Epistemic Context Research Articles

“Your crisis is our crisis; we take those on!” Exploring the profound role of spiritual diversity in social work

ABSTRACT Spiritual Diversity (SD) is transformative when integrated into the epistemic context and practice. SD’s transformative potential can significantly enhance clients’ quality of life when harnessed. The profound lived experiences of social workers must be unearthed to embrace spiritual diversity as a holistic resource fully. Therefore, this study aimed to delve into the lived experiences of social workers, explore the profound role of spiritual diversity, and uncover diverse perspectives in different social work contexts. Seven in-depth, semi-structured Zoom interviews with spiritually informed social workers were conducted. Using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA), the exploratory comments and observations of the participants were drawn. The study generated 122 codes from the data and developed fourteen emergent themes. These themes were then clustered into four major themes: 1. Spiritual turn among social workers, 2. Spirituality as a strength-based mechanism, 3. Creating access to spiritual resources, and 4. Increased vitality in the healing process. Demonstrating the seamless integration of the spiritual diversity approach and critical discourse on social work practices, this study adds to the growing body of research that underscores the benefits of a spiritual diversity approach in social work settings.

“Lives versus livelihoods”: Conflict and coherence between policy objectives in the COVID-19 pandemic

Many policies were put in place during the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States to manage the negative impact of the coronavirus. Limiting severe illness and death was one important objective of these policies, but it is widely acknowledged by public health ethicists that pandemic policies needed to consider other factors. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with 38 people across 17 states who participated in the state-level COVID-19 pandemic policy process, we examine how those actors recounted their engagement with four different objectives over the course of the pandemic: protecting public health with respect to COVID-19 (which we refer to as pathogen-focused disease prevention), protecting the economy, promoting the public's broader health and wellbeing, and preserving and restoring individual freedoms. We describe the different ways that pathogen-focused disease prevention was thought to have conflicted with, or to have been coherent with, the other three policy objectives over the course of the pandemic. In tracing the shifting relationships between objectives, we highlight four reasons put forward by the participants for why policy changes occurred throughout the pandemic: a change on the part of decisionmaker(s) regarding the perceived acceptability of the negative effects of a policy on one or more policy objectives; a change in the epistemic context; a change in the ‘tools in the toolbox’; and a change in the public's attitudes that affected the feasibility of a policy. We conclude by considering the ethical implications of the shifting relationships that were described between objectives over the course of the pandemic.

Re-thinking Global Governance as Fuzzy: Multi-Scalar Boundaries of Responsibility in the Arctic

ABSTRACT The article reconsiders global governance as fuzzy and situated across multiple scales rather than multi-level. It revisits Global Governance research, whose introspective focus on opening “black boxes” has marginalized “in-between” approaches. The article highlights the value of “in-between” approaches for mid-range theorizing on global normative order using the Arctic as an example. It shows how sovereignty and “projects of belonging” unfold across diverse fora in designating “responsibility.” In legal, cultural, and epistemic contexts, boundary work by national and non-state actors demarcates jurisdiction and shields claims of responsibility to prevent others from gaining rights or access to the region. Through examples, the article demonstrates that normative boundary practices do not form a homogenous project of belonging. Instead, these practices blur the lines of where “all things Arctic” are negotiated, who holds legitimate voice to influence governance, and complicate long-term decision-making.

The Role of the Law in Critical Theory: An Engagement with Hardt and Negri’s Commonwealth

AbstractThis paper discusses the role of Law and Legal Thinking in Critical Theory with specific reference to the arguments that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri offer in their book Commonwealth. The core idea is that Critical Theory is no less radical, but much more concrete, when it is performing not only an external, but also an internal critique of the Law. It shows that the role of the law in critical theory emerges as a problem when the latter claims that ‘there is no outside’ and that ‘the legal base of the system structures our lives.’ It then discusses optimistic and pessimistic strategies to overcome the problem, and argue for a demanding strategy which consist in articulating the external and the internal critique of the law. To make this point, the paper goes back to the epistemic context in which critical attitudes are deployed (the ‘Conflict of the Faculties’), describes the four theoretical moves constitutive of the historical moment in which, at the end of the 18th Century, modern law as we know it was conceived of and founded; and sketches the key moments of the history of the internal critique of the law. It then illustrates the demanding strategy with examples taken from the field of Intellectual Property, and concludes that the Law is malleable and open enough to allow the thinking and practicing of radical alternatives from within the legal system and also that alternatives spoken in the language of the law are no less radical, but certainly, more concrete than others.

Developing a framework for heterotopias as discursive playgrounds: a comparative analysis of non-immersive and immersive technologies

The discursive space represents the reordering of knowledge gained through accumulation. In the digital age, multimedia has become the language of information, and the space for archival practices is provided by non-immersive technologies, resulting in the disappearance of several layers from discursive activities. Heterotopias are unique, multilayered epistemic contexts that connect other systems through the exchange of information. This paper describes a process to create a framework for Virtual Reality, Mixed Reality, and personal computer environments based on heterotopias to provide absent layers. This study provides virtual museum space as an informational terrain that contains a “world within worlds” and presents place production as a layer of heterotopia and the subject of discourse. Automation for the individual multimedia content is provided via various sorting and grouping algorithms, and procedural content generation algorithms such as Binary Space Partitioning, Cellular Automata, Growth Algorithm, and Procedural Room Generation. Versions of the framework were comparatively evaluated through a user study involving 30 participants, considering factors such as usability, technology acceptance, and presence. The results of the study show that the framework can serve diverse contexts to construct multilayered digital habitats and is flexible for integration into professional and daily life practices.

The Buddha’s Lucky Throw and Pascal’s Wager

ABSTRACT The Apaṇṇaka Sutta, one of the early recorded teachings of the Buddha, contains an argument for accepting the doctrines of karma and rebirth that Buddhist scholars claim anticipates Pascal’s wager. I call this argument the Buddha’s wager. Does it anticipate Pascal’s wager and is it a good bet? Contemporary scholars identify at least four versions of Pascal’s wager in his Pensées. This article demonstrates that the Buddha’s wager anticipates two versions of Pascal’s wager, but not its canonical form. Like Pascal’s wager, the Buddha’s wager presents a decision problem between two opposing theses in an epistemic context that lacks evidence of their truth or falsity. Like Pascal, the Buddha also tries to solve this problem using dominance, superdominance or ‘superduperdominance’ reasoning. The Apaṇṇaka Sutta likely provides the earliest textual example of such reasoning. While the Buddha’s wager does not exhibit the expected utility reasoning of the best-known form of Pascal’s wager, the article suggests a reformulation that parallels Alan Hájek’s (2018) vector-value reformulation. Is it a good bet? This article argues that it is not if this means we are rationally required to accept its recommendation. This is because, while it avoids two of the major objections levelled against Pascal’s wager, it succumbs to one and has at least two problems of its own.

Analysis of the President's Contexts in Speaking Tough Language

This paper examined the speeches of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte, the 16th President of the Republic of the Philippines who was labeled as a singular man with a singular voice. This paper used pragmatic analysis. This research capitalized on the contexts of using the expression “Putang Ina” (son of a whore) in the speeches working within the Taxonomy of Illocutionary Forces by John Searle. Moreover, it also utilized Habitus and Field Theory by Pierre Bourdieu. The result showed that the president made use of physical, linguistic, social, and epistemic contexts in his speeches. Duterte’s utterances exhibited his ability to assert power and authority. Moreover, tough language was used to attack the interlocutors and despite that, the president was still an effective speaker. The use of tough expressions in his speeches has become his habit and was already part of his system to convey abhorrence.

Knowledge in real-world contexts: not glamorous, but indispensable

During the past several decades, many epistemologists have argued for and contributed to a paradigm shift according to which knowledge is central to assertion, action, and interaction. This general position stands in sharp contrast to several recently developed accounts regarding specific epistemic contexts. These specific accounts resist applying traditional epistemic norms, including strong knowledge norms, to real-world situations of interest. In particular, I consider recent arguments about the epistemic standards for scientific pronouncements, expert testimony in a political context, and interactive reasoning. I argue, firstly, that knowledge does have a crucial role to play in each case, contrary to appearances. Clarifying the role of knowledge fills gaps in our understanding left open by the existing accounts. Secondly, I show that combining the insights from the knowledge-centric approach and from the more specific accounts provides a new perspective on the open problem of developing an account of knowledge-based decisions. Specifically, I argue that the biggest open problem regarding knowledge-based decisions is not how we respond to uncertainty, but rather how we assess the relevance of our many disparate pieces of knowledge, choosing which to integrate, and how. A strong case emerges for a procedural solution to this part of the problem of how to make knowledge-based decisions.

Epistemic modality and grounding: constructions expressing positive epistemic judgement in Spanish and Italian from the perspective of cognitive grammar (with particular reference to the verbs credere and creer)

Abstract This paper examines the means of expressing positive epistemic judgement in Spanish and Italian: modals in their epistemic interpretation, epistemic adverb + indicative/subjunctive, with particular attention to the verbs creer/credere and their possible combination with the subjunctive. The constructions are analysed through the prism of cognitive grammar, specifically Langacker’s theory of grounding. It is argued that the different types of epistemic judgement are analogous to nominal grounding elements (demonstrative pronouns, the definite article and relative quantifiers). The subjunctive after epistemic adverbs and verbs (such as tal vez or credere) is seen as the verbal counterpart of the relative quantifier some. Analyses suggest that this analogy helps to define the semantic difference between similar structures with the indicative and to resolve questions concerning the function of the subjunctive in epistemic contexts, such as the degree of uncertainty or the speaker’s attitude towards the propositional content.

AI as an Epistemic Technology.

In this paper I argue that Artificial Intelligence and the many data science methods associated with it, such as machine learning and large language models, are first and foremost epistemic technologies. In order to establish this claim, I first argue that epistemic technologies can be conceptually and practically distinguished from other technologies in virtue of what they are designed for, what they do and how they do it. I then proceed to show that unlike other kinds of technology (including other epistemic technologies) AI can be uniquely positioned as an epistemic technology in that it is primarily designed, developed and deployed to be used in epistemic contexts such as inquiry, it is specifically designed, developed and deployed to manipulate epistemic content such as data, and it is designed, developed and deployed to do so particularly through epistemic operations such as prediction and analysis. As has been shown in recent work in the philosophy and ethics of AI (Alvarado, AI and Ethics, 2022a), understanding AI as an epistemic technology will also have significant implications for important debates regarding our relationship to AI technologies. This paper includes a brief overview of such implications, particularly those pertaining to explainability, opacity, trust and even epistemic harms related to AI technologies.

‘Pregnancy no bi disease’: Contextual beliefs in antenatal classes in selected Nigerian hospitals

This paper examines how language is used to show shared beliefs between caregivers and pregnant women in antenatal classes in the Nigerian context, which hitherto suffers neglect. The data consist of tape recordings and observational notes taken during antenatal classes in selected hospitals in Lokoja, Nigeria. The study adopted a top-down analytic approach using Odebunmi’s model of contextual beliefs, supported by van Dijk’s epistemic context model, and Fetzer and Fischer’s lexical markers model. The analysis shows three categories of shared knowledge: a. state of pregnancy and postnatal care b. sexual relationships and spice lexemes c. traditional child care and superstitions. Shared knowledge of the state of pregnancy and postnatal care manifests in pregnancy misconceptions, nutrition during pregnancy and postnatal care orientations highlighted by lexical markers such as recoverable knowledge connector and joint attention builder. Shared knowledge of sexual relations and spice lexemes reflect sexual communication and native spices using metaphorization and proximal deictic lexical markers. Grandmothers’ involvement and insistence on using traditional methods and superstitions frame shared knowledge of traditional child care and superstitions through belief affirmative and self-reformulation markers. Analysis of the shared beliefs shows how caregivers represent pregnant women’s mental knowledge in interactions as well as how pregnant women interject beliefs for clarification and validity. This way, both participants demonstrate how contextual beliefs facilitate communicative processes and meaningful understanding in their interactions.

Epistemic probabilities are degrees of support, not degrees of (rational) belief

AbstractI argue that when we use ‘probability’ language in epistemic contexts—e.g., when we ask how probable some hypothesis is, given the evidence available to us—we are talking about degrees of support, rather than degrees of belief. The epistemic probability of A given B is the mind‐independent degree to which B supports A, not the degree to which someone with B as their evidence believes A, or the degree to which someone would or should believe A if they had B as their evidence. My central argument is that the degree‐of‐support interpretation lets us better model good reasoning in certain cases involving old evidence. Degree‐of‐belief interpretations make the wrong predictions not only about whether old evidence confirms new hypotheses, but about the values of the probabilities that enter into Bayes' Theorem when we calculate the probability of hypotheses conditional on old evidence and new background information.

Onyenachiya: A New Perspective on Religion in African Philosophy of Religion

How does one understand the relationship between a person and their objects of belief in the philosophy of Religion? How does the object of belief impact individuals’ lives, choices, decisions, and what they become in the future? The character of religion is binding, and the object of belief in a being – transcendent or immanent as the sole determinant of the fate and destiny of individuals leaves room for many questions that border on freedom and responsibility. By introducing Onyenachiya to the discussion of the phenomenon of religion from an African philosophical approach to religion, the authors argue that there is a certain threshold of self-evaluation and relationship between a person and their object of belief which is significantly cooperative and collaborative. Although onyenachiya, a concept that stems from an African epistemic context (Igbo), has no corresponding English translation, it is a contraction of two independent words, onye (person, giver, who) and chi (personal god, doppelgänger). The two are joined together by conjunction, ‘na’ with the suffix ‘ya’ at the end, emphasizing the chi’s personal and unique nature. The authors argue that if chi is connected to a person's destiny, onyenachiya demonstrates an agent-centered destiny, which gives room for agency, accountability, and responsibility and gives a new account of religious tolerance.

La metafora considerata nei suoi molteplici usi

Metaphor has often been seen as tightly associated with both aesthetics and cognition, as well as with other aesthetic and cognitive phenomena such as imagination, symbol, allegory, analogy and simile. This article offers a theory of metaphor that accounts for such aesthetic and cognitive associations. The theory is based on a suitably interpreted version of a tool originally developed in an epistemic context, viz. Floridi and Sanders’ method of abstraction.

A Thematic Engagement of Literature on Prayer Mountains as Sacred Spaces in Contemporary Ghanaian Christianity

Sacred spaces and their attendant pilgrimage attractions seem to be some of the universal and more obvious features of world religions. One of the emerging phenomena within contemporary Ghanaian Christianity is Christians’ pilgrimage to some sacred mountains. Even though scholarship on this phenomenon is gradually bourgeoning within the Ghanaian epistemic context, a thematic engagement of literature on Prayer Mountains (PMs) as sacred spaces in the Ghanaian Christian setting seems to have fallen out of scholars’ grasp. This paper, therefore, employs discourse analysis as a method to elucidate some selected themes. In light of discourse analysis, the paper concludes, among others, that the evolution of the PMs phenomenon in Ghanaian Christianity is likely to cause a rethinking of the conventional notion of PMs as spaces for transcendental encounters. Such a revision may result in the emergence of other themes or concepts of future academic relevance. Keywords: Discourse analysis, sacred, profane, sacred space, prayer rituals, Prayer Mountains

Watching People Watching People: Culture, Prestige, and Epistemic Authority

ABSTRACT Novices sometimes misidentify authorities and end up endorsing false beliefs as a result. In this paper, I suggest that this phenomenon is at least sometimes the result of culturally evolved mechanisms functioning in faulty epistemic contexts. I identify three background conditions which, when satisfied, enable expert-identifying mechanisms to function properly. When any one of them fails, that increases the likelihood of identifying a non-authority as authoritative. Consequently, novices can end up deferring to merely apparent authorities without having failed in any epistemic obligations.

Epistemic Responsibility, Rights and Duties During the COVID-19 Pandemic

ABSTRACT We start by introducing the idea of echo chambers. Echo chambers are social and epistemic structures in which opinions, leanings, or beliefs about certain topics are amplified and reinforced due to repeated interactions within a closed system; that is, within a system that has a rather homogeneous sample of sources or people, which all share the same attitudes towards the topics in question. Echo chambers are a particularly dangerous phenomena because they prevent the critical assessment of sources and contents, thus leading the people living within them to deliberately ignore or exclude opposing views. In the second part of this paper, we argue that the reason for the appearance of echo chambers lies in the adoption of what we call ‘epistemic vices’. We examine which vices might be responsible for their emergence, and in doing so, we focus on a specific one; ‘epistemic violence’. In assessing and evaluating the role of this epistemic vice, we note that it can be triggered by epistemic contexts characterized by high stakes that may turn ordinary intellectual virtues (such as skepticism) into vices (such as denialism). In the third part of this contribution, we suggest a way to deal with echo chambers. The solution focuses on advocating a responsibilist pedagogy of virtues and vices that -we claim- might be capable of preventing their emergence.

Inquisitive logic as an epistemic logic of knowing how

In this paper, we present an alternative interpretation of propositional inquisitive logic as an epistemic logic of knowing how. In our setting, an inquisitive logic formula α being supported by a state is formalized as knowing how to resolve α (more colloquially, knowing how α is true) holds on the S5 epistemic model corresponding to the state. Based on this epistemic interpretation, we use a dynamic epistemic logic with both know-how and know-that operators to capture the epistemic information behind the innocent-looking connectives in inquisitive logic. We show that the set of valid know-how formulas corresponds precisely to the inquisitive logic. The main result is a complete axiomatization with intuitive axioms using the full dynamic epistemic language. Moreover, we show that the know-how operator and the dynamic operator can both be eliminated without changing the expressivity over models, which is consistent with the modal translation of inquisitive logic existing in the literature. We hope our framework can give an intuitive alternative interpretation to various concepts and technical results in inquisitive logic, and also provide a powerful and flexible tool to handle both the inquisitive reasoning and declarative reasoning in an epistemic context.

Belief systems and ideological deep disagreement

Deep disagreement is characterized as being a disagreement in which the interlocutors are unable to reach a common agreement or position on the problem under discussion. However, deep disagreement can be solved irrationally, that is, through fallacious persuasive techniques. One of the objectives of this work is to investigate the debate on deep disagreement in both dialectical and epistemic contexts, and to provide some elements that would allow the concept to be better encompassed in some theoretical framework suitable for analysis. As a hypothesis of this work, it is argued that there is no disagreement between logics, but disagreement between agents or subjects. A structure of belief systems is exposed based on the substantive beliefs that lead by inference to the derived beliefs. Mathematical and epistemological development of a theory of deep disagreement is based on the topological structure of belief systems.

A Economia Comportamental substitui ou complementa a Economia Neoclássica? Repensando a revolução comportamental por uma abordagem contextualista

ABSTRACT The rise of Behavioral Economics poses an important question: does it substitute or complement Neoclassical Economics? This article makes an analysis to identify how the substitution-complementarity issue is highly sensitive to the epistemic context. In particular, the paper distinguishes four epistemological contexts: descriptive, explicative, predictive, and prescriptive. The idea that the behavioral substitute the neoclassical approach in descriptive and explicative contexts is defended; however, there is a complementarity in the predictive and prescriptive contexts, where there are some domains in which the neoclassical approach might still work well.