Epistemic Justification Research Articles

Fisher Meets Bayes: The Value of Randomisation for Bayesian Inference of Causal Effects

SummaryFor a Bayesian agent with beliefs about the relationship between covariates and potential outcomes, deterministically selecting an assignment that yields optimal covariate balance rationally dominates randomisation. However, randomisation—by enabling control over the probabilities of erroneous causal conclusions due to unknown covariate imbalances—offers insurance against the possibility that an agent's beliefs may be misleading. For the most part, such rational justifications for optimum assignment have presupposed the framework of Bayesian inference, while such epistemic justifications for randomisation have presupposed the framework of significance testing. In this paper, I build on a conception of balance that seems inextricable from the significance testing framework, Fisherian balance, to show that it implies an analogous epistemic justification for randomisation within the framework of Bayesian inference. Consequently, for the choice between optimum and random assignment, this paper shows that epistemic justifications need not be wedded to significance testing nor must Bayesian inference be wedded to rational justifications.

Involvement in serious incident investigations: a qualitative documentary analysis of NHS trust policies in England

BackgroundThe considered shift from individual blame and sanctions towards a commitment to system-wide learning from incidents in healthcare has led to increased understanding of both the moral and epistemic importance of involving those affected. It is important to understand whether and how local policy describes and prompts involvement with a view to understanding the policy landscape for serious incident investigations in healthcare.This study aimed to explore the way in which involvement of those affected by serious incidents is represented in incident investigation policy documents across acute and mental health services in the English NHS, and to identify guidance for more effective construction of policy for meaningful involvement.MethodsWe conducted a documentary analysis of 43 local serious incident investigation policies to explore the way in which involvement in serious incident investigations is represented in policy documents across acute and mental health services in the NHS in England.ResultsThree headline findings were generated. First, we identified involvement as a concept was conspicuous by its absence in policy documents. Direct reference to support or involvement of those affected by serious incidents was lacking. Even where involvement and support were recognised as important, this was described as a passive process rather than there being moral or epistemic justification for more active contribution to learning. Second, learning from serious incidents was typically described as a high priority but the language used was unclear and ‘learning’ was more often positioned as construction of an arbitrary set of recommendations rather than a participatory process of deconstruction and reconstruction of specific systems and processes. Third, there was an emphasis placed on a just and open culture but paradoxically this was reinforced by expected compliance, positioning investigations as a tool through which action is governed rather than an opportunity to learn from and with the experiences and expertise of those affected.ConclusionsMore effective representation in policy of the moral and epistemic reasons for stakeholder involvement in serious incident investigations may lead to better understanding of its importance, thus increasing potential for organisational learning and reducing the potential for compounded harm. Moreover, understanding how structural elements of policy documents were central to the way in which the document is framed and received is significant for both local and national policy makers to enable more effective construction of healthcare policy documents to prompt meaningful action.

Testimonial Knowledge in Classical Kalām and Islamic Law

Abstract Many social epistemologists suggest that testimonies may be considered a valid source of knowledge, no less than, for instance, direct observation. In this article, I will focus on the accounts of testimonial knowledge in classical kalām and Islamic law. I will present the arguments for why Islamic philosophers and jurists believe that testimonies convey knowledge. I will address the main disagreement in Islamic philosophy regarding the nature of testimonial knowledge, whether we can apply an internalist model of epistemic justification to testimonial knowledge or not. I will suggest that the best way to understand the traditional view on testimonial knowledge in Islamic philosophy and law is as “weak testimonial reliabilism”: testimonial knowledge typically results from the occurrence of certain external conditions (of which we might be unaware), even though they hold only insofar as our experience of this world tells us so, and may not hold in another possible world.

Justification, normalcy and randomness

AbstractSome random processes, like a series of coin flips, can produce outcomes that seem particularly remarkable or striking. This paper explores an epistemic puzzle that arises when thinking about these outcomes and asking what, if anything, we can justifiably believe about them. The puzzle has no obvious solution, and any theory of epistemic justification will need to contend with it sooner or later. The puzzle proves especially useful for bringing out the differences between three prominent theories; the probabilist theory, the normic theory and a theory recently defended by Goodman and Salow.

Structural encroachment

AbstractMoral encroachment states that moral factors can make a difference to what we are epistemically justified in believing. I present two motivating cases that resemble a common example in the moral encroachment literature to show that the agent's commitments and beliefs, and not the moral factors of the situation, influence epistemic justification. I call this view Structural Encroachment.

An Overview of Skeptical Worries: The Gettier Problem, Agrippa’s Trilemma, and the Brain-in-a-Vat

Here I will explore through a literature review three important but different ways in which skepticism has been developed. The first is that of the Gettier problem and its potentially skeptical implications for knowledge. The second is Agrippa’s Trilemma, in which the non-skeptic ostensibly struggles to develop a satisfactory account of epistemic justification. Third and lastly, there are brain-in-a-vat scenarios, as one attempts to meet the skeptic’s challenge of having knowledge of the external world. I conclude that the above are important challenges while still maintaining that the non-skeptic has formulated responses worth our consideration.

Epistemic consequentialism as a metatheory of inquiry

The overall aim of this article is to reorient the contemporary debate about epistemic consequentialism. Thus far, the debate has to a large extent focused on whether standard theories of epistemic justification are consequentialist in nature and therefore vulnerable to certain trade-off cases where accepting a false or unjustified belief leads to good epistemic outcomes. We claim that these trade-offs raise an important—yet somewhat neglected—issue about the epistemic demands on inquiry. We first distinguish between two different kinds of epistemic evaluation, viz., backing evaluation and outcome evaluation, and then go on to outline and discuss a consequentialist metatheory about the right combinations of decision procedures to adopt in inquiry. Note that the piece is exploratory in the following sense: we try to explore epistemic evaluation in consequentialist terms, which involves stating a form of epistemic consequentialism, but also pointing to what non-consequentialist alternatives might be. Rather than trying to argue decisively for a particular conclusion, we aim to outline various intricate issues in an underexplored area of theorizing. In the course of doing this, we’ll transpose some well-known themes from discussions of consequentialism in ethics to the current debate about consequentialism in epistemology, e.g., agent-neutrality, options, and side-constraints.

Why and how to construct an epistemic justification of machine learning?

Consider a set of shuffled observations drawn from a fixed probability distribution over some instance domain. What enables learning of inductive generalizations which proceed from such a set of observations? The scenario is worthwhile because it epistemically characterizes most of machine learning. This kind of learning from observations is also inverse and ill-posed. What reduces the non-uniqueness of its result and, thus, its problematic epistemic justification, which stems from a one-to-many relation between the observations and many learnable generalizations? The paper argues that this role belongs to any complexity regularization which satisfies Norton’s Material Theory of Induction (MTI) by localizing the inductive risk to facts in the given domain. A prime example of the localization is the Lottery Ticket Hypothesis (LTH) about overparameterized neural networks. The explanation of MTI’s role in complexity regularization of neural networks is provided by analyzing the stability of Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM), an inductive rule that controls the learning process and leads to an inductive generalization on the given set of observations. In cases where ERM might become asymptotically unstable, making the justification of the generalization by uniform convergence unavailable, LTH and MTI can be used to define a local stability. A priori, overparameterized neural networks are such cases and the combination of LTH and MTI can block ERM’s trivialization caused by equalizing the strengths of its inductive support for risk minimization. We bring closer the investigation of generalization in artificial neural networks and the study of inductive inference and show the division of labor between MTI and the optimality justifications (developed by Gerhard Schurz) in machine learning.

Twelve tips for strengthening global equity in health professions education publication

Despite recent calls to engage in scholarship with attention to anti-racism, equity, and social justice at a global level in Health Professions Education (HPE), the field has made few significant advances in incorporating the views of the so-called “Other” in understanding the nature, origin, and scope of knowledge as well as the epistemic justification of knowledge production. Editors, authors, and reviewers must take responsibility for questioning existing systems and structures, specifically about how they diffuse the knowledge of a few and silence the knowledge of many. This article presents 12 recommendations proposed by The Global South Counterspace Authors Collective (GSCAC), a group of HPE professionals, representing countries in the Global South, to help the Global North enact practical changes to become more inclusive and engage in authentic and representative work in HPE publishing. This list is not all-encompassing but a first step to begin rectifying non-inclusive structures in our field.

On the culpable ignorance of group agents: the group justification thesis

ABSTRACT People are often responsible for what they do, but they also often possess an excuse. One of the most common excuses is ignorance. Not all ignorance constitutes an excuse, however, for some ignorance is culpable and culpable ignorance is no excuse. But what about group agents? In our everyday practices, we blame group agents constantly. But if groups can be blameworthy, they plausibly can also be excused. Surely one such excuse is ignorance. But, as with individual agents, some group ignorance is also surely culpable. How should we understand the culpable ignorance of group agents? In this paper, I argue for two conditional claims that together constitute what I call the Group Justification Thesis, which is a group-agent adaptation of the Justification Thesis put forth by Biebel [(2018). ‘Epistemic Justification and the Ignorance Excuse.’ Philosophical Studies 175 (12): 3005–3028]: (i) A group agent is excused because of ignorance only if that ignorance is justified, and (ii) a group agent is culpable despite being ignorant only if that ignorance is not justified. One interesting upshot of this view is that a group agent can be culpably ignorant even though none of the members are culpable for their ignorance.

Prospects for epistemic generationism about memory

A source of epistemic justification can be either preservative or generative, in that it can either just preserve justification that was provided by some other source or generate justification on its own. This paper asks what is required for generationism about memory to be true and argues that there are rather demanding conditions that a case of memory justification needs to satisfy in order to count as epistemically generative in a substantive sense. By considering a parallel argument for epistemically generative cases of imagination and drawing from empirical data on event completion, we argue that there are such cases of memory justification because the way in which memory processes fill in the content of event memories suggests that memory is fit to provide justification about past events that is not due to a source other than memory.

An epistemic argument for evolutionary dispositions

The use of dispositions has been put into question many times in the philosophical literature, especially with regards to how dispositional attributions can be justified. Yet, dispositions are an important part not only of our everyday talk but also of our scientific practices. In this paper, we develop an argument that infers the epistemic justification of dispositional talk from itsindispensability for carrying out basic epistemological projects, and we apply it to the use of dispositions in evolutionary biology. For doing this, we first advocate for a function-based strategy for the epistemic justification of dispositional attributions. We next review the functional role of some key dispositional notions in evolutionary biology, such as fitness and evolvability. Then, we show that alternative non-dispositional substitutes of these dispositions fail to fulfill their roles to the same degree. We conclude that the use of dispositions is justified in evolutionary biology.

Essence of Thought Experiments

Thought experiments feature prominently in both scientific and philosophical methods. In this paper, I investigate two questions surrounding knowledge in the thought experiment process. First, on what implicit knowledge do thought experiments rely? Second, what provides epistemic justification for beliefs acquired through the process? I draw upon neo-Aristotelian metaphysics and Husserlian phenomenology to argue that essence is the object of implicit knowledge that anchors the imagined possibilities involved in thought experiments to the actual world, and that this essentialist knowledge enables the possibility of prima facie justification being conferred by the phenomenological givenness of thought experiment scenarios.

Internalism and Externalism in Early Modern Epistemology

Do Descartes, Locke, and Hume have an internalist or externalist view of epistemic justification? Internalism is, roughly, the view that a belief that p is justified by a mental state, such as the awareness of evidence. By contrast, externalism is, roughly, the view that a belief that p is justified by facts about the belief-forming process, such as the reliability of the belief-forming process. I argue that they all think that the awareness of evidence is required for justification, but none of them think that the awareness of evidence alone is sufficient for justification. Similarly, I argue that they all think that reliability of the belief-forming process is required for justification, but none of them think reliability alone is sufficient for justification. So, neither a fully internalist position nor a fully externalist position adequately captures their views of justification; rather, both the supporting evidence and the reliability of the belief-forming process explain why we should hold those beliefs, and hence explain why those beliefs are justified. Thus, they each have a partly internalist, partly externalist view of justification. 

Subjective Confidence as a Monitor of the Replicability of the Response.

Confidence is commonly assumed to monitor the accuracy of responses. However, intriguing results, examined in the light of philosophical discussions of epistemic justification, suggest that confidence actually monitors the reliability of choices rather than (directly) their accuracy. The focus on reliability is consistent with the view that the construction of truth has much in common with the construction of reality: extracting reliable properties that afford prediction. People are assumed to make a binary choice by sampling cues from a "collective wisdomware," and their confidence is based on the consistency of these cues, in line with the self-consistency model. Here, however, I propose that internal consistency is taken to index the reliability of choices themselves-the likelihood that they will be repeated. The results of 10 studies using binary decisions from different domains indicated that confidence in a choice predicts its replicability both within individuals and across individuals. This was so for domains for which choices have a truth value and for those for which they do not. For the former domains, differences in replicability mediated the prediction of accuracy whether confidence was diagnostic or counterdiagnostic of accuracy. Metatheoretical, methodological, and practical implications are discussed.

The interdependence of social deliberation and judgment aggregation

AbstractImagine that the judgments of some individuals on some issues are aggregated into collective judgments. Social deliberation about the issues prior to aggregation can lead to improved judgments, at both the individual and the collective level. In this paper I argue that the epistemic justification for a social deliberation design depends on the chosen judgment aggregation rule, and vice versa. This claim consists of two parts. First, the epistemic superiority of one deliberation design over another or over the absence of any deliberation depends on which procedure is subsequently used to aggregate individual judgments. Second, the epistemic superiority of one aggregation procedure over another depends on how the preceding social deliberation was designed. In short, the choice of deliberation design and of aggregation rule are intertwined. This claim is substantiated by two models. Both models display a tragic rise in competence: social deliberation raises individual competence while reducing collective competence. Here, individual and social epistemology come interestingly apart.

Testimony and Non-Evidential Reasons for Belief (A Non-Purist Place for Interpersonalism)

Abstract Interpersonalist theories of testimony have the theoretical virtue of giving room to the characteristic interpersonal features of testimonial exchange among persons. Nonetheless, it has been argued that they are at a serious disadvantage when it comes to accounting for the way in which testimonial beliefs may be epistemically justified. In this paper, we defend the epistemological credentials of interpersonalism, emphasizing that it is inseparable from the acceptance of non-evidential epistemic reasons to believe, which demands proper conceptual elaborations on the notions of epistemic reasons and of epistemic justification. We offer a proper reading of epistemic reason, and we defend non-purism on justification as the adequate way to conceive the epistemic proposal of interpersonalism on testimony, realizing that only this combination is capable of apprehending certain cases in which there seems to be no way to rule out the idea that the assurance offered by the testifier offers an epistemic reason to believe that it is not evidential.

The Conceptual Plurality in Jürgen Habermas’s Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie

In Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie (Also a History of Philosophy), Jürgen Habermas weaves together various themes such as faith and knowledge, history and theology, naturalism and epistemic justification, learning processes and moral development as well as multiculturalism and deliberative democracy in a transnational public sphere. This article argues that to articulate these multiple elements, Habermas adopts a robust framework built upon four conceptual pillars that can be clearly identified: postmetaphysical, postconventional, postnational, and postsecular. This “conceptual plurality” underlies his genealogy of the centuries-long tension and mutual learning between religious faith and scientific knowledge in the Western philosophical tradition. By considering the interplay of these concepts, it is possible to understand the several ways in which religion emerges in contemporary society and the equally multiple strategies Habermas uses to interpret religion throughout his career, which are masterfully reconsidered and articulated in his opus magnum on religion.

Roderick Chisholm on Reliabilism: Implications for Epistemic Indubitability

This paper aims at examining the pitfalls of Roderick Chisholm’s concept of reliabilism and its implications for epistemic indubility. Chisholm posits that justified belief depends on what is practically true and right for the knower to believe. He maintains that epistemic justification depends on evidence internally available to the knower and anchored his argument on the fact that we rarely have direct access to the truth of propositions, that is, to reality. Every conclusion about the epistemic status of a belief in this perspective involves a conclusion about the “legitimacy” of its source. Our paper argues that this premium Chisholm’s reliabilism places on the knowing subject’s ability to acquire knowledge through the right kind of source undermines our quest for epistemic indubitability hence, among the purposes of this study are: to examine how the reliability of a belief is dependent on the authenticity of its process of realization. It investigates what constitutes the criteria for a reliable belief and tries to resolve whether reliability is conferred on beliefs by our mere confessions. We find that a reliable belief may not after all be error free. Also that reliability invokes the skeptical question of the reliability of human knowledge. Our research which adopts the analytical method of enquiry concludes by underscoring the fact that Chisholm’s reliabilism turns the indubitable knowledge quest of philosophy into doubtful probabilities and further into full blown skepticism.

The role of ethical and social values in psychosocial measurement

In the natural sciences, measurement is taken as a reliable source of knowledge because it requires a special kind of rigour. This is usually understood as an epistemic kind of rigour. We argue that in psychometrics, the science of measuring mental traits, attitudes, and experiences, the quality of knowledge supplied by measurement procedures must be established through ethical as well as epistemic justification. We reject views that restrict the role of ethics in measurement to guarding against potential harmful consequences and show that ethical and social value judgments are intrinsic to the design, validation, interpretation, and use of psychometric tools. We propose a five-step procedure called ‘ethical iterations’ that allows researchers, decision makers, and other interested parties to ensure that measurement practice is aligned with their aims and values. We substantiate our claims with evidence from our work with Foundry, a youth health organization in British Columbia, Canada.