Election Observation Missions Research Articles

Democratic Erosion, Partisanship, and Election Observers: Evidence from a Survey Experiment

To what extent do voters support election observation missions (EOMs) monitoring their elections? Building on but departing from prior work, we argue that citizens’ support for election observation missions likely depends on their partisanship. To test our argument, we conduct a survey experiment with a national sample of about 3, 500 Americans in the run-up to the 2020 United States presidential election. Respondents read an adapted news article about the deployment of common interventions in the upcoming election. To test our theoretical expectations, we randomize the partisan source endorsing the interventions. We find that respondents who self-identify as Democrats and Independents/Others are much less likely to support election observers when endorsed by Trump. In addition, Democrats are more likely to support election observers if they read that Biden approves of them. In contrast, Republicans are less likely to support an intervention if they read the same. Our results contribute to ongoing debates about how to promote and defend free elections in backsliding or democratizing countries and, more generally, to the literatures on election observation and public opinion.

A Comparative Review of the European Union Observation Mission’s Reports on the Nigerian 2019 and 2023 General Elections

One of the means of knowing if a democracy is making progress is through successful successive elections and one of the ways to gauge the success of an election is to look into the reports of the various observation missions and groups that observed and monitored that election. The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) is one of the credible observation missions that have monitored Nigerian elections since Nigeria returned to civil rule in 1999. The reports of the Mission have helped to show the good, the bad, and the worst of the Nigerian brand of electoral process. Unlike the observation reports of the international organizations that Nigeria belongs to like the Commonwealth, the African Union and the ECOWAS, the EU EOM report is usually devoid of the element of a "progress report" as enunciated by Kelly (2012), the reports are more factual and more relatable. The paper submits that for a democracy to make genuine progress through its electoral process, its election needs to be observed by factual electoral observation groups in the mold of EU EOM, despite the expected claim of foreign interference by the indicted party in an election.

Izborna hronika za 2023. - pogled sa strane

The author in this paper presents the views of the external observers (international election observation missions) of the parliamentary Elections in Serbia: Venice Commissions, Council of Europe and the OSCE. The main emphasis is placed on an analysis of the assessment of certain segments of the novelties in the Serbian electoral laws and its application in practice. Due to the limited extent of the paper, only several important issues of the Serbian political and legal system were examined, such as early elections, electoral administration, weaknesses of the electoral system, the state of the media, etc. In the first place, international observers point out that the "culture" of early elections impacts the efficient and autonomous functioning of the parliament. The important recommendation which lawmakers should consider is consolidation and harmonisation of the electoral laws into one law or in special codification. Serious objection is sent to provision which regulated the election management bodies, due to their inability to prevent voter intimidation and pressure on voters in polling stations and to build the general trust of the electorate in the electoral processes. The observes noticed numerous irregularities prior to the elections, that raise a number of concerns regarding freedom of expression and intimidation and harassment of civil activists, as well as other human rights of the defenders and journalists. Such concerns are followed by the fact that incumbents' and ruling parties' activities usually enjoy extensive, uncritical and, at times, promotional coverage in public and government-affiliated private media. At the very end of paper, there is a summary review of the preliminary analysis of the last elections. The main goal of the paper is to provide the reader with the key views of the mentioned international bodies. Also, the author seeks to present the views of the Serbian scientific community on the mentioned issues, as well as to offer original solutions, which could be used in some future constitutional and legal reform.

Pouring Salt into the Wound: The Crisis of International Election Observation and COVID-19 in Africa

International election observation in Africa is in crisis. This crisis manifests in various ways, including lowering of standards from democracy promotion to ‘peaceocracy’; strategic interest bias; progress bias; low-tech methodologies; dominance over citizen observer groups; and contradiction of verdicts of election observation missions with court judgments. The crisis characterizes the wound of international election observation. The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic found a pre-existing unhealthy condition of international election observation, thereby pouring salt into the wound. It accentuated the existential crisis of international election observation. Observation has to be recalibrated during and after the pandemic. Existing challenges facing international election observation have to be redressed. International election observation has to adapt to the new condition marked by COVID-19. This adaptation should include development and implementation of guidelines on election observation during COVID-19. In the long run, sustainability of election observation rests in the institutional strengthening of citizen-based observer groups.

Effectiveness of Multitrack Diplomacy Actors in Critical Assessment of Kenya’s Presidential Election Outcomes, 2007-2017

In Kenya’s last four presidential elections, election observers had been seriously looked upon by both the Kenyan voters and the international community to provide alternative but credible information on the process and outcomes of presidential elections in Kenya. This was expected to promote legitimacy of the outcomes. Given that there was a dearth of specific scholarship to address the question, this study was conducted. This paper therefore examines the effectiveness of multitrack diplomacy in monitoring Kenya’s presidential election outcomes. The study was epistemological. It was conducted in 8 of the 17 constituencies of Nairobi City County which hosts the Kenya’s largest city and its capital with a natural representation of the population of the entire country. Out of the over 4 million residents of Nairobi City County, total sample size was 441 (384 questionnaire respondents, 32 focus group discussion participants and 25 key informant interview respondents). The study reached 436 (384 questionnaire respondents, 32 focus group discussion participants and 20 key informant interview respondents) out of 4 million people. Targeted were Kenya citizens who had voted at least once for a presidential candidate in any of the presidential elections held between 2007 and 2017 for the survey; individuals working with and for government institutions in Kenya’s electoral systems especially the election management body, ministry of foreign affairs, members of parliament, the Chief Justice, pollsters, the media, non-governmental organizations, religious institutions across all faiths as to Muslims, Christians and Hindu, major political parties, former election observers and diplomatic missions. The study found that multitrack diplomacy (MTD) actors or election observer missions (EOMs) observed election irregularities to above 50%. They detected electoral fraud in the 2007 presidential elections, identified election irregularities in the 2013 and the 2017 presidential elections but could not deter nor prevent outcome fraud. The paper, based on the study, concluded that multitrack diplomacy actors that monitored the presidential elections were fairly effective, they had reasonable capacity, fairly above 50%. Overall, multitrack diplomacy is effective in monitoring of Kenya’s presidential election but inefficacious in preventing and deterring election outcome fraud. Multitrack diplomacy actors-the election observation missions (EOMs) to use enhanced technology to match the electoral systems technology, improve on their objectivity during monitoring and be granted full accesses by governments and election management bodies (EMBs) for systematic, comprehensive and accurate monitoring.

Dual Effects of Democracy Promotion: Evidence from International Election Observation Data of Myanmar’s General Elections

Since the 1990s, international election observation, as an important way of election monitoring, has become increasingly active on the international stage. By inviting international election observation missions (IEOMs) to conduct election monitoring, the nascent democracies not only hope to promote democracy and enhance its legitimacy, but also tend to reduce international sanctions and improve relations with the West. The international election observation of Myanmar’s two general elections in 2010 and 2015 is an important sample to observe Myanmar’s democratic process and its interaction with the international community. IEOMs in Myanmar have witnessed diverse situations from being rejected to being invited, from being independently observed to participating and from slamming elections to praising them. In the 2015 general elections, IEOMs had an important impact on Myanmar’s democratic transition, but in essence, their limitations were only surrounding the election-related matters. The work done by many international election observation organizations has been limited to the procedural level of democracy, and could not help Myanmar to further the institution-building. General elections in Myanmar are due in 2020. Currently, many IEOMs have traveled to Myanmar for election observation, but it is yet to be decided whether it will contribute to good governance in Myanmar.

Re-evaluating international observation of Kenya’s 2017 elections

ABSTRACTFollowing the Supreme Court’s decision to annul the August 2017 Kenyan elections, many commentators – including journalists, academics, politicians and non-elite Kenyan voters – criticised international election observation missions on the grounds that they had declared the election ‘free and fair’. This article argues that specific allegations of incompetence and bias fail to acknowledge how international observers’ preliminary statements restrained from offering final verdicts or commenting upon the tallying process in which the problems emerged. Rather, due to a combination of the media environment and popular expectations about observers’ work, the complexity of their statements was lost as their findings were disseminated. This suggests that a fairer critique of international observers would focus on how they communicate, including when they decide to make their statements. It also shows that both the circulation of information relating to observers and popular perceptions of observation missions are important issues, despite being relatively overlooked by scholars working on election observation.

Electoral Tourism, Normative Power or Instrumentalised Practice? European Union Election Observation Missions in Africa

Since 1994, the European Union (EU) has participated in 142 Election Observation Missions (EOMs) and Election Expert Missions (EEMs) (EEAS, 2016). Yet, even though they are significant, there has been limited scholarly work on EU-EOMs. This article seeks to close this gap. By offering a comprehensive analysis, this article argues that EU-EMOs exemplify how the EU and African governments see election monitoring as an instrumentalised tool. The discussion reveals that the practice of intrumentalisation significantly hinders norm diffusion through EU-EOMs. Introducing various subject areas, the first section illustrates how the EU’s role in international relations and with it EU-EOMs are marked by the EU’s dichotomous character and inherent tensions between its normative and strategic commitments. Building on these insights, the second section challenges constructivist concepts of norm diffusion. The third section projects the instrumental nature of election monitoring through the quantitative and case study analysis. This mixed methods approach aims to integrate factors that explain why actors engage with each other through EU-EOMs, notably trade, aid and legitimacy. It further scrutinises what occurs during EU-EOMs and how these interactions can lead to the internalisation of norms. The conclusion draws on the theoretical and empirical findings to discuss why the EU is unable to effectively diffuse norms through EU-EOMs and how these findings alter our understanding of election monitoring.

How to Rig an ElectionCheeseman, Nic and BrianKlaasNew Haven and London: Yale University Press (2018), 320 pp., ISBN 978‐0‐300‐20443‐8

How to Rig an ElectionCheeseman, Nic and BrianKlaasNew Haven and London: Yale University Press (2018), 320 pp., ISBN 978‐0‐300‐20443‐8

International Election Observer Recommendations and UN Human Rights Mechanisms: Toward a More Robust System of Global Accountability on Democracy and Human Rights

ABSTRACTIn the last decade, states around the world have begun to pass and enforce laws that restrict fundamental rights and freedoms and effectively close off political space. Faced with the challenge of closing political space, there is an urgent need to deepen the linkage between election observation assessments and reporting, and the United Nations’ human rights mechanisms and system. In this article, the authors argue that the election assistance and human rights communities must work together to promote a cohesive framework for accountability on all human rights, including electoral rights. Stronger links and reporting from election observation missions into the Universal Periodic Review and treaty body system can function as part of a strengthened international human rights accountability mechanism, using UN mechanisms and related obligations accepted by states.

International Election Observation and Standards for Systems of Representation: A Critical View

ABSTRACTThis paper presents a critical view on the extent to which international standards (treaty and non-treaty obligations) prescribe particular features for electoral systems, for representation in parliament, and how they have been reflected in international election observation mission (IEOM) reports. Apart from regulating the equality of the vote and an acceptable deviation from equality, there are few specific requirements for systems of representation in the standards. The requirements of genuine and fair elections may be interpreted to exclude unreasonable systems, but the interpretation would often be controversial. In some non-treaty documents, it is even explicitly stated that anything goes as long as the few defined requirements are met. Against this background, IEOM reports have been very careful not to comment on systems of representation. In rare cases, however, comments have been issued, in post-conflict situations in particular. The paper points out inconsistencies in the interpretation of international standards by IEOMs and argues that detailed standards may help remove inconsistencies and reduce the claims of application of double standards. The paper also discusses inconsistencies following the restrictions some of the non-treaty documents make on the requirement of equality of votes to one (the lower) house of the legislature.

Helsinki’s counterintuitive effect? OSCE/ODIHR’s election observation missions and solidification of virtual democracy in post-communist Central Asia: the case of Tajikistan, 2000–2013

ABSTRACTSince the late 1990s, the post-communist states of Central Asia, as ‘participating States’ of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, have been regularly persuaded by the organization to invite its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights to monitor their national parliamentary and presidential elections. The OSCE/ODIHR’s objectives have been to assist the Central Asian participating states in holding free and fair elections and aid in a presumed ongoing post-communist democratization process. We argue that contrary to OSCE’s assumptions, repeated OSCE/ODIHR election observations of Central Asian states with histories of fraudulent elections (as demonstrated by the case study of Tajikistan during 2000–2013) have not contributed to the flourishing of democracy and political pluralism, but rather inadvertently aided in the solidification of authoritarianism and ‘virtual democracy’ – a phenomenon we refer to as ‘Helsinki’s counterintuitive effect’. Using stakeholder interviews, we test four hypotheses in support of this general proposition.

Strategies of Actors Influencing Electoral Integrity: A Case Study of the Czech Republic

The goal of this study is to examine the behaviour of electoral stakeholders that has influenced the quality of parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic since the 1998 elections. The text attempts to answer these questions: ‘What kinds of strategies do political actors use in electoral processes that decrease the quality of elections?’ ‘Do these tactics vary over time?’ ‘Are they efficient?’ ‘Who are the actors?’ The Czech Republic, as a newly established democracy, features comparably very high electoral integrity, while neighbouring countries experience (from time to time) electoral problems. This work aims to describe the behaviour of electoral stakeholders in order to understand whether they behave in a manner which maintains a high level of electoral integrity. The framework for analysis is constructed on the background of Andreas Schedler’s work (2002; 2013) with respect to influencing the level of institutional rules or the game within those rules. The analysis consists of different kinds of data sources. Among these, election observation mission reports, parties’ strategic documents (party manifestos), secondary analyses (providing the explanation of behaviour), and news (offering information about behaviour on a daily basis) are most important. The results will provide a description of primary electoral stakeholder behaviour, which then allows us to better understand how they affect electoral integrity.

The Use of Election Observation Reports in Regional Human Rights Jurisprudence

ABSTRACTThis article argues that reports from election observation missions can constitute evidence and shows that they are occasionally being used as evidence when regional human rights bodies are resolving human rights cases that deal with elections. The practice has so far been confined to regional human rights jurisprudence. Between 1998 and April 2016, election observation mission reports have been used in a total of 16 cases brought before regional human rights courts and commissions. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have each used mission reports once, while the main bulk of practice has emerged in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). I will argue that so far, the jurisprudence indicates three different usages of election mission reports: (1) as facts in the circumstances of the case; (2) as corroborative or indirect evidence; and (3) as direct evidence that is conclusive for the resolution of the case. Furthermore, there is an emerging dialogue between the ECtHR and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe–Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), particularly with regards to the election observation missions that concern Article 3 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights. This indicates that there may be a new function for mission reports in human rights law, particularly in Europe.

Reflecting on the Nigerian Media, Elections, and the African Democracy

This article examines how the media could enhance the conduct of elections. It also discusses the implications of the 2007 elections on public assessment of Nigerian democracy. The outcome of the 2007 elections was particularly worrisome following the electoral irregularities that occurred during the elections. The internal and the external observers that monitored the elections noted these irregularities, which were later confirmed by the Nigerian Judiciary when the results of the elections earlier approved by the Independent National Electoral Commission were later canceled by the court. The article used the content analysis approach to review the Nigerian press coverage of the elections and used the social responsibility media theory to argue why the media should support the government to conduct free and fair elections. The findings reveal that although the media gave adequate publicity to the elections, the public and the private media disagreed regarding the credibility of the results of the elections. The public media supported the Federal Government’s position in the elections, insisting that the elections were free and fair, notwithstanding the report by the Election Observation Mission that confirmed that the elections were rigged. The article recommends among other things, that the Nigerian press should report more objectively on election activities.

Two Decades of Election Observation by the African Union: A Review

Between 1989 and 2013, the African Union (AU) observed 423 elections in Africa. However, these election observation missions were inconsistent at best in terms of approach, methodology, framework and status. The first, which was in Namibia in 1989, was deployed within the framework of the United Nations (UN) statute in terms of which the UN invited the AU. The subsequent election observation missions have to date been deployed either as diplomatic or mediation missions or a combination of diplomatic and independent technical missions. This article shows that the election observation journey of the AU has passed through several stages and regimes. While we recognise the challenges, we also point towards improvement, and identify the missing links that the AU needs to complete to become a truly independent actor in its election observation missions.

From a perpetrator’s perspective

Do international election observers deter or spur violence after election day? This article argues that only when conceptually and empirically distinguishing between violence by governments and opposition groups, can we assess the impact of international election observation. Disaggregating post-electoral violence uncovers that observers can deter governments from using force, but they have the opposite effect on opposition groups. When expecting criticism from observers, opposition leaders can easily deny their responsibility for violence by individual party militants, while weaponry and official insignia betray police and military involvement in violence and force the government to bear command responsibility. Governments also anticipate higher international costs for engaging in post-electoral violence than opposition groups, which are not usually targets of international punishment. On the other hand, international election observers unintentionally incite opposition groups to organize violence, as opposition groups seek to benefit from international attention and support that come with the presence of observers. Observers’ exposure of fraud reverses this differential effect: because governments expect international costs for election rigging anyway, observers cannot deter repression after highly fraudulent elections. But their alertness to electoral malpractice alleviates opposition groups’ incentives for post-electoral violence. Using data on 230 state-wide elections in Africa from 1990 to 2009, the analysis supports the observable implications of this argument. The findings of this article imply that international election observation missions make the post-electoral environment more peaceful when it comes to government repression after non-fraudulent elections. But observers ought to develop greater local expertise to identify opposition grievances before these groups resort to violence and be attentive to the possibility of increased repression after exposing cheating.

Election Observation Mission to Burma in 2015

Election Observation Mission to Burma in 2015

EU Election Observation a Tool for Building Stable Secure Democracies

Election observation is a tool for democracy development and thus an important instrument in advancing stability and security. Election monitoring activities rose to prominence in the early 1990s as states of Eastern Europe after the fall of communism were holding their first free elections. Election monitoring has become a complex activity with many defining actors in the international arena. Genuine democratic elections are an important and integral part of democracies and as such are also essential to provide for more stable and secure countries, regions and in fact a safer world. Although development cooperation and democracy building were the prime aim of election monitoring activities it must also be noted that such activities may positively influence the post-election behaviour of all relevant actors, as these tendencies have been observed in political science researches. The aim of the paper is however to examine the matter from a legal perspective presenting the European Union’s regulatory structure regarding election observation. The European Union is one of the most prominent organisers of such activities with detailed legal regulation on the matter. EU regulations in this field are also of great importance due to the fact that they serve as a basis and inspiration of further international legislation of election observation missions. The detailed legal instruments of the EU were created at the end of the 1990s, early 2000s thus before the work began on the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation, which is a document elaborated in 2005. The European Union is one of the most important actors in development cooperation and has been aiming at increasing its importance in international politics, thus the legal regulation of EU election observation as a tool of democracy building is directly linked to security in the instable regions of our world.

Civic Engagement and its Role in Mitigating Electoral Violence in Nigeria: Implications for the 2015 General Elections

In May 1999, Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, made an epochal transition to democratic civilian rule following roughly thirty-three years of military dictatorship. Since 1999, Nigeria has held four successive elections, which have all been (more or less) undermined by electoral violence. Despite this recurrent and disturbing trend of electoral violence, few works have attempted to systematically engage with three key questions: why is electoral violence a recurrent phenomenon in Nigeria? Why have there been so few constitutional provisions to mitigate its recurrence? What lessons can be learned from Nigeria’s turbulent electoral past, especially with regards to the role of civic engagement? These are the core questions this paper seeks to address. This paper draws its data primarily from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)-Electoral Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) programme, with which the authors were actively involved during the 2007 and 2011 general elections in Nigeria. To balance any inconsistencies, data derived from a content analysis of IFES reports and cumulative observations will be triangulated and cross-validated with reports of different Election Observation Missions to Nigeria (1999-2011), as well as reports from local and international observation teams and key International NGOs working in the areas of elections and democracy in Nigeria, including National Democratic Institute (NDI), Human Rights Watch (HRW) and International Republican Institute (IRI). The paper thus argues that as Nigeria prepares for 2015 elections, important lessons should be adapted from the IFES-EVER project to ensure robust civic engagement in preventing and mitigating electoral related violence. The use of electoral support networks, link with Nigerian police and other security agencies, constant engagement and information sharing between INEC and all relevant stakeholders as well as biweekly reportage and publication of incidents of electoral violence with names of perpetrators will go a long way in preventing and mitigating incidents of electoral violence in Nigeria 2015 General Elections. Furthermore, crucial attention should also be paid to Nigerian legal and constitutional provisions on electoral violence with the view to reviewing the standards and level of sanctions to perpetrators.