Auctions have been categorized exclusively as common value (CV) or private value (PV). Due to different cost structures of buyers and demand uncertainty, few studies would dispute that most real-world auctions have both elements. The well-designed online Hybrid Dutch Auction (HDA), with a transparent e-platform, can tackle collusion, overpayment, entry deterrence, and price discovery in public asset marketplaces.For the first time, this paper models a hybrid auction with both PV and CV components. We nest two auction theory paradigms for the HDA with a two-dimensional signal model and report a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behavior. The findings reveal that: (1) increased competition can mitigate the negative effect of uncertainty about the CV on revenue and bidding behavior; (2). Dynamic inconsistency benefits both parties. (3) Interestingly, the correct answer to the dilemma between attracting more buyers and gathering more information depends on the precision of the seller’s disclosed information.