Emotions In Philosophy Research Articles

Emotions in the Image of God? The Holistic Vision of Classical Christian Anthropology

In conversation with classical Christian anthropology, this article offers a holistic account of the human person in which reason, emotion, and desire are united in drawing humans to God, mutually informing life lived with a Godward orientation. First, I explore the ways several Christian theologians have construed the relation of reason and emotion in the pre-fall state. I give special attention to Augustine and Gregory of Nyssa. I then bring the themes of these accounts into conversation with contemporary accounts of emotion in philosophy and psychology. I conclude by arguing that the most persuasive accounts of Christian anthropology take the regulation of reason, emotion, and desire to be governed by relationship with God. A holistic walk with God requires the well-ordered collaboration of reason, emotion, and desire. In fact, the union of reason, emotion and desire expresses a creaturely reflection of God’s oneness and holiness.

The Philosophy of Envy

<i>The Philosophy of Envy</i>

On the rationality of emotion regulation

ABSTRACT Much of the recent work in psychology (and affective science) has shown that humans regulate their emotions nearly constantly, sometimes well and sometimes poorly. I argue that properly regulating one’s emotions displays emotional rationality, and failing to do so displays emotional irrationality. If an agent feels an emotion that is obviously problematic for the agent to feel and she is aware that it is problematic, then the agent ought to regulate her emotions in future similar situations. To capture this aspect of emotional rationality, I introduce the concept of imprudence, which is meant to capture a familiar way that we assess each other’s emotions, despite the fact that it has yet to be a factor in the literature on emotions in philosophy, psychology, or affective science.

Emotion and Cognition: Recent Developments and Therapeutic Practice

As is widely known, the last twenty-five years have seen an acceleration in the development of theories of emotion. Perhaps less well-known is that the last three years have seen an extended defense of a predominant, although not universally accepted, framework for the understanding of emotion in philosophy and psychology. The central claim of this framework is that emotions are a form of evaluative response to their intentional objects, centrally involving cognition or something akin to cognition, in which the evaluation of the object relates to the concerns, interests, or well-being of the subject. I aim to summarize and review the work of five authors on three of the central themes of this framework, and to note some implications for the understanding of emotion in different psychotherapeutic approaches.

Back to Basics: On the Very Idea of “Basic Emotions”

In this essay, I take on the idea of basic emotions, first from the recent debate in psychology, then from the much-longer running literature on emotions in philosophy. I explore the matter from a number of different angles, for instance, from claims that there are basic emotions (a la affect programs, linguistic analysis, phenomenology, and models borrowed from the physical sciences) and that there are no basic emotions (and see what that leaves us with). I also want to ask whether the current emphasis on basic emotions is directing our attention in an overly narrow way, or perhaps in the wrong direction altogether. The question is not only whether there are any such basic building blocks of emotion but whether the search for them distorts rather than furthers our understanding of emotions. The search for simples is bound to obscure all sorts of complexities. My aim is to combat what I see as a debilitating reductionism in emotion theory and to defend the view that emotions provide a particularly rich field of complex phenomena in which chemical and building-block models seem simplistic, inappropriate and utterly misleading.

Narrative Emotions: Beckett's Genealogy of Love

Previous articleNext article No AccessSymposium on Morality and LiteratureNarrative Emotions: Beckett's Genealogy of LoveMartha NussbaumMartha Nussbaum Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 98, Number 2Jan., 1988 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/292939 Views: 32Total views on this site Citations: 29Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1988 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Michael Eggert, Axel Zweck Narrative Scharniere – Zur Vermittlung von Emotionalität und Zukunftsperspektiven, (May 2022): 85–109.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35890-7_4Daria A. Eismann “MY ENTIRE BODY IS A WOUND”: PAIN, CORPOREALITY AND THE “OTHER” IN PATRIA BY FERNANDO ARAMBURU, (Jan 2022).https://doi.org/10.31338/uw.9788323555902.pp.201-232Andeline dos Santos Awareness of Emotions as Co-Storying, (Sep 2022): 345–362.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08556-7_17Moritz E. Wigand, Paul Hoff, Florian Steger, Thomas Becker Accepting the Incomprehensible, Journal of Nervous & Mental Disease 209, no.1010 (Oct 2021): 697–701.https://doi.org/10.1097/NMD.0000000000001374Andrei-Bogdan Popa Affective Refuge in the Work of Samuel Beckett, East-West Cultural Passage 21, no.11 (Jan 2022): 110–128.https://doi.org/10.2478/ewcp-2021-0007Britt Johanne Farstad Future Urban Environments in Science Fiction: Initiated Thought Experiments, (May 2021).https://doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.98245Manya Lempert Tragedy and the Modernist Novel, 22 (Aug 2020).https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108865616Daniel J. Goodey A Capabilities Approach Analysis of Evangelii Gaudium and Its Significance for Catholic Learning Environments on LGBT + Issues, Religious Education 114, no.55 (Sep 2019): 640–651.https://doi.org/10.1080/00344087.2019.1659747Vinh Nguyen, Thy Phu, Y-Dang Troeung Refugee Compassion and the Politics of Embodied Storytelling: A Critical Conversation, a/b: Auto/Biography Studies 33, no.22 (Jun 2018): 441–445.https://doi.org/10.1080/08989575.2018.1445591Nadia Louar Beckett's Bodies in the Trilogy, or Life as a Pensum, Journal of Beckett Studies 27, no.11 (Apr 2018): 69–82.https://doi.org/10.3366/jobs.2018.0221Cheng Yuan Deliberative Emotion, (Jan 2019): 89–120.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8651-9_4Julian Murphet On the Mortification of Novelistic Discourse in Three Novels, Journal of Beckett Studies 26, no.11 (Apr 2017): 39–52.https://doi.org/10.3366/jobs.2017.0186Alys Moody A Machine for Feeling: Ping 's Posthuman Affect, Journal of Beckett Studies 26, no.11 (Apr 2017): 87–102.https://doi.org/10.3366/jobs.2017.0189John D. Lantos Reason, Emotion, and Implanted Devices, The American Journal of Bioethics 16, no.88 (Jul 2016): 1–2.https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2016.1199608Laura Stark Emotional causality in dynamistic Finnish–Karelian folk belief, Scandinavian Journal of History 41, no.33 (May 2016): 369–387.https://doi.org/10.1080/03468755.2016.1179828Jochen Kleres Narrative des Mitgefühls: Methodischer Ansatz und Anwendung, (Jun 2015): 267–287.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-01654-8_14Michelle Voss Roberts Tasting the divine: the aesthetics of religious emotion in Indian Christianity, Religion 42, no.44 (Oct 2012): 575–595.https://doi.org/10.1080/0048721X.2011.638089Ruben Borg Putting the Impossible to Work: Beckettian Afterlife and the Posthuman Future of Humanity, Journal of Modern Literature 35, no.44 (Jul 2012): 163–180.https://doi.org/10.2979/jmodelite.35.4.163JOCHEN KLERES Emotions and Narrative Analysis: A Methodological Approach, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 41, no.22 (Nov 2010): 182–202.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5914.2010.00451.xDavid S. Miall Emotions and the Structuring of Narrative Responses, Poetics Today 32, no.22 (Jun 2011): 323–348.https://doi.org/10.1215/03335372-1162704Jeff Everett, Constance Friesen Humanitarian accountability and performance in the Théâtre de l’Absurde, Critical Perspectives on Accounting 21, no.66 (Aug 2010): 468–485.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2010.01.014Remy Debes Which empathy? Limitations in the mirrored “understanding” of emotion, Synthese 175, no.22 (Mar 2009): 219–239.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9499-7Adia Mendelson-Maoz Ethics and Literature: Introduction, Philosophia 35, no.22 (Jul 2007): 111–116.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9068-6Andrew Abbott Against Narrative: A Preface to Lyrical Sociology, Sociological Theory 25, no.11 (Mar 2007): 67–99.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9558.2007.00298.xSusan Mooney Feeling Fear, Narrating Feelings: The Decomposing Masculine Subject in Molloy, Malone Dies , and The Unnamable, Journal of Beckett Studies 16, no.1-21-2 (Jan 2006): 204–222.https://doi.org/10.3366/jobs.2007.16.1-2.18P. Anne Scott Emotion, moral perception, and nursing practice, Nursing Philosophy 1, no.22 (Oct 2000): 123–133.https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1466-769x.2000.00023.xGeorge Turski Experience and Expression: The Moral Linguistic Constitution of Emotions, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 21, no.44 (Dec 1991): 373–392.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5914.1991.tb00202.xJohn Denvir “Deep Dialogue”—James Joyce's Contribution To American Constitutional Theory, Law & Literature 3, no.11 (Nov 2014): 1–19.https://doi.org/10.1080/1535685X.1991.11015690Martha Nussbaum Beyond Obsession and Disgust: Lucretius's Genealogy of Love, Apeiron 22, no.11 (Jan 1989): 1–60.https://doi.org/10.1515/APEIRON.1989.22.1.1

The Logic of Emotion

Emotion has almost always played an inferior role in philosophy, often as antagonist to logic and Even David Hume, one of the few great philosophers to give emotion its due, sharply distinguished passion from and set them at odds with each other. Where he differed from other philosophers was his argument that reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions, rather than the other way round. It is also worth noting that Hume's analysis of emotion is wholly derivative of his more general epistemological theories, with considerable damage to his view of emotions. The same must be said of Descartes; with his compatriot Malebranche, he considered emotions as animal spirits, clearly inferior products of the psyche. Leibniz considered emotions to be confused perceptions. And we all know Kant's famous (or infamous) degradation of the emotions as pathological, at least in the context of practical Along with this general demeaning of emotion in philosophy comes either a wholesale neglect or at least retail distortion in the analysis of emotion. My aim here is to help correct this neglect and distortion and return the topic of emotion to the very heart of philosophy, as it is in human nature. I want to argue that the emotions have a logical structure that is no less fascinating and no less analyzable than the logical structures of reason.