Elliptic Curve RSA Research Articles

Intelligent Authentication Model in a Hierarchical Wireless Sensor Network With Multiple Sinks

A wireless sensor network consists of a number of sensors laid out in a field with mobile sinks dynamically aggregating data from the nodes. Sensitive applications such as military environment require the sink to identify if a sensor that it visits is legitimate, and in turn, the sensor has to ensure that the sink is authenticated to access its sensitive data. For the system to intelligently learn the credentials of non-malicious sink and non-malicious sensors based on the dynamically observed data, four approaches using access control lists, authenticator tokens, message digests, and elliptic curve variant of RSA algorithm are proposed along with the formal logic for correctness. The experimented data is analysed using false acceptance rate, false rejection rate, precision, and curve analysis parameters. The approaches are further compared based on the attacks they are vulnerable to and execution time, ultimately concluding that exchange of message digests and elliptic curve RSA algorithm are more widely applicable.

Secure and efficient hand-over authentication in WLAN using elliptic curve RSA

Roaming of mobile nodes among multiple access points should be secure and efficient. Hand-over occurs when a mobile node migrates from one access point to another and establishes a new connection by terminating the previous one. However, designing an appropriate hand-over authentication protocol is a complex task because the processing efficiency and power of mobile node is restricted to a certain extent. The lesser security level and higher computation complexity are the main issues of the existing hand-off authentication protocols. To overcome these problems, Elliptic Curve RSA is proposed with modification in the initialization and authentication phases of the hand-off authentication protocol. The result of the proposed work shows the improvement in higher security level along with lesser computational cost. Further, the proposed algorithm is performing well against the various possible attacks.

Low exponent attack against elliptic curve RSA

Håastad showed that low exponent RSA is not secure if the same message is encrypted to several receivers. This is true even if time-stamp is used for each receiver. For example, let e = 3. Then if the number of receivers is 7, the eavesdropper can find the plaintext from the seven ciphertexts of each receiver. This paper shows that elliptic curve RSA is not secure in the same scenario. It is shown that the KMOV scheme and Demytko's scheme are not secure if e = 5, n ⩾ 2 1024 and the number of receivers is 428. In Demytko's scheme, e can take the value of 2. In this case, this system is not secure if the number of receiver is 11 for n ⩾ 2 175.