Empirical Refutation Research Articles

Trouble on the Horizon for Presentism

Surface presentism is the combination of a general relativistic physics with a presentist metaphysics. In this paper, we provide an argument against this combination based on black holes. The problem focuses on the notion of an event horizon. We argue that the present locations of event horizons are ontologically dependent on future black hole regions, and that this dependence is incompatible with presentism. We consider five responses to the problem available to the surface presentist, and argue that none succeed. Surface presentism thus faces the prospect of empirical refutation based on the evidence available for the existence of black holes.

Taming Pereboom’s Wild Coincidences

AbstractPereboom’s ‘wild coincidences’ argument against agent-causal libertarianism is based on the claim that in a world governed by statistical laws, the dovetailing of indeterministic physical happenings with the free actions of agent causes would be a coincidence too wild to be credible. In this paper it is shown that the conclusion is valid for deterministic laws, but that it fails for statistical laws. Therefore, the ‘wild coincidences’ argument does not provide the promised empirical refutation of agent-causal libertarianism.

Religion and Diplomacy: The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ as Historical Libel

The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ hypothesis suggested that global politics would revert to inter-civilizational (inter-religious) conflict with the end of the Cold War. Conceptual and empirical refutations followed, but the idea that pre-Cold War inter-polity interaction was generally characterized by such conflict was not addressed. We consider this a possible historical libel. First, we briefly review the position of major faith traditions toward making and keeping agreements with those of other faith traditions. Most forms of agreements are sanctioned, and there is inconsistent and minimal support for duplicity. Second, using the MATRS database of multilateral treaties, we identify 79 sovereign entities active between 1750 and 1900 (when multilateral treaties were numerous and official state religions were prominent), link states to their official religions, and analyze the pattern of 385 multilateral treaties’ signings. We conclude that there is no tendency among states with one official religion to avoid entering into treaties with those of other official religions. The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ hypothesis is a historical myth.

Skill and self-knowledge: empirical refutation of the dual-burden account of the Dunning-Kruger effect.

For many intellectual tasks, the people with the least skill overestimate themselves the most, a pattern popularly known as the Dunning-Kruger effect (DKE). The dominant account of this effect depends on the idea that assessing the quality of one's performance (metacognition) requires the same mental resources as task performance itself (cognition). Unskilled people are said to suffer a dual burden: they lack the cognitive resources to perform well, and this deprives them of metacognitive insight into their failings. In this Registered Report, we applied recently developed methods for the measurement of metacognition to a matrix reasoning task, to test the dual-burden account. Metacognitive sensitivity (information exploited by metacognition) tracked performance closely, so less information was exploited by the metacognitive judgements of poor performers; but metacognitive efficiency (quality of metacognitive processing itself) was unrelated to performance. Metacognitive bias (overall tendency towards high or low confidence) was positively associated with performance, so poor performers were appropriately less confident-not more confident-than good performers. Crucially, these metacognitive factors did not cause the DKE pattern, which was driven overwhelmingly by performance scores. These results refute the dual-burden account and suggest that the classic DKE is a statistical regression artefact that tells us nothing much about metacognition.

Fertility Preferences and Contraceptive Change in Low- and Middle-Income Countries.

The past four decades have witnessed an enormous increase in modern contraception in most low- and middle-income countries. We examine the extent to which this change can be attributed to changes in fertility preferences versus fuller implementation of fertility preferences, a distinction at the heart of intense debates about the returns to investments in family planning services. We analyze national survey data from five major survey programs: World Fertility Surveys, Demographic Health Surveys, Reproductive Health Surveys, Pan-Arab Project for Child Development or Family Health, and Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys. We perform regression decomposition of change between successive surveys in 59 countries (330 decompositions in total). Change in preferences accounts for little of the change: less than 10 percent in a basic decomposition and about 15 percent under a more elaborate specification. This is a powerful empirical refutation of the view that contraceptive change has been driven principally by reductions in demand for children. We show that this outcome is not surprising given that the distribution of women according to fertility preferences is surprisingly stable over time.

Computational models of category-selective brain regions enable high-throughput tests of selectivity

Cortical regions apparently selective to faces, places, and bodies have provided important evidence for domain-specific theories of human cognition, development, and evolution. But claims of category selectivity are not quantitatively precise and remain vulnerable to empirical refutation. Here we develop artificial neural network-based encoding models that accurately predict the response to novel images in the fusiform face area, parahippocampal place area, and extrastriate body area, outperforming descriptive models and experts. We use these models to subject claims of category selectivity to strong tests, by screening for and synthesizing images predicted to produce high responses. We find that these high-response-predicted images are all unambiguous members of the hypothesized preferred category for each region. These results provide accurate, image-computable encoding models of each category-selective region, strengthen evidence for domain specificity in the brain, and point the way for future research characterizing the functional organization of the brain with unprecedented computational precision.

Perception and Past Experience 50 Years After Kanizsa's (Im)possible Experiment.

In the revolutionary year 1968, the Institute of Psychology of the University of Trieste directed by Gaetano Kanizsa published a collective volume to celebrate the 70th birthday of Cesare L. Musatti. Kanizsa devoted the opening article to the empirical refutation of an argument developed by Musatti in Structure and experience in perceptual phenomenology. Musatti held that the debate between rationalist and empiricist theories of perception was not scientific, since a crucial experiment on the role of past experience is—in principle—impossible. Besides rejecting his mentor’s argument on logical grounds, Kanizsa produced a parade of visual effects to demonstrate that in several conditions (involving object formation and camouflage, Petter’s rule, phenomenal transparency, shape recognition, motion organization) actual perception violates expectations based on familiarity with specific objects. The empirical refutation of expectations based on past experience was recurrent in Kanizsa’s subsequent production and represents a lively topic of current perceptual science, though Musatti’s smile is still here.

Does neutral red suit the requirements of being a reliable indicator in clearance rate measurements of suspension-feeding bivalves? An empirical refutation

Abstract One basic requirement in the measurements of feeding rates in suspension-feeding bivalves when using clearance methods is that the suspended particles that are used in the determination of these rates must reach size compatibility with full retention by the gill. In spite of this requirement, clearance of neutral red (NR) -a soluble vital dye- has long been used for this purpose and recourse to this method has even increased over the last years for determining the filtration rate as a specific physiological response to stress in ecotoxicological and biomonitoring studies. The aim of this study was to produce empirical evidence that would dismiss the suitability of the NR method for providing reliable measurements for feeding rates in suspension feeders. Experiments that were designed to this end in the blue mussel Mytilus galloprovincialis led to three main conclusions: 1) Temporal dynamics of NR retention by the mussels point to a diffusion mechanism whereby the marker would be up-taken by gill tissue rather than filtered by the muco-ciliary action of this organ. 2) The NR method largely underestimates the clearance rate (by 90% on average) when compared with conventional methods that use microscopic particles in the size-range of gill retention. 3) The close similitude between rates of retention of NR by intact mussels and mussels that had been sacrificed by sectioning apart the valves adductor muscle proves outright the lack of a quantitative relationship between this retention process and the pumping activity.

The Allais paradox: what it became, what it really was, what it now suggests to us

AbstractWhereas many others have scrutinized the Allais paradox from a theoretical angle, we study the paradox from an historical perspective and link our findings to a suggestion as to how decision theory could make use of it today. We emphasize that Allais proposed the paradox asa normative argument, concerned with ‘the rational man’ and not the ‘real man’, to use his words. Moreover, and more subtly, we argue that Allais had an unusual sense of the normative, being concerned not so much with therationality of choicesas with therationality of the agent as a person. These two claims are buttressed by a detailed investigation – the first of its kind – of the 1952 Paris conference on risk, which set the context for the invention of the paradox, and a detailed reconstruction – also the first of its kind – of Allais’s specific normative argument from his numerous but allusive writings. The paper contrasts these interpretations of what the paradox historically represented, with how it generally came to function within decision theory from the late 1970s onwards: that is, as an empirical refutation of the expected utility hypothesis, and more specifically of the condition of von Neumann–Morgenstern independence that underlies that hypothesis. While not denying that this use of the paradox was fruitful in many ways, we propose another use that turns out also to be compatible with an experimental perspective. Following Allais’s hints on ‘the experimental definition of rationality’, this new use consists inletting the experiment itself speak of the rationality or otherwise of the subjects. In the 1970s, a short sequence of papers inspired by Allais implemented original ways of eliciting the reasons guiding the subjects’ choices, and claimed to be able to draw relevant normative consequences from this information. We end by reviewing this forgotten experimental avenue not simply historically, but with a view to recommending it for possible use by decision theorists today.

The Structure of Negative Social Ties in Rural Village Networks.

Negative (antagonistic) connections have been of longstanding theoretical importance for social structure. In a population of 24,696 adults interacting face to face within 176 isolated villages in western Honduras, we measured all connections that were present, amounting to 105,175 positive and 16,448 negative ties. Here, we show that negative and positive ties exhibit many of the same structural characteristics. We then develop a complete taxonomy of all 138 possible triads of two-type relationships. Consistent with balance theory, we find that antagonists of friends and friends of antagonists tend to be antagonists; but, in an important empirical refutation of balance theory, we find that antagonists of antagonists also tend to be antagonists, not friends. Finally, villages with comparable levels of animosity tend to be geographically proximate. Similar processes, involving social contact, give rise to both positive and negative social ties in rural villages, and negative ties play an important role in social structure.

The Allais Paradox: What It Became, What It Really Was, What It Now Suggests to Us

Whereas many others have scrutinized Allais paradox from a theoretical angle, we study paradox from an historical perspective and link our findings to a suggestion as to how decision theory could make use of it today. We emphasize that Allais proposed paradox as a normative argument, concerned with the rational man and not real man, to use his words. Moreover, and more subtly, we argue that Allais had an unusual sense of normative, being concerned not so much with rationality of choices as with rationality of agent as a person. These two claims are buttressed by a detailed investigation – first of its kind – of 1952 Paris conference on risk, which set context for invention of paradox, and a detailed reconstruction – also first of its kind – of Allais's specific normative argument from his numerous but allusive writings. The paper contrasts these interpretations of what paradox historically represented, with how it generally came to function within decision theory from late 1970s onwards: that is, as an empirical refutation of expected utility hypothesis, and more specifically of condition of von Neumann-Morgenstern independence that underlies that hypothesis. While not denying that this use of paradox was fruitful in many ways, we propose another use that turns out also to be compatible with an experimental perspective. Following Allais's hints on the experimental definition of rationality, this new use consists in letting experiment itself speak of rationality or otherwise of subjects. In 1970s, a short sequence of papers inspired by Allais implemented original ways of eliciting reasons guiding subjects' choices, and claimed to be able to draw relevant normative consequences from this information. We end by reviewing this forgotten experimental avenue not simply historically, but with a view to recommending it for possible use by decision theorists today.

Quantum Theory: Realism or Pragmatism?

Durante su larga y extraordinariamente productiva carrera, Hilary Putnam flirteó de
 vez en cuando con el pragmatism. Pero su realismo científico aportó un punto fijo
 para sus intentos de interpretar la teoría cuántica. Recientemente he defendido que
 los tratamientos pragmatistas de la representación, la explicación y la probabilidad
 son claves para comprender cómo usamos la teoría cuántica con tanto éxito y, así,
 como debería ser interpretada. Para Putnam, el realismo científico es en sí mismo una
 hipótesis científica que explica el éxito de la ciencia. Si estoy en lo correcto, el éxito
 de la teoría cuántica debilita esta clase de realismo científico mientras que apoya un
 pragmatismo rival. El realismo científico permanece inmune a la refutación empírica
 si se ve no como una hipótesis científica sino como un ideal regulativo. Pero una pers-
 pectiva pragmatista de la teoría cuántica plantea un desafío a una cierta clase de realismo
 metafísico.

“Ought Implies Can,” Framing Effects, and “Empirical Refutations”

This paper aims to contribute to the current debate about the status of the “Ought Implies Can” (OIC) principle and the growing body of empirical evidence that undermines it. We report the results of an experimental study which show that people judge that agents ought to perform an action even when they also judge that those agents cannot do it and that such “ought” judgments exhibit an actor-observer effect. Because of this actor-observer effect on “ought” judgments and the Duhem-Quine thesis, talk of an “empirical refutation” of OIC is empirically and methodologically unwarranted. What the empirical fact that people attribute moral obligations to unable agents shows is that OIC is not intuitive, not that OIC has been refuted.

Swinburne's apologetic strategy for theism evaluated

AbstractIn this article, I classify Richard Swinburne's apologetic strategy for theism, and raise eight structural problems with regard to his Bayesian approach. For example, is theism really a meaningful theory? Does it have any predictive power? If so, isn't theism a degenerating research programme? Furthermore, is it legitimate to immunize theism against empirical refutations? Is Swinburne's tactic of doing so successful?

Why the Dynamics of Competition for Online Platforms Leads to Sleepless Nights But Not Sleepy Monopolies

Recent claims that online platforms have secured permanent monopolies, protected by barriers to entry from network effects and stockpiles of data, and should be the focus of intense antitrust and regulatory scrutiny, are inconsistent with the economics, technology, and history of online competition. Online platforms face dynamic competition as a result of: disruptive innovation that provides opportunities for entry; competition from online platforms that have secured a toehold in one area but compete across multiple areas; the fragility of category leadership resulting from the fact that network effects are reversible and entry costs are low; and the prevalence of ad-supported models which result in seemingly disparate firms competing for consumer attention and advertiser dollars. The last two decades of online platform competition demonstrate that category leaders are often toppled, unexpectedly, through some combination of technological change, business model innovations, and cross-platform rivalry. The palpable threat of displacement prevents online platforms from taking their customers for granted. The history of online platform competition also provides empirical refutation of the proposition that data on users protects platform leaders from competition or puts an insurmountable obstacle before entrants. All this points to online platforms facing sleepless nights since any online platform that tries the quiet life of monopoly risks catastrophe.

Climate Discourse and the Ontology of the Citizen

Deliberative mechanisms surrounding climate change politics in advanced democracies have, for some time, been at the mercy of ideological and political economic commitments. One need only to look at the banning of protests and marches during the 2015 COP21 international climate talks in Paris, or the historical risk assessments of violent international conflict linked to climate concerns by Germany and the US to see that the political institutionalization of climate change is pervasive. On the other hand, the discursive demarcation by climate science has consistently taken up two arguments in opposition to climate politics: (a) the view that political discourses on climate variability should rest on climatological models and the research of climate experts, and (b) that the climatological data itself serves as the impartial intermediary through which we can provide an empirical refutation to ideological rhetoric and economic influences on climate change politics. I contend that in the attempt to bridge the political and scientific camps we transpose a central feature in democratic climate deliberation—namely, the ontology of the citizen; who in the discursive bridge is relegated to a medium of exchange for both camps, rather than a commensurate party in the climatological discussion.

Blame, not ability, impacts moral “ought” judgments for impossible actions: Toward an empirical refutation of “ought” implies “can”

Recently, psychologists have explored moral concepts including obligation, blame, and ability. While little empirical work has studied the relationships among these concepts, philosophers have widely assumed such a relationship in the principle that “ought” implies “can,” which states that if someone ought to do something, then they must be able to do it. The cognitive underpinnings of these concepts are tested in the three experiments reported here. In Experiment 1, most participants judge that an agent ought to keep a promise that he is unable to keep, but only when he is to blame for the inability. Experiment 2 shows that such “ought” judgments correlate with judgments of blame, rather than with judgments of the agent’s ability. Experiment 3 replicates these findings for moral “ought” judgments and finds that they do not hold for nonmoral “ought” judgments, such as what someone ought to do to fulfill their desires. These results together show that folk moral judgments do not conform to a widely assumed philosophical principle that “ought” implies “can.” Instead, judgments of blame play a modulatory role in some judgments of obligation.

Learning horizon and optimal alliance formation

We develop a theoretical Bayesian learning model to examine how a firm's learning horizon, defined as the maximum distance in a network of alliances across which the firm learns from other firms, conditions its optimal number of direct alliance partners under technological uncertainty. We compare theoretical optima for a `close' learning horizon, where a firm learns only from direct alliance partners, and a `distant' learning horizon, where a firm learns both from direct and indirect alliance partners. Our theory implies that in high tech industries, a distant learning horizon allows a firm to substitute indirect for direct partners, while in low tech industries indirect partners complement direct partners. Moreover, in high tech industries, optimal alliance formation is less sensitive to changes in structural model parameters when a firm's learning horizon is distant rather than close. Our contribution lies in offering a formal theory of the role of indirect partners in optimal alliance portfolio design that generates normative propositions amenable to future empirical refutation.

An Empirical Refutation of Pareto-optimality?

Pareto-optimality is a fundamental tenet of modern economics. It states that, given an initial allocation of goods between individuals, a change to a different allocation that makes at least one in...

Vision and abstraction: an empirical refutation of Nico Orlandi’s non-cognitivism

This article argues against the non-cognitivist theory of vision that has been formulated in the work of Nico Orlandi. It shows that, if we understand ‘representation’ in the way Orlandi recommends, then the visual system’s response to abstract regularities must involve the formation of representations. Recent experiments show that those representations must be used by the visual system in the production of visual experiences. Their effects cannot be explained by taking them to be non-visual effects involving attention or memory. This contradicts Orlandi’s version of the non-cognitivist hypothesis, but does so while vindicating her methodological position.