Entry Of Investors Research Articles

Can Green Credit Policies Promote Fund Investment? Evidence from China

Fund investment, as a type of financial investment in the capital market, is designed to attract more social capital towards the green environmental protection sector and foster a harmonious relationship between economic development, social advancement, and ecological conservation. Therefore, as a significant policy instrument, will implementing the green credit policy impact the investment preferences of fund investors? How does it influence their participation in the market? This study utilizes microdata from Chinese Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share-listed companies from 2004 to 2020 to establish a DID model based on the Green Credit Guidelines introduced in 2012. The research delves into the effects of the green credit policy on fund investment and its underlying mechanisms. The green credit policy was found to favor the entry of fund investment, and the results are still valid after a series of robustness tests. The attraction effect of the green credit policy on investors is more evident in non-state-owned enterprises, small and micro enterprises, and non-green industries. Green credit policy can positively influence investor entry through the financing constraint effect and productivity effect. The study theoretically supplements the literature in the field of evaluating the effect of the green credit policy, and practically provides practical guidance and inspiration for strengthening the synergy of the government, banks, and enterprises in implementing green credit policy, promoting industrial transformation, and upgrading, and realizing high-quality economic development.

Who gains favor with green investors amidst climate risk?

PurposeThis study aims to investigate the impact of climate risk disclosure by listed companies on the entry of green investors. It seeks to understand how proactive climate risk disclosure can attract green investment and the underlying mechanisms that facilitate this process.Design/methodology/approachTextual analysis is employed to assess the extent of climate risk disclosure in annual reports. The research constructs indicators for green investor entry and applies regression analysis to examine the relationship between climate risk disclosure and green investment, considering various mediating variables such as positive online news coverage, ESG scores, and corporate reputation.FindingsGreen investors are more likely to invest in companies with higher levels of climate risk disclosure. This relationship is robust across different types of firms, with non-state-owned, non-high-tech, large-scale firms, and those in the Eastern region showing a stronger attraction to green investors. Climate risk disclosure promotes green investment through the “signal transmission” mechanism, enhancing corporate reputation and ESG performance.Originality/valueThis paper extends the traditional theory of external incentives for corporate green development to include autonomous incentives through active climate risk disclosure. It provides new insights into the theory of corporate sustainable development and offers practical recommendations for enhancing corporate green development pathways. The study’s comprehensive approach and use of extensive data contribute valuable knowledge to the field of green investment and corporate sustainability.

Low-carbon city pilot policy and green investors entry

Using low-carbon city pilot policy as a natural experiment, this study investigates whether low-carbon city pilot policy can help enterprises attract green investor entry in China. The results show that low-carbon city pilot policy significantly attracts green investor entry, which is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises and heavily polluting enterprises. Mechanism studies indicate that low-carbon city pilot policy facilitates green investor entry by alleviating financing constraints and strengthening enterprises' risk-taking.

Iklim Investasi dalam Penyelesaiannya Penerapan Omnibus Law

There are five main factors that affect the entry of investors into a country, namely political stability, legal certainty, consistent policies, regulations, and taxes. This research is a literature study that summarizes some literature relevant to the theme. Data collection methods are literature studies that use books and literature, notes, journals and others as the main research objects. The purpose of this paper is to know the investment climate in Indonesia and the application of omnibus law as a solution, as well as to know the challenges of implementing omnibus law in Indonesia. The results showed that Indonesia was dubbed a hyperegulation country that reached 42,996 with details, central regulations as many as 8,414, ministerial regulations 14,453, non-ministry government agency regulations 4,164, and local regulations as many as 15,965. Too much will have an impact on the overlap and inconsistency of regulations between the center and the area causing vertical and horizontal conflicts. The government deregulates and debirokratization through omnibus law with two substances, namely the Omnibus Law Copyright Act which contains 11 clusters that combine 79 laws in which it concerns rules on employment, licensing alignment, investment requirements, to government administration. The challenge of implementing omnibus law is that Indonesia adheres to the civil law system while the concept of omnibus law adherents common law and still new. There is a public reaction between the pros and cons because the manufacturing process is not transparent and participatory, and omnibus law is not in accordance with the provisions of the establishment of laws and regulations. However, legally omnibus law is appropriate after the passing of Law No. 15 of 2019 concerning Changes to Law No. 12 of 2011.

Separating equilibria, underpricing and security design

Classical security design papers equate competitive capital markets to securities being fairly priced in expectation. We revisit Nachman and Noe’s (1994) adverse selection setting, modeling capital market competition as free entry of investors and allowing firms to propose prices for their securities, as happens in private securities placements and bank lending. We identify equilibria in which high types issue underpriced debt, which yields positive expected profits to uninformed lenders, while low types issue steeper securities, such as equity. In addition, pooling equilibria exist in which all firms issue underpriced debt. Introducing pre-existing capital structures provides further foundations for pecking-order theories of external finance.

Estimating the impact of co-investment on Fiber to the Home adoption and competition

The demand for faster broadband access is a key driver of FTTH adoption and fixed broadband competition, and therefore of co-investment. This paper assesses the effects on FTTH adoption and competition of FTTH co-investment. Co-investment had indeed been endorsed in the European Electronic Communication Code as a relevant option for conciliating investment and competition. This paper contributes to evaluating this policy option by providing detailed empirical estimates of the influence of co-investment on Fiber to the Home (FTTH) adoption and competition in the French fixed broadband market. We combine several French municipality level datasets and use a two-stage control-function approach to correct for the endogeneity of investor entry. We show that the presence of co-investment leads to an increase of 7.9% in FTTH adoption in 2018. Co-investment offers also enhance competition. Co-investment by competitors causes a decrease in Orange, French incumbent operator, total retail broadband market penetration by 5.9% whereas no co-investment by competitors lets Orange’s total retail broadband market penetration unchanged. Our findings confirm that co-investment supports the policy objectives of adoption and competition and should be supported by regulation.

The analysis of palm oil plantation impact on the social geographic conditions in Kapuas sub-district, Sanggau district

The establishment of palm oil plantation in Sanggau is started in 1979. The establishment utilizes the land of Dayak indigenous people in the form of customary rights and managed lands that have been cultivated for generations. Based on the data of 2005, the area of palm oil plantation in Sanggau District is up to 131,148.64 hectares, consisting of large state-owned companies covering 20,512.60 hectares, national private companies 30,453.40 hectares, and foreign private companies 21,999.30 hectares. While the area of palm oil plantation of farmers is 77, 383.30 hectares. The entry of investors in the plantation business area will become a stimulus for the establishment of palm oil factories and job opportunities for local communities and immigrants. The research aims at determining the impact of palm oil plantation on the social geographic conditions in Kapuas, Sanggau. This is qualitative descriptive research. Purposive sampling is employed as the sampling technique. In collecting data, the researchers utilize interviews and questionnaires. Descriptive analysis is employed as a data analysis technique. The results of this study indicate that there is a significant change in the social geographic condition of the local and immigrant communities who stay at Kapuas, Sanggau.

Separating Equilibria, Positive Profits and Security Design

Classical security design papers equate competitive capital markets to securities being fairly-priced in expectation. We revisit the adverse selection setting of Nachman and Noe (1994), modeling capital-market competition as free entry of investors, and allowing firms to propose a price for the security issued, as is typical in private securities placements and bank lending. In addition to an equilibrium in which all firms pool on fairly-priced debt, we identify a continuum of separating equilibria in which high types issue under-priced debt, while low types issue more information-ally-sensitive securities, such as equity. We also uncover a continuum of pooling equilibria in which all types issue debt that is under-priced relative to the average firm type. Our model provides theoretical foundations for the pecking-order theory of external finance, and it reconciles positive profits for bank loans or privately-placed debt when lenders have no informational advantage.

The evolution and adoption of equity crowdfunding: entrepreneur and investor entry into a new market

Equity crowdfunding (ECF) offers entrepreneurs an online social media marketplace where they can access numerous potential investors who, in exchange for an ownership stake, may supply them with finance. In this paper, we describe the evolution of this market in the UK. Using an inductive qualitative longitudinal research design, we analyse the emerging views of entrepreneurs and investors towards ECF. Our interviewees include large and small-scale investors, as well as market participants who have chosen not to invest or raise funds via ECF. We find that the large financial flows to entrepreneurs in the UK via the ECF platforms, nearly half a billion GBP since 2011, have probably been largely incremental to traditional sources of early stage entrepreneurial finance. Moreover, our research indicates that for the most part, investors appear to understand and appropriately evaluate the risks that they are bearing; ECF investments are perceived as a high risk, high return component within individuals’ portfolios. Investors also use their communication with peers and entrepreneurs via the ECF platform as a learning tool. On the entrepreneurs’ side, ECF allows them to test their products, to develop their brand, to build a loyal customer base and to turn customers into investors. We conclude that policymakers, with the support of a locally appropriate regulatory framework, could support equity crowdfunding as one of the market choices available for entrepreneurs looking to start or grow their ventures.

Portfolio Choice and Asset Pricing with Investor Entry and Exit

Portfolio Choice and Asset Pricing with Investor Entry and Exit

How Does International Economic Law Regulate the Right of Entry of Investments in Services?

This paper analyses the different ways that international law regulates the entry of foreign investments. By comparing the provisions in the regimes of trade and investment law, this paper argues that there is more liberalization in investment treaties and more investment regulation in the GATS than commonly thought. Different clauses reflect the varied techniques used to regulate the entry of foreign investments and investors in services. No matter how divergent the goals of trade and investment treaties may be, in relation to the entry of investments and investors, the interpretation of the wording of their provisions leads to particularly similar results. The concept of commercial presence in the GATS includes aspects equivalent to the so-called establishment of foreign direct investments. The interpretation of GATS rules as covering potential service suppliers bear a resemblance to concepts already present in BIT practice in relation to investors that seek to invest. Therefore, there are some signs of an increasing conceptual and substantive convergence of rules. The way the admission clauses evolved to establishment clauses in some treaties shows that the difference between them, while less radical and of limited practical relevance, may indicate a step towards a convergence with international trade law. There has also been a trend towards treaty language granting more entry rights and commitments. This was done by the progressive introduction of national treatment for entry rights, the expansion of services coverage in Mode 3 and the recognition and clarification of the rights to potential investors. The increasing number of ITs containing establishment rights is noted especially in light of the new mega-regionals. There has also been a disposition to include provisions related to the entry of investors coming from the international trade law world into the investment law arena. In sum, the substantive convergence of the rules related to entry of investments in treaty-making is becoming more evident.

ANALISIS PERHITUNGAN, PENCATATAN DAN PELAPORAN PAJAK PENGHASILAN PASAL 23 ATAS PENGADAAN BARANG DALAM HAL INI JASA PENYEWAAN BARANG BERAT PADA PT.WILLIAM MAKMUR PERKASA

In running the government, a State must run the economy well. This affects the country for the prosperity of society development in order to achieve the objectives set by the State Act. One aspect in the implementation of the necessary development funding comes from tax revenue. The purpose of this study was to determine the mechanism of calculation, recording and reporting of Income Tax Article 23 on the procurement of goods in this respect rental services heavy loads PT.William Perkasa Makmur. The analysis method used in this research is descriptive analysis method. The results showed that as a company engaged in the field of contracting and rental of heavy equipment, PT. William Makmur Perkasa continue to provide tools that have the best quality and the weight to be able to sustain the work. The company realizes the development in this area both by the Government and private parties, seen also with the advent of the projects undertaken by the Government to prepare the facilities and infrastructure to support the development of the area, of course, which is a prerequisite for the entry of investors in investing. Laws and regulations on taxation applicable always changes the company should remain always pay attention to it. This is important so that it can determine the amount of income tax 23 in accordance with the existing rules.

When Some Investors Head for the Exit

We develop a measure of binding short-sales constraints in equity markets derived from Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002)'s breadth of mutual fund ownership. We show that when the exit rate, the fraction of investors that held a stock in the previous quarter and that exit that stock this quarter, is high, short-sales constraints are more tightly binding and price is high relative to fundamentals. In contrast, entry of investors that have not previously owned the stock is associated with more not less over-pricing. The exit rate better captures the disagreement distribution of investors in similar fund styles actively evaluating a stock. Using equity funds and for the fi rst time hedge funds, we show that stocks with high exit rates consistently under-perform the market throughout the entire 1980-2008 sample.

Liquidity and congestion

Abstract This paper studies the relationship between the endogenous arrival of investors to a market and liquidity in a search-based model of asset trading. Entry of investors causes two contradictory effects. First, it reduces trading costs, which attracts new investors (externality effect). But secondly, as investors concentrate on one side of the market, the market becomes “congested,” decreasing the returns to investing and discouraging new investors from entering (congestion effect). The equilibrium level of liquidity depends on which of the two effects dominates. When congestion is the leading effect, some interesting results arise. In particular, diminishing trading costs can deteriorate liquidity and welfare.

Myths About Mutual Fund Fees: Economic Insights on Jones v. Harris

Mutual funds stand ready at all times to sell and redeem common stock to the investing public for the net value of their assets under management. In the language of transaction cost economics, they are open-access common pools subject to virtually free investor entry and exit. The Investment Company Act (1940) requires mutual funds to be managed by an outside advisory firm pursuant to a written contract, which normally pays the adviser a small share of net asset value, say, one-half of one percent per year. Following 1970 amendments to the Investment Company Act imposing a fiduciary duty on advisers with respect to their receipt of compensation, a large number of private civil suits attempting to recover excessive fees have been filed against advisory firms. By failing to account for the transaction costs inherent in mutual fund organization, Congress, securities regulators, financial scholars, and even courts have misidentified a conflict of interest with respect to fund advisory fees, encouraging these frivolous suits. With free investor entry and exit and rational expectations, fund flows endogenize investor returns. Regardless of the level of the advisory fee, any expected abnormal return to a manager’s superior stock-picking skill will be competed away by investors chasing the prospect of capturing the associated rents. With shareholders having a common claim to fund assets, all expected rents will be either transferred to the manager in the form of higher total fee payments on a larger asset base or dissipated by added administrative costs. As a first approximation, the level of advisory fees is therefore irrelevant to fund shareholders. The best they can expect from placing their money in a managed fund is a normal competitive return after adjusting for risk and other factors. With the U.S. Supreme Court having recently granted certiorari in an excessive fee case appealing an arguably maverick opinion by Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, it is essential that various myths about mutual fund fees be exposed to careful economic analysis.

Liquidity and Congestion

This paper studies the relationship between the arrival of potential investors and market liquidity in a search-based model of asset trading. The entry of investors into a specific market causes two contradictory effects. First, it reduces trading costs, which then attracts new investors (the thick market externality effect). But second, as investors concentrate on one side of the market, the market becomes congested, decreasing the returns to participating in this market and discouraging new investors from entering (what we call the congestion effect). The equilibrium level of market liquidity depends on which of the two effects dominates. When congestion is the leading effect, some interesting results arise. In particular, we find that diminishing trading costs in our market can impair liquidity and reduce welfare.

Does foreign strategic investment transfer management knowledge to local Chinese banks?

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to analyze whether, and how, foreign strategic investor entry to China conveys management expertise to domestic banks. Some observers are concerned that foreign investors will be reluctant to transfer their expertise to local partners, and few skills will be acquired by Chinese banks. At the same time, the trade‐off between China's access to banking skills and foreigners' access to Chinese customers will overwhelmingly favour the foreigners.Design/methodology/approachThe discussion is based on authentic cases collected from the China Banking Regulatory Commission, various banks annual reports, and the China Financial Development Report. Cross‐border management knowledge transfer from global banks to emerging economies is the theoretical framework for analyzing strategic investment in bank cases.FindingsThe paper finds that there are some successes of management knowledge transfer from such investment, although foreign strategic investment is limited as a minority share in each local bank. Culture shock came at the first stage and syncretism later on.Originality/valueThe cultural shock and rigidity of traditional conception are an impediment in the transfer process. This paper shows that the initial conflict can be avoided.

Role of strategic investors in Polish companies: Catalysts for organizational change or opportunists?

Abstract The entry of large activist (or so‐called ‘strategic’) investors has become a prevalent phenomenon in transforming economies, such as the Polish one. This paper investigates the relationship between firm performance and the likelihood of a strategic investor entry, as well as the changes firms undergo under control of an activist investor. Theoretical predictions and empirical analyses of 211 Polish companies in the period of 1994–2000 allow us to conclude that strategic investors are more likely to buy stakes in firms of higher labor productivity, and tend to catalyze changes in poorly performing firms. There is also some evidence that investors refrain from committing resources to restructuring the target firms before seizing significant control over them.

Heterogeneity in Investor Confidence and Asset Market Under-and Overreaction

This paper develops a behavioral finance model that may explain underreaction and overreaction in asset markets from the perspective of heterogeneous investors with different confidence levels. The model explains the occurrence of underreaction by the sequential entry of investors with different confidence levels in interpreting earnings shocks. When the average investor confidence level is high enough, owing to the stochastic nature of the fundamental value and the change in order flow and trading volume, it is likely for asset price to overshoot what the fundamental value warrants, leading to overreaction and negative autocorrelation of asset returns. It is shown that in repeated trading episodes with repeated earnings shocks, the average investor confidence level would be higher as a result of the biased self-attribution and confirmatory bias, causing overreaction more likely to occur. Also, the higher average confidence level of investors gauged by the later timing of winding up their asset holding positions also makes overreaction more likely to occur.