End-Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Research Articles

Pay-for-performance programs effectiveness in healthcare: the case of the end-stage renal disease quality incentive program.

This paper focuses on Medicare's End-Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Program (QIP). QIP aims to promote high-quality services in outpatient dialysis facilities by tying their payments to their performance on pre-specified quality measures. In this paper, employing principal-agent theory, we examine the effectiveness of QIP by exploring the changes in various clinical/operational measures when they become a part of the program as a performance measure. We study five QIP quality measures; two are operational: hospitalization and readmission. And three others are clinical: blood transfusion, hypercalcemia, and dialysis adequacy. Overall, we observe a significant improvement in all QIP quality measures after being included in the program, except for readmission. We recommend adjusting the weight and redesigning the readmission measure for Medicare to incentivize providers to reduce readmission. We also discuss establishing care coordination and employing data-driven clinical decision support systems as opportunities for dialysis facilities to improve the care delivery process.

Mortality Risk of Patients Treated in Dialysis Facilities with Payment Reductions under ESRD Quality Incentive Program.

The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services End-Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Program (ESRD QIP) measures quality of care delivered by dialysis facilities and imposes Medicare payment reductions for quality lapses. We assessed the association between payment reductions and patient mortality, a quality indicator not included in the ESRD QIP measure set. Association between mortality and ESRD QIP facility payment reduction based on the year of performance was expressed as the unadjusted rate and patient case-mix-adjusted hazard ratio. We also measured association between mortality and 1-year changes in payment reductions. Retrospective patient cohorts were defined by their treating dialysis facility on the first day of each year (2010-2018). Facility performance resulted in payment reductions for 5%-42% of dialysis facilities over the 9 study years. Patients experienced progressively higher mortality at each payment reduction level. Across all years, unadjusted mortality was 17.3, 18.1, 18.9, 20.3, and 23.9 deaths per 100 patient-years for patients in facilities that received 0%, 0.5%, 1%, 1.5%, and 2% payment reductions, respectively. The adjusted hazard ratio showed a similar stepwise pattern by the level of payment reduction: 1.0 (reference), 1.08 (95% confidence interval [CI], 1.07 to 1.09), 1.15 (95% CI, 1.13 to 1.16), 1.19 (95% CI, 1.16 to 1.21), and 1.34 (95% CI, 1.29 to 1.39). Strength of the association increased from 2010 to 2016. Patients treated in facilities that improved over 1 year generally experienced lower mortality; patients in facilities that performed worse on ESRD QIP measures generally experienced higher mortality. Patient mortality was associated with ESRD QIP facility payment reductions in dose-response and temporal patterns.

COVID-19−Associated Decline in the Size of the End-Stage Kidney Disease Population in the United States

COVID-19−Associated Decline in the Size of the End-Stage Kidney Disease Population in the United States

Changes in Dialysis Center Quality Associated With the End-Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Program : An Observational Study With a Regression Discontinuity Design.

In 2012, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services started levying performance-based financial penalties against outpatient dialysis centers under the mandatory End-Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Program. To determine whether penalization was associated with improvement in dialysis center quality. Leveraging the threshold for penalization (total performance score< 60), a regression discontinuity design was used to examine the effect of penalization on quality over 2 years. Publicly available Medicare data from 2015-2018 were used. The effect of penalization at dialysis centers with different characteristics (for example, size or chain affiliation) was also examined. United States. Outpatient dialysis centers (n= 5830). Dialysis center total performance scores (a composite metric ranging from 0 to 100 based on clinical quality and adherence to reporting requirements) and individual measures that contribute to the total performance score. There were 1109 (19.0%) outpatient dialysis centers that received penalties in 2017 on the basis of performance in 2015. Penalized centers were located in ZIP codes with a higher average proportion of non-White residents (36.4% vs. 31.2%; P< 0.001) and residents with lower median income ($49290 vs. $51686; P< 0.001). Penalization was not associated with improvement in total performance scores in 2017 (0.4 point [95% CI, -2.5 to 3.2 points]) or 2018 (0.3 point [CI, -2.8 to 3.4 points]). This was consistent across dialysis centers with different characteristics. There was also no association between penalization and improvement in specific measures. The study could not account for how centers respond to penalization. Penalization under the End-Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Program was not associated with improvement in the quality of outpatient dialysis centers. None.

Long-term Clinical Outcomes Among Responders and Nonresponders to the In-Center Hemodialysis Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (ICH CAHPS) Survey

Rationale & ObjectiveThe In-Center Hemodialysis Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (ICH CAHPS) survey, introduced into the End-Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Program, is the only patient-reported outcome currently used for value-based reimbursement in dialysis. Current response rates are ∼30% and differences in long-term clinical outcomes between survey responders and nonresponders are unknown.Study DesignRetrospective cohort study.Setting & ParticipantsPatients from all Dialysis Clinic Incorporated facilities from across the United States who met survey eligibility (aged ≥18 years and had been treated at their facility for at least 3 months).ExposuresPatient-level demographic, clinical, and treatment-related characteristics.OutcomesMortality, all-cause hospitalization, and kidney transplantation.Analytical ApproachTime-to-event analyses using competing-risks models. Sensitivity analyses performed after multiple imputation for missing covariate data.ResultsAmong 10,395 eligible patients, 3,794 (36%) responded to the survey. During a median follow-up of 33 months, 4,588 patients died, 7,638 patients were hospitalized at least once, and 789 patients received a transplant. In multivariable models, survey response was associated with lower mortality (subdistribution hazard ratio [sHR], 0.80; 95% CI, 0.75-0.86) and hospitalization (sHR, 0.94; 95% CI, 0.89-0.99) and higher likelihood for a kidney transplant (sHR, 1.27; 95% CI, 1.10-1.46). Results were consistent across sensitivity analyses after multiple imputation for missing covariates.LimitationsSmall amount of missing covariate data, baseline covariate data assigned at the first month of the 3-month survey administration period, reasons for nonresponse unknown.ConclusionsResponse to the ICH CAHPS survey is associated with lower risk for mortality and hospitalization and higher likelihood for kidney transplantation. These findings suggest that survey responders are healthier than nonresponders, emphasizing the need for caution when interpreting facility-level survey results to inform quality improvement and public policy efforts and the critical need to better capture patient-reported outcomes from more vulnerable patients.

Achieving equity in dialysis care and outcomes: The role of policies.

Socially disadvantaged persons, including racial and ethnic minorities, individuals with low incomes, homeless persons, and non-US citizens bear a disproportionate burden of end-stage kidney disease (ESKD). Inequities in nephrology referral, vascular access, use of home dialysis modalities, kidney transplantation, and mortality are prominent. Public policies, including the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, end-stage renal disease Quality Incentive Program, and the Prospective Payment System, were enacted to improve healthcare access and dialysis care. Here, we highlight inequities in dialysis care and outcomes, how current ESKD and other public policies may influence or exacerbate these inequities, and gaps in the literature needed to inform future policies toward achieving equity in ESKD. We give special attention to the 2019 Advancing American Kidney Health Executive Order, which has high potential to radically transform dialysis care.

The Role Of Social Risk Factors In Dialysis Facility Ratings And Penalties Under A Medicare Quality Incentive Program.

Medicare's End-Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Program is a mandatory pay-for-performance program for US dialysis facilities, in which facilities are penalized up to 2percent of their total Medicare payments based on their performance on quality metrics. While analyses of similar programs in other settings have shown performance to be related to social risk factors, it is unknown whether this program displays similar patterns. In this national study, facilities located in low-income ZIP codes and with high proportions of patients who were black or dually enrolled in Medicaid had lower performance scores and higher rates of penalization under the program. Independent (versus chain) status, large facility size, and urban location were also associated with penalties. Further study is needed to determine the degree to which these patterns reflect low-quality care delivery versus patient factors beyond providers' control. In the meantime, the impact of these penalties on providers serving vulnerable populations should be tracked closely.

Patient-Reported Experiences of Dialysis Care Within a National Pay-for-Performance System

Medicare's End-Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Program incorporates measures of perceived value into reimbursement calculations. In 2016, patient experience became a clinical measure in the Quality Incentive Program scoring system. Dialysis facility performance in patient experience measures has not been studied at the national level to date. To examine associations among dialysis facility performance with patient experience measures and patient, facility, and geographic characteristics. In this cross-sectional analysis, patients from a national end-stage renal disease registry receiving in-center hemodialysis in the United States on December 31, 2014, were linked with dialysis facility scores on the In-Center Hemodialysis Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (ICH-CAHPS) survey. Of 4977 US dialysis facilities, 2939 (59.1%) reported ICH-CAHPS scores from April 8, 2015, through January 11, 2016. Multivariable linear regression models with geographic random effects were used to examine associations of facility ICH-CAHPS scores with patient, dialysis facility, and geographic characteristics and to identify the amount of total between-facility variation in patient experience scores explained by these categories. Data were analyzed from September 15, 2017, through June 1, 2018. Dialysis facility, geographic characteristic, and 10% change in patient characteristics. Dialysis facility ICH-CAHPS scores and the total between-facility variation explained by different categories of characteristics. Of the 2939 facilities included in the analysis, adjusted mean ICH-CAHPS scores were 2.6 percentage points (95% CI, 1.5-3.7) lower in for-profit facilities, 1.6 percentage points (95% CI, 0.9-2.2) lower in facilities owned by large dialysis organizations, and 2.3 percentage points (95% CI, 0.5-4.2) lower in free-standing facilities compared with their counterparts. More nurses per patient was associated with 0.2 percentage points (95% CI, 0.03-0.3) higher scores; a privately insured patient population was associated with 1.2 percentage points (95% CI, 0.2-2.2) higher scores. Facilities with higher proportions of black patients had 0.95 percentage points (95% CI, 0.78-1.12) lower scores; more Native American patients, 1.00 percentage point (95% CI, 0.39-1.60) lower facility scores. Geographic location and dialysis facility characteristics explained larger proportions of the overall between-facility variation in ICH-CAHPS scores than did patient characteristics. This study suggests that for-profit operation, free-standing status, and large dialysis organization designation were associated with less favorable patient-reported experiences of care. Patient experience scores varied geographically, and black and Native American populations reported less favorable experiences. The study findings suggest that perceived quality of care delivered in these settings are of concern, and that there may be opportunities for improved implementation of patient experience surveys as is highlighted.

Update on the End‐Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Program

The End-Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Program continues to evolve and expand. In this article, we will review the program's structure and critically assess the clinical metrics in place. In addition, we will discuss upcoming program changes to help prepare dialysis facilities and nephrologists to meet new proposed metrics.

The Association Between Dialysis Facility Quality and Facility Characteristics, Neighborhood Demographics, and Region

The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) initiated the End-Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Program in 2012. For each dialysis facility, an overall quality performance score is determined based on various quality measures. This article studies the association between the overall dialysis facility quality and facility characteristics, neighborhood demographics, and region. Data from the CMS Payment Year 2014 Dialysis Compare File were used, and were linked to 2010 US Census data (n = 4086). Multiple linear regression was used to examine the association between dialysis facility quality and facility characteristics, neighborhood demographics, and region. The analysis demonstrates that dialysis facility quality varies significantly by facility profit status, chain membership, and facility size. Dialysis facilities in neighborhoods with a higher proportion of African Americans have significantly lower quality. Regional differences in quality exist.

Meeting the 2012 QIP (Quality Incentive Program) Clinical Measures: Strategies for Dialysis Centers

The US Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services end-stage renal disease Quality Incentive Program (QIP) is a pay-for-performance program that reduces dialysis center payments by up to 2% for suboptimal patient care. In January 2012, the performance year began for payment year 2014, bringing significant changes to the QIP by introducing 6 quality indicators (3 clinical measures and 3 reporting measures) and a new scoring methodology. To succeed under the new QIP, dialysis facilities must meet 3 clinical measures that assess anemia management, hemodialysis adequacy, and vascular access type in patients receiving dialysis treatment, as well as 3 reporting measures that involve the reporting of dialysis safety events, attestation of administering a patient satisfaction survey, and attestation of patient mineral metabolism monitoring. To help dialysis providers reach these targets, this article provides an overview of the 3 clinical measures and the QIP scoring methodology, as well as a description of patient claims that are excluded when the scores for these measures are calculated. Strategies and solutions that address provider- and patient-related factors also are discussed to help ensure that more dialysis centers meet the new QIP clinical measures for performance year 2012/payment year 2014.

Changes to the End-Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Program

Monitoring the quality of dialysis care has long been a component of the Medicare ESRD program. As part of the 2008 Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act (MIPPA), Congress mandated the Quality Incentive Program (QIP), which linked measures of care quality to payments. The legislation embraced the idea that this linkage of federal money to performance would encourage the purchase of greater 'value.' The first 2 program years for the QIP use a simple scoring methodology and a limited scope of quality metrics. For payment year 2014 (performance period calendar year 2012), the program changes substantially, with an expanded number of quality measures and a more complex scoring methodology. In this article, we describe the program structure, quality measures, scoring system, and financial impact.