Epistemic Problem Research Articles

Vztah těla a mysli podle Kanta. Kantova transcendentálně-logická redukce jednoho metafyzického problému

The paper advocates the view that within Kant’s project of transcendental philosophy, the metaphysical problem of the relation between body and soul is reduced to an epistemic problem. The paper also aims to demonstrate the particular implications of this reduction with regard to the issues addressed in metaphysical conceptions of the relation between body and mind. Further, it is shown what conception of matter Kant develops within his reduction.

A Black-Archipelago Anticolonial Canon Speaks Psychology

In Euromodernity, the discipline of western psychology holds a unique place in the global knowledge order. It is the primary epistemic source, the authoritative voice of psychological knowledge. This essay explores epistemic problems with western psychological science and its canonical status. Epistemic selectivism—the failure to address phenomena which are detrimental to all human beings, not only those of concern to western subjects and their subjectivities—is identified as a problem to be solved in the discipline of western psychology. In order to address epistemic failures of western psychology I return to the knowledge that emerges from the geography where Europe launched its project of racial and racist modern life. I review the Black-Archipelago anticolonial canon that speaks psychology. I follow this anticolonial canon because it pierces and penetrates epistemic silences about psychological experience in Euromodernity. Of the plenitude of theories and concepts developed by Black, Caribbean anticolonial thinkers which are of relevance to understanding the psychological effects of Euromodernity I focus in this review on two fundamental ideas—Frantz Fanon’s sociogenic principle and the emancipatory thrust of consciousness. An embrace of the principle of open epistemologies is proposed as a solution to the problem of epistemic selectivism.

The Medicine Revolution Through Artificial Intelligence: Ethical Challenges of Machine Learning Algorithms in Decision-Making.

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) and its autonomous learning processes (or machine learning) in medicine has revolutionized the global health landscape, providing faster and more accurate diagnoses, personalization of medical treatment, and efficient management of clinical information. However, this transformation is not without ethical challenges, which require a comprehensive and responsible approach. There are many fields where AI and medicine intersect, such as health education, patient-doctor interface, data management, diagnosis, intervention, and decision-making processes. For some of these fields, there are some guidelines to regulate them. AI has numerous applications in medicine, including medical imaging analysis, diagnosis, predictive analytics for patient outcomes, drug discovery and development, virtual health assistants, and remote patient monitoring. It is also used in robotic surgery, clinical decision support systems, AI-powered chatbots for triage, administrative workflow automation, and treatment recommendations. Despite numerous applications, there are several problems related to the use of AI identified in the literature in general and in medicine in particular. These problems are data privacy and security, bias and discrimination, lack of transparency (Black Box Problem), integration with existing systems, cost and accessibility disparities, risk of overconfidence in AI, technical limitations, accountability for AI errors, algorithmic interpretability, data standardization issues, unemployment, and challenges in clinical validation. Of the various problems already identified, the most worrying are data bias, the black box phenomenon, questions about data privacy, responsibility for decision-making, security issues for the human species, and technological unemployment. There are still several ethical problems associated with the use of AI autonomous learning algorithms, namely epistemic, normative, and comprehensive ethical problems (overarching). Addressing all these issues is crucial to ensure that the use of AI in healthcare is implemented ethically and responsibly, providing benefits to populations without compromising fundamental values. Ongoing dialogue between healthcare providers and the industry, the establishment of ethical guidelines and regulations, and considering not only current ethical dilemmas but also future perspectives are fundamental points for the application of AI to medical practice. The purpose of this review is to discuss the ethical issues of AI algorithms used mainly in data management, diagnosis, intervention, and decision-making processes.

Planning problems as epistemic problems. Notes on the debate about multiple truths in planning

Planning problems as epistemic problems. Notes on the debate about multiple truths in planning

Epistemic Vulnerability: Theory and Measurement at the System Level

ABSTRACT Research about the epistemic crisis has largely treated epistemic threats in isolation, overlooking what they collectively say about the health of news environments. This study integrates the literature on epistemic problems and proposes a broadly encompassing framework that departs from the traditional focus on falsehoods: epistemic vulnerability. This framework is an attempt to more fully capture the erosion of authority and value conferred to political information, which has put stress on the public spheres of many democracies. The study develops the EV index to quantify this phenomenon at the system level in a comparative manner. Using OLS regression, I test the relationships between the EV index and various structural characteristics of political and media systems. Findings are remarkably consistent with established typologies of media systems. Northern European countries exhibit greater epistemic resilience, while the US, Spain, and Eastern Europe are more vulnerable. The study also offers strong evidence that populism, ideological polarization, and political parallelism contribute to higher levels of epistemic vulnerability. Conversely, public media viewership and larger party systems are associated with more epistemically resilient societies.

Florence Marryat’s Sensational Ecologies of Empire, 1865–1897: Imaginary Tropics, White Proto-Feminism, and a Comforting Plantationocene

Abstract Among Florence Marryat’s vast canon of work, scholars have mostly focused on her spiritualism, her alleged proto-feminism, and, not least, the racial politics of her most famous novel, The Blood of the Vampire (1897). Little attention, however, has been paid to the role of her abundant nature imaginations that infuse most of her colonial fictions. Among these, Marryat’s decades-spanning engagement with ‘the tropics’ stands out, ranging from the miasmic and deceitful Caribbean in Too Good for Him (1865), the lush Brazilian jungles of Her Father’s Name (1876), the glimpses of post-revolutionary Haitian Voodoo in A Daughter of the Tropics (1887) to the plantation settings of A Crown of Shame (1888) and The Blood of the Vampire. With attention to Marryat’s ecological fictions, I argue that these novels’ allegedly liberatory rhetoric marks the tropics of the Caribbean and the Americas as a distinct epistemic problem for the imperial project, in that they confound the affective balance of white, English perception, and colonial desire. As a result, charting, understanding, and thereby re-mastering ‘nature’ are framed as foundational processes for white – often specifically female – self-awareness. Written in the wake of the brutally curbed 1865 Jamaican Morant Bay Rebellion, Marryat’s tropics thus lament not women’s social exclusion per se but specifically white women’s exclusion from the imperial project. Ultimately, the nature encounter in Marryat’s tropics offers proto-feminist empire fictions as a remedy for the perceived erosion of the late nineteenth-century plantation ecologies.

Understanding the limits to animal cognition

The thriving field of comparative cognition examines the behaviour of diverse animals in cognitive terms. Comparative cognition research has primarily focused on the abilities of animals - what tasks they can do - rather than on the limits of their cognition - tasks that exceed an animal's cognitive abilities. We propose that understanding and identifying cognitive limits is as important as demonstrating the capacities of animal minds. Here, we identify challenges that have deterred the study of cognitive limits related to epistemic, practical and publication problems. The epistemic problem is concerned with how we can confidently infer a cognitive limit from null or negative results. The practical problem is how can we be certain our research has identified a cognitive limit rather than failures in tasks due to methodological or experimental design issues. The publication problem outlines the publication bias toward positive and exciting results over negative or null results in animal cognition. We propose solutions to these three challenges and examples of how to conduct research to confidently identify and confirm cognitive limits in animals. We believe a refocus on the cognitive limits of animals is the next step in the field of comparative cognition. Knowing the limits to the intelligence of different animals will aid us in appreciating the diversity of animal intelligence, and will resolve outstanding questions of how cognition evolves.

‘You wanna talk afterwards?’ Ontoepistemological implications of the researcher self in fictional research narratives

ABSTRACT This paper demonstrates how fictional narratives can address ethical and epistemic problems in the creation and conduct of qualitative research. A story about international students with parental responsibilities in the UK is presented. Through this ‘performance,’ fictional narratives can address issues linked to ethical and epistemic desires. This article contributes to the extant literature on fictional research writing by presenting and interrogating a piece written in response to ethical and epistemic dilemmas in the field. I present the lack of opportunity to meet for a group study to demonstrate how participants can convene in the ‘virtual real.’ Instead of passively accepting the unfortunate limitations on our interactions and interpretations, I allowed a fictional version of a utopian meeting to ‘occur’ among us. At the same time, the account itself performs a reflexive dystopian unravelling as I reveal some tacit frameworks and processes that led to its writing. Finally, I discuss the repercussions of desire on the material presentation of research as part of an initiative to address impossibilities in the conduct of research.

Epistemic problems in Hayek’s defence of free markets

Abstract Friedrich von Hayek’s classical liberalism argued that free markets allow individuals the greatest opportunity to achieve their ends. This paper develops an internal critique of this claim. It argues that once externalities are introduced, the forms of economic knowledge Hayek thought to undermine government action and orthodox utilitarianism also rule out relative welfarist assessments of more or less regulated markets. Given the pervasiveness of externalities in modern economies, Hayek will frequently be unable to make comparative welfarist claims, or he must relax his epistemic assumptions and allow for greater government action than his classical liberalism would wish to accept.

Pragmatic Progress and the Improvement of Medical Knowledge for Global Health

The paper presents an epistemological argument on the crisis in medical knowledge today, first identifying a fundamental problem of the crisis, i.e., the epistemic gap, and then introducing the concept of pragmatic progress as a tool for understanding what is needed for pharmaceutical research to solve pressing epistemic and public health problems. This (new) analysis can contribute to identifying at least one mechanism needed to close the epistemic gap in current medical knowledge, which in turn could serve as a criterion for filtering current and future proposals. In order to do this, first, I show that the drug market has led to a significant epistemic gap between the knowledge needed to address pressing public health issues and the knowledge produced following the demands of the global market. Second, using the notion of pragmatic progress, I suggest a reading of the crisis in medical knowledge, which emphasizes the problems that clinical research is set to solve. Then I present two alternative ways to restructure medical research to fulfill this aim, illustrating how each can be implemented through real-world examples. The last section addresses a possible objection to the argument and exemplifies how the criterion can be used to filter undesirable proposals.

Mulla Sadra's Realism on The Principle of Ittihad al-'Aqil wa al-Ma'qul: A Response to Modern Realism

<span id="docs-internal-guid-6eb786c7-7fff-c73a-b069-03c5ca0fb7a1"><span>This article attempts to show Mulla Sadra’s model of realism by tracing it through his philosophical principles, especially the principle of </span><span>Ittihad 'Aqil wa Ma'qul</span><span> (subject-object unity). Furthermore, the study of the Sadra realism model, which is based on the principle of </span><span>Ittihad 'Aqil wa Ma'qul,</span><span> is presented to respond to fundamental epistemic-ontological issues, namely the relationship between the subject’s consciousness and external objects, in order to strengthen belief in the nature and existence of external reality, which is independent of contamination of the subject's mental decisions (mind-independent reality). How does the subject's consciousness relate to external objects? This problem is still an anxiety and has not been resolved by modern philosophers who focus on the discourse of perception, giving rise to various schools of realism, which are represented by two major schools: direct realism and indirect realism. By overcoming these epistemic problems, ultimately, this effort leads to the confirmation of Mulla Sadra's more original and comprehensive model of realism. This paper is attempted using a critical-analytical method, namely analyzing Mulla Sadra's philosophical ideas on the </span><span>Ittihad 'Aqil wa Ma'qul</span><span> principles and the views of modern realism by focusing on the issue of perception. The conclusions drawn from the results of the analysis of the </span><span>Ittihad 'Aqil wa Ma'qul</span><span> were used as a basis for responding to modern realism as well as an affirmation of Mulla Sadra's style of realism.</span></span>

Empathy with Future Generations?

In this paper, I analyse whether empathy with future generations is feasible and whether it is a potentially useful instrument in effectively providing resources for future generations. I argue that empathy with future generations is possible, that it likely leads to a form of minimal concern, and that it can help in solving the relevant motivational problem. The most significant hurdle is not so much to do with achieving the required normative recognition of future generations, but with epistemic problems regarding the right actions in protecting future interests and needs. Empathy can again be of help in this regard, but it would need to be successfully trained and supported. We need to stretch our empathy to non-existing people and we need to constrain our imagination in adequate ways to achieve a sufficient understanding of the perspectives of future people.

The Motivation Problem of Epistemic Expressivists

Many philosophers have adopted epistemic expressivism in recent years. The core commitment of epistemic expressivism is that epistemic claims express conative states. This paper assesses the plausibility of this commitment. First, we raise a new type of problem for epistemic expressivism, the epistemic motivation problem. The problem arises because epistemic expressivists must provide an account of the motivational force of epistemic judgment (the mental state expressed by an epistemic claim), yet various features of our mental economy seem to show that they can’t do so. Second, we develop what we take to be the most promising response to that problem for expressivists. We end by noting that this response faces an important challenge pertaining to the psychology of epistemic criticism and praise.

Democracy and the Epistemic Problems of Political Polarization

Political polarization is one of the most discussed challenges facing contemporary democracies and is often associated with a broader epistemic crisis. While inspiring a large literature in political science, polarization’s epistemic problems also have significance for normative democratic theory, and this study develops a new approach aimed at understanding them. In contrast to prominent accounts from political psychology—group polarization theory and cultural cognition theory—which argue that polarization leads individuals to form unreliable political beliefs, this study focuses on system-level diversity. It argues that polarization’s epistemic harms are best located in its tendency to reduce the diversity of perspectives utilized in a democratic system and in how this weakens the system’s ability to identify and address problems of public concern. Understanding such harms is also argued to require a greater consideration of the political dynamics of polarization and issues of elite discourse, alongside political psychology.

Appreciating the need for autonomy, or recognizing the truth of evidentialism?

ABSTRACT In this article I raise two challenges for the primary argument of Adam Carter's Autonomous Knowledge. The first is that his argument for thinking that internalist theories of epistemic justification face problems from TrueTemp-style examples is unsound. The second is that the autonomy condition that Carter argues for is not new as it seems to be already implicit in Earl Conee and Richard Feldman's account of well-founded belief. Ultimately, I do not see these challenges as undermining the value of Carter's project. Rather, these challenges help illuminate that what Autonomous Knowledge does is provide a powerful argument for Evidentialism.

A Solution to the General Epistemic Problem for Anti-Intellectualism

AbstractSome authors maintain that anti-intellectualism faces a general epistemic problem of explaining the cognitive aspect of know-how, and answering the question of why know-how as a kind of disposition is to be considered a distinct kind of knowledge. In the present paper, I argue for a solution to this problem, the central idea of which is that there is a broader sense of knowledge to which both knowledge-that and knowledge-how belong. I present two versions of this solution. According to the first version, know-how is a distinct kind of knowledge since there is a general analyzable category of knowledge under which both know-how and know-that fall. This general category is analyzed into three components: a success component, an externalist anti-luck component, and an internalist anti-luck component. According to the second version of the solution, know-how is a distinct kind of knowledge since there is an unanalyzable analogical conception of knowledge that comes first in both the theoretical realm (as propositional knowledge) and the practical realm (as know-how). Both versions of the solution are plausible since they distinguish between know-how and knacks in an anti-intellectualist manner by positing that there is an internal relation between know-how and non-propositional intentionality.

The Epistemic Projection Approach to Values in Science

AbstractI develop a novel account of how nonepistemic aims and values can appropriately influence scientific investigation. At its heart is a process of epistemic projection in which a nonepistemic aim or value is mapped to an epistemic research problem that aligns with that aim or value. Choices in research are then justified as a means of solving that research problem. This epistemic projection approach makes research responsive to nonepistemic aims and values yet remains consistent with the value-free ideal; it could be acceptable to parties on both sides of the values-in-science debate. It also promises to be useful in practice.

Belief reliability index determination method based on group decision‐making

AbstractFor newly developing systems, the determination of the reliability index is an important task in the system demonstration process that determines both the system design goal and the verification requirement. However, due to the insufficient data at the beginning of the system life cycle, the problem of epistemic uncertainty cannot be ignored. Researchers have proposed several belief reliability metrics and analysis methods to quantify the epistemic uncertainty of a system, but to the best knowledge of the authors, no relevant studies have been performed on system reliability index determination. In this paper, we propose a belief reliability index determination method based on group decision‐making. Using a similar system‐based reliability index determination method, this method comprehensively considers the demands of users and the capabilities of contractors. In addition, the Delphi method and Hadamard multiplication convex combination are combined to effectively solve the epistemic uncertainty quantification problem. The Delphi method is used to find the conflicts caused by multi‐expert scoring, and the Hadamard multiplication convex combination can integrate the scoring matrix of all experts, which makes the results more reasonable. Finally, a Low‐Earth‐orbit (LEO) satellite communication system is used to verify the effectiveness of our belief reliability index determination method.

Why Health-enhancing Nudges Fail

Nudges are means to influence the will formation of people to make specific choices more likely. My focus is on nudges that are supposed to improve the health condition of individuals and populations over and above the direct prevention of disease. I point out epistemic and moral problems with these types of nudges, which lead to my conclusion that health-enhancing nudges fail. They fail because we cannot know which choices enhance individual health—properly understood in a holistic way—and because health-enhancing nudges are often themselves bad for our health. They can be bad for our health because they assume inferior agency in their targets and accordingly regularly lead to appropriate resentment and anger—strong emotions which go along with an increased risk of health impairments. Briefly, health-enhancing nudges fail because they are based on persistent ignorance and on a presumptuous attitude.

ECHO: A hierarchical combination of classical and multi-agent epistemic planning problems

Abstract The continuous interest in Artificial Intelligence (AI) has brought, among other things, the development of several scenarios where multiple artificial entities interact with each other. As for all the other autonomous settings, these multi-agent systems require orchestration. This is, generally, achieved through techniques derived from the vast field of Automated Planning. Notably, arbitration in multi-agent domains is not only tasked with regulating how the agents act, but must also consider the interactions between the agents’ information flows and must, therefore, reason on an epistemic level. This brings a substantial overhead that often diminishes the reasoning process’s usability in real-world situations. To address this problem, we present ECHO, a hierarchical framework that embeds classical and multi-agent epistemic (epistemic, for brevity) planners in a single architecture. The idea is to combine (i) classical; and(ii) epistemic solvers to model efficiently the agents’ interactions with the (i) ‘physical world’; and(ii) information flows, respectively. In particular, the presented architecture starts by planning on the ‘epistemic level’, with a high level of abstraction, focusing only on the information flows. Then it refines the planning process, due to the classical planner, to fully characterize the interactions with the ‘physical’ world. To further optimize the solving process, we introduced the concept of macros in epistemic planning and enriched the ‘classical’ part of the domain with goal-networks. Finally, we evaluated our approach in an actual robotic environment showing that our architecture indeed reduces the overall computational time.