Election Assistance Commission Research Articles

What Do We Actually Know About Poll Worker Recruitment in the United States? Poll Worker Recruitment Policies and Data Problems in the Election Assistance Commission Report

What Do We Actually Know About Poll Worker Recruitment in the United States? Poll Worker Recruitment Policies and Data Problems in the Election Assistance Commission Report

Adoption of Strategies to Mitigate Transmission of COVID-19 During a Statewide Primary Election - Delaware, September 2020.

Elections occurring during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic have been affected by notable changes in the methods of voting, the number and type of polling locations, and in-person voting procedures (1). To mitigate transmission of COVID-19 at polling locations, jurisdictions have adopted changes to protocols and procedures, informed by CDC's interim guidance, developed in collaboration with the Election Assistance Commission (2). The driving principle for this guidance is that voting practices with lower infection risk will be those which reduce the number of voters who congregate indoors in polling locations by offering a variety of methods for voting and longer voting periods. The guidance for in-person voting includes considerations for election officials, poll workers, and voters to maintain healthy environments and operations. To assess knowledge and adoption of mitigation strategies, CDC collaborated with the Delaware Department of Health and Social Services and the Delaware State Election Commission on a survey of poll workers who served during the statewide primary election on September 15, 2020. Among 522 eligible poll workers, 93% correctly answered all three survey questions about COVID-19 transmission. Respondents noted that most voters and poll workers wore masks. However, masks were not always worn correctly (i.e., covering both the nose and mouth). Responses suggest that mitigation measures recommended for both poll workers and voters were widely adopted and feasible, but also highlighted gaps in infection prevention control efforts. Strengthening of measures intended to minimize the risk of poll workers acquiring COVID-19 from ill voters, such as additional training and necessary personal protective equipment (PPE), as well as support for alternative voting options for ill voters, are needed. Adherence to mitigation measures is important not only to protect voters but also to protect poll workers, many of whom are older adults, and thus at higher risk for severe COVID-19-associated illness. Enhanced attention to reducing congregation in polling locations, correct mask use, and providing safe voting options for ill voters are critical considerations to minimize risk to voters and poll workers. Evidence from the Delaware election supports the feasibility and acceptability of implementing current CDC guidance for election officials, poll workers, and voters for mitigating COVID-19 transmission at polling locations (2).

A Failsafe for Voters? Cast and Rejected Provisional Ballots in North Carolina

Provisional ballots constitute a failsafe for voters who have their registration or voter identification questioned by poll workers. Scholars have yet to examine who is more likely to cast a provisional ballot, and more importantly, why some provisional ballots are rejected. We suggest that beyond individual-level factors, there are administrative reasons why some prospective voters are more likely to be required to cast provisional ballots than others, and why some provisional ballots are rejected. Drawing on county data collected by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission’s (EAC) biennial Election Administration and Voting Surveys (EAVS) from 2012 to 2016, and individual records of provisional ballots cast in the 2016 Presidential Election in North Carolina, we examine aggregate- and individual-level reasons to explain who casts provisional ballots and why some are rejected. Our findings raise normative questions concerning whether voters casting provisional ballots are treated equally under the law.

Early Voting: Do More Sites Lead to Higher Turnout?

In both 2008 and 2012, about one-third of U.S. voters cast their ballots before Election Day. Reformers have argued that early voting lowers participation costs and should therefore increase turnout. Recent research, however, has reported that no positive relationship exists. The literature widely omits consideration of important differences in early voting implementation within states. I break from past research and measure early voting availability at the county level, where it often varies considerably. I rely on Election Assistance Commission data on the number of early voting sites available in 2008 and 2012. Specifically, I measure the effect of a county's early voting site density on turnout. My model controls for other known participation predictors, including lagged turnout, demographics, political variables, and voter identification requirements. Ultimately, I find that early voting site density has a significant and positive effect on voter turnout.

The Site Gap

In both 2008 and 2012, about one third of the American electorate cast their votes early. While early voting programs are established by states, counties have considerable discretion with regard to implementing them. While some counties offer only a single early voting site, others offer dozens. Previous research suggests that site density may affect the degree to which programs increase turnout. I use county-level data from the 2008 and 2012 elections to measure whether a county’s racial and ethnic composition predicts high (or low) levels of site density. Applying county-level data from the Election Assistance Commission and American Community Survey, I find that the percentage of a county identifying as Black has a significantly negative association with early voting site density. This relationship persists when numerous demographic covariates are included in ordinary least squares models. These site disparities suggest that early voting may not be achieving its full potential in heavily African American communities.

Is the Election Assistance Commission Worth Keeping?

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) created the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC). As policymakers debate the merits of HAVA, the area receiving the most scrutiny is the performance of the EAC. This essay offers my own thoughts on that question as one of the EAC's founding commissioners. My preliminary view is that the EAC – despite its missteps and ongoing difficulties – is worth keeping. Although it has discharged much of its original mandate, much work remains to be done. A federal role in overseeing election administration remains vital, and there is no evident substitute for the EAC.

Electronic Voting Security 10 Years after the Help America Vote Act

Merle S. King, executive director of the Center for Election Systems at Kennesaw State University, and Brian Hancock, director of voting system testing and certification at the US Election Assistance Commission (EAC), discuss e-voting security 10 years after the Help American Vote Act (HAVA).

Administering the Overseas Vote

While there is a growing academic literature about mail‐in ballots, there has been no serious academic research to date on overseas voters, even though the counting of overseas military ballots figured into the 2000 presidential election controversy. The participation of nearly 4 million overseas voters, both civilian and military, is governed by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act. The authors examine the reported perceptions of military and nonmilitary voters covered by this legislation using two surveys funded by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, focusing on their perceptions of electronic means of transmitting voting materials. The authors find that civilian overseas citizens have a harder time registering and voting than military overseas citizens; that the key factor is the timely transmission of voting materials; and that, despite privacy concerns, electronic transmission of voting materials is viewed favorably.

Stop the Presses: How Paper Trails Fail to Secure E-Voting

Americans trust computers to run critical applications in fields such as banking, medicine, and aviation, but a growing technophobic movement believes that no computer can be trusted for electronic voting. Members of this movement claim that in order to have secure elections, Americans must revert to paper ballots. Such claims are not only incorrect but attack the very foundation of our digital society, which is based on the knowledge that information can be reasonably secured. Clearly, no system with a human element - including electronic and nonelectronic voting machines - is error-proof, and specific versions of certain voting machines have security weaknesses. Neither of these facts, however, should be taken as a universal indictment of e-voting. Direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines are electronic machines, similar to ATMs, that let voters view ballots on a screen and make choices using an input device such as buttons or a touchscreen. Some opponents of electronic voting are lobbying for legislation that would require so-called voter-verified paper audit trails for all DRE voting machines. The purpose of the paper audit trails would be to provide proof that the DRE voting machines functioned correctly. Unfortunately, as discussed in this report, paper audit trails for DRE voting machines have several shortcomings. They do not provide complete security to voters and they increase costs and risks. Furthermore, requiring voter-verified paper audit trails would prevent the use of innovative voting technology that offers voters more security, transparency, and reliability than can be delivered with paper audit trails alone. Congress is now considering legislation that would mandate that all DRE voting machines have voter-verified paper audit trails, and many states will vote on similar legislation this year. We believe it is time for the debate on e-voting technology to move beyond a discussion of paper audit trails. To restore voter confidence and promote secure election technology in the United States by ensuring that states can continue to improve their voting systems, this report recommends the following: * Congress and the states should allow the use of fully electronic ballots, not restrict electronic voting systems to those that create paper ballots. * Congress and the states should require that future voting machines have verifiable audit trails, not require machines that create verifiable paper audit trails. * Congress should provide funding for the U.S. Election Assistance Commission to issue grants for developing secure cryptographic voting protocols and for pilot testing of new voting technology.

Job Serebrov and Tova Wang, Voting Fraud and Voter Intimidation, [Draft] Report to the U. S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) on Preliminary Research and Recommendations (2006)

Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and PolicyVol. 6, No. 3 Recent Cases and MaterialsJob Serebrov and Tova Wang, Voting Fraud and Voter Intimidation, [Draft] Report to the U. S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) on Preliminary Research and Recommendations (2006)Tova Wang and Job SerebrovTova WangSearch for more papers by this author and Job SerebrovSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:13 Aug 2007https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2007.6314AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB ToolsPermissionsDownload CitationsTrack CitationsAdd to favorites Back To Publication ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail FiguresReferencesRelatedDetails Volume 6Issue 3Aug 2007 InformationMary Ann Liebert, Inc.To cite this article:Tova Wang and Job Serebrov.Job Serebrov and Tova Wang, Voting Fraud and Voter Intimidation, [Draft] Report to the U. S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) on Preliminary Research and Recommendations (2006).Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy.Aug 2007.330-351.http://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2007.6314Published in Volume: 6 Issue 3: August 13, 2007PDF download

The U.S. Election Assistance Commission: What Role in the Administration of Elections?

What role in the administration of elections will the new U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) play, and how does that role differ from past federal involvement? The answers are uncertain because delays in appointing the commission members and insufficient funding severely handicapped early activities. This article examines the factors that influence the EAC's emerging role: the commission's background, structure, tasks and tools, start-up activities, and recent issues. Because the principal impact of the EAC is indirect, affecting election administration through the states, we draw on the “tools of government” literature to frame the discussion. Although the Help America Vote Act of 2002, which created the EAC, continues a long line of federal regulatory mandates in the elections arena, the EAC has almost no regulatory authority. Its principal tools are grants and information—instruments of cooperative, rather than coercive, federalism. Given that the major grant programs are ending, the EAC's long-term contribution will likely be to create and disseminate information. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.