Epistemic Preferences Research Articles

Taking pluralism seriously: a new perspective on evidence-based policy

Abstract Scientific policy advice in the face of complex real-world problems requires a maximally pluralistic knowledge base. However, integrating different types of knowledge from a variety of sources raises a series of highly challenging epistemic as well as practical problems. We propose an integrated model of pluralistic policy advice emphasizing the appropriate constitution and structure of pluralistic expert panels. Furthermore, we suggest that normative assumptions underlying expert advice should be made explicit to policymakers. The goal should not be to avoid normative biases, but rather to create transparency with respect to the unavoidable value judgements that influence the epistemic preferences of experts and to provide policymakers with evidence-based scenarios that range over a variety of value preferences.

Finding the Invisible Workers in Astronomy

Why do we remember some scientists while forgetting others who participated in the same knowledge-making process? Mount Wilson Observatory was founded in 1904 by George Ellery Hale near Pasadena in Southern California and is perhaps most famous for astronomer Edwin Hubble and his observations made with the 100-inch reflector telescope, which suggested that our universe is expanding. Moving away from the prominent astronomers, intellectual ideas, and telescopes at Mount Wilson Observatory, this article focuses on the work done by some of the forgotten participants such as human computers, who were mostly women, and telescope assistants, who were men, during the first two decades since its founding. By regarding Mount Wilson Observatory as a factory observatory that carried out specialty production, I narrate scientific knowledge-making from the perspectives of these workers by examining their labor and the products that came out of their labor. These highly skilled individuals carried out various tasks, yet the degree of their participation in scientific activities depended on the supervisor, gender, and geographical space. Efficiency was the primary driving factor in how astronomers delegated work at Mount Wilson Observatory, and gender facilitated the managerial practice of using geographical space to achieve efficiency. Such practice effectively created a glass ceiling only for women, and the gendered workspace may also have contributed toward an epistemic preference by astronomers for observation over computation.

Must we be perfect?: A case against supererogation

ABSTRACT In this paper we offer an argument against supererogation and in favour of moral perfectionism. We argue three primary points: (1) That the putative moral category is not generated by any of the main normative ethical systems, and it is difficult to find space for it in these systems at all; (2) That the primary support for supererogation is based on intuitions, which can be undercut by various other pieces of evidence; and (3) That there are better reasons to favour perfectionism, including competing intuitions about the good-ought tie-up, and the epistemic preference for theoretical simplicity.

The role of motivation in the association of political ideology with cognitive performance

Previous research reports a negative association between individuals’ tendency to endorse right- versus left-wing socio-cultural views and performance in cognitive tasks. We hypothesized that this association results to some extent from explicit epistemic preferences and low motivation to perform well in such tasks, rather than resulting from low ability only. In two studies we found support for this hypothesis. In Study 1, we show that part of the association of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) with performance in the cognitive reflection task (CRT) could be explained by the motivational construct of need for cognition. In Study 2, we experimentally manipulated the motivation of participants by providing (vs. not providing) monetary incentives in the CRT and documented an improvement in the performance of participants high in RWA but not of participants low in RWA. The crucial role of ideology-based motivational differences in the context of cognitive performance is discussed.

The Power and Politics of Engineering Education Research Design: Saving the ‘Small N’

ABSTRACTFor decades, American researchers have brought intellectual, financial and labor resources to understanding minority underrepresentation in engineering, including through studies of persistent racial and gender discrimination in higher engineering education. This paper considers prevailing standards for legitimate and significant research in this area and the persistent stigma associated with the study of small populations. The preference among many engineering education research producers and consumers for the ‘large-n’ brings with it presumptions about human differences including ideas of race, gender, disability and other categories by which subjects are customarily sorted for analytic purposes. This paper asks how such epistemic preferences enact power, showing how taxonomic inclinations may prevent incisive understanding of demographic privilege in U.S. higher technical education. We offer an illustrative contrast to such studies, describing a qualitative research project on underrepresented minorities in U.S. engineering schools, called ‘Learning from Small Numbers’. This project shows the analytic value of intersectional, Queer, and Disabilities Studies theories to interrogate inequity in engineering education. We argue that the reflexivity and indeterminacy supported by these theories illuminates the ruling relations of academic social sciences overall, while also reflecting on our own research preferences. There is no feature of an investigative project, including definitions of subject populations and choice of research methodology, that is not actively chosen by researchers, and it is the profound social consequences of these choices in equity-focused engineering education research that we want to consider.

Why is Pain Still Under-Treated in the Emergency Department? Two New Hypotheses.

Across the world, pain is under-treated in emergency departments (EDs). We canvass the literature testifying to this problem, the reasons why this problem is so important, and then some of the main hypotheses that have been advanced in explanation of the problem. We then argue for the plausibility of two new hypotheses: pain's under-treatment in the ED is due partly to (1) an epistemic preference for signs over symptoms on the part of some practitioners, and (2) some ED practices that themselves worsen pain by increasing patients' anxiety and fear. Our argument includes the following logic. Some ED practitioners depart from formal guidance in basing their acute pain assessments on observable features rather than on patient reports of pain. This is potentially due to an epistemic preference for signs over symptoms which aims to circumvent intentional and/or unintentional misrepresentation on the part of patients. However, conducting pain assessments in line with this epistemic preference contributes to the under-treatment of pain in at least three respects, which we detail. Moreover, it may do little to help the practitioner circumvent any intentional misrepresentation on the part of the patient, as we explain. Second, we examine at least four ED practices that may be contributing to the under-treatment of pain by increasing patient anxiety and fear, which can worsen pain. These practices include failing to provide orienting information and partially objectifying patients so as to problem-solve along lines pre-established by modern medical science. We conclude by touching on some potential solutions for ED practice.

The match matters: Examining student epistemic preferences in relation to epistemic beliefs about chemistry

Student epistemic preferences have been found to be important in student learning and achievement. The present study proposed a new conceptualization of student epistemic preferences in the epistemic match model, assessed the match between student epistemic beliefs about chemistry and their epistemic preferences, and, most importantly, examined how this epistemic match may be associated with chemistry course achievement. We adopted latent class analysis and found three distinct profiles of epistemic preferences based on the dimensions of simple and certain knowledge, attainable truth, and alternative knowledge claims. Students in Latent Class 3 (Moderate Preferences) demonstrated the closest match between chemistry epistemic beliefs and epistemic preferences, and had more students who obtained higher grades and fewer students who had lower grades in an introductory chemistry course compared to the other two classes. Students in Latent Classes 1 (All Preferred) and 2 (Alternative-Claim Disliked), however, demonstrated certain degrees of epistemic mismatch between chemistry epistemic beliefs and epistemic preferences, and had noticeably lower achievement in the chemistry course. The study findings highlight the importance of achieving a close match between epistemic beliefs and epistemic preferences for higher achievement in a subject domain.

Students’ epistemic worldview preferences predict selective recall across History and Physics texts

This study evaluates the psychological reality of two sets of epistemic beliefs, or epistemic ‘worldviews’, called mechanism and organicism. One author who described these two worldviews, Stephen Pepper, hypothesised that they appear to possess domain-general characteristics. Although Pepper’s ideas have had a small presence in research across a variety of knowledge domains, they have been overlooked by epistemic beliefs researchers. This paper introduces Pepper’s epistemic worldviews to epistemic beliefs researchers by empirically demonstrating their purported domain-general capabilities. Participants read two texts about the French Revolution and quantum mechanics containing both mechanist and organicist descriptions. Then, they recorded as much as they could recall from both texts. Analyses of these free recall data reveal a significant interaction between participants’ worldview preference and the type of text that they recall across both texts. The data are interpreted to support the hypothesis that mechanism and organicism possess domain-general properties when learning from a text.

Examining the measurement of epistemic style: The development and validation of the Epistemic Preference Indicator-Revised

The Epistemic Preference Indicator (EPI; Eigenberger, Critchley, & Sealander, 2007) measures a dual-process cognitive model comprising Intellective (IP) and Default (DP) processing. These two habitual thinking styles are defined by complex, effortful thinking (IP) and effortless, expedient thinking (DP). The current study examined the response format and content validity of the EPI. An eight-item alternative (EPI-R) was found to perform similarly to the original measure, displaying adequate explanatory power, reliability and content validity.

Identities, capabilities and revisions

The compatibility between freedom as possibility of change and continuity of personal identity is questionable. Change implies revisions. The tension between ensuring continuity of choice and evaluating a situation of choice that has been changed by these very revisions can be overcome by putting certain conditions on epistemic revision and preference revision. These conditions define a procedure leading to what I call a ‘justified path of revision and action’. I will examine several examples in order to show how this procedure of evaluation works. It can also be used to compare two different capabilities while ensuring the continuity of personal identity and the real autonomy of the person.

Individual differences in epistemic style: A dual-process perspective

This article reports the results of using a specially designed scaled questionnaire to investigate the dualistic properties of epistemic style. The scale is introduced as a measure of individual difference in epistemic style, conceptualized within the framework of dual-process notions of cognitive function. The study examined several psychometric components of the measure, including dimensional structure, distributional characteristics, and indications of construct validity. The instrument, called the Epistemic Preference Indicator, was found to be a reliable and valid measure of two dimensions that are negatively related—each reflecting incompatible epistemic assumptions and approaches to solving knowledge-dependent problems. Theoretical speculations are made concerning the nature of epistemic dualism and the dimension of cognitive processing that may underlie the two proposed epistemic preferences or styles.

What's in a Name? Pragmatism, Essentialism, and Environmental Ethics

Essentialists like J. Baird Callicott have argued that one cannot have an environmental ethic unless one adopts the nonanthropocentric principle, which holds that things other than humans can be morally considerable in their own right, typically because they are thought to be intrinsically valuable. Pragmatists like Bryan Norton reject this; they claim that environmental ethics has no core or essence, and hence that the nonanthropocentric principle is not essential to an environmental ethic. Norton advances as an alternative the Convergence Hypothesis, which says that there are many different ways of justifying environmental principles and policies. In this paper I show that pragmatists and essentialists are arguing past one another because they fail to note two crucial points. First, they often propose different accounts of which principles constitute an environmental ethic and so they disagree about which principles must be justified. The nonanthropocentric principle may be required to justify the principles that Callicott believe to be constitutive of an environmental ethic, but it may be unnecessary to justify those principles that pragmatists think are constitutive. Second, essentialists and pragmatists often overlook the distinction to be made between the adequacy of a justification and its epistemic or rhetorical preferability. The nonanthropocentric principle may not be needed to provide an adequate justification of the constitutive principles and judgements, but a justification that contains the nonanthropocentric principle might nevertheless be epistemically preferable.

Verisimilitude and the scientific strategy of economic theory

Methodological norms in economic theorizing are interpreted as rational strategies to optimize some epistemic utility functions. A definition of ‘empirical verisimilitude’ is defended as a plausible interpretation of the epistemic preferences of researchers. Some salient differences between the scientific strategies of physics and of economics are derived from the comparison of the relative costs associated with each strategy. The classical discussion about the ‘realism of assumptions’ in economics is also considered under the light of the concept of ‘empirical verisimilitude’.

Explanatory update theory: Applications of counterfactual reasoning to causation

A stratified view of causal reasoning is set forth; one in which the identification of counterfactual dependencies plays an important role in determining what sort of causal connection, if any, exists between two events named by a given pair of partial descriptions. A semantics for temporal counterfactuals in which events are represented at the object level is then formalized based on a syntactic form of belief updating. Counterfactuals are evaluated relative to an agent's information state, taken to include a set of initial beliefs together with additional assumptions to handle the frame problem. Inertial inferences emerge as a side-effect of requiring minimal information change between states of the world in some chronicle. A chronicle is, in addition, assumed minimal with respect to an explanatory preference that minimizes the set of beliefs that are not part of an agent's initial set of beliefs or are not supported by some body of law-like knowledge. A number of epistemic preferences that underly the choice of alternative worlds in accommodating a counterfactual supposition are then examined ranging over types of knowledge, locality of action, and time. This leads to a semantics for causation.

Personal epistemologies and preferences for rationalist versus constructivist psychotherapies

In 2 studies, the relationship between epistemic beliefs and therapeutic preferences was addressed. In Study 1, participants' primary epistemic orientation (constructivist or rationalist, derived from R. DiGiuseppe & J. Linscott's 1993 Therapist Attitudes Questionnaire) predicted their preference ratings for 3 psychotherapy orientations (metaphorical, rational, behavioral). Study 2 provided a factor analysis and revision of the questionnaire and then applied this in the context of practicing psychotherapists. Results showed that rationalist beliefs were positively related to therapists' descriptions of their own therapy and their identification with prominent rationalist therapists, and constructivist beliefs were related to an identification with prominent constructivist therapists. Implications of these findings are discussed.

Subjective probability and indifference

This axiom is read: If it is not the case that p is epistemically preferable to q, and it is not the case that q is epistemically preferable to r, then it is not the case that p is epistemically preferable to r. Peter Millican has pointed out that my argument against (A2) is unsound if epistemic preferability is given a probabilistic interpretation ('On the Transitivity of Epistemic Preferability', ANALYSIS 42.2, March 1982). Nicholas LaPara gives such an interpretation in 'Chisholm, Kiem, Preferability' (Ratio, June 1975). In the following two paragraphs I provide another counterexample to (A2) that also shows that epistemic preferability cannot be given a probabilistic interpretation. Suppose there are 21 buckets of water bl, b2, ... , b21 such that bucket bi contains water at i degrees centrigrade. Jim makes pairwise comparisons between bi and bi +1 where 1< i < 21 by putting his hands in the appropriate buckets. Since Jim cannot discern a temperature ditterence of I degree by this method, he is epistemically indifferent between propositions pi and pi+, where 'pi' reads 'The bucket containing water of the highest temperature of all 21 buckets is bucket i'. So if the epistemic indifference relation is transitive, Jim should be indifferent between p, and P21. However, Jim can discern a temperature difference of 20 degrees and so he is not indifferent between p, and P21. Therefore, epistemic indifference is not transitive. Since (A2) implies the transitivity of epistemic indifference, this example shows that (A2) is false. The above argument also shows that epistemic preferability cannot be given a probabilistic interpretation. If 'pPq' is read as 'p is more probable than q' then the standard definition of indifference as ~-(pPq) & (qPp) forces us to read 'pIq' as 'p and q are equiprobable'. It would then follow that the epistemic indifference relation is transitive. Since this relation has already been shown to be nontransitive, the probabilistic interpretation of epistemic preferability must be rejected.

On the transitivity of epistemic preferability

On the transitivity of epistemic preferability

On the Transitivity of Epistemic Preferability

Journal Article On the transitivity of epistemic preferability Get access P. J. R. Millican P. J. R. Millican Lincoln CollegeOxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 42, Issue 2, March 1982, Pages 88–90, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/42.2.88 Published: 01 March 1982

Is Epistemic Preferability Transitive?

Is Epistemic Preferability Transitive?

Is epistemic preferability transitive?

Is epistemic preferability transitive?