Electoral Accountability Research Articles

SISTEMA ELEITORAL PROPORCIONAL DE LISTA ABERTA: CRÍTICAS DA CIÊNCIA POLÍTICA AO SISTEMA ELEITORAL DO BRASIL

The open-list proportional electoral system is used in democracies such as Brazil for the election of its legislative representatives. This system, however, has been subject to criticism in political science, both in Brazil and internationally, due to its effects on party structure, voter behavior, and the political process in general. This article examines the main theoretical criticisms of the open-list proportional system, discussing issues such as party fragmentation, campaign personalization, distortion of the popular will, intraparty competition, difficulty in electoral accountability, and the tendency toward personalist voting.

Is country leaders’ education relevant for policy making? The case of the Covid-19 pandemic

AbstractThis paper examines the impact of a country leader’s education on policy responses and policy outcomes during the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. Relying on a quasi-experimental event-study approach, I find that political leaders with a graduate education responded more stringently to the first nationally registered infection than political leaders with lower educational attainment. Subsequently, political leaders with a graduate education reported fewer Covid-19 infections and Covid-19 related deaths at the onset of the pandemic. The results suggest that the education of political leaders can explain policy differences, particularly in countries with low electoral accountability. The low level of accountability allowed political leaders with a graduate education to implement stringent, evidence-based policies to contain the pandemic without fear of electoral punishment.

Party polarization in digital fingerprints: Tracing politicians’ social media posts on the George Floyd protests

Under what conditions do politicians express their views on social media? How do politicians express their opinions around a given issue on social media? This paper contends that issue ownership and electoral accountability are critical factors that drive politicians’ attitudes toward a politically salient issue. It conducts a case study on the 2020 George Floyd protests in the United States, using an original, computationally-gathered dataset of posts on Twitter. The multi-level analysis results suggest that politicians’ race and party affiliation, in conjunction with their constituencies’ partisan orientation and racial composition, played significant roles in determining the frequency of Floyd-related Twitter posts they shared. Additionally, topic modeling results demonstrate a disparity in how the political movement is phrased between Democrats and Republicans. These findings shed light on the motivations behind social media posting behavior by public officials and carry significant implications for party polarization in contemporary democracies.

Fiscal Rules, Corruption and Electoral Accountability

Fiscal Rules, Corruption and Electoral Accountability

Electoral Accountability in a Multilevel Governance Context: Economic Voting and Gubernatorial Support in Latin America

Electoral Accountability in a Multilevel Governance Context: Economic Voting and Gubernatorial Support in Latin America

Theories of governance and development: How does India’s experience fit?

ABSTRACT This article examines the apparent paradox of India’s combination of durable democracy and electoral accountability with a capable bureaucracy, coinciding with a deficient development trajectory. It outlines the nature of the conceptual problem, where India is an outlier in global patterns. Then it compares different conceptual approaches to drawing connections from governance institutions to development outcomes. Next, it reviews some of the contributions to understanding India’s political economy in recent decades. Finally, it draws lessons from India’s experience for the appropriateness of different theories of governance and development. One conclusion is that the paradox recedes when attention is paid to the subnational level, where India’s states encompass considerable variation in initial societal and economic conditions and in development outcomes, and a sufficiently rich theoretical framework, that of limited access orders, is used to situate and encompass the different subnational experiences.

Identity and political corruption: a laboratory experiment

AbstractThis paper explores the role of identity in voters’ decision to retain corrupt politicians. We build up a model of electoral accountability with pure moral hazard and bring it to the lab. Politicians must decide whether to invest in a public project with uncertain returns or to keep the funds for themselves. Voters observe the outcome of the project but not the action of the politician; if the project is unsuccessful, they do not know whether it was because of bad luck or because the politician embezzled the funds. We run two treatments; a control and a treatment where subjects are assigned an identity using the minimal group paradigm. Our main result is that, upon observing a failed project, voters approve politicians of their same identity group significantly more often than in the control and compared to politicians of a different identity group. This is partially driven by a belief on same-identity politicians being more honest. We also observe that subjects acting as politicians embezzle funds less often than expected by the equilibrium prediction.

DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC COOPERATION COUNTRIES: DOES FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT MATTER?

A study on the factors influencing foreign direct investment (FDI) was started by the Islamic Cooperation countries, the majority of which are developing nations, due to the significance of capital flows for these nations. The present study employs an institutional quality framework, green economic policies, and the function of financial development to evaluate the components that effect foreign direct investment (FDI). The results of this research demonstrate that institutional changes and green economic policies stimulate foreign investment. Several institutional metrics, including government performance, the rule of law, political stability, and regulatory quality, have highly positive outcomes, while electoral accountability and preventing corruption have negative and minor consequences. Furthermore, elements of the green economy including human capital, natural resources, and environmental laws have a big impact on foreign investment. These results also suggest that the growth of the financial sector can boost the impact of institutional quality and the green economy on the attraction of foreign investment. The conclusions of this study demonstrate that investors examine institutional integrity, the green economy, and financial development when making investment decisions.

Contentious Origins of Authoritarian Social Protection: China’s “Threat-Driven” Strategy in Redistribution

AbstractDespite the lack of electoral accountability, China has built an expanding welfare system that is set to include most citizens. Why does China defy the conventional prediction of an exclusive authoritarian welfare state? This paper looks at the critical time when China first established its social security system in the 1990s and argues that the state adopts a “threat-driven strategy” where the redistribution effort varies with the expected collective action of economic losers. Analyzing an original granular county-level dataset of China’s laid-off workers and social security taxation, the paper finds that a group of newly emerged economic losers, precipitated by state policy, drives the local states’ efforts to redistribute. In particular, the number of laid-off state-owned enterprise workers explains 46% of the variations in social security collection among non-state-owned enterprises. Instrumental variable estimation, with legacy state-owned enterprises established in historical contingencies as the instrument for laid-off workers, shows consistent results. Further analysis on mechanisms demonstrates that layoffs lead to an increase in SOE protests, which in turn foster greater redistribution.

Legislator Pivotality and Voter Accountability

Pivotal legislators’ positions are critical to legislative outcomes, but does this heightened importance in policymaking translate into heightened electoral accountability or voter knowledge? Arguments about clarity of responsibility suggest that pivotal legislators, who are decisive in determining legislative outcomes, may be held to higher standards, while perspectives rooted in electoral incentives for position taking suggest they may not. Two survey experiments show that voters do not respond more strongly to pivotal legislators’ votes on policy. Moreover, observational data analysis rejects the expectation that constituents have more knowledge about the votes of pivotal moderate legislators compared to non-pivotal moderate legislators. These results suggest that pivotal legislators face similar, if not lower, accountability for their votes. Combined with the policy-concessions pivotal legislators can secure, these patterns point to the benefits that accrue to pivotal legislators from institutional rules that give them key veto power over policy.

Corruption Disclosure and Electoral Accountability System: Reducing Political Corruption

This literature review explores how corruption exposure affects voter behavior, political dynamics, and the fate of current political parties and politicians. This demonstrates the importance of strengthening electoral accountability in maintaining democracy, combating corruption, and improving political systems. Research has found that the disclosure of corrupt practices significantly impacts voter behavior, as it may lead to a decrease in support for current political parties and politicians affected by corruption. In addition, exposing dereliction of duty is an important tool in combating political corruption, making the election process more transparent and accountable. Therefore, this review emphasizes the crucial role of exposing corrupt behavior in shaping voter behavior, holding politicians accountable, and maintaining the integrity of democratic systems under electoral accountability systems. This proves that strengthening electoral accountability plays an important role in maintaining democratic integrity and promoting responsive political models and provides an important foundation for future research in this field. Promote transparency in the election process and strengthen the implementation of accountability policies.

Productivity matters: legislative effectiveness, bipartisanship, and electoral accountability

Productivity matters: legislative effectiveness, bipartisanship, and electoral accountability

O micie rozliczalności wyborczej

The article presents scientific research on certain assumptions concerning electoral accountability and provides conceptual insights. The central hypothesis is to demonstrate the illusory nature of accountability for the exercise of power once the electoral process comes to an end. An analysis is made of the character and epistemic value of electoral accountability as a myth – a creation structuring an image of political reality. The research is supported by empirical evidence from contemporary social studies. The purpose of the article is to show that the concepts of representation and accountability in political relations are mythical constructs; such an insight allows us to better understand the false expectations those constructions lead to. The study takes an international approach and contributes to worldwide deliberations on political representation.

Diffuse Support, Partisanship, and the Electoral Relevance of the Supreme Court

Abstract Despite the Supreme Court’s lack of direct electoral accountability, voters may factor its outputs into their voting decisions because elected representatives can affect the Court’s powers and composition. In this paper, we uncover an ironic predicament that faces candidates running on reforming this institution. Citizens who possess higher levels of diffuse support for the Court are more likely to rank it as an important factor in their voting logic. But because this diffuse support has sorted along partisan lines, candidate messaging about reform may not motivate partisans who have lost support for the Court because they view it as less important than other pressing issues. Thus, although Democrats are sympathetic to reform, Democratic candidates may have weak incentives to promote reform given low levels of diffuse support among their constituents. This dynamic mitigates against the possibility of a public or congressional backlash against the Court, preserving the status quo.

Lacking Incentives, Not Information. Why Politicians tend to be Less Responsive to Lower‐Income Citizens

The principle that democracies give all citizens an equal voice is challenged by scholarly work showing that policies tend to be biased in favor of the more wealthy citizenry. One reason for such unequal representation lies in representatives being less responsive to the preferences of lower compared to higher‐income citizens in their policy actions. Drawing on surveys with local elected representatives in Belgium and Sweden, this study zooms in on two potential drivers of unequal responsiveness. We look at the possibility that politicians have less incentives to be responsive to the less affluent, and less accurate information to do so in the first place. Concretely, we question politicians about the anticipation of accountability from lower‐ versus higher‐income citizens (incentives) and make them estimate the policy positions of lower‐ and higher‐income citizens (information). Moreover, we explore whether descriptive representation factors into these two possible drivers of unequal responsiveness by leveraging variation in politicians’ backgrounds. First, we find that representatives anticipate significantly less electoral accountability from lower‐income than from higher‐income citizens. Moreover, politicians with a lower‐class background hold less unequal accountability beliefs, hinting at the importance of more equal descriptive representation in mitigating inequality in responsiveness. Second, unequal responsiveness does not seem to be a matter of representatives having less accurate information about the opinions of lower‐income citizens; politicians’ estimations of different income groups’ policy preferences are equally inaccurate.

Democracy, accountability, and forest loss: a cross-national analysis of low- and middle-income nations

ABSTRACT The existing cross-national research on democracy and forest loss has produced contradictory results. On the one hand, some studies find that democracy is related to less forest loss because of electoral accountability and guaranteeing political rights and civil liberties. On the other hand, studies find that democracy is related to increased forest loss in low- and middle-income nations because leaders promote policies that prioritize economic growth over protecting the natural environment. We use this research as a starting point for our study and build upon it in two ways. First, we examine how vertical, horizontal, and diagonal accountability – three different aspects of democracy – impacts forest loss in low- and middle-income nations. Second, we address the issue of endogeneity in the vertical, horizontal, and diagonal accountability. To do so, we analyze data for 80 low- and middle-income nations using a two-stage instrumental variable regression model. We find that higher levels of horizontal and diagonal accountability are related to less forest loss. We do not find that vertical accountability is related to forest loss in low- and middle-income nations. From the findings, we arrive at our theoretical implication, which support arguments concerning how actors at different scales work individually and together to promote conservation.

Mass Political Information on Social Media: Facebook Ads, Electorate Saturation, and Electoral Accountability in Mexico

Abstract Social media’s capacity to quickly and inexpensively reach large audiences almost simultaneously has the potential to promote electoral accountability. Beyond increasing direct exposure to information, high saturation campaigns—which target substantial fractions of an electorate—may induce or amplify information diffusion, persuasion, or coordination between voters. Randomizing saturation across municipalities, we evaluate the electoral impact of non-partisan Facebook ads informing millions of Mexican citizens of municipal expenditure irregularities in 2018. The vote shares of incumbent parties that engaged in zero/negligible irregularities increased by 6–7 percentage points in directly-targeted electoral precincts. This direct effect, but also the indirect effect in untargeted precincts within treated municipalities, were significantly greater where ads targeted 80%—rather than 20%—of the municipal electorate. The amplifying effects of high saturation campaigns are driven by citizens within more socially-connected municipalities, rather than responses by politicians or media outlets. These findings demonstrate how mass media can ignite social interactions to promote political accountability.

Bureaucratic Quality and Electoral Accountability

In many theories of electoral accountability, voters learn about an incumbent’s quality by observing public goods outcomes. But empirical findings are mixed, suggesting that increasing the visibility of these outcomes only sometimes improves accountability. I reconcile these heterogeneous findings by highlighting bureaucrats’ role in the production of public goods. In a simple model of electoral accountability involving a voter, a politician, and a bureaucrat, I show that accountability relationships yield distinct empirical implications at different levels of bureaucratic quality. To illustrate how this model rationalizes otherwise mixed or heterogeneous results, I develop a new research design—a theoretically structured meta-study—to synthesize existing findings. Meta-study evidence on the accountability of Brazilian mayors suggests that a common model of electoral accountability that allows for variation in bureaucratic quality predicts observed heterogeneity in politician and voter behavior and beliefs across multiple studies with distinct samples, treatments, and outcomes.

Income Shocks and Electoral Accountability: Evidence from Natural Resource Windfalls

Income Shocks and Electoral Accountability: Evidence from Natural Resource Windfalls

Electoral Accountability In The 21st Century: The Mobile Coverage Effect On Established Political Parties In Mexico

Electoral Accountability In The 21st Century: The Mobile Coverage Effect On Established Political Parties In Mexico