Epistemic Utility Research Articles

Better guesses

AbstractIt has recently become popular to analyze scenarios in which we guess, in terms of a trade‐off between the accuracy of our guess (namely, its credence) and its specificity (namely, how many answers it rules out). Dorst and Mandelkern describe an account of guessing, based on epistemic utility theory (EUT), in which permissible guesses vary depending on how one weighs accuracy against specificity. We provide a minimal formal account of guessing that: (i) does not employ EUT, but rests on how such trade‐offs are treated in the sciences; (ii) is relatively parsimonious; and (iii) is consistent with a variety of more specific models that describe what an agent is doing when they (rationally) guess. Our account also recovers patterns of guessing and predictions about typical outcomes of guessing, as identified by Dorst and Mandelkern. Furthermore, we focus on how permissible guesses can be improved upon, via changes in an agent's credence distribution. Such better permissible guesses can be generated in solving Fermi problems—guessing problems of a type that has received almost no attention in the philosophical literature—which we also analyze. Our account strengthens the case for understanding guessing (now, very broadly considered) in terms of accuracy‐specificity trade‐offs.

Betting on Conspiracy: A Decision Theoretic Account of the Rationality of Conspiracy Theory Belief

AbstractThe question of the rationality of conspiratorial belief divides philosophers into mainly two camps. The particularists believe that each conspiracy theory ought to be examined on its own merits. The generalist, by contrast, argues that there is something inherently suspect about conspiracy theories that makes belief in them irrational. Recent empirical findings indicate that conspiratorial thinking is commonplace among ordinary people, which has naturally shifted attention to the particularists. Yet, even the particularist must agree that not all conspiracy belief is rational, in which case she must explain what separates rational from non-rational conspiratorial thinking. In this paper, I contrast three strategies to this end: (1) the probabilistic objectivist, who assesses the objective probability of conspiracies; (2) the subjectivist, who rather focuses on the perspective of the believer, and typically views the decision to believe in a conspiracy as a problem of decision making under risk. Approaches (1) and (2) rely on assessments of the probability of conspiracy which, I argue, limits their applicability. Instead, I explore (3) viewing the problem facing the potential believer as a decision problem under uncertainty about probabilities. I argue, furthermore, that focusing solely on epistemic utilities fails to do justice to the particular character of conspiracy beliefs, which are not exclusively epistemically motivated, and I investigate the rationality of such beliefs under a number of standard decision rules.

Reconciling truthfulness and relevance as epistemic and decision-theoretic utility.

People use language to influence others' beliefs and actions. Yet models of communication have diverged along these lines, formalizing the speaker's objective in terms of either the listener's beliefs or actions. We argue that this divergence lies at the root of a longstanding controversy over the Gricean maxims of truthfulness and relevance. We first bridge the divide by introducing a speaker model which considers both the listener's beliefs (epistemic utility) and their actions (decision-theoretic utility). We show that formalizing truthfulness as an epistemic utility and relevance as a decision-theoretic utility reconciles the tension between them, readily explaining puzzles such as context-dependent standards of truthfulness. We then test a set of novel predictions generated by our model. We introduce a new signaling game which decouples utterances' truthfulness and relevance, then use it to conduct a pair of experiments. Our first experiment demonstrates that participants jointly maximize epistemic and decision-theoretic utility, rather than either alone. Our second experiment shows that when the two conflict, participants make a graded tradeoff rather than prioritizing one over the other. These results demonstrate that human communication cannot be reduced to influencing beliefs or actions alone. Taken together, our work provides a new foundation for grounding rational communication not only in what we believe, but in what those beliefs lead us to do. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Between Indispensable Epistemic Utility and Political Harm: A Response to Rosemary Bertocci and Francis Rohlf

ABSTRACT Religion still has a great potential and perhaps even a monopoly on explaining life in terms of meaning and significance. In this paper, we argue that neither the development of science nor scientism poses a threat to religion. We suggest, however, that the political entanglement of religion may be a threat. In this paper, we discuss the paradoxical situation in which the political harm of religion is inextricably linked to its beneficial potential to give meaning and significance to life.

Electronegativity as a new case for emergence and a new problem for reductionism

AbstractThe potential reducibility of chemical entities to their physical bases is a matter of dispute between ontological reductionists on one hand, and emergentists on the other. However, relevant debates typically revolve around the reducibility of so-called ‘higher-level’ chemical entities, such as molecules. Perhaps surprisingly, even committed proponents of emergence for these higher-level chemical entities appear to accept that the ‘lowest-level’ chemical entities—atomic species—are reducible to their physical bases. In particular, the microstructural view of chemical elements, actively developed and defended by emergentists, appears to hold that the explanatory power of nuclear charge justifies being reductionist about atomic species. My first task in this paper is to establish that nuclear charge cannot ultimately provide explanations sufficient to justify a reductionist approach to atomic species, unless we abandon the persuasive intuition that the presence of an element in a substance ought to explain the properties of that substance. The ‘missing piece’ for explaining the properties of substances by way of their elemental constituents is the electronegativity values of participant atoms. But electronegativity is a strikingly disunified concept that appears distinctly unamenable to analysis by way of fundamental physical principles. Through evaluating the uncertain physical identity of electronegativity, as well as its widespread and indispensable epistemic utility in chemical practice, I argue that electronegativity provides compelling grounds to seriously consider emergence for atomic species.

Generalized Immodesty Principles in Epistemic Utility Theory

Generalized Immodesty Principles in Epistemic Utility Theory

Formal Epistemology Meets Mechanism Design

This article connects recent work in formal epistemology to work in economics and computer science. Analysing the Dutch Book Arguments, Epistemic Utility Theory and Objective Bayesian Epistemology we discover that formal epistemologists employ the same argument structure as economists and computer scientists. Since similar approaches often have similar problems and have shared solutions, opportunities for cross-fertilisation abound.

Accuracy, probabilism and Bayesian update in infinite domains

Scoring rules measure the accuracy or epistemic utility of a credence assignment. A significant literature uses plausible conditions on scoring rules on finite sample spaces to argue for both probabilism—the doctrine that credences ought to satisfy the axioms of probabilism—and for the optimality of Bayesian update as a response to evidence. I prove a number of formal results regarding scoring rules on infinite sample spaces that impact the extension of these arguments to infinite sample spaces. A common condition in the arguments for probabilism and Bayesian update is strict propriety: that according to each probabilistic credence, the expected accuracy of any other credence is worse. Much of the discussion needs to divide depending on whether we require finite or countable additivity of our probabilities. I show that in a number of natural infinite finitely additive cases, there simply do not exist strictly proper scoring rules, and the prospects for arguments for probabilism and Bayesian update are limited. In many natural infinite countably additive cases, on the other hand, there do exist strictly proper scoring rules that are continuous on the probabilities, and which support arguments for Bayesian update, but which do not support arguments for probabilism. There may be more hope for accuracy-based arguments if we drop the assumption that scores are extended-real-valued. I sketch a framework for scoring rules whose values are nets of extended reals, and show the existence of a strictly proper net-valued scoring rules in all infinite cases, both for f.a. and c.a. probabilities. These can be used in an argument for Bayesian update, but it is not at present known what is to be said about probabilism in this case.

Downwards Propriety in Epistemic Utility Theory

AbstractEpistemic utility theory is often identified with the project of axiology-first epistemology—the project of vindicating norms of epistemic rationality purely in terms of epistemic value. One of the central goals of axiology-first epistemology is to provide a justification of the central norm of Bayesian epistemology, Probabilism. The first part of this paper presents a new challenge to axiology-first epistemology: I argue that in order to justify Probabilism in purely axiological terms, proponents of axiology-first epistemology need to justify a much stronger claim about epistemic value—what I label ‘Downwards Propriety’—than any they have offered a justification for. The second part of this paper offers an argument that this challenge cannot be met given a purely accuracy-based account of epistemic value: that there is no hope for providing a purely axiological justification of Downwards Propriety if accuracy is the fundamental source of epistemic value.

The Epistemic Value of the Living Fossils Concept

Living fossils, taxa with similar members now and in the deep past, have recently come under scrutiny. Those who think the concept should be retained have argued for its epistemic and normative utility. This article extends the epistemic utility of the living fossils concept to include ways in which a taxon’s living fossil status can serve as evidence for other claims about that taxon. I will use insights from developmental biology to refine these claims. Insofar as these considerations demonstrate the epistemic utility of the living fossils concept, they support retaining the concept and using it in biological research.

Epistemic utility theory’s difficult future

According to epistemic utility theory, epistemic rationality is teleological: epistemic norms are instrumental norms that have the aim of acquiring accuracy. What’s definitive of these norms is that they can be expected to lead to the acquisition of accuracy when followed. While there’s much to be said in favor of this approach, it turns out that it faces a couple of worrisome extensional problems involving the future. The first problem involves credences about the future, and the second problem involves future credences. Examining prominent solutions to a different extensional problem for this approach reinforces the severity of the two problems involving the future. Reflecting on these problems reveals the source: the teleological assumption that epistemic rationality aims at acquiring accuracy.

Knowing Use: An Analysis of Epistemic Functionality in Synthetic Biology

ABSTRACT Social studies of knowledge have contributed many insights into the making and the character of scientific and technological knowledge. However, studies of knowledge use are scarce. This article engages with under-examined topics concerning epistemic utility. I posit and demonstrate that scientific and technological knowledge claims are functional. I argue that knowledge and its functions are mutually-enabling and mutually-sustaining constructs. To substantiate my claims, I present useful conceptualisations of ‘function’ and ‘functionality’ and employ them in an empirical case study. I examine knowledge use in synthetic biology, a young form of biological engineering. I demonstrate that knowledge in the field is brought into existence with function in mind, kept in existence through functional use, qualified and situated by its functionality and evaluated by its functional operation. The case study reveals the effectiveness of my conceptualisations and offers lessons about knowledge as both an end-result of epistemic work and a mechanism for practice. My theoretical and empirical contributions expand understanding of scientific and technological knowledge and shed light on an area of study awaiting investigation. I conclude with open-ended reflections on work yet to be done.

Veritism and the normativity of logic

AbstractThe idea that logic is in some sense normative for thought and reasoning is a familiar one. Some of the most prominent figures in the history of philosophy including Kant and Frege have been among its defenders. The most natural way of spelling out this idea is to formulate wide‐scope deductive requirements on belief which rule out certain states as irrational. But what can account for the truth of such deductive requirements of rationality? By far, the most prominent responses draw in one way or another on the idea that belief aims at the truth. In this paper, I consider two ways of making this line of thought more precise and I argue that they both fail. In particular, I examine a recent attempt by Epistemic Utility Theory to give a veritist account of deductive coherence requirements. I argue that despite its proponents’ best efforts, Epistemic Utility Theory cannot vindicate such requirements.

A Theory of Epistemic Risk

I propose a general alethic theory of epistemic risk according to which the riskiness of an agent’s credence function encodes her relative sensitivity to different types of graded error. After motivating and mathematically developing this approach, I show that the epistemic risk function is a scaled reflection of expected inaccuracy (a quantity also known as generalized information entropy). This duality between risk and information enables us to explore the relationship between attitudes to epistemic risk, the choice of scoring rules in epistemic utility theory, and the selection of priors in Bayesian epistemology more generally (including the Laplacean principle of indifference).

Exploration vs. Data Refinement via Multiple Mobile Sensors.

We examine the deployment of multiple mobile sensors to explore an unknown region to map regions containing concentration of a physical quantity such as heat, electron density, and so on. The exploration trades off between two desiderata: to continue taking data in a region known to contain the quantity of interest with the intent of refining the measurements vs. taking data in unobserved areas to attempt to discover new regions where the quantity may exist. Making reasonable and practical decisions to simultaneously fulfill both goals of exploration and data refinement seem to be hard and contradictory. For this purpose, we propose a general framework that makes value-laden decisions for the trajectory of mobile sensors. The framework employs a Gaussian process regression model to predict the distribution of the physical quantity of interest at unseen locations. Then, the decision-making on the trajectories of sensors is performed using an epistemic utility controller. An example is provided to illustrate the merit and applicability of the proposed framework.

Concept Utility

Practices of concept-revision among scientists seem to indicate that concepts can be improved. In 2006, the International Astronomical Union revised the concept "Planet" so that it excluded Pluto, and insisting that the result was an improvement. But what could it mean for one concept or conceptual scheme to be better than another? Here we draw on the theory of epistemic utility to address this question. We show how the plausibility and informativeness of beliefs, two features that contribute to their utility, have direct correlates in our concepts. These are how inclusive a concept is, or how many objects in an environment it applies to, and how homogeneous it is, or how similar the objects that fall under the concept are. We provide ways to measure these values, and argue that in combination they can provide us with a single principle of concept utility. The resulting principle can be used to decide how best to categorize an environment, and can rationalize practices of concept revision.

An objection of varying importance to epistemic utility theory

Some propositions are more epistemically important than others. Further, how important a proposition is is often a contingent matter—some propositions count more in some worlds than in others. Epistemic Utility Theory cannot accommodate this fact, at least not in any standard way. For EUT to be successful, legitimate measures of epistemic utility must be proper, i.e., every probability function must assign itself maximum expected utility. Once we vary the importance of propositions across worlds, however, normal measures of epistemic utility become improper. I argue there isn’t any good way out for EUT.

A Criterial Framework for Concept Evaluation in Social Practice and Scholarship

This article responds to the argued lack of clearly articulated, consistent, and agreed criteria that might be used by researchers for determining the adequacy of a given concept for a given task. It does so by describing the development of a framework of such criteria, presenting that framework, and illustratively applying it to the evaluation of the concept of warm-up in psychodrama. The framework comprises eight criteria in three categories: the intrinsic qualities of a concept (the criteria of clarity, comprehensiveness, parsimony, and resonance), the contextualization of a concept (differentiation and connectedness), and its application (epistemic utility and practical utility). Using the framework to evaluate the concept of warm-up in the context of its use in psychodrama suggests its potential to make significant differentiations. It is argued that this framework may contribute to evaluating other concepts in other contexts, although the extent of such generalizability remains to be ascertained.

When propriety is improper

We argue that philosophers ought to distinguish epistemic decision theory and epistemology, in just the way ordinary decision theory is distinguished from ethics. Once one does this, the internalist arguments that motivate much of epistemic decision theory make sense, given specific interpretations of the formalism (for example, that epistemic utility functions be at least as psychologically real as ordinary utility functions are for decision theory). Making this distinction also causes trouble for the principle called Propriety, which says, roughly, that the only acceptable epistemic utility functions make probabilistically coherent credence functions immodest (expect themselves to be least inaccurate). We cast doubt on this requirement, but then argue that epistemic decision theorists should never have wanted such a strong principle in any case.

Making Fit Fit

Reductionist accounts of objective chance rely on a notion of fit, which ties the chances at a world to the frequencies at that world. Here, I criticize extant measures of the fit of a chance system and draw on recent literature in epistemic utility theory to propose a new model: chances fit a world insofar as they are accurate at that world. I show how this model of fit does a better job of explaining the normative features of chance, its role in the laws of nature, and its status as an expert function than do previous accounts.