Epistemic Account Research Articles

Opowieść autobiograficzna jako sieć. Analiza „Pokoju utrechckiego” Alice Munro w ujęciu językoznawstwa kognitywnego

The paper uses the conceptual metaphor WEAVING AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NARRATIVE IS WEAVING A WEB as an analytical tool to guide the exploration of the autobiographical aspects of Alice Munro’s short fiction, in which the writer often reconstructs the emotional reality of her past. The paper analyses Munro’s The Peace of Utrecht through the lens of Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar, focusing on the use of the English Present tense. To conclude, the study bears out Langacker’s epistemic account of the English present, revealing how the protagonist’s conception of reality changes as she weaves her narrative in an attempt to reconnect with the past.

Quineanism, Noneism and Metaphysical Equivalence

In this paper we propose and defend the Synonymy account, a novel account of metaphysical equivalence which draws on the idea (Rayo in The Construction of Logical Space, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) that part of what it is to formulate a theory is to lay down a theoretical hypothesis concerning logical space. Roughly, two theories are synonymous—and so, in our view, equivalent—just in case (i) they take the same propositions to stand in the same entailment relations, and (ii) they are committed to the truth of the same propositions. Furthermore, we put our proposal to work by showing that it affords a better and more nuanced understanding of the debate between Quineans and noneists. Finally we show how the Synonymy account fares better than some of its competitors, specifically, McSweeney’s (Philosophical Perspectives 30(1):270–293, 2016) epistemic account and Miller’s (Philosophical Quarterly 67(269):772–793, 2017) hyperintensional account.

Intersectionality and Science and Technology Studies

Over the past thirty years, intersectionality has become a nearly ubiquitous framework for understanding, critiquing, and intervening in complex social inequalities. Emerging from critical race and feminist studies, intersectionality has many shared analytic priorities with science and technology studies (STS), including an emphasis on co-emergent social forces, historical contingency, and interventions that challenge and enhance knowledge production. Despite these shared affinities, STS and intersectionality remain largely nonoverlapping scholarly discourses. Based on a systematic review of intersectionality in eight STS journals, we observe a slight increase in intersectionality’s usage over time but find that its relevance is contained largely to venues outside of the STS mainstream. Our study identifies some ways STS scholars have modeled intersectionality’s responsible use through citation practices, methodological integration, and normative claims about justice/injustice. We also consider what epistemic exclusion of intersectionality might foreclose. We argue that increased use of intersectionality would amplify engagement with justice in STS work, not only by introducing new questions and theoretical frames but also opening possibilities for new interdisciplinary formations. This is not simply an argument for greater inclusion of a term, but rather for transformation in epistemic accountability toward feminist studies and other social justice–oriented fields.

Keep trusting! A plea for the notion of Trustworthy AI

AbstractA lot of attention has recently been devoted to the notion of Trustworthy AI (TAI). However, the very applicability of the notions of trust and trustworthiness to AI systems has been called into question. A purely epistemic account of trust can hardly ground the distinction between trustworthy and merely reliable AI, while it has been argued that insisting on the importance of the trustee’s motivations and goodwill makes the notion of TAI a categorical error. After providing an overview of the debate, we contend that the prevailing views on trust and AI fail to account for the ethically relevant and value-laden aspects of the design and use of AI systems, and we propose an understanding of the notion of TAI that explicitly aims at capturing these aspects. The problems involved in applying trust and trustworthiness to AI systems are overcome by keeping apart trust in AI systems and interpersonal trust. These notions share a conceptual core but should be treated as distinct ones.

An Epistemic Account of Populism

Abstract The genus problem of populism presents one of the most vexing conceptual questions across the social sciences: Some theorists believe that populism is nothing more than an assembly of discursive patterns, while others maintain that populism is a strategy to gain political power. Then there are those that argue that populism is a thin ideology that lacks a coherent set of guiding principles. The paper intervenes in this debate in two ways: First, it offers a methodological apparatus for evaluating and developing contested concepts such as populism. Second, it puts forward and defends the claim that populism can be fruitfully understood as a coherent ideology that rests on four foundational principles. These principles, I will argue, are necessary for explaining the paradigmatic beliefs and dispositions exhibited by exponents of populism. One of the key characteristics of populism, on the account developed in this paper, is its peculiar epistemic stance.

What Makes Requests Normative? The Epistemic Account Defended

This paper defends the epistemic account of the normativity of requests. The epistemic account says that a request does not create any reasons and thus does not have any special normative power. Rather, a request gives reasons by revealing information which is normatively relevant. I argue that compared to competing accounts of request normativity, especially those of David Enoch and James H.P. Lewis, the epistemic account gives better answers to cases of insincere requests, is simpler, and does a better job incorporating the importance of relationships. I also defend the epistemic account from three objections: that requests are important because they constitute consent, that requests and wishes must be normatively different, and that some requests do not provide any new information.

Democratic education and the epistemic quality of democratic deliberation

This article examines the challenges that an epistemic account of deliberative democracy, according to which democratic deliberation has ‘truth-tracking’ capacities, encounters in contemporary polarized societies, and then discusses how these challenges could be addressed through democratic education. The focus of the article is especially on two phenomena indicated by recent empirical research: the increasing public distrust in experts and motivated reasoning that affects citizens’ belief-formation. The article suggests that some of the idealizing core assumptions of epistemic democracy make it difficult to recognize and address these phenomena as serious challenges to the epistemic quality of public deliberation. With these challenges in view, the article then addresses the question how the deliberative model of education should be revised or complemented for it to prepare students for epistemically good-quality public deliberation. The article proposes two pedagogical approaches: (1) fostering students’ epistemic trust through a ‘realistic’ account of science education, and by familiarizing students with adequate criteria for recognizing trustworthy experts, and (2) teaching integrative negotiation, which focuses on examining and explicating students’ interests and needs in situations in which motivated reasoning prevents them from meaningfully engaging with educationally and epistemically productive practices.

Against epistemic accounts of luck

Abstract Epistemic accounts of luck define luck’s chanciness condition relative to a subject’s epistemic position. This could be put in terms of a subject’s evidence or knowledge about whether the event will occur. I argue that both versions of the epistemic account fail. In §2, I give two types of counterexamples to the evidence-based approach. In §3, I argue—contrary to the knowledge-based view—that an event can be a matter of good or bad luck for a subject even if she knows that it will occur. In §4, I argue that epistemic accounts cannot explain some instances of constitutive luck. Because of these problems, luck’s chanciness condition cannot be adequately defined in epistemic terms.

Science is more than knowing

Bird’s new book, Knowing Science, provides an exemplar of how to do epistemology and philosophy of science together. While I wholeheartedly appreciate his attempt to bridge the gap between epistemology and philosophy of science and find his project promising, I am not convinced by the central thesis of the book that knowledge plays a central role in science. In this article, I focus on Bird’s epistemic account of scientific progress, which is the view that the nature of scientific progress is the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Contra Bird, I argue that scientific progress cannot be fully characterised as the accumulation of scientific knowledge.

How Requests Give Reasons: The Epistemic Account versus Schaber's Value Account

How Requests Give Reasons: The Epistemic Account versus Schaber's Value Account

Notes on Polanyi’s Interest in Heidegger

This essay makes use of a variety of archival materials in the Michael Polanyi Papers to show that Polanyi’s comment linking his account of “indwelling” and Heidegger’s “being-in-the-world” (in his 1964 “Preface to the Torchbook Edition” of Personal Knowledge) was a carefully considered, thoughtful philosophical claim. Materials from both before and after the writing of this Torchbook Preface make clear that Polanyi was seriously exploring connections between his emerging epistemic account and ideas developed by Heidegger as well as other modern thinkers who in the sixties often were dubbed “existentialists.”

The Paper Chase Case and Epistemic Accounts of Request Normativity

According to the epistemic account of request normativity, a request gives us reasons by revealing normatively relevant information. The information is normative, not the request itself. I raise a new objection to the epistemic account based on situations where we might try to avoid someone requesting something of us. The best explanation of these situations seems to be that we do not want to acquire a new reason to do something. For example, if you know I am going to ask you to read a draft of my paper, you might avoid running into me so as to avoid acquiring a reason to read a draft of my paper. I then argue that the epistemic account can successfully reply to this objection and that in fact the epistemic account does a better job of accounting for cases like this than competing views of the normativity of requests.

Closed-minded Belief and Indoctrination

AbstractWhat is indoctrination? This paper clarifies and defends a structural epistemic account of indoctrination according to which indoctrination is the inculcation of closed-minded belief caused by “epistemically insulating content.” This is content which contains a proviso that serious critical consideration of the relevant alternatives to one's belief is reprehensible whether morally or epistemically. As such, it does not demand that indoctrination be a type of unethical instruction, ideological instruction, unveridical instruction, or instruction which bypasses the agent's rational evaluation. In this way, we can account for why indoctrination can occur for liberal democratic beliefs as much as it occurs for fascist, fundamentalist, or fanatical belief: for indoctrination is fundamentally a structural epistemic phenomenon.

People, posts, and platforms: reducing the spread of online toxicity by contextualizing content and setting norms

We present a novel model of individual people, online posts, and media platforms to explain the online spread of epistemically toxic content such as fake news and suggest possible responses. We argue that a combination of technical features, such as the algorithmically curated feed structure, and social features, such as the absence of stable social-epistemic norms of posting and sharing in social media, is largely responsible for the unchecked spread of epistemically toxic content online. Sharing constitutes a distinctive communicative act, governed by a dedicated norm and motivated to a large extent by social identity maintenance. But confusion about this norm and its lack of inherent epistemic checks lead readers to misunderstand posts, attribute excess or insufficient credibility to posts, and allow posters to evade epistemic accountability—all contributing to the spread of epistemically toxic content online. This spread can be effectively addressed if (1) people and platforms add significantly more context to shared posts and (2) platforms nudge people to develop and follow recognized epistemic norms of posting and sharing.

The influence of congruency proportion, target eccentricity, and valence strength on the spatial-valence metaphoric congruency effect in a word valence judgment task.

In a word valence judgment task, positive words (e.g., excellence) are judged faster when presented at the top (congruent position) than at the bottom of the screen (incongruent position), whereas the opposite pattern occurs for negative words (e.g., disaster). This spatial-valence metaphoric congruency effect reflects top-positive/bottom-negative metaphoric association and may be attributed to at least three possible mechanisms: spreading activation between spatial and valence concepts (activation account), epistemic function that a conceptual metaphor serves to reduce the uncertainty associated with valence concepts (epistemic account), and/or the extent to which spatial-valence metaphoric association is relevant to task demand (relevance account). In three experiments, we manipulated congruency proportion, target eccentricity, and valence strength in a word valence judgment task to test these three possible accounts. Results showed that the metaphoric congruency effect was larger when a high (vs. equal) proportion of targets appears in congruent, relative to incongruent, position, and for targets with strong (vs. weak) valence. However, the effect in reaction time measure was not modulated by whether the target appeared in the position being near vs. far away from the center of the screen. The overall findings are better accommodated by the relevance account. The implications of the current findings on other theoretical accounts, such as Conceptual Metaphor Theory and polarity correspondence account, are also discussed.

Popper's ‘Rationality Principle’ and ‘Epistemic’ Rationality: an Attempt at Reconciliation

ABSTRACT ‘Situational Analysis’ (SA) constitutes Popper's methodological proposal for the social sciences. There is an apparent inconsistency in the fact that, on the one hand, Popper maintains that we learn by ‘trial and error-elimination’ and, on the other hand, he declares that his ‘Rationality Principle’ (RP) has nothing to do with the epistemic account of rationality implicit in his ‘evolutionary theory of knowledge and learning’. We claim that the most likely reason Popper makes such claim is that his formulation of SA is better interpreted as an extension of his view of the ‘method’ of history to the theoretical social sciences. In light of it we argue that the implementation of SA in the latter may require the adoption of an expanded ‘Rationality Principle’ (ERP) whereby scientists assume that individual actors exhibit both practical and epistemic rationality. We identify two variants of SA we denote as SA1 and SA2 according to whether they are grounded on ERP or RP respectively and discuss some approaches in the social sciences that are representative of each of them. We conclude that the adoption of ERP helps mitigating the absence of social interaction in Popper's formulation of SA.

Conceptions of scientific progress in scientific practice: an empirical study

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate over the nature of scientific progress in philosophy of science by taking a quantitative, corpus-based approach. By employing the methods of data science and corpus linguistics, the following philosophical accounts of scientific progress are tested empirically: the semantic account of scientific progress (i.e., scientific progress in terms of truth), the epistemic account of scientific progress (i.e., scientific progress in terms of knowledge), and the noetic account of scientific progress (i.e., scientific progress in terms of understanding). Overall, the results of this quantitative, corpus-based study lend some empirical support to the epistemic and the noetic accounts over the semantic account of scientific progress, for they suggest that practicing scientists use the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’ significantly more often than the term ‘truth’ when they talk about the aims or goals of scientific research in their published works. But the results do not favor the epistemic account over the noetic account, or vice versa, for they reveal no significant differences between the frequency with which practicing scientists use the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’ when they talk about the aims or goals of scientific research in their published works.

Caller resistance to perform cardio-pulmonary resuscitation in emergency calls for cardiac arrest.

A key objective of an emergency call for cardiac arrest is to recruit a bystander to perform cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) until the ambulance arrives. Emergency medical services worldwide work towards increasing the rate of bystander-CPR, and existing research has identified a number of physical barriers to the provision of bystander-CPR. Yet, little is known about the specific ways in which emergency callers resist recruitment to perform basic first-aid, sometimes in the absence of any physical obstacle. This study investigated 65 emergency calls for cardiac arrest received in Australia in 2014 and 2015, in which the callers initially resisted CPR. We used conversation analysis to examine callers' practices to resist recruitment and call-takers' practices to counter this resistance. We found that callers who resisted CPR typically provided an account. When callers accounted for their resistance on deontic grounds, they expressed that CPR was not a possible course of action (e.g. "I can't do it"). When callers provided an epistemic account, their justification was based on their knowledge or opinion (e.g. "I think it's too late"). Our findings suggest that epistemic resistance can be a barrier to bystander-CPR. We identified two practices used by call-takers to address caller resistance based on epistemics. Providing more context on the purpose of CPR (e.g. "this is to help him in the meantime") seemed effective in persuading callers to perform CPR. By contrast, aligning with the caller's epistemic and deontic rights (e.g. "it's up to you") did not seem effective in persuading callers.

Testimonial Injustice and a Case for Mindful Epistemology

AbstractIn her 2007 book Epistemic Injustice Miranda Fricker identifies testimonial injustice as a case where a hearer assigns lower credibility to a speaker due to “identity prejudice.” Fricker considers testimonial injustice as a form of epistemic injustice since it wrongs the speaker “in her capacity as a knower.” Fricker recommends developing the virtue of “testimonial justice” to address testimonial injustice. She takes this virtue to involve training in a “distinctly reflexive critical social awareness.” The main goal of this article is to argue that Fricker's proposed training falls short of the target and that a cultivation of the capacity of being present—the ability to be mindful—would be necessary to develop the critical social awareness that Fricker requires. I want to explore the impact of compassion and open‐mindedness—virtues cultivated in mindfulness training—on testimonial justice specifically and virtue epistemology generally. In attempting to develop an epistemic account informed by mindfulness—a mindful epistemology—my primary goal is to bring Buddhist insights on how to anchor the mind by training it to be fully present and attentive into the focus of mainstream Western philosophy. More specifically, I argue that doing so allows us to appreciate the crucial role that a prediscursive level of cultivation plays in the development of testimonial justice.

Storying Toward Pasin and Luksave: Permeable Relationships Between Papua New Guineans as Researchers and Participants

In Oceania, Papua New Guinea (PNG) appears large in the consciousness of exploring social life through the notion of sociality. Scholarship within the Melanesian region employs sociality to interrogate forms of social life and the different ways research methods account for the understanding of interactions between individuals and communities. Yet for the three PNG authors this assumed coherency between epistemes and method highlighted specific conceptual challenges for us as researchers and participants. We identified with two conceptual notions: “pasin” and “luksave” as distinct Austronesian language ideas derived from Tok Pisin—a creolisation of English utilized as a lingua franca throughout the country. We explored the development of pasin and luksave and the ways the conceptual claims served a dual function of developing a methodological and epistemic pathway toward an ethical assurance of meaningful relationality. We extend on current understanding in two ways. Firstly employing the methodology of story as critique of research assumptions and secondly, extend on the process of story work to suggest storying as a novel but relatable research methodology. Storying such research experiences as both method and epistemic accountability, guided our responsibility toward the relationships we hold to people, community and knowledge. Pasin and luksave embed an emancipatory and de-colonial intent through the guise of oral stories. These intentions in our scholarship fostered a form of coherent expressions of research claim and method assumption and also raised questions for us regarding what decolonizing Papua New Guinea ought to consider. Our paper also highlights a reformulation of the different ways research considers Oceania in particular Melanesia and the Papua New Guinean research context.