Elite Accountability Research Articles

The mechanisms of personalization

ABSTRACT This article draws on Max Weber’s account of legitimate authority to argue that there are three key mechanisms that drive the personalization of power in political regimes: the mobilization of charisma, the mobilization of legality or formal authority, and the mobilization of informal authority. The mobilization of charisma involves leaders using emotional connections with followers to undermine formal institutional constraints. The mobilization of legality refers to using legal discourses and procedures to expand formal executive powers. The mobilization of informal authority relies on leaders occupying strategic positions in patronage networks to undermine or expand formal authority. Each mechanism allows leaders to escape elite accountability through different means. The article illustrates these mechanisms through historical and contemporary examples. It argues that understanding these distinct mechanisms can help explain variation in trajectories and consequences of personalization across regimes. The framework advances theories of personalization by highlighting how personal power relies not just on disrupting elite coordination but on deploying different forms of authority.

Online Media and Elite Accountability in Africa: The Case of Sahara Reporters and the amaBhungane

The study was conducted with the purpose of assessing the role of online media in enforcing accountability and helping citizens understand problems of elite accountability in Africa. The focus was on an online newspaper, Sahara Reporters from Nigeria and amaBhungane, a South African investigative unit that publishes online. Textual analysis was used as an appropriate research methodology to gather data, and elitism and accountability were used as key literature review entries. Critical findings were that both media play a significant role in enforcing elite accountability in these two different contexts, however, their modes of reporting (tabloid and broadsheet) have a significant impact on how their stories are received and whether they have effect. It was discovered that Sahara Reporters follows tabloid reporting while amaBhungane follows broadsheet reporting. The question of whether they achieve their aims of ensuring that there is accountability lies on their ideological differences in reporting.

Review Essay: Machiavelli: Radical Democratic Political Theorist?

John P. McCormick has become the leading proponent of a new democratic—or, now, “populist”—reading of Machiavelli. The authors of all three of the other books reviewed here cite McCormick as a source and inspiration; and he has written positive blurbs for their books. In Machiavellian Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2011) McCormick argued that Machiavelli's praise of Roman “offices or assemblies that exclude the wealthiest citizens from eligibility; magistrate appointment procedures that combine lottery and election; and political trials in which the entire citizenry acts as ultimate judge over prosecutions and appeals” constitutes “a robust, extra-electoral model of elite accountability and popular empowerment” very different from, and much superior to, the aristocratic “republicanism” attributed to Machiavelli by the “Cambridge school.” In Reading Machiavelli: Scandalous Books, Suspect Engagements, and the Virtue of Populist Politics, McCormick extends his previous analysis by offering “original readings of crucial themes within … The Prince, the Discourses, and the Florentine Histories” (1–2). He also expands his critique of competing interpretations of Machiavelli and Rome by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Leo Strauss, John Pocock, and Quentin Skinner.

Democracia maquiaveliana: controlando as elites com um populismo feroz

Este ensaio demonstra que o pensamento político de Maquiavel lida com as deficiências de dois polos opostos da teoria democrática contemporânea. Assim como fazem as abordagens formais ou minimalistas, ele especifica mecanismos eleitorais para o controle das elites; e de modo similar às abordagens da cultura substantiva ou cívica, encoraja modos mais diretos e robustos de participação popular. Com base nisso, seleciono aspectos dos Discursos de Maquiavel que proporcionam uma teoria da democracia na qual a população escolhe as elites que assumirão o poder, mas também as patrulha constantemente por meio de instituições e práticas extraeleitorais, como os tribunos do povo, as denúncias públicas e as petições populares. Maquiavel acrescenta a essas características do governo popular uma dimensão cultural importante: o povo deve desdenhar as elites, desconfiar delas e enfrentar ativamente a injustiça inevitavelmente acarretada pela elite governante. Finalmente, exploro as ramificações dessa teoria para os debates sobre a responsabilidade das elites na teoria democrática contemporânea.

Machiavellian Democratic Innovations: McCormick's People's Tribunate

Machiavellian Democratic Innovations:McCormick's People's Tribunate Graham Smith (bio) and David Owen (bio) In Machiavellian Democracy,1 John McCormick offers an intriguing re-reading of Machiavelli's commitment to democracy and his suggestions for institutional reform. Central to this re-interpretation is a distinction that Machiavelli draws between the humours of patricians and plebians: the interests of the political-economic elite lie in the domination of common citizens; the interests of common citizens are in avoiding such domination. In order for common citizens to protect their interests within the republic, institutions need to be crafted that give them the power to hold elites accountable for their actions, through for example the power to veto and propose legislation and to sanction official misbehaviour. Most of the book focuses on Machiavelli's analysis of the political situation in Florence and his celebration of the Roman tribunes. However, in the last chapter McCormick draws lessons from Machiavelli's insights to provide a provocative institutional design to remedy specific contemporary democratic ills. And for McCormick, these democratic deficits are not so different from those faced by pre-modern republics: first, "the absence of extra-electoral means by which the general citizenry renders political elites accountable;" and second, "the lack of a quasi-formal distinction between economic-political elites and common citizens."2 [End Page 203] To this end, Machiavellian Democracy concludes with a provocative suggestion for institutional reform: I propose the establishment of a People's Tribunate of fifty-one lottery-selected, nonwealthy citizens who would wield powers reminiscent of those entrusted to the Roman tribunes for one-year non-renewable terms.3 McCormick makes clear that this is a thought experiment "intended to contribute in a constructive way to the burgeoning literature and practical trend in institutional reform . . . . This is a heuristic proposal intended for critical but not necessarily practical purposes; it is meant to be loosely instructive rather than strictly prescriptive."4 This commentary attempts two things. First, it sketches McCormick's reading of Machiavelli and explores the contemporary salience of Machiavelli's argument on the significance of the humours. Second, it brings McCormick's institutional thought experiment into dialogue with current trends in institutional design, in particular what is often termed 'democratic innovations': institutions that aim to increase and deepen citizen participation in political decision making.5 This is arguably one of the most vibrant areas of analysis in institutional design and McCormick's proposal provides a valuable vantage point from which we can interrogate the assumptions and limits of the current trajectory of this area of work. I. A central feature of Machiavelli's break with the traditional reading of the history of the Roman Republic is his insistence that the institutionalisation of class conflict was central to the longevity and robustness of the Republic. This remains a controversial claim but, for Machiavelli, the nobles and plebians are characterised by distinct 'humours' that arise from their relational constitution as opposed class/status groups. This feature is fundamental to McCormick's compelling re-interpretation of Machiavelli and to the conclusions that he draws from Machiavelli's thought. There are three central strands to this re-interpretation. The first explores the rhetorical and political character of The Discourses as a text which aims to persuade its youthful grandi dedicatees that the [End Page 204] Roman Republican model (rather than the Venetian model) offers the best bet for wealth and glory, and to show that, at least in some important areas, the wisdom of the people can be held to exceed that of the few. The second addresses Machiavelli's analysis of the class-bias of the seemingly neutral character of general, especially elected, bodies and the importance for political liberty and equality of both class-specific institutions such as the Tribunate from which the nobili were excluded and other mechanisms such as political trials when these were genuinely participatory. McCormick's basic claim here is that Machiavelli shows us that the aristocratic effect and privileged access to resources and information enjoyed by magistrates in modern republics render elections inadequate mechanisms of elite accountability and responsiveness; moreover, a socio-political definition of the "the people" that includes wealthy citizens, rather than...

Incentivize the Powerful or Empower the Poor?: Thoughts on John McCormick's <i>Machiavellian Democracy</i>

Incentivize the Powerful or Empower the Poor?Thoughts on John McCormick's Machiavellian Democracy Andrew Rehfeld (bio) On September 16, 2008, US Treasury Secretary Stanley Paulson and Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke held a "closed door meeting" with members of congress at which they shared information about the pending financial crisis. The next day one of those attendees, Congressman Jim Moran, sold off his financial shares in companies that stood to be affected. Because legislators are apparently not forbidden to trade on information gleaned as a result of their insider access, the trade was legal.1 While the political benefits of wealth is well documented through the influence of money on politics, the economic benefits of political power should now be abundantly clear as well. In neither case does the public good seem to be much enhanced. A rising tide may raise all boats, but increasingly it appears that the political and economic elite are simply siphoning off water to play in their own reservoir. As the global economic crises of the past 3 years continue to spread misery to those outside of the top 90% of whatever measure one uses of wealth and political influence, one has to wonder whether our current institutions are really up to the task. In Machiavellian Democracy, John McCormick believes he has found an answer by drawing on Machiavelli's analysis of Rome, Florence, and Venice.2 By McCormick's reading, Machiavelli recognized the usefulness of holding the elite accountable to the non-elite by distributing to them some political offices with the power to sanction elites for their political service. These institutions also served as public reminders that economic and political inequalities mattered even if they were not always readily apparent. [End Page 226] A cogent and provocative analysis, Machiavellian Democracy is a trifecta of political theory, for it uses the history of political thought to discover something about the past with an eye to solving contemporary political problems. To say that McCormick's analysis is well timed is an understatement. Not only has wealth and political power become more concentrated than ever, according to the Brookings Institution, concentrated poverty has also spiked in America, with over 10% of poor Americans living in neighborhoods of extreme poverty, areas in which "40 percent of the population lives below the federal poverty line." While that level is still down from 14% in 1990, it is up from last year and in any case is troubling.3 The economic collapse of 2008 through the more recent "Occupy" movements around the globe has put the oppressive power of economic and political elites back on the mainstream political map.4 The recent US Supreme Court decision in Citizens United that permits the virtually unlimited flow of money for political advertisements could not make these concerns more pressing in the United States.5 As we watch members of the ruling class devise solutions to these global economic woes, one need not be Machiavelli or McCormick to wonder whether foxes are the right ones to guard the hen house. How then to constrain the foxes and put their wiles to the good use of all? McCormick is certainly right that beyond the infrequent election cycles, western democracies have no institutional mechanisms to hold the rich and powerful to account for their work. Votes matter, but can be neutralized and manipulated whether through money for advertisements, redistricting to ensure future electoral success or other rhetorical measures.6 Further, a patina of democratic myths hides the pernicious reality of increasing political and economic inequality. The most familiar of these myths is the inspirational but difficult to realize "American dream;" as pernicious are the stupefying dictums of "one-person-one-vote" and "every vote counts." It is not that people shouldn't have equal votes or that their votes don't count. It is just that, as McCormick emphasizes, equal voting is hardly enough to ensure a "mechanism of elite accountability and responsiveness."7 To remedy the situation, McCormick updates Machiavelli's insights leading, in my view, to the most provocative and imaginative aspect of his work: a call for a People's Tribunate, a small body of 51 citizens randomly...

Party politics, elite accountability and public participation: Ward committee politics in the Msunduzi Municipality

The paper explores whether ward committees are in fact the non-partisan structures for community participation in local government stipulated by legislation and official policy. Findings from the municipality of Msunduzi suggest that, where they actually function, ward committees are dominated by local political leaders. In most IFP wards and some ANC wards, ward committees are simply extensions of the local party branch, and reflect the pathologies associated with the 'dominant party syndrome'. In other wards there is both more party pluralism and less direct party control, but often intra-party factionalism or local political rivalries dominate the composition and operation of ward committees. In short, ward committees allow for little community voice alternative to dominant ward political leadership.

Rousseau’s Rome and the Repudiation of Populist Republicanism

The chapters of Rousseau’s Social Contract devoted to republican Rome prescribe institutions that obstruct popular efforts at diminishing the excessive power and influence of wealthy citizens and political magistrates. I argue that Rousseau reconstructs ancient Rome’s constitution in direct opposition to the more populist and anti‐elitist model of the Roman Republic championed by Machiavelli in the Discourses: Rousseau eschews the establishment of magistracies, like the tribunes, reserved for common citizens exclusively, and endorses assemblies where the wealthy are empowered to outvote the poor in lawmaking and elections. On the basis of sociologically anonymous principles like generality and popular sovereignty, and by confining elite accountability to general elections, Rousseau’s neo‐Roman institutional proposals aim to pacify the contestation of class hierarchies and inflate elite prerogative within republics – under the cover of more formal, seemingly more genuine, equality.

Notes from the Editor

The American founders were distrustful of the masses and concerned about controlling their political influence. Might the greater threat, however, emanate not from the “have-nots” but from the “haves”–as symbolized by our cover photo of the fabulously wealthy J. P. Morgan being restrained by a peace officer while angrily swinging his cane at one of his social lessers? In the lead article in this issue, “Contain the Wealthy and Patrol the Magistrates: Restoring Elite Accountability to Popular Government,” John P. McCormick argues that the long-standing preoccupation with controlling the masses is misdirected. Looking beyond the American founders to ancient constitutions for guidance about present-day problems, McCormick provides a typology of measures meant to curb undue elite influence. Along the way, he offers evidence that modern republics are in far greater danger from the excessive influence of political and economic elites than from the discontents and passions of the masses. This is important food for thought for all, regardless of one's bank balance.

Contain the Wealthy and Patrol the Magistrates: Restoring Elite Accountability to Popular Government

Modern republics neglect to establish formal institutions that prevent wealthy citizens from exerting excessive political influence and they abandon extra-electoral techniques traditionally employed to keep office-holders accountable. Inspired by Guicciardini's and Machiavelli's reflections on the Roman, Venetian, and Florentine constitutions, this article highlights three forgotten practices that facilitate popular control ofbotheconomic and political elites: magistrate appointment procedures combining lottery and election, offices or assemblies excluding the wealthy from eligibility, and political trials enlisting the entire citizenry in prosecutions and appeals. I present a typology of regimes that evaluates the wealth containment potential of various magistrate selection methods, and propose a hypothetical reform supplying the U.S. Constitution with a “Tribunate” reminiscent of elite-accountability institutions in pre-eighteenth-century popular governments.

Machiavelli Against Republicanism

Scholars loosely affiliated with the “Cambridge School” (e.g., Pocock, Skinner, Viroli, and Pettit) accentuate rule of law, common good, class equilibrium, and non-domination in Machiavelli's political thought and republicanism generally but underestimate the Florentine's preference for class conflict and ignore his insistence on elite accountability. The author argues that they obscure the extent to which Machiavelli is an anti-elitist critic of the republican tradition, which they fail to disclose was predominantly oligarchic. The prescriptive lessons these scholars draw from republicanism for contemporary politics reinforce rather than reform the “senatorial,” electorally based, and socioeconomically agnostic republican model (devised by Machiavelli's aristocratic interlocutor, Guicciardini, and refined by Montesquieu and Madison) that permits common citizens to acclaim but not determine government policies. Cambridge School textual interpretations and practical proposals have little connection with Machiavelli's “tribunate,” class-specific model of popular government elaborated in The Discourses , one that relies on extra-electoral accountability techniques and embraces deliberative popular assemblies.

Machiavellian Democracy: Controlling Elites with Ferocious Populism

This essay demonstrates that Niccolò Machiavelli’s political thought addresses the deficiencies of two opposite poles of contemporary democratic theory: As do formal or minimalist approaches, he specifies electoral mechanisms for elite control; and similar to substantive or civic culture approaches, he encourages more direct and robust modes of popular participation. On these grounds, I cull from Machiavelli’s Discourses a theory of democracy in which the populace selects the elites who will hold office but also constantly patrols them through extraelectoral institutions and practices, such as the tribunes of the people, public accusations, and popular appeals. Machiavelli adds to these institutional features of popular government an important cultural dimension: The people should despise and mistrust elites, and they should actively confront the injustice that elite governing inevitably entails. Finally, I explore the ramifications of this theory for debates over elite accountability in contemporary democratic theory.

PARTY DEMOCRACY ON-LINE: UK PARTIES AND NEW ICTS

This paper examines the impact of new information and communications technologies (ICTs) on levels of intra-party democracy in the UK in light of recent claims of increasing centralization of power and marginalization of members within West European political parties. Specifically, it examines whether parties adoption of the internet, in the shape of an internal computer communication system (ICCS) and internal party groups' use of the World Wide Web (WWW), is promoting intra-party democracy in two areas: (1) the vertical distribution of power between members and elites; (2) the spatial concentration of power between intra-party groupings and central party elites. The findings show that while many parties have made use of the internet for internal communication there is no concerted effort being made by parties to harness its potential to promote members input into decision-making and elite accountability.

Legislative development and Chinese political change

Legislative development (or decay) is a component of political change. 1 In nations with weak legislatures just as in those with strong legislatures, growth or decline of an assembly’s institutional importance alters the pattern of rule. In socialist systems, in particular, the health of a legislature reveals much about the state of mass-elite relations and the division of tasks among government organs. When a socialist legislature is impotent or ignored, lawmaking, supervision, representation, and regime support functions are dispensed with or carried out elsewhere. When a legislature is rising and active, it assumes a range of responsibilities and may serve as a testing ground to develop and refine techniques of rule. In China, the ups and downs of the National People’s Congress (NPC) have coincided with changes in the policymaking environment and have heralded (or reflected) changes in the way leaders interact with the citizenry and with each other. Throughout its history, the NPC has been a window on evolving party-society and party-state relations which has shed light on the broad character of the Chinese polity-how open or closed it is, how exclusive or inclusive it may be becoming.* In one institution, in miniature, the forces of change and continuity have met and interacted. At different times, reform or reaction has prevailed. But the underlying question, posed at the end of the Qing dynasty and still troubling to this day, has remained the same: what reforms must be instituted to build China into a strong and prosperous nation? Through our legislative window, three separate but intersecting alternatives can be discerned. First, the path of liberalization. Advocates of liberalization have achieved notoriety on three separate occasions-in the 191Os, during the Hundred Flowers Movement in the mid-1950s, and in the first few years of the post-Mao thaw. In the legislature their ascendance has been marked by lively criticism and calls for structural reform. Liberal reformers, at various points, have sought to limit central power and to transform the legislature from a “rubber stamp” into an institution with an established place in the policymaking process. They have envisioned outside control over leaders and regular influence over policy: they have aimed to build a legislature that has the wherewithal to veto misguided policies and the power to remove incompetent or immoral leaders. They have sought to strengthen the nation by diffusing power. When allowed, liberals have urged leaders to be more responsive and have championed electoral reform and elite accountability; they have supported close legislator-constituent ties and active representation of individual, partial, and national interests. Despite repeated defeats, several

The theory and practice of socialist democracy in Cuba: Mechanisms of elite accountability

The theory and practice of socialist democracy in Cuba: Mechanisms of elite accountability