Epistemic Rationality Research Articles

Withhold by default: a difference between epistemic and practical rationality

AbstractIn practical rationality, if two reasons for alternative actions are tied, then either action is *permissible*. In epistemic rationality, we get the Epistemic Ties Datum: if the reasons for belief and disbelief are tied, then withholding judgment is *required*. I argue that this difference is explained by a difference in default biases. Practical rationality is biased toward permissibility. An action is permissible unless the specific features of the situation (e.g., the costs and benefits that apply) make it prohibited. In contrast, epistemic rationality is biased toward withholding judgment. Withholding judgment is required unless the specific features of the situation (e.g., the evidence) makes belief or disbelief permissible. This difference explains the Epistemic Ties Datum. When the reasons for belief and disbelief are equally weighty, they cancel each other out. But then the only remaining reason is the default reason, or default bias, to withhold judgment. Since it is the only remaining reason, it requires us to withhold judgment.

Opportunity Costs and Resource Allocation Problems: Epistemology for Finite Minds

Abstract Overwhelmingly, philosophers tend to work on the assumption that epistemic justification is a normative status that supervenes on the relation between a cognitive subject, some body of evidence, and a particular proposition (or “hypothesis”). This article will explore some motivations for moving in the direction of a rather different view. On this view, we are invited to think of the relevant epistemic norm(s) as applying more widely to the competent exercise of epistemic agency, where it is understood that cognitive subjects are simultaneously engaged in a number of different epistemic pursuits (distinct “lines of inquiry”), each placing irreconcilable demands on our limited cognitive resources. In effect, adopting this view would require shifting our normative epistemic concern away from the question of how a subject stands with respect to the evidence bearing on the hypothesis at stake in any one line of inquiry, and over onto the question of how well they cope with the inherent risks of epistemic resource management across several lines of inquiry. While this conclusion brings to light important connections between practical and epistemic rationality, it does not collapse the distinction between them. It does, however, constitute a step in the direction of a more systematically developed account of “non-ideal epistemology.”

Non‐ideal epistemic rationality

AbstractI develop a broadly reliabilist theory of non‐ideal epistemic rationality and argue that if it is correct we should reject the recently popular idea that the standards of non‐ideal epistemic rationality are mere social conventions.

The value of incoherence

AbstractI argue that level‐incoherence is epistemically valuable in a specific set of epistemic environments: those in which it is easy to acquire justified false beliefs about normative requirements of epistemic rationality. I argue that in these environments level‐incoherence is the rationally dominant strategy. Nevertheless, level‐incoherent combinations exhibit a distinctive tension, and this tension has been thought by many to indicate that level‐incoherence is always irrational. Although this idea has proved resilient, I argue that it is incorrect. I evaluate three candidate explanations for the distinctive tension exhibited by level‐incoherent combinations, only one of which is the traditional view (which I call the ‘Prohibition View’) that epistemic level‐incoherence is prohibited by epistemic rationality. I argue instead for the ‘Inquiry View’, according to which level‐incoherence is not rationally criticisable but is a reason to undertake further inquiry.

Epistemic emotions and self-trust

AbstractEpistemic emotions – namely affective phenomena like curiosity, certainty, and doubt – have been claimed to play a key role in epistemic evaluation and motivation, and, relatedly, to be an integral aspect of the epistemic virtues. In this paper I argue that the experience of epistemic emotions is extensively shaped by self-trust. More specifically, I claim that the set of epistemic emotions that we can undergo, and how these unfold over time, is modulated by the level of trust in one’s abilities as a knower. I do so by drawing on research on epistemic injustice, as well as through the exploration of some features of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and depression. I then argue that the connection between epistemic emotions and self-trust can be best accounted for by conceiving of self-trust, through the framework of philosophical phenomenology, as an affective background orientation which has a structuring role in our cognitive and affective experience.

Epistemic consequentialism as a metatheory of inquiry

The overall aim of this article is to reorient the contemporary debate about epistemic consequentialism. Thus far, the debate has to a large extent focused on whether standard theories of epistemic justification are consequentialist in nature and therefore vulnerable to certain trade-off cases where accepting a false or unjustified belief leads to good epistemic outcomes. We claim that these trade-offs raise an important—yet somewhat neglected—issue about the epistemic demands on inquiry. We first distinguish between two different kinds of epistemic evaluation, viz., backing evaluation and outcome evaluation, and then go on to outline and discuss a consequentialist metatheory about the right combinations of decision procedures to adopt in inquiry. Note that the piece is exploratory in the following sense: we try to explore epistemic evaluation in consequentialist terms, which involves stating a form of epistemic consequentialism, but also pointing to what non-consequentialist alternatives might be. Rather than trying to argue decisively for a particular conclusion, we aim to outline various intricate issues in an underexplored area of theorizing. In the course of doing this, we’ll transpose some well-known themes from discussions of consequentialism in ethics to the current debate about consequentialism in epistemology, e.g., agent-neutrality, options, and side-constraints.

Misinformation, observational equivalence and the possibility of rationality

ABSTRACT In vice epistemology, bad epistemic outcomes, such as maintaining false beliefs, are interpreted as indicators of blameworthy irrationality. Conversely, a growing trend in philosophical psychology advocates for environmentalist explanations, suggesting these outcomes emerge because rational cognitive processes of faultless individuals falter due to polluted environmental inputs. Building on concrete examples, I first offer a systematic analysis of the relative explanatory merits of that environmentalist project. I then use this analysis to advance the rationality debate, which has recently been identified as stagnating due to an observational equivalence between environmentalist and vice accounts. Although the conceptual imprecision of vice epistemology has frequently been critiqued, the framework developed here reveals that environmentalism is (also) unable to meet various theoretical desiderata. I show why this is so and argue that, to make progress, environmentalism needs a more substantive conception of epistemic rationality. To this end, I propose that a closer engagement with questions of cognitive agency – how rational creatures can “make up” their minds about what to believe – could enable the necessary progress.

The (Dis)unity of psychological (social) bias

ABSTRACT This paper explores the complex nature of social biases, arguing for a functional framework that recognizes their unity and diversity. The functional approach posits that all biases share a common functional role in overcoming underdetermination. This framework, I argue, provides a comprehensive understanding of how all psychological biases, including social biases, are unified. I then turn to the question of disunity, demonstrating how psychological social biases differ systematically in the mental states and processes that constitute them. These differences indicate that biases at various levels of the cognitive architecture require distinct treatment along at least two dimensions: epistemic evaluation and mitigation strategies. By examining social biases through this dual lens of unity and diversity, we can more effectively identify when and how to intervene on problematic biases. Ultimately, this approach provides a nuanced understanding of the nature of social bias, offering practical guidance for addressing existing biases and proactively managing emerging biases in both human and artificial minds.

Against zetetic encroachment

Proponents of zetetic encroachment claim that certain zetetic or inquiry-related considerations can have a bearing on the epistemic rationality of one’s belief formation. Since facts about the interestingness or importance of a topic can be the right kind of reasons for inquisitive attitudes, such as curiosity, and inquisitive attitudes are ways to suspend judgement, these facts also amount to reasons against believing. This mechanism is said to explain several contentious phenomena in epistemology, such as the occurrence of pragmatic encroachment. In this paper, I provide two lines of reasoning against zetetic encroachment. First, on any contrastivist understanding of epistemic reasons, the case in favour of zetetic encroachment loses all its motivational force. Second, the thesis of zetetic encroachment is incompatible with the most promising way to understand degrees of inquisitive attitudes.

Epistemic ownership and the practical/epistemic parallelism

We may succed in the fulfilment of our desires but still fail to properly own our practical life, perhaps because we acted as addicts, driven by desires that are alien to our will, or as “wantons,” satisfying the desires that we simply happen to have (Frankfurt, 1988). May we equally fail to own the outcomes of our epistemic life? If so, how may we attain epistemic ownership over it? This paper explores the structural parallellism between practical and epistemic rationality, building on Williamson’s (2002) suggestion that we should commence with successful performances as the foundation for both domains, be it action or knowledge. By highlighting the limitations of higher-order regulative approaches in epistemology, exemplified by Sosa (2007, 2011, 2015, 2021), the paper introduces a form of teleological epistemic constitutivism inspired by Velleman (2000, 2009). The proposal is that epistemic ownership is not attained in the mere pursuit of truth or knowledge, but requires furthermore a struggle to understand what we know.

Kierkegaard on the Relationship Between Practical and Epistemic Reasons for Belief

AbstractOn the dominant contemporary accounts of how practical considerations affect what we ought to believe, practical considerations either encroach on epistemic rationality by affecting whether a belief is epistemically justified, or constitute distinctively practical reasons for belief which can only affect what we ought to believe by conflicting with epistemic rationality. This paper argues that Søren Kierkegaard offers a promising alternative view on which practical considerations can affect what we ought to believe without either encroaching on or (necessarily) conflicting with epistemic rationality by determining which among the epistemically permitted outright doxastic attitudes one should all‐things‐considered adopt.

Epistemic Rationality and Epistemic Normativity, written by Bondy, P.

Epistemic Rationality and Epistemic Normativity, written by Bondy, P.

Rumour: A Lexicographical Description of the Word Meaning From Evidentiality Perspective

Current media studies as well as the analysis of social interaction put forward the notion of rumours playing a significant role in human communication and making it a full-fledged object of linguistic analysis. The article is devoted to the description and unification of the lexicographical meaning of the word ‘rumour’ which is basic for indirect knowledge transmission. The proposed research perspective is preconditioned by the interest in uncertain knowledge and informal communication practices including such phenomena as rumors, gossip, etc., inherent in professional communication, as well as in the category of evidentiality. The empirical material comprises dictionary interpretations, the inconsistency of which stipulated the application of the ideas of lexical semantics. Componential analysis is chosen as the main method to define meanings. As a result, the polysemy of the word under study has been exposed, with its structure including five lexico-semantic variants with different types of relations. The invariant set of ‘without confirmation’, ‘uncertain origin’, ‘questionable accuracy’ components in the structure of the meanings indicates that there is a direct connection of the word semantics with the linguistic categories of evidentiality and epistemic modality. The analysis shows that when interpreting the values obtained, the concept of evidence as a source of information has an explanatory potential, the crucial factor being its distinct classification in terms of levels. The extensive typology of reportive evidentials enables to define the central meaning of the word ‘rumour’ as information characterized as transmitted knowledge, realized through informal statements, categorized as a proper reportative marked by the third level of evidence. The core ‘questionable accuracy’ seme testifies to the correlation of the reportative evidential value and the epistemic evaluation of the acquired knowledge which manifests itself in the fact that indirect mediated access to information potentiates its qualification as lacking confirmation.

Hope: a solution to the puzzle of difficult action

ABSTRACT Pursuing difficult long-term goals typically involves encountering substantial evidence of possible future failure. If decisions to pursue such goals are serious only if one believes that one will act as one has decided, then some of our lives’ most important decisions seem to require belief against the evidence. This is the puzzle of difficult action, to which I offer a solution. I argue that serious decisions to φ do not have to give rise to a belief that one will φ, but can instead be accompanied by a hope to φ. Hope can motivate and rationalize the various actions that we associate with serious commitment. It can also account for the existence of special pressures to adopt an agential stance toward one’s future. Because hope can be cognitively rational when belief is not, there is no problematic tension between the ideal of epistemic rationality and the phenomenon of difficult action.

An argumentation experience regarding concepts of calculus with ChatGPT

ABSTRACT ChatGPT, an artificial intelligence-supported chatbot, has become a resource in the field of education for students across various disciplines. The conversation that unfolds based on the user-generated questions and ChatGPT’s responses implies the emergence of an argumentation between the student and ChatGPT. In this study, the argumentation between a university student and ChatGPT, conducted to examine situations where a tangent line cannot be drawn to a function’s graph, was analyzed using Toulmin’s model enriched with Habermas’ construct of rationality. The findings indicate that ChatGPT offers rational support to the warrant in student’s reasoning in the of context epistemic rationality regarding the definitions of continuity, derivative, and tangent concepts. However, ChatGPT provides problematic responses in the context of epistemic rationality regarding the relationship between continuity and derivative, as well as in the context of communicative rationality concerning the geometric interpretation of the derivative and the definition of the tangent line. ChatGPT has not provided reliable and stable support to the student in the reasoning process. It can be concluded that ChatGPT, which is considered to have the potential to assist learning processes, requires expertise in calculus concepts for its use in mathematical reasoning processes. Otherwise, it may be confusing and/or misleading.

Probabilifying reflective equilibrium

This paper aims to flesh out the celebrated notion of reflective equilibrium within a probabilistic framework for epistemic rationality. On the account developed here, an agent’s attitudes are in reflective equilibrium when there is a certain sort of harmony between the agent’s credences, on the one hand, and what the agent accepts, on the other hand. Somewhat more precisely, reflective equilibrium is taken to consist in the agent accepting, or being prepared to accept, all and only claims that follow from a maximally comprehensive theory that is more probable than any other such theory. Drawing on previous work, the paper shows that when an agent is in reflective equilibrium in this sense, the set of claims they accept or are prepared to accept is bound to be logically consistent and closed under logical implication. The paper also argues that this account can explain various features of philosophical argumentation in which the notion of reflective equilibrium features centrally, such as the emphasis on evaluating philosophical theories holistically rather than in a piecemeal fashion.

New Frontiers in Epistemic Evaluation in advance

New Frontiers in Epistemic Evaluation in advance

Эвиденциализм, тезис Фантла-Макграта и аргумент от ошибки

The paper aims to show that the example given by J. Fantl and M. McGrath (2002) that pragmatic considerations regarding the risk of attributing the desired epistemic status to a given belief in a given situation affect the very concept of «epistemic fact» and as a consequence, we must abandon evidentialism, as a general concept that the necessary and sufficient conditions of justification are determined solely by the available epistemic data, does not achieve its goals. Taking into account J. Kvanvig's position that the problem of «pragmatic encroachment» could be reduced to the notion of «the false presupposition about the value of knowledge» (2011), we may say that this is not a problem of epistemic rationality, but a problem of the sufficiency of epistemic justification in situations where the risk of making a mistake is just another factor that emphasizes the fundamentally subjective nature of epistemic status attribution to a belief. As a consequence, we see the J. Fantl’s and M. McGrath’s argument as a form of the skeptical argument «from error», which is solved by pointing out on the fundamental difference in the «volumes» of epistemic data within situations that the person introspectively draws for himself, assuming whether he knows or not. Such an interpretation does not threaten evidentialism at all.

Argumentation-induced rational issue polarisation

Computational models have shown how polarisation can rise among deliberating agents as they approximate epistemic rationality. This paper provides further support for the thesis that polarisation can rise under condition of epistemic rationality, but it does not depend on limitations that extant models rely on, such as memory restrictions or biased evaluation of other agents’ testimony. Instead, deliberation is modelled through agents’ purposeful introduction of arguments and their rational reactions to introductions of others. This process induces polarisation dynamics on its own. A second result is that the effect size of polarisation dynamics correlates with particular types of argumentative behaviour. Polarisation effects can be soothed when agents take into account the opinions of others as premises, and they are amplified as agents fortify their own beliefs. These results underpin the relevance of argumentation as a factor in social-epistemic processes and indicate that rising issue polarisation is not a reliable indicator of epistemic shortcomings.

Judgment under radical uncertainty: Epistemic rational heuristics

AbstractThe special issue “Expanding the boundaries of rationality: Towards new models of decision making for radical uncertainty” addresses the challenge of developing logically sound models of decision making for conditions of uncertainty evading those manageable by established decision making approaches. This editorial characterizes the sought new models and approach as constructivist in nature but neither deductive nor Bayesian in logic: a set of epistemic rationality models for discovering new problems and solutions (“found” either in the real or the artificial world, i.e., either detected or designed) that extend the available bounded rationality models. This editorial offers a map of this territory, positioning the new heuristics identified in this collection of articles in a more general picture of heuristic methods qualifyable as fit to radical uncertainty.