test object discrimination, object preferences and logical inferences (Experiments 2-4). Taken together, the results of the four experiments suggest that under suitable circumstances (when memory and other task demands are minimized), great apes engage in basic forms of essentialist reasoning. Psychological essentialism is thus possible also in the absence of language.

Evolutionary Ideas Held by Experienced South African Biology Teachers

With evolutionary biology relatively recently introduced into the South African school curriculum, the need arose to explore practising teachers' knowledge of the subject. A number of anticipated as well as unanticipated cognitive and affective barriers to the understanding of evolutionary biology were identified from a questionnaire with open-ended items and administered at the start of a short learning programme on evolution education. The questionnaire was face validated and piloted. Teachers were conveniently sampled and comprised all course participants (n = 57). Responses to the questions were analysed using inductive and deductive coding. These codes were organised into themes, guided by the research question. These themes indicated poor content knowledge, essentialist and teleological reasoning, creationist objections and a perceived racist agenda to the teaching of this subject.

Bilingualism changes children's beliefs about what is innate.

Young children engage in essentialist reasoning about natural kinds, believing that many traits are innately determined. This study investigated whether personal experience with second language acquisition could alter children's essentialist biases. In a switched-at-birth paradigm, 5- and 6-year-old monolingual and simultaneous bilingual children expected that a baby's native language, an animal's vocalizations, and an animal's physical traits would match those of a birth rather than of an adoptive parent. We predicted that sequential bilingual children, who had been exposed to a new language after age 3, would show greater understanding that languages are learned. Surprisingly, sequential bilinguals showed reduced essentialist beliefs about all traits: they were significantly more likely than other children to believe that human language, animal vocalizations, and animal physical traits would be learned through experience rather than innately endowed. These findings suggest that bilingualism in the preschool years can profoundly change children's essentialist biases.

Is it about "pink" or about "girls"? The inherence heuristic across social and nonsocial domains.

The inherence heuristic provides an intriguing and novel explanation for early thought in a variety of domains. Exploring similarities and differences in inherent reasoning across social and nonsocial domains can help us understand the role that inherent thinking plays in the development of human reasoning and the process by which more elaborate essentialist reasoning develops.

Inherence is an aspect of psychological essentialism.

Inherence is not a distinct construct from psychological essentialism; it is one of several underlying beliefs. I propose that inherence is only one entry point to the perception of an essence and posit that context may influence which aspects of essentialist reasoning precede inferring an essence. I also discuss how psychological essentialism can uniquely account for violations of category-based expectancies.

Not So Fast: Reassessing Gender Essentialism in Young Adults

We examined young adults’ essentialist reasoning about gender categories. Previous developmental results suggest that until age 9 or 10, children show marked essentialist reasoning about gender, but this disappears by early adulthood. In contrast, results from social cognition suggest that essentialist thinking about social categories persists into adulthood. To address this discrepancy, 69 undergraduates engaged in a switched-at-birth task under speeded or delayed conditions. Delayed participants made essentialist decisions about physical but not behavioral properties and replicated past findings. Speeded participants showed markedly higher essentialist responding for behavioral properties compared with delayed participants. These findings suggest that gender essentialism does not necessarily diminish in adulthood but instead may be suppressed by more explicit reasoning processes.

Essentialist Reasoning and Knowledge Effects on Biological Reasoning in Young Children

Biological kinds undergo a variety of changes during their life span, and these changes vary in degree by organism. Understanding that an organism, such as a caterpillar, maintains category identity over its life span despite dramatic changes is a key concept in biological reasoning. At present, we know little about the developmental trajectory of children’s understanding of dramatic life-cycle changes and how this might relate to their understanding of evolution. We suggest that this understanding is a key precursor to later understanding of evolutionary change. Two studies examined the impact of age and knowledge on children’s biological reasoning about living kinds that undergo a range of natural life-span changes—from subtle to dramatic. The participants, who were 3, 4, and 7 years old, were shown paired pictures of juvenile and adult animals and asked to endorse biological or nonbiological causal mechanisms to account for life-span change. Additionally, reasoning of 3- and 4-year-old participants was compared before and after exposure to caterpillars transforming into butterflies. The results are framed in terms of a developmental trajectory in essentialist reasoning, a cognitive bias that has been associated with difficulties in understanding and accepting evolution.