Reviews Conflicting Missions:Havana, Washington, and Africa,1959-1976.ByPiero Gleijeses. Chapel Hill, CA and London: University of NorthCarolina Press,2002. 552pp. Hardback. In November 1975 Cuba launched the largestmilitaryintervention in its history, sendingmorethan30,000troopsintoAngola to defenditsally,the MPLA, fromtwin invasionsby Zaire and South Africa.This was not an unprecedented event,however,but thefinalact in a long history of Cuban involvement inAfricawhichdatesback to theearliestdaysoftherevolution. PieroGleijeses'snewbook,theculmination ofmorethana decadeofresearch in Cuba and southernAfrica,examinesCuba's evolvingrelationship with Africa during therevolution's first seventeen years, from thefirst internationalistmissionsinAlgeriaand theCongo inChe Guevara'stime,to thefull-scale intervention inAngolaof1975/76. Giventhecomplexity of theconflict in sub-SaharanAfricaand themany partiesinvolved,it is not surprising that it should have taken so long to producethisbook (whichshouldperhapsbe seen as onlythefirst partof a largerstudyon Cuban involvement inAfricasince1959).Drawingon a large bodyofevidence,gleanedfrompreviously inaccessibleCuban and American archives,and frominterviews with seniorpolitical and military veterans, Gleijesespaintsa meticulous pictureofCuban and Americaninvolvement in Africathroughoutthe 1960s and early 70s, revealingas much about the motivations ofthoseforeign powerswhichintervened, as abouttheir ignorance ofAfrica ingeneral. In Gleijeses's book the researchprocess featuresprominently, and he repeatedly returns tohislongbattlewiththeCuban government togainaccess toclassified military andpoliticalarchives, andtothehigh-ranking veterans of Cuba's internationalist missionsin Africa.Anyone who has carried out research inCuba and Angola,or has had dealingswiththeCuban military or the MPLA, cannot fail to empathizewithGleijeses's at timesexasperating experience.Nevertheless, nearlya decade ofeffort has produceda collection of documents,includingoriginalletters,cables and reportsfromCuban archives, whicharenowinthelibrary oftheSchoolofAdvancedInternational Studiesat JohnsHopkins University in Washington DC. Some of theseare available on theinternet siteof theCold War International HistoryProject (http://cwihp.si.edu), and as a collectiontheyare sureto provean invaluable sourceforfuture studieson Cuban foreign policyinAfrica. Gleijesesis excellenton detail,an essentialskillwhenstudying a conflict whichinvolves so manydifferent entangled strands, andhepuncheslargeholes in manyof theconclusionsdrawnby some of thefirst writers on Angola's chaoticde-colonizationprocess (such as Hodges and Legum,Marcum and Moss). In particular, Gleijesesmakesa convincing case thatSovietmilitary involvement in Angola remainedmuted,and on a par withAmericanaid to the FNLA and UNITA, untilwell afterAngola became independent on REVIEWS 227 11November1975.Thisassertion debunksclaimsbytheAmerican administrationthattheir covertoperation'scomparatively smallbudgetwas toblamefor itsfailure, and putsthespotlight insteadon theCIA's numerousintelligence failures inAngola. Thereare manyinteresting asidesthroughout Conflicting Missions- such as theinvolvement of theFrenchoil companyElf in FLEC's declarationof Cabindan independence,or the revelationthat Cuba secretlysuppliedthe Algerian FLN withAmerican weaponrywhichhad beenseizedfrom theCIA's Cuban exilesattheBayofPigs.Gleijesesalso takestimetocorrect someofthe mythsand misreporting of the war which have throughrepeatedcitation becomeestablished fact.Intheprocessheteasesoutmanyofthecontradictions inthepoliciesofeachofthemainintervening parties- theUSA,Cuba, South Africa,theSovietUnion and theWesternEuropean powers- and of their fractious African allies. Conflicting Missionspaintsa critical andattimesdamning picture ofCuban involvement in Africain the earlyyears of the Revolution,revealingthe mixture ofideologicalcommitment and totalignorance ofAfricawhichdrove the2,000Cubans who servedon internationalist missionsbetween1959 and 1974.FarfrombeingCastro'sideal rovingambassador,Guevaraemerges as a terrible diplomat,rubbing updozensofAfrican revolutionaries thewrongway (mostnotoriously theleaderof FRELIMO, Eduardo Mondlane, sparkinga hostility whichlastedintothemid-1970s, andevenupsetting theMPLA during theirfirst meeting).The real alliance betweentheCubans and Africans was forgedbythemenand womensentto carryout internationalist missionsin Algeria,Congo-Brazzaville, Guiñéand Angola,and itis frominterviews with themthata pictureof Cuban involvement in Africaemerges.It is one of disorganized hasteandrepeatedincompetence - manyofthefirst internationalistsarriving unannouncedand unexpectedinAlgeria,Guinea-Conakry and Angola - but also of greatimprovizationand innovation(whichproved criticalingetting theBM-21 missile-launchers readyintimeforthekeybattle at Quifangondo). Gleijesesis bluntin his analysisof Cuban motivation forgoingto Africa, puttingit down to a mixtureof 'altruism,self-defence and ignorance'.But there isnevertheless a markedsympathy inthebooktowardsthosehedescribes in the introductionas 'the defeated': Cuba and the MPLA. Gleijeses is determinedthat their side of the storyshould get a fair hearing,and unfortunately thishas meantthatforthehandfulofmilitary clashesbetween the Cubans and the South Africansduringthe 'Second LiberationWar' (1975-76)hefavours Cuban accounts,perpetuating Havana's policyoftalking down majorCuban setbacks,such as thedisasterat Bridge14 in December 1975. The one maincriticism thatcan be madeofConflicting Missionsisthatitis heavilyrelianton Americanintelligence reports and correspondence between theCuban commanders, leavingthedecision-making processbythepolitical and military leaders- theCastrobrothers inHavana, Kissinger and Fordin Washington, Vorsterand P. W. Botha in Pretoria- behindthescenes,and 228 REVIEWS thusopen to speculation.Gleijesesis thefirst to concedethispoint,lamenting theCuban government's repeatedrejections to his requestsforan interview withtheCastros. As a resultsome of themostintriguing questionsare left unanswered:forexample,what role in assistingtheCubans in Angola was playedbyRosa Coutinho,'theRed Admiral',who twicevisitedHavana for talkswithCastroduring1975,andwhowas closelyinvolvedinthePortuguese de-colonization process. Inthefinal chapterGleijesesrevealsthatthefateful decisionto sendcombat troops into Angola in earlyNovember1975 was not taken by the Cuban Politbüroafterreceiving an urgent requestfromtheMPLA (a versionwhich hasoften beenrepeatedas fact...