Equal Moral Status Research Articles

Three Injustices of Adaptation Finance - A Relational Egalitarian Analysis

This primarily diagnostic paper offers, from the perspective of relational egalitarianism, a normative analysis of three major injustices in the context of adaptation finance. Adaptation finance includes payments provided by the affluent countries of the Global North to low-income countries in the Global South, countries particularly exposed to the harms of climate change. Relational egalitarianism is the normative view that interactions between people and between institutions have to respect the equal moral status of every human being. The first injustice, from this perspective, consists in the sheer fact that adaptation measures are required at all to deflect harm from people who did not significantly contribute to the causes of climate change. The second injustice consists in the persisting, even increasing adaptation finance gap, as countries of the Global North do neither provide adequate financial means to reduce climate risks, nor even fulfil their commitments to adaptation finance pledged in the Copenhagen Accord in 2009. The third injustice emerges from current procedures to determine criteria for distributing scarce financial resources that consolidate structural injustice. The paper concludes by providing the contours of a practical response to these injustices that respects the demands of relational egalitarianism.

Rights, Wronging, and Equality of Status

AbstractTwo problems about rights have received so far little attention. One is the problem of identifying a general value in the practice of rights. The second is to see when, if at all, rights violations wrong the right-holder, in a morally significant sense. In the present essay, I address the first question by investigating the second. I first show that if we commit to the two ideas, common in the contemporary philosophy of rights, that claim-rights always correlate with directed duties and that rights aspire to protect interests of the right-holder, we make it hard to explain why rights violations, in general, wrong right-holders. In the final section, I present what I see as a promising solution to the puzzle. I describe a particular social environment (the society of equals) where interacting with others through rights is indeed valuable because respecting rights communicates that one takes seriously others’ equal moral status. In such a society and only in such a society, I conclude, moral agents are required to treat all rights violations as wrongs perpetrated against the right-holder.

Some Challenges for Moreau's Theory of Wrongful Discrimination

AbstractAt the heart of Sophia Moreau's theory of wrongful discrimination is the moral duty to treat others as equals. This article raises some challenges regarding the contours of this duty and suggests some ways to make the theory stronger. In particular, it suggests that we incorporate a cosmopolitan view of the duty's scope, that we illuminate the features at the basis of individuals’ equal moral status to determine its grounds, and that we identify some considerations about important interests to articulate its contents. The relation between Moreau's theory and human rights discourse is also briefly examined, and more engagement with the latter is recommended.

A Basis for Biocentric Equality?

Biocentric egalitarianism is the view that all living things share an equal fundamental moral status qua living things. In light of the well-known problems with past philosophical attempts to argue for this position, this paper proposes a way biocentric egalitarian claims might be understood and possibly vindicated. Relying on frameworks developed in recent discussions of the “basis of equality” in human-centered ethics, the paper argues that thinking of egalitarian claims as justified by (rather than as justifying) social ideals provides the best way of understanding the basis of biocentric egalitarian claims in environmental ethics. The paper first reviews arguments for biocentric egalitarianism and their central flaws and proceeds to survey different models for justifying egalitarian claims among humans. The paper argues the Social Ideal approach to justification is the one most likely to be helpful to biocentric egalitarians.

Constructivist and well-being based justifications of human rights. Rivals or allies?

ABSTRACT Scholars disagree about the proper justification of human rights and which rights qualify as human rights. While some argue for a very limited set of human rights, others defend more comprehensive accounts. In this paper I suggest that a defence of a comprehensive set of human rights can be strengthened by combining constructivist deontological and well-being based teleological justifications. To this end, I discuss two prominent proponents of constructivism and the well-being approach: Rainer Forst and Simon Caney. Forst criticises teleological justifications for grounding human rights in non-universalizable conceptions of the good, such as autonomy, that can reasonably be rejected by others. Constructivism, in contrast, does not rest on any particular idea of the good life and thus allows for greater ethical plurality. I reject this specific criticism, arguing that Caney’s approach ultimately allows for the same plurality. I also highlight that constructivism on its own cannot justify rights of people who are not (yet) able to reason. The well-being approach provides substantive arguments for the rights of these individuals. However, these arguments are made with the framework provided by constructivism. I hold, contra Caney, that Forst’s right to justification is primary in that it is the unavoidable basis from which justice issues can be dealt with in a reasonable way and that the main function of human rights is to protect the equal moral status of persons. I conclude that Forst’s constructivist and Caney’s well-being approach are complementary rather than rivalrous: when combined they provide a more robust justification for a comprehensive set of human rights than considered separately.

Pregnancy and superior moral status: a proposal for two thresholds of personhood

In this paper, I suggest that, if we are committed to accepting a threshold approach to personhood, according to which all beings above the threshold are persons with equal moral...

Contingency, arbitrariness, and the basis of moral equality

AbstractHardly anyone denies that (nearly) all human beings have equal moral status and therefore should be considered and treated as equals. Yet, if humans possess the property that confers moral status upon them to an unequal degree, how come they should be considered and treated as equals? It has been argued that this is because the variations in the degree to which the status‐conferring property is held above a relevant threshold are contingencies that do not generate differences in degrees of moral status. Call this the contingency argument for the basis of moral equality. In this paper, I reject the contingency argument. Instead, I develop an attitude‐based account of the basis of moral equality: according to this account, the basis of moral equality lies in a fitting, basic, and independent moral attitude which is owed to human beings qua moral status‐holders, and provides a coherent and plausible explanation for why the variations above the threshold for moral status do not matter.

Relational egalitarianism and moral unequals

Relational egalitarianism and moral unequals

The problem of equal moral status

A central puzzle of contemporary moral and political philosophy is that while most of us believe that all or almost all human beings enjoy the same moral status, human beings possess the capacities that supposedly ground moral status to very unequal levels. This paper aims to develop a novel strategy to vindicate the idea of moral equality against this challenge. Its central argument is that the puzzle emerges only if one accepts a usually unstated theoretical premise about value and the proper response to value. The premise holds that if the presence of a valuable property warrants a certain kind of response towards its bearers, then every variation in the degree to which the property is present necessarily constitutes a reason for a corresponding variation in the response that is warranted towards its bearers. It argues that despite its intuitive appeal, the premise is not plausible as a general view about the proper way of responding to value, and as a view about responding to the value of rational beings in particular. It proposes an account of the proper manner of valuing rational beings that supports a distinctive version of the so-called threshold approach to justifying equal moral status.

Solidarity in Pandemics, Mandatory Vaccination, and Public Health Ethics.

Mandatory vaccination has been a highly disputed policy for tackling infectious diseases. Here I argue that a universal mandatory vaccination policy for the general public against the COVID-19 pandemic is ethically preferable when grounded in the concept of solidarity, which is defined by Barbara Prainsack and Alena Buyx as an enacted commitment to a relevant respect recognized by a group of individuals with equal moral status. This approach is complementary to utilitarian accounts and could better address other reasonable oppositions to mandatory vaccination. From a solidaristic account, the recognized relevant respect is to end the COVID-19 pandemic as soon as possible. This group of individuals would be willing to carry costs to assist each other in this respect, and a mandatory vaccination policy could be their institutionalized mutual assistance. The costs to be carried include both the financial costs of vaccination and the health costs stemming from potential adverse events and scientific uncertainties. The proposed social health insurance similarity test suggests the degree of coercion the mandatory vaccination policy could undertake within each state's specific legal and judicial context. (Am J Public Health. 2022;112(2):255-261. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2021.306578).

Can prolife theorists justify an exception for rape?

Prolife theorists typically hold to the claim that all human beings possess equal moral status from conception and consequently possess a right to life. This, they believe, entails that abortion is impermissible in all circumstances. Critics characterize this as an extreme anti-abortion position, as it prima facie allows no exceptions, even in cases of rape. Here, I examine whether the prolife claim regarding equal moral status is compatible with a more attractive moderate stance that permits an exception in the case of rape. I show that Judith Jarvis Thomson's analysis of rights can be used to modify the prolife position in this way, but that doing so involves concessions that prolife theorists are unlikely to find acceptable.

Populism on the periphery of democracy: moralism and recognition theory

ABSTRACT Moralism is an often-cited feature of populist politics; yet, as a concept, it remains under-theorised in current literature. This paper posits that to understand the threat that populism poses to democracy, it is necessary to develop this key feature of populism. Essential to discerning what moralism is is the difference between moralism, or moralistic blame, and moral criticism. While moral criticism is a restrained and thoughtful method of holding persons accountable for their actions, moralism amounts to a distinctly punitive form of exclusion: it seeks to undermine the equal moral status of the target of criticism. As a key feature of populism, then, moralism enables a political actor to solidify a conception of the ‘morally-pure‘ while normalising hate and disrespect for particular persons and groups in society. Populism – shaped by the features of anti-pluralism and moralism – therefore presents a clear threat to democracy, especially if we consider pluralism and recognition-respect as two basic principles underpinning democracy itself.

To the Sickest or to the Healthiest?

The COVID-19 pandemic has raised questions about the just allocation of limited medical resources. In this essay, I consider four pressing moral questions raised by the scarcity of mechanical ventilators, using the guiding principle that the primary criterion should be the conviction that each and every human being has equal moral status because each has an intrinsic dignity that makes him or her inestimable and inviolable. I propose that any legitimate criteria for ventilator allocation cannot discriminate among patient populations on the basis of any judgments that are not medically relevant. Instead, ventilators should be distributed solely on the basis of the likelihood that they will benefit patients and enable them to heal.

On the Basis of Moral Equality: a Rejection of the Relation-First Approach

The principle of moral equality is one of the cornerstones of any liberal theory of justice. It is usually assumed that persons’ equal moral status should be grounded in the equal possession of a status-conferring property. Call this the property-first approach to the basis of moral equality. This approach, however, faces some well-known difficulties: in particular, it is difficult to see how the possession of a scalar property can account for persons’ equal moral status. A plausible way of circumventing such difficulties is to explore another avenue for the justification of persons’ equal moral status: moral equality should be grounded in the wrongness of treating others as inferiors. Call this the relation-first approach to the basis of moral equality. This paper aims at providing some reasons as to why this approach should be rejected and clarifying why the property-first approach still represents the most promising way of justifying our commitment to moral equality. Two objections will be pressed against the relation-first approach: first, grounding moral equality in the wrongness of treating others as inferiors gives rise to some disturbing normative implications; second, relation-first accounts cannot vindicate the idea that a range of beings has equal fundamental rights. This, however, is precisely what an account of moral equality is meant to justify. The paper, then, concludes that the relation-first approach fails to provide a plausible answer to the question of the basis of moral equality. Property-first accounts, whatever problems they encounter, are still more viable in principle.

An exploration of Peter Singer and Richard Posner's ethical arguments regarding the moral status of animals, with a specific focus on the use of animals for the consumption of food

The use of animals for the consumption of food is becoming a focus in recent times, due to environmental and animal welfare concerns. There has been an increase in research around the environmental concerns of the mass scale of the production of meat, with meat production in 2018 estimated at 330.51 million metric tons. In the UK alone, 182,000 cows were slaughtered in November 2018 and 108.4 million broiler chickens were slaughtered in October 2018. Many animal welfare groups argue against the inhumane conditions animals go through before they reach our plate. Due to this, a record number of people are reducing meat and animal product consumption, with some research indicating over 1.6 million people in the UK are vegan or vegetarian in 2016. With the questions and concerns around eating meat becoming so prominent today, it seems like the perfect time to revisit the philosophical arguments. This article will explore the global scale of using animals for the consumption of food, through the ethical arguments advocated by philosopher Peter Singer, author of Animal Liberation, of affording animals an equal moral status to humans. It will then consider the arguments advanced by Judge Richard Posner, as a tool to offer a critical analysis of Singer’s ideas.

Designing humans: A human rights approach.

Advances in genomic technologies such as CRISPR-Cas9, mitochondrial replacement techniques, and in vitro gametogenesis may soon give us more precise and efficient tools to have children with certain traits such as beauty, intelligence, and athleticism. In this paper, I propose a new approach to the ethics of reproductive genetic engineering, a human rights approach. This approach relies on two claims that have certain, independent plausibility: (a) human beings have equal moral status, and (b) human beings have human rights to the fundamental conditions for pursuing a good life. I first argue that the human rights approach gives us a lower bound of when reproductive genetic engineering would be permissible. I then compare this approach with other approaches such as the libertarian, perfectionist, and life worth living approaches. Against these approaches, I argue that the human rights approach offers a novel, and more plausible, way of assessing the ethics of reproductive genetic engineering.

On cosmopolitan humility and the arrogance of states

ABSTRACTOne of the potentially most significant objections to a cosmopolitan moral approach charges an essential arrogance: cosmopolitanism disdains particularist moral insights even while – in what is said to be its most coherent form – it seeks to bind all persons within global political institutions. It is argued here that adopting a form of institutional cosmopolitanism actually helps to meet this sort of objection. An appropriately configured such approach will have a conception of equal global citizenship at its core. It will seek to place individuals in relations of political humility, understood not as plain deference to competing moral claims, but as concrete recognition of the equal moral status of others. It will seek to progressively empower as actual citizen equals those whose interests are often ‘arrogantly’ neglected in the current system, and to multiply mechanisms of input and challenge for them over time.

The Moral Status of the Human Embryo.

Moral status ascribes equal obligations and rights to individuals on the basis of membership in a protected group. Substance change is an event that results in the origin or cessation of individuals who may be members of groups with equal moral status. In this paper, two substance changes that affect the moral status of human embryos are identified. The first substance change begins with fertilization and ends with the formation of the blastocyst, a biological individual with moral status comparable to that ascribed to human organs. The second substance change begins at implantation and ends late in embryological development with the formation of the human body, an organism with moral status as a human being. The bioethical implications of each substance change are explored. The Two Substance Change theory is contrasted with continuity theories, which recognize no substance change in embryological development and with fertilization-only substance change theories.

Mental-Threshold Egalitarianism

Mental-threshold egalitarianism, well-known examples of which include Jeff McMahan’s two-tiered account of the wrongness of killing and Tom Regan’s theory of animal rights, divides morally considerable beings into equals and unequals on the basis of their individual mental capacities. In this paper, I argue that the line that separates equals from unequals is unavoidably arbitrary and implausibly associates an insignificant difference in empirical reality with a momentous difference in moral status. In response to these objections, McMahan has proposed the introduction of an intermediate moral status. I argue that this move ultimately fails to address the problem. I conclude that, if we are not prepared to give up moral equality, our full and equal moral status must be grounded in a binary property that is not a threshold property. I tentatively suggest that the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is such a property, and a plausible candidate.

An Assessment of Rights and Affirmative action Policies in India

This article is a contextualized explanation of affirmative action policies and focuses on how the policies have fared in the Indian context. The article has focused on the assessment of the affirmative action or reservation policies as they are referred to in India. The plural Indian society is an ideal example of caste and identity based socio political structure, where contradictions rule strongly and govern the peace of the socio political set up. The reservations have a long history and were seen as a remedy for the diversity discord. Caste had been playing its dominant role as the prime divisive tool and keeping the society heirarchised. The constitution of India had been the central domain of activity where time and again amendments and clauses were added to adjust the provisions for the deprived lot. The Mandal commission brought to light the OBC issue which had been simmering for a while. The OBC demands made the reservation issue highly politicized and complex. Proliferation of groups in the wake of Mandal furore added pressure on the reservation policies and as a result of which, reservation policies were increasingly seen as rights. When assessing the policies, one cannot deny the fact that they have played a significant role in ameliorating the conditions of the underprivileged. There had been redistribution of goods so that those with a history of discrimination were compensated for being deprived of equal moral status. However this had not spread evenly throughout the beneficiary groups. Yet some significant and noteworthy progress has been made, job reservations had enabled them (the deprived lot) to acquire influential roles and their participation had also increased. These positive results are accompanied by their inherent drawbacks. The policies are confronted with the challenge being posed by the narrow sectarian interests who want to use the reservations to foster political ends. The alienation which has been building within the non beneficiaries and the consequent hatred which it amounts to is creating tensions in society. The institutional mechanism of the Indian social and political set up is making every possible effort to have an integrated outlook, and reflect homogeneity as far as respecting individuals without thinking about caste considerations is concerned. What is needed is to make a shift from the rights view and focus on the policy design so as to suit the needs of all. A thorough appraisal of the policy structure is the need of the hour. The article will revolve around the dominant role of caste in the Indian society, followed by the rights and policies as per the Indian constitution and the landmark events in the evolution of reservations in India. The article ends with the assessment of the whole situation prevalent in India.