Entity List Research Articles

Huawei Is Quietly Dominating China’s Semiconductor Supply Chain

Huawei is emerging as the leader of China’s national team in semiconductors, dominating chip manufacturing and seeking to integrate the country’s entire supply chain. Its ambitions stem from both its placement on the U.S. Entity List and strong government support at the national and local level. Internationally, Huawei is coy about these ambitions, hiding its supply chain involvement and often operating under a different company’s name. Meanwhile, Huawei’s experience is also encouraging other Chinese technology companies to support China’s quest for chip self-sufficiency, developing new hardware and software for that purpose. The clandestine nature of Huawei’s involvement—it is not known who serves what role in semiconductor production—makes it more difficult for Western companies and governments to assess China’s progress in technology, vet potential partners and customers, and conduct risk assessments.

SF-GPT: A training-free method to enhance capabilities for knowledge graph construction in LLMs

Knowledge graphs (KGs) are constructed by extracting knowledge triples from text and fusing knowledge, enhancing information retrieval efficiency. Current methods for knowledge triple extraction include ”Pretrain and Fine-tuning” and Large Language Models (LLMs). The former shifts effort from manual extraction to dataset annotation and suffers from performance degradation with different test and training set distributions. LLMs-based methods face errors and incompleteness in extraction. We introduce SF-GPT, a training-free method to address these issues. Firstly, we propose the Entity Extraction Filter (EEF) module to filter triple generation results, addressing evaluation and cleansing challenges. Secondly, we introduce a training-free Entity Alignment Module based on Entity Alias Generation (EAG), tackling semantic richness and interpretability issues in LLM-based knowledge fusion. Finally, our Self-Fusion Subgraph strategy uses multi-response self-fusion and a common entity list to filter triple results, reducing noise from LLMs’ multi-responses. In experiments, SF-GPT showed a 55.5% increase in recall and a 32.6% increase in F1 score on the BDNC dataset compared to the UniRel model trained on the NYT dataset and achieved a 5% improvement in F1 score compared to GPT-4+EEF baseline on the WebNLG dataset in the case of a fusion round of three. SF-GPT offers a promising way to extract knowledge from unstructured information.

Mechanism of strategic remoulding of high-dimensional industrial eco-economy and the reconstruction of carbon neutral industrial chain

Considerable changes in the international society, fierce international competition and unpredictable economic changes are currently observed. Since then, the epidemic has had a far-reaching impact, and many industrial and supply chains have suffered from ‘broken chains’, ‘blocked chains’ and ‘poor chains’. The European Union (EU) has also sounded the alarm on China’s ‘card neck’ restrictions and ‘entity list’. Therefore, pursuing the integration of dual carbon landscape planning and industrial chain and addressing the key high-dimensional ecological economy ‘neck-choking’ problem path have become important tasks. National ministries and commissions have issued a number of documents to promote the integration and innovation of the industrial chain, high-, medium- and low-dimensional enterprises, and guide such industries to take the road of ‘high dimensional’ development. This paper takes eco-economic strategy as the starting point to reshape the systematic theoretical analysis framework of economic strategy mechanism. In response to the high-dimensional industrial transformation adaptation path and carbon neutral industry chain development model of the academic inquiry, the ‘profit model’ is set as the core and configuration complementary, alternative management thinking analysis path and model. Simultaneously, the high-dimensional industrial eco-economic industrial chain adaptation path is identified. The effects of high-dimensional industry ‘five forces’, ‘colouring map’ and ‘new tools’ are explored and then integrated and refined to improve the implementation efficiency of the carbon neutral industrial chain. Finally, focusing on the high-dimensional ecological economic strategy reshaping mechanism, the formation of sustainable development of the ‘carbon neutral’ industrial chain, unified standards and the realisation of the chain length system is investigated.

Does the U.S.-China trade war stop? A novel event study on fake news and stock price in China

This study leverages the unique fake news event on the U.S.-China trade war, and adopts the difference-in-differences framework to identify its two-stage effect on stock prices in China. Our results reveal that the spread of fake news, proclaiming the end of the trade war, caused stock prices of high-tech companies to soar. After it was clarified, prices gradually decreased until the end of the first stage. But in the second stage, the stock prices of these companies grew higher than their counterparts, caused by speculation beliefs. The two-stage effect was more pronounced for the high-tech companies on the Entity List.

Does being included in an entity list enhance regulated firms’ mergers and acquisitions? Evidence from Chinese high-tech firms

Using a sample of Chinese high-tech firms, we document that firms included in the entity list by the U.S. enhance their mergers and acquisitions (M&As) investments. Mechanism tests indicate that the inclusion of Chinese firms in the entity list has disrupted their reliance on imported factors of production, thereby motivating their M&A decisions that aim to secure resources. Additional tests show that being included in the entity list motivates firms to enhance specific types of M&As such as technological and domestic M&As. Meanwhile, national industrial policy plays an important role in supporting these firms’ M&As.

Export controls and innovation performance: Unravelling the complex relationship between blacklisted Chinese firms and U.S. suppliers

AbstractExport controls are crucial for protecting domestic economic interests globally. However, there is a lack of consensus regarding their impact on innovation performance. This study contributes to the literature by examining the effects of the U.S. entity list on the innovation performance of blacklisted Chinese firms and related industries, as well as the reverse shock on U.S. suppliers. Using propensity score matching and a difference‐in‐differences approach, we found that export controls stimulate technological innovation in blacklisted firms and generate industry‐wide spillover effects in the sanctioned country. Particularly, firms heavily reliant on imports from the United States and those solely dependent on China's domestic market experience significant effects. However, export controls have a negative impact on the innovation performance of U.S. suppliers. We examine the mechanisms driving these effects, including government grants, R&D investment and firm performance. Our work offers valuable insights into the complex relationship between export controls and innovation performance, highlighting the differentiated impacts on blacklisted firms, related industries and U.S. suppliers.

The United States–China ‘tech war’: Decoupling and the case of Huawei

AbstractThis paper offers an analysis of US strategy in the unfolding United States–China ‘tech war’ and its consequences. We argue that a tech war is now underway, and that Washington is the driving force behind it. Here, we focus on the most impactful policy so far: the placement of Huawei and over 150 of its affiliates on the sanctioned Entity List. As a result, a decoupling between high‐end US tech and Huawei Technologies is well underway, if not already complete. However, the consequences of the sanctions have not been what Washington intended or expected. The company appears to have maintained its position as one of the world's leading innovators in 5G technology and remains a leading supplier of 5G base stations. The United States risks undermining co‐operation with China in other critical policy areas because the tech war is viewed as aggressive in Beijing. It has also exposed the limits of US influence over allies and third countries, many of whom are opting for Huawei's cheaper 5G infrastructure. Nevertheless, the expansion of this approach by the Biden administration suggests that, in future, Washington may prioritise security interests over commercial ones as it seeks to preserve as much US primacy as possible.

A Study on the Game Strategy of Chip Price Behavior at the Background of the US-China Trade War

The US-China trade war has had a profound impact on the game strategy and price behavior of chips in the semiconductor industry. This study aims to analyze the influencing factors, strategic shifts, and game theory dynamics of chip prices in the context of the trade war. The asymmetrical relationship between the United States and China in chip supply and demand, coupled with the imposition of tariffs and restrictions, has disrupted the supply chain, which leads to fluctuations in chip prices. The study highlights the artificial inflation of demand and oversupply of certain chip types because of stockpiling and entity list disruptions. It also examines the impact of tariffs on the cost structure of semiconductor manufacturing and the subsequent adjustments in pricing strategies. Furthermore, the study explores the localization strategies and shifts in global semiconductor production that have been prompted by the trade war and their implications on chip prices. Lastly, the study analyzes the repeated game perspective and its influence on the strategic choices and behaviors of the parties involved in the trade war. Overall, this study provides insights into the game strategy and price behavior of chips in the background of the US-China trade war, contributing to a better understanding of the dynamics and implications for the semiconductor industry.

Chronology of Practice: Chinese Practice in Private International Law in 2022

Abstract This survey contains materials reflecting the Chinese practice of private international law in 2022. Firstly, the changes in the statutory framework of private international law in China include two legislative acts and one administrative regulation. Moreover, three international treaties in this regard were ratified by the National People’s Congress. Secondly, three judicial interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) were adopted or amended, and 56 typical cases in six judicial documents on different topics were issued by the SPC. Thirdly, four typical cases on Chinese courts’ jurisdiction; 14 cases on choice of laws on various issues such as foreign investment contracts and negative lists, rights in rem, life insurance contracts and mandatory rules; one case on international judicial assistance rendered to an Argentinean court; three cases on interim measures; three cases on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments; nine cases on international arbitration including international sports arbitration and foreign awards, are selected in this survey for their emerging significance. Fourthly, the provisions regarding the extraterritorial application of Chinese laws have been identified for the first time in this series of surveys, shedding light on this aspect of private international law in China. They include those contained in, inter alia, China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, Anti-foreign Sanctions Law, Export Control Law, Securities Law, the Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures, as well as the Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List.

The Impact of Sino-US Trade Friction on China's Manufacturing Industry

Against the backdrop of rapid economic development and globalization, the trade environment for Chinas manufacturing industry to integrate into the global value chain has undergone changes. The trade frictions between China and the United States have escalated from time to time, and how to face the challenges has become a major issue. Based on the background of trade frictions between China and the United States, this article first introduces the current development status of Chinas manufacturing industry, and then conducts an in-depth analysis of the changes in international and domestic market demand for Chinas manufacturing industry. Secondly, it analyzes the part of the Entity List of the China-United States trade war that affects the Chinese market, and analyzes the impact of Sino-US trade friction on the integration of Chinas manufacturing industry and the global value chain. Finally, some suggestions are put forward for the Chinese manufacturing industry to cope with trade frictions between China and the United States, providing strategies for industry protection and the path to achieve the transition of the manufacturing industry in the global value chain.

Mapping U.S.-China technological “decoupling”: Beyond U.S.-China relations

As a global phenomenon of political and economic geography, a partial “decoupling” of U.S. and Chinese technology ecosystems is well under way. It should be noted that the biggest manifestation of this decoupling is the U.S. crackdown on Chinese technology companies. The U.S. government has placed over 1000 Chinese firms on the Entity List, Unverified List, Chinese Military firms Sanitations List, and NS-CMIC as a representative action to stifle the Chinese technology industry. The spatial patterns of the technological decoupling between China and the United States can be summed up by looking at the spatial distribution of blacklisted firms. Beyond China, the United States largely works to prevent China from forging indirect business links with U.S. high-tech companies through its allies (for example, the United Kingdom). Core cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen in China, which are also hubs for Chinese high-tech businesses, are the major targets of industrial suppression in the United States. The U.S.-China rivalry will continue to shape the global economic geography in the future.

US economic statecraft and great power competition

AbstractThis article develops a conceptual framework for explaining variation in the United States’ economic statecraft in the Cold War and the present day, focusing on how US officials perceived the type of geoeconomic capability that its rivals possessed and the type of national security challenge that they posed. This framework specifies four ideal-type strategies on the part of the United States: economic containment, national economic competition, technological containment, and national technological competition. Analyses of U.S. strategy toward the Soviet Union, China, and Japan support the theory. These ideal types explain why, in the rivalry with Japan in the 1980s, the United States openly engaged in competition but did not adopt containment, relying on Voluntary Export Restraints, currency devaluation agreements, and bilateral semiconductor agreements rather than placing Japan on something historically analogous to the Commerce Department's contemporary Entity List or targeting Japan with comprehensive export controls through an institution like CoCom. These ideal types (and the theory behind them) also explain why the United States has implemented containment measures against specific Chinese companies but has not pursued a systematic “decoupling” of the US and Chinese economies.

COVID-19, business continuity management and standardization: case study of Huawei

Purpose This paper aims to theoretically and empirically demonstrate the role played by business continuity management (BCM) to address risks such as trade conflicts and natural disasters. This paper also answers whether compliance with international standards such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 22301 is adequate. Design/methodology/approach A case study of Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei is conducted to examine how a robust end-to-end BCM system has been established in two decades and in what way it has helped Huawei to efficiently maintain growth under pressure, such as being added to the “Entity List” and the pandemic. Findings Huawei case contributes to BCM theory in its approach to establishing the BCM system and its well-established BCM model. Huawei establishes and continually improves its BCM system by applying the Plan (establish), Do (implement and operate), Check (monitor and review) and Act (maintain and improve) cycle. Characterized as 4Ps: BCM policy, BCM process, incident management plan and business continuity plan, Huawei BCM system is shaped into a loop with end-to-end BCM process, covering all steps along its value chain – from suppliers and partners to Huawei itself and then on to its customers – with key initiatives for all domains such as R&D, procurement, manufacturing, logistics and global technical services. In practice, implementing international standards such as ISO 22301 enables Huawei to develop business continuity but not enough. Optimizing the BCM system is an ongoing effort, and BCM maturity is ever present: continually improving Huawei’s own BCM system and benchmarking against best practices available worldwide. Research limitations/implications Apart from the case study, other methods such as counter-factual analysis can be used to further test whether Huawei’s BCM system is cost-effective. Another direction for future study is whether suggested BCM maturity levels should be supplemented into ISO 22301. In the digital age, how to use digitalization to ensure business continuity is a current issue not just for practitioners such as Huawei but also for researchers worldwide. Practical implications In practice, implementing international standards such as ISO 22301 enables Huawei to develop business continuity but not enough. Optimizing the BCM system is an ongoing effort, and BCM maturity is ever present: continually improving Huawei’s own BCM system and benchmarking against best practices available worldwide. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is one of the first studies to focus on how an organization continually improves the suitability, adequacy and effectiveness of its BCM system, with special attention to standards compliance.

Between a Rock and a Hard Place Under China’s Anti-Sanction Law 2021: The Game- Theoretical Perspective

The Chinese Anti-Sanction Law (ASL 2021) has for the first time created a legal basis for sanctioning specific foreign entities for conduct inconsistent with China’s core interests and policies. Those involved in implementing foreign sanction measures can be put on an anti-sanctions list and may be denied entry into China or be expelled from the country. The escalated confrontations are part of a broader global trend of tightening export controls, sanctions and foreign investment controls on national security or public interest grounds. At the heart of the problem is the incongruity between the US and Chinese perspectives on distinct values such as human rights, national security and other public policies. The conflict of law arises inevitably as a multinational company (MNC) attempts to comply with both US law and ASL 2021. The law creates a legal conundrum for foreign MNCs, which are placed in a proverbial rock-and-hard-place situation. Using in-depth analyses of China’s evolving sanctions regime, it is essential to explore resolutions to mitigate the escalated tension and break the deadlock. It is therefore necessary for foreign entities to navigate a delicate balancing act between compliance with US laws and China’s requirements for continued transactions. Blocking Mechanism, Anti-Sanction Law, National Security, Entity List

Chronology of Practice: Chinese Practice in Private International Law in 2020

Abstract This survey contains materials reflecting the practice of Chinese private international law in 2020. First, regarding changes in the statutory framework of private international law in China, three legislative acts, one administrative regulation on the Unreliable Entity List and ten judicial interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court were adopted or amended in 2020 on a wide range of matters, including conflict of laws, punitive damages, international civil procedure, etc. Second, 11 typical cases involving Chinse courts’ jurisdiction are selected to highlight the development in Chinese private international law, involving standard essential patents, abuse of market dominance, declaration of non-infringement of patent, asymmetric choice of court agreement and other matters. Third, nine cases on choice of law questions relating, in particular, to habitual residence, rights in rem, matrimonial property regimes and ascertainment of foreign law, are examined. Fourth, five cases involving anti-suit injunction or anti-enforcement injunction are reported and one introduced in detail. Fifth, the first occasion for on international judicial assistance of extracting DNA, as well as three representative cases on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, are discussed. The Statistics of international judicial assistance cases in China is first released in this survey. Finally, this survey also covers five recent decisions illustrating Chinese courts’ pro-arbitration attitude towards the uncertainty brought about by contractual clauses referring to both litigation and arbitration.

Graph-based entity-oriented search

Entity-oriented search has revolutionized search engines. In the era of Google Knowledge Graph and Microsoft Satori, users demand an effortless process of search. Whether they express an information need through a keyword query, expecting documents and entities, or through a clicked entity, expecting related entities, there is an inherent need for the combination of corpora and knowledge bases to obtain an answer. Such integration frequently relies on independent signals extracted from inverted indexes, and from quad indexes indirectly accessed through queries to a triplestore. However, relying on two separate representation models inhibits the effective cross-referencing of information, discarding otherwise available relations that could lead to a better ranking. Moreover, different retrieval tasks often demand separate implementations, although the problem is, at its core, the same. With the goal of harnessing all available information to optimize retrieval, we explore joint representation models of documents and entities, while taking a step towards the definition of a more general retrieval approach. Specifically, we propose that graphs should be used to incorporate explicit and implicit information derived from the relations between text found in corpora and entities found in knowledge bases. We also take advantage of this framework to elaborate a general model for entity-oriented search, proposing a universal ranking function for the tasks of ad hoc document retrieval (leveraging entities), ad hoc entity retrieval, and entity list completion. At a conceptual stage, we begin by proposing the graph-of-entity, based on the relations between combinations of term and entity nodes. We introduce the entity weight as the corresponding ranking function, relying on the idea of seed nodes for representing the query, either directly through term nodes, or based on the expansion to adjacent entity nodes. The score is computed based on a series of geodesic distances to the remaining nodes, providing a ranking for the documents (or entities) in the graph. In order to improve on the low scalability of the graph-of-entity, we then redesigned this model in a way that reduced the number of edges in relation to the number of nodes, by relying on the hypergraph data structure. The resulting model, which we called hypergraph-of-entity, is the main contribution of this thesis. The obtained reduction was achieved by replacing binary edges with n -ary relations based on sets of nodes and entities (undirected document hyperedges), sets of entities (undirected hyperedges, either based on cooccurrence or a grouping by semantic subject), and pairs of a set of terms and a set of one entity (directed hyperedges, mapping text to an object). We introduce the random walk score as the corresponding ranking function, relying on the same idea of seed nodes, similar to the entity weight in the graph-of-entity. Scoring based on this function is highly reliant on the structure of the hypergraph, which we call representation-driven retrieval. As such, we explore several extensions of the hypergraph-of-entity, including relations of synonymy, or contextual similarity, as well as different weighting functions per node and hyperedge type. We also propose TF-bins as a discretization for representing term frequency in the hypergraph-of-entity. For the random walk score, we propose and explore several parameters, including length and repeats, with or without seed node expansion, direction, or weights, and with or without a certain degree of node and/or hyperedge fatigue, a concept that we also propose. For evaluation, we took advantage of TREC 2017 OpenSearch track, which relied on an online evaluation process based on the Living Labs API, and we also participated in TREC 2018 Common Core track, which was based on the newly introduced TREC Washington Post Corpus. Our main experiments were supported on the INEX 2009 Wikipedia collection, which proved to be a fundamental test collection for assessing retrieval effectiveness across multiple tasks. At first, our experiments solely focused on ad hoc document retrieval, ensuring that the model performed adequately for a classical task. We then expanded the work to cover all three entity-oriented search tasks. Results supported the viability of a general retrieval model, opening novel challenges in information retrieval, and proposing a new path towards generality in this area.

U.S.-China Economic Tensions—Will Biden Get Right What Trump Got Wrong?

U.S.-China Economic Tensions—Will Biden Get Right What Trump Got Wrong? Yukon Huang (bio) Although President Biden has vowed to reverse many of Trump's policies, both administrations see China as a strategic threat and great-power rival. This reflects popular sentiments expressed in various polls that China has become an "overwhelming geopolitical concern."1 Biden has characterized the U.S.-China confrontation as "a battle between the utility of democracies in the twenty-first century and autocracies."2 At the same time, Biden wants to avoid a total collapse in U.S.-China relations since China is a partner as well as competitor and rival, depending on the issue. If tensions are inevitable, then Biden's challenge is to differentiate between real issues where progress is desired and several misguided concerns that absorbed Trump's attention. The Trump administration's misguided concerns The Trump administration's first mistake was failing to recognize that trade deficits are not the central problem. President Trump's trade war with China was fueled by his belief that China was responsible for the United States' huge trade deficits, which contributed to lost manufacturing jobs and reduced competitiveness.3 However, trade deficits are not a good indicator of the state of the economy.4 For example, when an economy is doing well, increasing household incomes result in more imports and larger trade deficits. Furthermore, the United States has been running trade deficits for over forty years, long before China became a major economic power and exporter. In other words, the trade balances of the United States and China are not linked. When U.S. trade deficits soared in the late 1990s and early 2000s, China was not running significant trade surpluses. Later, when China's surpluses rose sharply, U.S. deficits declined. U.S. trade balances are largely driven by budget deficits and China's balances by rising household savings rates with urbanization—factors that have little to do with one another.5 Even if the goal had been to reduce the bilateral trade imbalance, the Trump administration's policy would still have made little sense. China cannot buy enough from the United States to bridge the trade deficit, in part because the latter does not produce enough of the high-end consumer goods or the raw materials that the former desires. Instead, Europe supplies China with much of its high-end consumer goods while Latin America and Africa provide much of its raw materials. Moreover, U.S. restrictions prevent sales of the high-tech products China wants due to reasons of national security. Such restrictions may be strategically aimed, but their impact on trade imbalances should not be underestimated.6 Sales of military equipment generated $175 billion for the United States in 2020.7 Aside from the understandable banning of military sales to China, U.S. export earnings are reduced by tightening licensing requirements imposed on China's purchases of hi-tech products for civilian use. In addition, more than 300 Chinese companies have been added over the past year to the Commerce Department's Entity List, which further restricts access to U.S. hi-tech products.8 Cutting off sales to Chinese firms like Huawei, ZTE, and other industrial leaders not only threatens their operational existence, but also represents substantial lost revenues for American suppliers. The U.S. Semiconductor Association, [End Page 246] for example, estimates losses of $30–50 billion if such restrictions are fully implemented.9 Therefore, it is no surprise that Trump's Phase One Trade Agreement committing China to buy more failed to achieve its desired effect of boosting U.S. exports to China and lowering its overall trade deficits.10 Second, Trump echoed popular but misguided sentiments that U.S. firms have been investing too much in China at the expense of the U.S. economy. Over the past two decades, only 1–2 percent of U.S. foreign investment has been going to China.11 By contrast, the European Union (EU), which is comparable to the United States in economic size, has been investing roughly twice as much. So the question is why the United States invests so little in China rather than so much...

China’s Counter-Strategy to American Export Controls in Integrated Circuits

This article examines China’s efforts to counter American sanctions against Huawei that in effect try to weaponize the silicon supply chain. While China has taken tentative steps to try to decouple from the American semiconductor industry, it faces three continuing challenges. First, the areas of technological dependence that the Huawei Entity List sanctions highlighted, fabrication capital equipment and electronic design automation (EDA) software, are areas in which China has very weak capabilities. Second, the wider the scope of the sanctions is, the more likely local and foreign firms will be willing to cooperate with Chinese efforts to create substitutes for controlled American technologies. But the scope of the sanctions appears to be in stasis and may even narrow during the Biden administration. Finally, the progressive expansion of China’s silicon ambitions has elicited foreign industrial policies to counter China’s own policies. This expanding market outside of China will lessen the effectiveness of Chinese policy and at the same time make a certain level of controls over IC technology palatable to American partners as Chinese customers are replaced by others.

Agglomerative clusterization with DBSCAN algorithm and iterative method

The tasks of grouping, classifying, and clustering data are widely encountered nowadays in different areas of activity. These tasks need to be solved in librarianship and even in social networks. One of the complex and important tasks is a grouping of normative and reference information. Solving this problem will allow us to perform complex operations with the normativereference information: building a hierarchical structure from scratch, adding new entities or groups to the existing, and combining several lists of normative-reference information independently of the original hierarchical structure presence. This article includesdescription of using DBSCAN as an agglomerative-iterative clusterization algorithm. The iterative part of this algorithm is necessary forfull entity list clusterization on every hierarchical level. Clustering metrics such as adjusted Rand index, Jaccard index, Foulkes-Mallows index are considered. A new metric based on the previously mentioned metrics has been proposed. A combination of Word2Vec and TF-IDF algorithms is used to convert the textual names of objects to numerical form.

IS A DIGITAL GREAT WALL BEING BUILT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHINA?

ABSTRACT This study briefly reviews the causes of the U.S.-China conflicts, the U.S. actions and China's responses. It continues to point out that China is not going to remove subsidies to SOEs, and 5G is critical in the development of cutting-edge technologies. As a result, the U.S.-China relations have entered into a new phase, a phase of prolonged fierce technological competition centered on 5G because dominance in the field of advanced technology will lead to dominance of the world. This paper discusses the U.S. campaign to constrain Huawei and lists possible causes for not being successful. This paper also reviews China's strong capabilities in high technology. The U.S. pressure on China, especially Executive Order 13873 and the Entity List, has forced China to start its nationwide campaign to be technologically independent. We posit that Beijing's directive, internally referred to as the “3-5-2” policy, issued in early 2019, and its intent to export its censored internet services may mark the starting point of the “Digital Great Wall”. Keywords Belt and Road Initiative; Chinese Dream; Entity List; Huawei; Long March; State-Owned Enterprise; 5G