Epistemic Vices Research Articles

Challenging Prejudice as the Necessary Condition for Testimonial Injustice: Unveiling the Role of Epistemic Vice

ABSTRACT The conception of epistemic injustice as a campaign tool has generated considerable debate. The challenge lies in identifying instances of testimonial injustice within complex real-world situations. Miranda Fricker suggests that credibility deficits and identity prejudice serve as necessary conditions for recognizing testimonial injustice. However, this approach faces conceptual generalisation: certain cases that intuitively seem to fit the definition fail to meet the criteria, while some cases that meet the criteria appear counterintuitive. Addressing this issue by introducing additional conditions alongside the original ones seems ineffective and redundant. Simply reverting to Fricker’s original definition is not a straightforward solution either. Identity prejudice plays a decisive role in Fricker’s establishment of testimonial injustice, but it is itself a broad and vague concept. The blurry boundary between heuristics and prejudices has led to many difficulties. An examination of the nature of prejudice indicates that the initial prejudice condition should be modified. It is epistemic inertia, rooted in our thought processes, that serves as the catalyst rendering heuristics unreliable and triggering various epistemic vices, including identity prejudice. Therefore, the prejudice condition is too narrow, while the superordinate concept of epistemic vice is more fundamental as a necessary condition for testimonial injustice.

Epistemic Hubris

ABSTRACT It is common nowadays for laypeople to take public stances on complex issues, such as the effectiveness of a vaccine or the seriousness of anthropogenic climate change, without any kind of disciplinary expertise. Yet those who do so act as if they were experts in the field, disseminating their thoughts and sometimes also spreading their advice. Scholars have ascribed this phenomenon to various kinds of individuals, such as conspiracy or contrarian thinkers, science denialists, know-it-all experts and celebrities. This paper aims to argue that behind such different manifestations lies a common, independently identifiable epistemic disposition that will be called epistemic hubris that will be fully explained in relation to other epistemic vices already discussed in the literature. Epistemic hubris includes, but is not limited to, overconfidence; it may or not entail arrogance; it is similar to yet distinct from hyper-autonomy and conspiracy thinking. Its peculiarity is that individuals who develop it seem to believe that they can easily become experts, even without special training. This disposition negatively affects individuals’ epistemic conduct, hindering knowledge and true belief formation, and can generate morally relevant consequences when people who falsely consider themselves experts begin to share their mistaken beliefs.

What's Wrong with Wishful Thinking? “Manifesting” as an Epistemic Vice

What's Wrong with Wishful Thinking? “Manifesting” as an Epistemic Vice

On the Intellectual Vice of Epistemic Apathy

ABSTRACT Our aim in this paper is to characterize epistemic apathy as an intellectual vice. The agent who possesses this character trait is led not to intervene to prevent another epistemic agent from forming a false belief when it would be appropriate to intervene. Following the motivational viewpoint on vice, we conclude that epistemic apathy can be cashed out in terms of imperfect epistemic motivations. The apathetic agent possesses bad (or, at least, lacks good) epistemic motives. We show, however, that motivationalism has difficulties accounting for the excess-vice: epistemic paternalism. Following the obstructivism understanding of intellectual vice, we highlight the fact that epistemic apathy does not get in the way of knowledge for the agent who possesses this trait. This goes against our intuition that epistemic apathy is an intellectual vice. To remedy this, we argue that epistemic vices do not necessarily harm the vicious agent.

Epistemic Vice Rehabilitation: Saints and Sinners Zetetic Exemplarism

AbstractThis paper proposes a novel educational approach to epistemic vice rehabilitation. Its authors Gerry Dunne and Alkis Kotsonis note that, like Quassim Cassam, they remain optimistic about the possibility of improvement with regard to epistemic vice. However, unlike Cassam, who places the burden of minimizing or overcoming epistemic vices and their consequences on the individual, Dunne and Kotsonis argue that vice rehabilitation is best tackled via the exemplarist animated community of inquiry zetetic principles and defeasible‐reasons‐regulated deliberative processes. The vice‐reduction method they propose is made up of four distinct yet complementary components: (1) positive exemplarism of epistemic virtue (saints), (2) negative exemplarism of epistemic vice (sinners), (3) direct teaching/instruction, and (4) cognitive apprenticeship. Dunne and Kotsonis argue that this pedagogical intervention appropriately considers learnings deriving from forensic scrutiny of both ideal and non‐ideal interpersonally calibrated zetetic features integral to knowledge acquisition as well as wider societal influences impacting the development of agents' epistemic character. It bridges research on vice epistemology (Cassam's obstructivist theory), social epistemology (corrupted social processes mitigating against vice rehabilitation), virtue epistemology, and moral exemplarism.

Symposium Introduction: Epistemic Vices: Moving Beyond Saints and Sinners

Symposium Introduction: Epistemic Vices: Moving Beyond Saints and Sinners

Deficient epistemic virtues and prevalence of epistemic vices as precursors to transgressions in research misconduct

Scientific research is supposed to acquire or generate knowledge, but such a purpose would be severely undermined by instances of research misconduct (RM) and questionable research practices (QRP). RM and QRP are often framed in terms of moral transgressions by individuals (bad apples) whose aberrant acts could be made conducive by shortcomings in regulatory measures of organizations or institutions (bad barrels). This notion presupposes, to an extent, that the erring parties know exactly what they are doing is wrong and morally culpable, but had nonetheless proceeded to commit wrongful acts. However, a confession of intent to deceived is often not readily admitted by perpetrators of RM. I posit that beyond the simplistic notion of conscious moral transgression, deficits in epistemic virtues and/or the prevalence of epistemic vices have important roles to play in initiating and driving RM/QRP. For the individual perpetrator, deficits in epistemic virtues could lead to or amplify errors in one’s desperate attempt to be accomplished or to excel, and pushes one across the ethical line or down the slippery slope of misconduct. Likewise, a lack of epistemic virtue within perpetrators’ institution or organization could make it conducive for deceitful acts and suppress indications and warning signs for the former. Furthermore, epistemic vices exhibited by reviewers, editors and journals could also promote RM/QRP. In this view, epistemic failings, rather than widespread moral deficiencies of individuals within the research ecosystem, may underlie the prevalence of RM/QRP.

Some vices of vice epistemology

AbstractThe actual or potential epistemic vices of a given discipline or field of study are its disciplinary vices. This paper identifies three actual or potential disciplinary vices of vice epistemology. Vice epistemology explains people's epistemic misconduct by reference to their supposed epistemic vices. Such vice explanations are contrasted with attempts to achieve Verstehen of people's epistemic conduct and understand it from their point of view. Although vice explanations do not preclude Verstehen, vice epistemology is in danger of overlooking alternatives to its preferred mode of explanation. In some cases, Verstehen calls into question the assumption that a person is guilty of epistemic misconduct. Vice explanations also risk attaching insufficient weight to politico‐strategic factors in the explanation of political action. Care needs to be taken by vice epistemologists to avoid intellectual myopia, political naivety, and overconfidence in attributing vices.

Anchors of belonging and the logics of othering of young Finns

ABSTRACT To better understand the ways the youth perceive ‘us’ and ‘them’ in twenty-first-century Western societies, this article looks at belonging and othering in the wider context of research on self-other identification and distantiation by exploring values, as anchors of belonging, and the logics of othering of young Finns. The analysis of interview data (N = 45) shows that young Finns studying in upper secondary education hold values of self-transcendence and openness to change in importance and see people holding values related to conservation and self-enhancement as their other. In their reasoning, the values of conservation and self-enhancement are typically related to and become manifest as (1) epistemic vices, (2) social injustices, (3) decadent behaviors, and (4) alienation from the status quo. These logics of othering are thus not based on identity, (sub)culture, religion, or ethnicity, but on characteristics and ideologies that feel alienating and condemnable, because they jeopardize the values, rights, and wellbeing of others. Furthermore, this article brings forth that while the values of the contemporary young Finns have not changed much compared to the previous generations of youths, their criteria for depicting the other have shifted.

Cognitive Metascience: A New Approach to the Study of Theories

In light of the recent credibility crisis in psychology, this paper argues for a greater emphasis on theorizing in scientific research. Although reliable experimental evidence, preregistration, methodological rigor, and new computational frameworks for modeling are important, scientific progress also relies on properly functioning theories. However, the current understanding of the role of theorizing in psychology is lacking, which may lead to future crises. Theories should not be viewed as mere speculations or simple inductive generalizations. To address this issue, the author introduces a framework called “cognitive metascience,” which studies the processes and results of evaluating scientific practice. This study should proceed both qualitatively, as in traditional science and technology studies and cognitive science, and quantitatively, by analyzing scientific discourse using language technology. By analyzing theories as cognitive artifacts that support cognitive tasks, this paper aims to shed more light on their nature. This perspective reveals that multiple distinct theories serve entirely different roles, and studying these roles, along with their epistemic vices and virtues, can provide insight into how theorizing should proceed. The author urges a change in research culture to appreciate the variety of distinct theories and to systematically advance scientific progress.

The possibility of AI-induced medical manslaughter: Unexplainable decisions, epistemic vices, and a new dimension of moral luck

The use of artificial intelligence (AI) systems in healthcare provides a compelling case for a re-examination of ‘gross negligence’ as the basis for criminal liability. AI is a smart agency, often using self-learning architectures, with the capacity to make autonomous decisions. Healthcare practitioners (HCPs) will remain responsible for validating AI recommendations but will have to contend with challenges such as automation bias, the unexplainable nature of AI decisions, and an epistemic dilemma when clinicians and systems disagree. AI decisions are the result of long chains of sociotechnical complexity with the capacity for undetectable errors to be baked into systems, which introduces a new dimension of moral luck. The ‘advisory’ nature of AI decisions constructs a legal fiction, which may leave HCPs unjustly exposed to the legal and moral consequences when systems fail. On balance, these novel challenges point towards a legal test of subjective recklessness as the better option: it is practically necessary; falls within the historic range of the offence; and offers clarity, coherence, and a welcome reconnection with ethics.

On the Contribution of Cognitive Distortions and Epistemic Vices Awareness to the P4C Applications

Öz: Bilişsel çarpıtmalar çocukluk döneminde oluşmaya başlar ve fark edilip önlenmediğinde bilgi edinme, değerlendirme veya iletme becerimizi engelleyen epistemik kusurlara dönüşür. Bilişsel çarpıtmalar psikolojide, epistemik kusurlar ise ağırlıklı olarak epistemolojide çalışılmaktadır. Hatalı düşünmenin bu iki grubu arasında bir ilişki olup olmadığına dair yeterli bir veri bulunmuyor. Bu yüzden bu çalışma iki temel iddiaya sahiptir. İlki, çocukluktaki bilişsel çarpıtmaların yetişkinlikte epistemik kusura dönüşmesi ve bunların bir karakter özelliği haline gelmesinin birey açısından negatif ve yıkıcı sonuçları vardır. İkincisi, bilişsel çarpıtmalar ve epistemik kusurların giderilmesi epistemik erdemlerin öğrenme süreçlerinde aktif olarak kullanılmasıyla mümkündür. Şayet bu iki sav doğru ise bilişsel çarpıtmaların ve epistemik kusurların giderilmesini ve yerine epistemik erdemlerin kazandırılmasını merkeze alacak P4C uygulamalarının, çocuklarda entelektüel karakter dönüşümü sağlayacağını, öğrencileri eğitimlerinin tüm süreçleri boyunca destekleyeceğini ve sosyal hayata olumlu katkıda bulunacağını düşünmekte haklı gerekçelerimiz vardır. Çünkü çocukluk döneminde bilişsel çarpıtmalarını fark eden çocuk, eleştirel düşünme ve rasyonaliteye yatkın olacak, negatif-otomatik düşüncelerden uzaklaşacak ve farklılıkları tehdit değil bir zenginlik olarak algılayacaktır.

A group identification account of collective epistemic vices

This paper offers an account of collective epistemic vices, which we call the “group identification account”. The group identification account attributes collective epistemic vices to the groups that are constituted by “group identification”, which is a primitive and non-doxastic self-understanding as a group member (Turner, 1982; Brewer, 1991; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Pacherie, 2013; Salice & Miyazono, 2020). The distinctive feature of the group identification account is that it enables us to attribute epistemic vices not just to established social groups (e.g. committees, research teams, juries) but also to loose social groups (e.g. loosely connected people in an echo chamber) when they are constituted by group identification. The group identification account is contrasted with Fricker’s (2010, 2020) influential account, the “joint commitment account”, which focuses on established social groups, and has difficulty in making sense of collective epistemic vices of loose social groups. The group identification account is motivated by the fact that collective epistemic vices can be useful to diagnose not only the epistemic performance of established groups but also that of loose groups in real-life cases, such as echo chamber (Nguyen, 2020), implicit bias (Holroyd, 2020), group polarization (Broncano-Berrocal & Carter, 2021), etc.

Distinctive substantial self-knowledge and the possibility of self-improvement

Quassim Cassam distinguishes between trivial and substantial cases of self-knowledge. At first sight, trivial cases are epistemically distinctive insofar as the agent needn't provide any sort of evidence to ground her claim to knowledge. Substantial cases of self-knowledge such as ‘I know I want to have a second child’ do not seem to bear this distinctive relation to evidence. I will argue, however, that substantial cases of self-knowledge are often epistemically distinctive and, to this end, I will challenge a crucial assumption in the current debate about self-knowledge, namely: if a piece of self-knowledge is based on evidence, it must have been delivered by a detached, theoretical attitude toward oneself (The Detachment Assumption).My case against the Detachment Assumption combines a negative and a positive programme. Regarding the negative aspect, I will first present Cassam's case for Inferentialism; second, I will argue that this view about self-knowledge is at odds with the sort of self-improvement that he vindicates in his analysis of epistemic vices and, third, I will conclude that only by allowing for an engaged relation to evidence, can we make sense of that sort of self-improvement. Regarding the positive programme, I will first examine the sensitivity to the music that is specific of a graceful dancer and, on this basis, outline an attitude toward oneself that, despite involving evidence, is not detached or theoretical but engaged, so that it gives rise to a kind of substantial self-knowledge that is both transformative and epistemically distinctive.

The epistemic vices of corporations

Vice epistemology studies the qualities of individuals and collectives that undermine the creation, sharing, and storing of knowledge. There is no settled understanding of which epistemic vices exist at the collective level. Yet understanding which collective epistemic vices exist is important, both to facilitate research on the antecedents and effects of collective epistemic vice, and to advance philosophical discussions such as whether some collective epistemic vices are genuinely collective. I propose an empirical approach to identifying epistemic vices in corporations, analyzing a large dataset of online employee reviews. The approach has parallels to the methodology for identifying the big-five personality traits. It surfaces epistemic vices that are attributed to corporations by its own members and reduces the number of vices to the minimum required to describe differences between corporations. This approach yields a new taxonomy of epistemic vices for corporations. While two vices identified have close correlates in the existing literature, four others have not been identified at all or only in aspects. Two of these vices are ‘genuinely’ collective in the sense that they can only be attributed to collectives.

Vice epistemology, norm-maintenance and epistemic evasiveness

Vice epistemology studies how character traits, attitudes, or thinking styles systematically get in the way of knowledge, while doxastic responsibility is concerned with what kinds of responses are appropriate towards agents who believe badly. This paper identifies a new connection between these two fields, arguing that our propensity to take responsibility for our doxastic failures is directly relevant for vice epistemology, and in particular, understanding the social obstacles to knowledge that epistemic vices can create. This is because responses to norm violations are an important mechanism by which norms are upheld, and maintaining epistemic norms is crucial for our collective epistemic successes. This paper then identifies a new kind of vice, one which is bad precisely because of the way it undermines the epistemic norms that our blaming practices help maintain, and thus the benefits that said norms create. I call this vice epistemic evasiveness, and it concerns the attitude that one takes towards their own performance as an epistemic agent. Evasiveness is bad because it creates uncertainty about which agents are reliable, it prevents holders of this attitude from learning from their mistakes, and it signals to third parties that the norm is not being upheld, making them less likely to follow the norm.

Tanesini on truth and epistemic vice

ABSTRACT Alessandra Taniesini's ‘The Mismeasure of the Self’ develops an internalist account of epistemic vice. On this view, epistemic vices are grounded in attitudes towards the self: fatalism, self-satisfaction, narcissistic infatuation, and self-abasement. The account is internalist insofar as it claims to ground both the nature and the normativity of vice within the subject's skull. In this paper, I argue against vice internalism: epistemic vices, I show, need a normative hook outside the skull to explain their vicious nature. In other words, the ‘mis’ in the ‘mismeasure’ of the self demands externalist unpacking.

On critical African philosophy: Mapping the boundaries of a good philosophical tradition

This essay deploys the existence of epistemic vices in the trajectory of Western philosophy to map the erasures and complicities that accompanied the emergence of contemporary African philosophy (CAP1). It argues that the complicity of CAP1 in the hyperspecialization and academic self-absorption that marked the professionalization of Western philosophy, makes it difficult to attend to the conditions for its own possibility. CAP1 arguably needs to make a critical turn into critical African philosophy (CAP2), understood as a metatheoretical and metaphilosophical framework for an internal transformation that is emancipatory. CAP2 is envisioned, first, as a critique of postcoloniality that rehumanizes the autonomous African subject; and, second, as an ethicopolitical project that explores the cracks between philosophy as theoretical practice and philosophy as praxis in opening up the spaces for postcolonial emancipation. The essay identifies three conditions that instigate the emancipatory possibility of philosophizing on the continent: the spatial/platial, demosophic, and political.

Collective vice and collective self-knowledge

Groups can be epistemically vicious just like individuals. And just like individuals, groups sometimes want to do something about their vices. They want to change. However, intentionally combating one’s own vices seems impossible without detecting those vices first. Self-knowledge seems to provide a first step towards changing one’s own epistemic vices. I argue that groups can acquire self-knowledge about their epistemic vices and I propose an account of such collective self-knowledge. I suggest that collective self-knowledge of vices is partially based on evidence that a group can generate by performing internal promptings. Whereas these promptings are done mentally in individual self-knowledge, these promptings are done by interactions of group members in the collective case. The group can then acquire inferential self-knowledge of their vices based on the evidence generated by the interactions within the group. Groups thereby bring themselves into a position from which they can combat and change those vices intentionally.

The Epistemic Vices of Democracies in the Age of Populism

The Epistemic Vices of Democracies in the Age of Populism