Epistemic Expertise Research Articles

Experts or Authorities? The Strange Case of the Presumed Epistemic Superiority of Artificial Intelligence Systems

The high predictive accuracy of contemporary machine learning-based AI systems has led some scholars to argue that, in certain cases, we should grant them epistemic expertise and authority over humans. This approach suggests that humans would have the epistemic obligation of relying on the predictions of a highly accurate AI system. Contrary to this view, in this work we claim that it is not possible to endow AI systems with a genuine account of epistemic expertise. In fact, relying on accounts of expertise and authority from virtue epistemology, we show that epistemic expertise requires a relation with understanding that AI systems do not satisfy and intellectual abilities that these systems do not manifest. Further, following the Distribution Cognition theory and adapting an account by Croce on the virtues of collective epistemic agents to the case of human-AI interactions we show that, if an AI system is successfully appropriated by a human agent, a hybrid epistemic agent emerges, which can become both an epistemic expert and an authority. Consequently, we claim that the aforementioned hybrid agent is the appropriate object of a discourse around trust in AI and the epistemic obligations that stem from its epistemic superiority.

Shared struggles, divergent paths: a comparison of grassroots and professional feminist advocates’ communication for social change in Argentina and the United States

Abstract Contemporary activism media research, largely focused on digital media's technological and discursive aspects, often lacks comparative studies and tends to overlook institutional or cultural factors in communication for social change (CSC). This study addresses these gaps by examining advocates’ sensemaking and communication praxis in contexts shaped by different advocacy traditions and sociocultural understandings of inequality. Through an analysis of 52 semi-structured interviews with Argentine grassroots advocates and U.S. professional ones, this study reveals similar media assessments across cases yet with different intersectional emphases: class in Argentina and race in the United States. Cross-case divergencies emerge in advocates’ positionality toward institutions and in their representational strategies: While grassroots advocates act as pragmatic agents of change and adopt a flexible communication style described as a “pedagogy of patience,” professional ones act as epistemic experts who offer a feminist critique of journalistic objectivity. I reflect on how these findings attend overlooked factors in CSC.

Disputed expertise and chaotic disinformation: COVID-19 and denialist physicians in Brazil.

This article aims to show how incorrect ideas about COVID-19 were promoted by physicians in Brazil, contributing to a catastrophic response at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives, and to examine the implications of this episode for the social studies of science, technology and medicine. The literature on the relationship between science and society takes two broad approaches, which are sometimes at odds with each other: (i) there is a traditional critique of science that points to unsupported claims of certainty and thus undue interference in general human affairs; (ii) there are many examples of attempts to undermine reasonable scientific claims, when they clash with economic and/or political interests of certain groups. Navigating those extremes is particularly critical in situations in which accurate knowledge is necessary for intervening in people's lives, as is the case in health-related issues. Determining who has actual epistemic expertise is a key factor in solving this conundrum. This became painfully clear during the unfolding of the COVID-19 pandemic, which highlighted the uncertainties of science in guiding decisions being made in real time, and provided opportunities for many forms of disinformation and conspiracy theories that hampered public health measures and promoted useless or even dangerous "treatments". This article discusses an instructive example of such developments in the chaotic response to the pandemic challenge in Brazil, which saw, among other unfortunate situations, physicians aligned with the denialist federal government advocating for unproven - or proven as ineffective - treatments and disseminating unfounded doubts about vaccines. Presumed expertise on the basis of professional training clearly did not translate into actual expertise in the necessary domains to ascertain the validity of such claims and scientific advice was overridden by ideology.

The Vices and Virtues of Instrumentalized Knowledge

This article starts by defining instrumentalized knowledge (IK) as the practice of selectively valuing some set of reliable beliefs for the promotion of a more generally false or unreliable worldview. IK is typically exploited by conspiratorial echo chambers, which display systematic distrust and opposition towards mainstream epistemic authorities. We argue that IK is problematic in that it violates core epistemic virtues, and this gives rise to clear and present harms when abused by said echo chambers. Yet, we contend, mainstream epistemic authorities (MEAs) are also complicit in practices resembling IK; we refer to these practices as instrumentalized knowledge* (IK*). IK* differs from IK in that the selective valuing of beliefs corresponds to a ”reliable” worldview, namely, one independently verified by the relevant epistemic experts. We argue that IK*, despite its apparent veracity, is also problematic, as it violates the same epistemic virtues as IK despite its aim of promoting true beliefs. This, we argue, leads it to being counterproductive in its goal of producing knowledge for the sake of the pursuit of truth, thereby raising the question of what distinguishes virtuous from nonvirtuous practices of instrumentalized knowledge. In an attempt to avoid this violation and to distinguish IK* from IK, we investigate whether and how IK* could still be epistemically virtuous. We conclude that IK* can be virtuous if its goal is to produce understanding as opposed to mere knowledge.

Democracies Across Cultures

Abstract In this discussion of democracy's conceptual pluralism(s), Frederic Schaffer holds a guiding lamp to show what researchers should take into consideration in the study of “the democracies” and their “rough equivalents” as can be found across language, culture, time, and space. This act generates a focus on practical tactics in research and knowledge dissemination. Is it, for example, best to establish an international committee of democracy's epistemic experts to gather, code, and organize the meanings of democracy and their rough equivalents as can be found in the world? And, with such a committee or something altogether different, how can we relate this information to pro-democracy institutions and activists when so many appear to be interested only in liberal conceptions of democracy? The discussion ends with considerations of an open range of research and activism in the fields of democratic theory, comparative politics, and democratization.

Trespassing Testimony in Scientific Collaboration

Abstract The term ‘epistemic trespassing’ has recently been coined to denote a person’s judgments regarding a domain where they are not epistemic experts. In this paper, I focus on expert trespassing testimony – that is, testimony by an expert in a domain of expertise other than his own. More specifically, I focus on intra-scientific trespassing testimony between scientific collaborators. By developing a number of distinctions, I argue that while intra-scientific trespassing testimony may seriously hamper scientific collaboration, it does not invariably do so and may even be beneficial to it.

Affiliation and negative assessments in peer observation feedback for foreign language teachers professional development

AbstractThe growing use of peer observation in teacher professional development has created an interest in understanding how it is carried out and what the benefits are. Post-observation feedback is a crucial component of peer observation practices. This study seeks to contribute to a better understanding of peer observation feedback in foreign language teacher’s professional development. Adopting a conversation analysis perspective, we aim to establish how the interactional infrastructure is developed between observers and observees after a negative assessment during peer observation feedback. The results show that, when the observer is assessing a specific teaching action negatively and the observee expresses alignment with the observer’s position, the observer adopts an affiliative stance through the use of his/her epistemic expertise in two ways: either putting his/her self in the shoes of the observee or, in other cases, expressing the affiliative stance by appealing to the epistemic community to which they both belong.

Knowledge communities and policy influence in China

How do citizen groups influence policy, particularly in political contexts thought to lack grassroots inputs into the policymaking process? Predominant explanations focus on bargaining and mobilization around interests and identities, neglecting the role of ideas. Emerging scholarship shows how knowledge—or epistemic power—shapes political decision making. This paper applies these advances to the Chinese context to uncover how knowledge communities impact policy and governance. The paper draws on extensive longitudinal field research embracing Chinese NGOs, local officials, and policy research bodies. It presents three cases of cross-sector collective knowledge generation within the Chinese context. In these cases, communities comprised of combinations of NGO staff, villagers, academics and officials interact around specific policy issues, generating knowledge and spurring policy innovations. The cases highlight the porous nature of sectoral boundaries that enable the formation of cross-sector communities, suggest an expanded notion of epistemic expertise and a broader conceptualization of knowledge production. In this way, the paper identifies mechanisms by which knowledge about development intersects with power structures and is then diffused.

Psychedelic injustice: should bioethics tune in to the voices of psychedelic-using communities?

Psychedelic compounds are regaining widespread interest due to emerging evidence surrounding their therapeutic effects. The controversial nature of these compounds highlights the need for extensive bioethical input to guide the...

Reframing Global Palliative Care Advocacy for the Sustainable Development Goal Era: A Qualitative Study of the Views of International Palliative Care Experts

ContextThe World Health Assembly Palliative Care Resolution in 2014 and the inclusion of palliative care within the sustainable development goals raised optimism that palliative care would no longer be a peripheral aspect of global health. However, no funding, accountability measures, or indicators for palliative care development accompanied these policy developments. This risks health actors continuing to prioritize the attainment of better known target-driven aspects of health care. ObjectivesTo explore the attitudes of international palliative care experts regarding how the future development of palliative care can be accelerated. MethodsAbout 16 international palliative care experts were interviewed for their epistemic expertise. Participants were interviewed face to face or via Skype. Interviews were recorded, transcribed nonverbatim, and analyzed using a thematic approach (NVivo). ResultsParticipants strongly supported the rollout of national palliative care policies around the world for two reasons: to ensure palliative care attracts national funding streams and to attract global funding for palliative care. The absence of a global indicator for palliative care development was considered a severe impediment to the inclusion of palliative care within global efforts toward universal health care. Advocacy partnerships, using human rights approaches with economic frames, were considered the most effective methods of influencing policymakers. ConclusionPalliative care represents a value proposition that is not currently being maximized by advocacy. Advocates should consider palliative care developmentally, focusing on key asks for development and consider how palliative care can contribute to other international development priorities, in particular poverty reduction.

Una defensa del construccionismo: la filosofía como ingeniería conceptual

El artículo ofrece una amplia exposición y defensa del «construccionismo», tanto como un enfoque metafilosófico, como una metodología filosófica, con referencias a la tradición filosófica que la ha inspirado, la llamada tradición del «conocimiento del fabricante». La tesis principal defendida es que la «tradición del conocimiento del usuario» propuesta por Platón debería ser complementada, si no reemplazada, por un enfoque construccionista de los problemas filosóficos en general y del conocimiento en particular. En pocas palabras, un agente epistémico sabe algo cuando ese agente es capaz de construir (reproducir, simular, modelar, construir, etc.) ese algo e insertar la información obtenida en la red correcta de relaciones que lo explican. O, en términos aún más intuitivos, un agente se califica como un agente epistémico no cuando es un usuario pasivo de cierta información sino cuando es un productor crítico de ella. Su pericia epistémica aumenta en relación con el alcance y profundidad de las preguntas que es capaz de formular y responder sobre un tema particular. El conocimiento del fabricante es el conocimiento de la ontología del artefacto semántico y ésta es una lección epistemológica fundamental que podemos aprender de las disciplinas poiéticas como la informática y la economía. De modo que el construccionismo desvía el foco del conocimiento mimético, pasivo y declarativo de que algo es así, para concentrarse más en el conocimiento poiético, interactivo y práctico de algo que es el caso, esto es, de los artefactos semánticos. Una vez aplicado a la interpretación de la filosofía misma, el construccionismo sugiere agregar la ingeniería conceptual al análisis conceptual como un método fundamental.

No one can serve two epistemic masters

Consider two epistemic experts—for concreteness, let them be two weather forecasters. Suppose that you aren’t certain that they will issue identical forecasts, and you would like to proportion your degrees of belief to theirs in the following way: first, conditional on either’s forecast of rain being x, you’d like your own degree of belief in rain to be x. Secondly, conditional on them issuing different forecasts of rain, you’d like your own degree of belief in rain to be some weighted average of the forecast of each (perhaps with weights determined by their prior reliability). Finally, you’d like your degrees of belief to be given by an orthodox probability measure. Moderate ambitions, all. But you can’t always get what you want.

Shared reality in intergroup communication: Increasing the epistemic authority of an out-group audience.

Communicators typically tune messages to their audience's attitude. Such audience tuning biases communicators' memory for the topic toward the audience's attitude to the extent that they create a shared reality with the audience. To investigate shared reality in intergroup communication, we first established that a reduced memory bias after tuning messages to an out-group (vs. in-group) audience is a subtle index of communicators' denial of shared reality to that out-group audience (Experiments 1a and 1b). We then examined whether the audience-tuning memory bias might emerge when the out-group audience's epistemic authority is enhanced, either by increasing epistemic expertise concerning the communication topic or by creating epistemic consensus among members of a multiperson out-group audience. In Experiment 2, when Germans communicated to a Turkish audience with an attitude about a Turkish (vs. German) target, the audience-tuning memory bias appeared. In Experiment 3, when the audience of German communicators consisted of 3 Turks who all held the same attitude toward the target, the memory bias again appeared. The association between message valence and memory valence was consistently higher when the audience's epistemic authority was high (vs. low). An integrative analysis across all studies also suggested that the memory bias increases with increasing strength of epistemic inputs (epistemic expertise, epistemic consensus, and audience-tuned message production). The findings suggest novel ways of overcoming intergroup biases in intergroup relations. (PsycINFO Database Record

A Defence of Constructionism: Philosophy as Conceptual Engineering

The article offers a broad account and a defence of constructionism, both as a metaphilosophical approach and as a philosophical methodology, with some references to the philosophical tradition that has inspired it, the so-called “maker’s knowledge” tradition. The main thesis defended is that Plato’s “user’s knowledge tradition” should be complemented, if not replaced, by a constructionist approach to philosophical problems in general and to knowledge in particular. To put it simply, an epistemic agent knows something when that agent is able to build (reproduce, simulate, model, construct etc.) that something and plug the obtained information in the correct network of relations that account for it. Or in even more intuitive terms, an agent qualifies as an epistemic agent not when she is a passive user of some information, but when she is a critical producer of it. Her epistemic expertise increases in relation to the scope and depth of the questions that is able to ask and answer on a particular topic. The maker’s knowledge is knowledge of the ontology of the semantic artefact and this is a fundamental epistemological lesson we can learn from poietic disciplines such as computer science and economics. So constructionism shifts the focus away from the mimetic,, passive and, declarative, knowledge, that something is the case, in order to concentrate more on the poietic, interactive and, practical knowledge, of something being the case, that is, of semantic artefacts. Once applied to the interpretation of philosophy itself, constructionism suggests adding conceptual engineering to conceptual analysis as a fundamental method.

Integrating Client and Clinician Perspectives on Psychotropic Medication Decisions: Developing a Communication-Centered Epistemic Model of Shared Decision Making for Mental Health Contexts

ABSTRACTShared decision making (SDM) interventions aim to improve client autonomy, information sharing, and collaborative decision making, yet implementation of these interventions has been variably perceived. Using interviews and focus groups with clients and clinicians from mental health clinics, we explored experiences with and perceptions about decision support strategies aimed to promote SDM around psychotropic medication treatment. Using thematic analysis, we identified themes regarding beliefs about participant involvement, information management, and participants’ broader understanding of their epistemic expertise. Clients and clinicians highly valued client-centered priorities such as autonomy and empowerment when making decisions. However, two frequently discussed themes revealed complex beliefs about what that involvement should look like in practice: (a) the role of communication and information exchange and (b) the value and stability of clinician and client epistemic expertise. Complex beliefs regarding these two themes suggested a dynamic and reflexive approach to information management. Situating these findings within the Theory of Motivated Information Management, we discuss implications for conceptualizing SDM in mental health services and adapt Siminoff and Step’s Communication Model of Shared Decision Making (CMSDM) to propose a Communication-centered Epistemic Model of Shared Decision Making (CEM-SDM).

Orientations to epistemics and deontics in treatment discussions

An ideological shift to patient-centered health care raises questions about how, in the face of medical authority, patients can assert agency in interactions with doctors. This study uses conversation analysis to explore how epistemic and deontic orientations are raised and made relevant in different types of responses to treatment proposals across two health care settings – New Zealand general practice consultations and Swedish hospital-based physician encounters. By examining responses ranging from acceptance to strong resistance, we show patient practices for deferring to and resisting medical authority, which includes claiming independent access to expert knowledge and raising everyday, experientially based concerns. Doctors rightfully privilege their own epistemic expertise in treatment decisions but they also take patient experiences into consideration. In cases of strong resistance we found doctors raising patients’ ultimate right to refuse treatment recommendation. Our analysis further nuances current knowledge by documenting the ways epistemic and deontic domains are observably relevant forces shaping the sequential unfolding of treatment proposals.

Expressing first-person authority

Ordinarily when someone tells us something about her beliefs, desires or intentions, we presume she is right. According to standard views, this deferential trust is justified on the basis of certain epistemic properties of her assertion. In this paper, I offer a non-epistemic account of deference. I first motivate the account by noting two asymmetries between the kind of deference we show psychological self-ascriptions and the kind we grant to epistemic experts more generally. I then propose a novel agency-based account of deference. Drawing on recent work on self-knowledge, I argue that a person normally has a distinctive type of cognitive agency; specifically she is able to constitute her psychological attitudes by making judgments about what they ought to be. I then argue that a speaker expresses this agentive authority when she self-ascribes a psychological attitude and this is what justifies deferentially trusting what she says. Because the notion of expression plays a central role in this account, I contrast it with recent neo-expressivist theories.

Knowledge and Knowers in Engineering Assessment

In multidisciplinary technology-based engineering diploma programmes in South Africa, the curriculum is often structured into distinctly theoretical and practical components, each of which is taught and assessed at different stages by different disciplinary or technical specialists. This separation does not necessarily reflect the complexity of such emerging regions, nor allow for the opportunity to assess multidisciplinary competence in the context of real world practice. Although the Exit Level Outcomes, endorsed by the Engineering Council of South Africa, are intended to provide a holistic framework of achievement in engineering qualifications, it is evident that these outcomes mean different things to the various stakeholders involved in curriculum design, delivery and evaluation. The moment of final academic assessment presents a number of challenges. Who is in a position to assess whether or not a candidate has successfully demonstrated the required level of competence? Legitimation Code Theory offers a lens through which to consider the nature of and relationship between the epistemic and social aspects of the assessment of complex performance, particularly in the South African socio-historical context. This paper presents the analysis of a single engineering assessment case study in which the knowledge and knower values that emerged among a group of assessors are interrogated.'The findings suggest that in the absence of specific epistemic expertise, the default assessment position relies on knower attributes. This may have implications for the assumption in science-based professions that what you know matters more than who you are.

A DEFENCE OF CONSTRUCTIONISM: PHILOSOPHY AS CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING

Abstract: This article offers an account and defence of constructionism, both as a metaphilosophical approach and as a philosophical methodology, with references to the so‐called maker's knowledge tradition. Its main thesis is that Plato's “user's knowledge” tradition should be complemented, if not replaced, by a constructionist approach to philosophical problems in general and to knowledge in particular. Epistemic agents know something when they are able to build (reproduce, simulate, model, construct, etc.) that something and plug the obtained information into the correct network of relations that account for it. Their epistemic expertise increases with the scope and depth of the questions that they are able to ask and answer. Thus, constructionism deprioritises mimetic, passive, and declarative knowledge that something is the case, in favour of poietic, interactive, and practical knowledge of something being the case. Metaphilosophically, constructionism suggests adding conceptual engineering to conceptual analysis as a fundamental method.

What is an expert?

Experts play an important role in society, but there has been little investigation about the nature of expertise. I argue that there are two kinds of experts: those whose expertise is a function of what they know (epistemic expertise), or what they do (performative expertise). Epistemic expertise is the capacity to provide strong justifications for a range of propositions in a domain, while performative expertise is the capacity to perform a skill well according to the rules and virtues of a practice. Both epistemic and performative experts may legitimately disagree with one another, and the two senses are conceptually and logically distinct.