Epistemic Possibility Research Articles

From modality to millianism

AbstractA new argument is offered which proceeds through epistemic possibility (for all S knows, p), cutting a trail from modality to Millianism, the controversial thesis that the semantic content of a proper name is simply its bearer. New definitions are provided for various epistemic modal notions. A surprising theorem about epistemic necessity is proved. A proposition p can be epistemically necessary for a knowing subject S even though p is a posteriori and S does not know p. The identity relation is well‐behaved in metaphysically possible worlds but can go rogue in epistemically possible worlds. Whereas it can be epistemically possible that Lewis Carroll is not Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, this is not epistemically possible in the manner that anti‐Millianism requires.

(Annihilation?) or Conversion: Thought and Problematics

The paper investigates the thought of “annihilation,” its theoretical underpinnings, and the praxical overtures it posits. It investigates the how and what of annihilation: what of annihilation as a term, and what Ambedkar wanted the text Annihilation of Caste (AoC) to be. With this frame, the paper re-reads AoC to read the thin line of “conversion” that becomes the only decision, that is, to convert inevitably, by the end of the speech. The paper argues that the term “annihilation” is of Jat-Pat-Todak Mandal and not of Ambedkar’s (as is overwhelmingly assumed, even in the scholarship), although the term remains precisely important to Ambedkar in his theological Buddhistic aspirations. The paper also reads AoC as a “text of conversion” and not as a “text of annihilation.” The paper then initiates an epistemic possibility in framing Ambedkar’s caste-destruction project anew, wherein conversion and spirituality dominate the praxical scenario as against annihilation.

Epistemic modality in American presidential discourse

This research examines the exploitation of epistemic modality markers in political discourse. This research inspects modal auxiliaries and semi-modals use in four speeches addressed by Obama at the annual United Nations General Assembly during his second period as a President of America. Applying both qualitative and quantitative methods, this research is in an attempt to accomplish the whole investigation dealing with explorative and quantification of epistemic modality in Obama’s political discourse. The data were taken from Obama’s speeches from 2013 to 2016 at the United Nations General Assembly. The findings demonstrate that 471 modality markers were found in Obama’s speeches and he frequently delivered epistemic probability with 189 cases or 40.2% modal auxiliaries and semi-modals. Epistemic certainty and possibility were found in 125 cases or 26.6% and in 157 cases or 33.2%. The highest degree of epistemic modality, epistemic certainty, is expressed by employing must, have to, need to, cannot, could not, and may not. Modal should, will, would, be going to, and ought to express epistemic probability and modal can, could, may, might, and be able to are exploited to express the lowest degree of epistemic modality, epistemic possibility. The higher epistemic modality markers involved in a proposition indicate the higher confidence of evaluation and judgment asserted based on the speaker’s knowledge, belief, and evidence. In contrast, the lower epistemic modality markers found indicate lower confidence in the evaluation and judgment of the proposition.

Expanding logical space; making room for Islamic theological contradictions

Islamic theological contradictions are metaphysical contradictions as opposed to logical and semantic ones. I shall demonstrate that if these theological contradictions are tolerable on the theoretical account of metaphysical dialetheism, then logical space, despite being the space of all possibilities, does not accommodate them in virtue of Chalmers’s ‘deep epistemic possibility’. To resolve this issue, I offer a recalibration of the modal concept of possibility. Doing so would redraw a demarcation between what is possible and what is not. Consequently, we can expand logical space, so it is properly inclusive of all possibilities, including metaphysical dialetheism. Expanding logical space in this way would repudiate Chalmers’s ‘deep epistemic possibility’ and make room for Islamic theological contradictions.

Stable acceptance for mighty knowledge

Drawing on the puzzling behavior of ordinary knowledge ascriptions that embed an epistemic (im)possibility claim, we tentatively conclude that it is untenable to jointly endorse (i) an unfettered classical logic for epistemic language, (ii) the general veridicality of knowledge ascription, and (iii) an intuitive ‘negative transparency’ thesis that reduces knowledge of a simple negated ‘might’ claim to an epistemic claim without modal content. We motivate a strategic trade-off: preserve veridicality and (generalized) negative transparency, while abandoning the general validity of contraposition. We criticize various approaches to incorporating veridicality into domain semantics, a paradigmatic ‘information-sensitive’ framework for capturing negative transparency and, more generally, the non-classical behavior of sentences with epistemic modals. We then present a novel information-sensitive semantics that successfully executes our favored strategy: stable acceptance semantics, extending a vanilla bilateral state-based semantics for epistemic modals with a knowledge operator loosely inspired by the defeasibility theory of knowledge.

Japanese EFL undergraduate students’ use of the epistemic modal verbs may, might, and could in academic writing

Abstract Modifying and hedging one’s claims appropriately is an important characteristic of academic writing. This study focuses on the three main English modal verbs used to express “epistemic possibility” to avoid making strong statements, viz., may, might, and could. The purpose of this corpus-based study is to explore modal verb usage by Japanese EFL undergraduate students and consider pedagogical implications of our findings. Our analysis suggests that the Japanese students’ use of these modal verbs, especially could, has a tendency to be informal and insufficiently academic. While the Japanese students use could very frequently, they do not use it sufficiently in the sense of “epistemic possibility”, and some of their use is inappropriate not just in academic English but in English more generally. The observed high frequency of could may be related to topics and may also be due to the influence of L1. We discuss different factors that may explain the findings, based mainly on the overview of factors impacting on EFL learners’ use of academic English offered by Gilquin and Paquot (2008). Too chatty: Learner academic writing and register variation. English Text Construction 1(1). 41–61), suggest several additions to this overview, and discuss implications for the instruction of these modal verbs in academic writing and in order to improve relevant teaching materials.

Rational belief, epistemic possibility, and the a priori

In this paper, I discuss Whiting’s (2021) account of rational belief and discuss some unresolved issues arising from its reliance on epistemic possibility and, by extension, perspective-relative aprioricity.

Unpacking L2 explicit linguistic knowledge and online processing of the English modals may and can: A comparison of acceptability judgments and self-paced reading

Abstract The present study uses self-paced reading as a measure of online processing and an acceptability judgement task as a measure of offline explicit linguistic knowledge, to understand L2 learners’ comprehension processes and their awareness of subtle differences between the modal auxiliaries may and can. Participants were two groups of university students: 42 native speakers of English and 41 native speakers of Croatian majoring in L2 English. The study is part of a larger project that has provided empirical evidence of the two modals, may and can, being mutually exclusive when denoting ability (can) and epistemic possibility (may) but equally acceptable in pragmatic choices expressing permission. The present results revealed that L1 and L2 speakers rated the acceptability of sentences in offline tasks similarly; however, L2 learners showed no sensitivity to verb–context mismatches in epistemic modality while demonstrating sensitivity when processing modals expressing ability. Implications for L2 acquisition of modals and future research are discussed.

The nature of the physical and the meaning of physicalism

I provide an account of the physical appropriate to the task of the physicalist while remaining faithful to the usage of “physical” natural to physicists. Physicalism is the thesis that everything in the world is physical, or reducible to the physical. I presuppose that some version of this position is a live epistemic possibility. The physicalist is confronted with Hempel’s dilemma: that physicalism is either false or contentless. The proposed account of the physical avoids both horns and generalizes a recent proposal by Vicente (2011). My account defines physicalism as the thesis that there are no objects that cannot be described by physical quantities. A dimensional account of physical quantities is given: quantities are determined by measurement procedures.

Ix—How Is Metaphysics Possible?

Abstract In the Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason Kant raises a famous question: how is metaphysics possible as a science? Kant posed this question for his predecessors in early modern philosophy. I raise this question anew for the resurgence of metaphysics within analytic philosophy. I begin by dividing the question of the possibility of metaphysics into separate questions about its semantic and epistemic possibility, and translate them into contemporary terms as: (1) Why do terms in metaphysical theories refer? (2) How do we have knowledge in metaphysics? I then argue that the inflationary conception of metaphysics cannot explain the semantic possibility of metaphysics and, consequently, cannot explain its epistemic possibility. I then argue, more briefly, that a deflationary conception cannot satisfactorily answer the Kantian questions either. The critical path alone remains open.

A hyperintensional approach to positive epistemic possibility

The received view says that possibility is the dual of necessity: a proposition is (metaphysically, logically, epistemically etc.) possible iff it is not the case that its negation is (metaphysically, logically, epistemically etc., respectively) necessary. This reading is usually taken for granted by modal logicians and indeed seems plausible when dealing with logical or metaphysical possibility. But what about epistemic possibility? We argue that the dual definition of epistemic possibility in terms of epistemic necessity generates tension when reasoning about non-idealized agents and is a problem of concern for most hyperintensional epistemic logics that alleviate the problem of logical omniscience. The tension is particularly evident when knowledge is taken as a primitive to define other epistemic concepts, such as justification and belief, as done in the knowledge-first tradition. We propose a non-dual interpretation of epistemic possibility, employing a hyperintensionality filter similar to the one that makes the corresponding epistemic necessity operator hyperintensional. We employ the proposed semantics to model Stalnaker’s belief as epistemic possibility of knowledge and provide a sound and complete axiomatization for a hyperintensional version of his bimodal logic of knowledge and belief.

‘Good’ Is ‘Possible’: A Case Study of the Modal Uses of ‘Good’ in Shaoxing

This paper sets out to investigate the modal uses of the lexeme hɒ3 ‘good’ in the Jidong Shaoxing variety of Wu and to reconstruct its grammaticalization pathway. Modal meanings of hɒ3 include circumstantial possibility, deontic possibility and necessity, and epistemic possibility. These meanings can be summarized as ‘can’, ‘may’, and ‘should’, respectively. The modal meanings of hɒ3 are derived from its meaning of ‘fit to’ rather than ‘good’. We propose here that hɒ3 first extended to express circumstantial possibility, and then further extended to denote deontic modality and participant-internal possibility in two separate directions: (i) circumstantial possibility > deontic modality, and (ii) circumstantial possibility > participant-internal possibility. The epistemic use of hɒ3 is proposed as the final stage of the lexeme’s modal extension.

Kripkean conceivability and epistemic modalities

AbstractIn this article, I show that (i) from what I call a “Kripkean” account of the relations between conceivability and metaphysical necessities, (ii) an apparently plausible principle relating conceivability and epistemic modality, and (iii) the duality of epistemic modalities, one can show the utterly anti‐Kripkean result that every metaphysical necessity is an epistemic necessity. My aim is to present and diagnose the problem and evaluate the costs of some possible Kripkean reactions. In particular, I will evaluate the consequences and theoretical costs of rejecting the main ingredients of the argument, namely that we cannot genuinely conceive the negations of metaphysical necessities, that there is no postulated relation between conceivability and epistemic possibility (actually, between unconceivability and epistemic impossibility), and that epistemic possibility and necessity are not dualities.

Mapping modal verbs to meanings: an elicited production study on “force” and “flavor” with young preschoolers

ABSTRACT Modals (e.g., can, must) vary along two dimensions of meaning: “force” (i.e., possibility or necessity), and “flavor” (i.e., possibilities relative to knowledge [epistemic], goals [teleological], or rules [deontic] …). Comprehension studies show that children struggle with both force and flavor dimensions of modals. However, given the complex one-to-many mappings from forms to meanings, it is not clear what force or flavor children assign to the modals being tested. In this study, we use a sentence-repair task to test which modals 3- and 4-year-old children themselves prefer to produce in teleological (goal-oriented) and epistemic (knowledge-based) possibility and necessity contexts, and how these preferences differ from those of adults. Our results provide a first controlled look at which modals children use to express the major flavor and force dimensions of modal verb meanings. We shed new light on children’s modal systems, and show that learners generally distinguish modal flavors but struggle distinguishing forces.

MEANS OF EXPRESSING EPISTEMIC MODALITY IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

The article is devoted to the analysis of the nomenclature of means of expressing epistemic modality in the English language. At the functional-semantic level, the semantics of epistemic assessment is reflected in the values of units of the morphological, lexical, and syntactic levels of language, capable of performing the following semantic functions at the level of utterance: the degree of confidence of the speaker, the degree of validity of judgment, subjectivity, and unreality. Since the combined common function of all means of expressing epistemic evaluation is to reflect the speaker’s incomplete epistemic commitment based on his insufficient epistemic guarantees, the degree of confidence and the degree of justification act as the basic semantic functions of epistemic evaluation. The first reflects the epistemic commitment that the speaker accepts, and the second — his epistemic guarantees. Depending on the quality of epistemic guarantees, the validity can be high, medium, low, or actually absent in the semantics of the indicator. Validity is related to the speaker’s knowledge about the situation and, in particular, the degree of validity directly depends on the source of information about the situation. Modal values of morphological indicators of epistemic evaluation include epistemic necessity and epistemic possibility and reflect the degree of invalidity of the proposition from the point of view of the speaker. In evaluative statements, epistemic necessity and epistemic possibility are reinterpreted as evaluative values of certainty and uncertainty, respectively; that is, the modal component of the value of such indicators is preserved, but at the communicative and pragmatic level, their modal value comes to the fore, reflecting the degree of confidence of the speaker.

Epistemic Possibility, Concessive Knowledge Attributions, and Fallibilism

I argue that modal terms have an epistemic interpretation on which concessive knowledge attributions are semantically contradictory. This is compatible with the fallibilist view that the basis on which we know something need not entail it, but not with the view that what is known need not be epistemically certain or necessary. The apparent contradictoriness of concessive knowledge attributions is not due to mere implicature, nor to assertion updating the modal base. And it is contextually invariant. Concessive knowledge attributions contrast markedly with concessive assertions and Moorean conjunctions, whose infelicity is plausibly due to norms of assertion. I briefly explain why the strict fallibilism I recommend is compatible with our ordinary use of ‘know,’ and with our knowing much on the basis of perception. Its contextual shiftiness closely parallels our variably strict use of temporal and other invariant terms with strict application conditions.

Demarcating the Use and Misuse of Epistemic and Deontic Modality Operators in Some Translated Verses of Surah Al-Kahf: A Systemic Functional Approach

The meager Arabic literature on modality was one of the pivotal impediments that challenged non-Arab translators when interpreting Qur’an verses. That being so, this study attempts to highlight some epistemic and deontic modality bloopers in some translated verses in Surah Al-Kahf (18:1-21). This modality investigation was carried out within the theoretical framework of the values and realizations of English and Arabic modality systems set by Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) and Anghelescu (1999). The results showed that, first, translators should not use English epistemic possibility modals with low values when rendering Arabic verbs in the subjunctive mood. Second, some Arabic conjunctions such as “أو” ‘or’ convey a degree of possibility that requires an English epistemic possibility adjunct modal to be there in the target text. Third, Arabic verbs with emphatic affixes are better translated with an English modal expressing high degree of inclination. Keywords: Epistemic Possibility, Deontic Modals, Modality, Proposition, Subjunctive and Jussive Moods.

The blurred line between epistemic and metaphysical modalities in the modal epistemology of imagination

AbstractModal epistemologies that rely on a fallibilism about modal claims have been gaining traction over the years. This paper critically discusses the accounts of Kung (2009, 2010, 2016) and Dohrn (2018, 2019, 2020b) and argues that they are invariably susceptible to being read as entailing claims of epistemic possibility. Both Kung and Dohrn seek to ground modal intuitions on non‐modal ones, and primarily appeal to the modalizing capacity of imagination to aid in the discovery of modal truths. However, insofar as inference from non‐modal imagination to modal truths remains fallible, then no non‐ad hoc distinction can be made between substantiation of fallible metaphysically modal claims and infallible epistemically modal ones. This is because, barring an agent's infallible knowledge of modal truths, how these truths are argued for must attend the agent's imperfect epistemic access thereof, therefore entailing claims of modality consistent with her epistemic state—that is, claims of epistemic possibility. If modal epistemologies in general non‐modally ground their modal assertions in this fallible fashion, then they seem inevitably interpretable in terms of epistemic possibility as opposed to some non‐epistemic reading of metaphysical possibility.

Strindberg's Representation of Anxiety in The Father: Between Naturalistic Determinism and Existential Indeterminism

Strindberg's Representation of Anxiety in <i>The Father</i>: Between Naturalistic Determinism and Existential Indeterminism

Investigation of features causing semantic mergers of English modal verbs by approach of attribute partial order diagram

Semantic merger, which is a phenomenon of semantic convergence of two meanings of a word in a certain context, is a kind of semantic indeterminacy in natural language, however, it brings trouble for natural language processing. Discovery of the features causing semantic mergers has been a significant but tough issue in natural language processing. Until now this issue has remained untouched. Therefore, in this article, this issue is studied. Based on a 1.8 million word English multi-genre corpus, taking English modal verb may as the target word, the contextual features causing semantic mergers between may(root possibility) and may(epistemic possibility) are investigated by an approach of attribute partial order diagram (APOD). First, the objects of may is categorized into 3 classes based on the idea of the three-way decision: may1(root possibility), may2(epistemic possibility) and may3(merger), then the rules for word sense disambiguation (WSD) of the three classes are extracted, respectively, and a comparison is made among the rules for different classes, and finally the features causing semantic merger of may are discovered. The discovered knowledge provides valuable evidence for finding the semantic merger, the cause of the semantic merger and the solution of semantic mergers of may, and the proposed approach can also be use for other modal verbs, which may benefit the natural language processing of English modal verbs.