Elected Chief Executives Research Articles

A policy cycle of electoral reform: comparing directly elected chief executives in Israel and Turkey

In studying electoral reforms, the democratic context is often a neglected variable. Israel and Turkey, at different times with different levels of democracy, have implemented a similar reform, the direct election of the chief executive. While there were similar justifications at the time of the introduction, the reforms then took on different dynamics. In Israel the reform was reversed, while in Turkey it became the centrepiece of further autocratisation. Adapting a framework of policy-analysis, the article explores similarities and differences in both cases. It argues that the democratic environment turns out as an important factor to explain the different trajectories of seemingly similar policy reforms in both cases. While the reverse reform in the Israeli case is linked to advantages in processing expert and civil society information, the trajectory in the Turkish case is based on the different power structure in the course of presidentialisation. Applying a comparative policy analysis to these cases of electoral reform, the article concludes that the democratic environment, that is, the degree of freely available information, helps explaining the different trajectories in both cases.

The Populist Challenge to U.S. Democracy: Renewing American Political Development's Comparative Perspective

AbstractRegarding the implications of the political developments of the last five years for the study of American political development (APD), this article argues that the unprecedented Trump phenomenon and its problematic repercussions for U.S. democracy have greatly enhanced the value of a comparative perspective, which can draw instructive lessons from the fate of attacks on liberal democracy by populist leaders in other countries. Comparativists examining the contemporary United States initially highlighted the risks of populist leadership (i.e., political agency), stressed the possibilities of democratic backsliding, and examined how popularly elected chief executives can undermine democracy from the inside—all of which fueled grave concerns. Yet for a more realistic assessment of populism's actual danger for U.S. democracy, one must analyze the probability of such a deleterious outcome. Therefore, researchers need to embed agency in contextual conditions and investigate what institutional, structural, cultural, and conjunctural factors empowered populist leaders to destroy democracy in some countries, whereas other constellations of these factors have impeded democratic backsliding in many other nations. With this move beyond a primary focus on agency, comparative analyses align with APD's longstanding attention to complex context factors. Interestingly, such a comparative perspective corroborates the distinctive institutional strengths and relative resilience of U.S. democracy.

Polarizing Figures: Executive Power and Institutional Conflict in Asian Democracies

Polarization does not necessarily pit left against right, rich against poor, secular against religious, or ethnicity against ethnicity. Rather than polarizing along deep social or ideological cleavages, today’s democracies often polarize over the perceived abuse of power by popularly elected chief executives. We argue that such conflicts are built into the definition and design of democracy, which requires both vertical accountability (i.e., inclusivity) and horizontal accountability (i.e., constraints) and divides sovereignty into separate institutions. We illustrate our institutional theory of polarization through a comparative analysis of polarizing crises in five Asian democracies since 2000. What mattered most for these crises’ severity and eventual resolution was not the depth of social cleavages, but how the leading elite opponents of polarizing figures managed their removal from office.

Politicians, bureaucrats and targeted redistribution

The paper argues that for political reasons elected politicians are more likely to be engaged in targeted redistribution than appointed bureaucrats. It uses the example of patronage jobs in the U.S. local governments to provide empirical support for this claim. It shows that the number of public employees is higher for elected chief executives. This difference is stronger in public services with bigger private–public wage differential and it increases during election years. It also finds that the number of public employees increases with the age of bureaucrats while there is no such relationship in the case of politicians, which is consistent with younger bureaucrats having stronger career concerns.

Book Review: Mietzner, M. (Ed.) (2013). The Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia: Conflict and Leadership.

Book Review: Mietzner, M. (Ed.) (2013). Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia: Conflict and Leadership. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Reprint edition. ISBN: 978-041-5460354. i-xiv + 177 pages.* Chen, K. (2014). Book Review: Mietzner, M. (Ed.) (2013). political resurgence of the military in Southeast Asia: Conflict and leadership. ASEAS - Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 7(1), 137-140.Since the early twenty-first century, some Southeast Asian countries (e.g., Thailand and Timor-Leste) have witnessed the political resurgence of militaries, especially military involvement in political institutions, economy, security, and society. most significant case might be the Thai military coup in 2006. More research in the field of military resurgence is called for to extend the debate on the civil-military relations. Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia is a timely exploration of the impact of militaries on politics in different geographical contexts and exposes the tensions and interconnections in civil- military relations in Southeast Asian countries.The contributors to this wide-ranging volume stem from an array of disci- plines, including history, political science, security studies, and Southeast Asian studies. In their opinion, the multifaceted aspects of the militaries' political re- surgence are ignored by structuralist approaches to a large extent, such as speci- fic ideology (i.e., communism or democracy), regime types (i.e., monarchy, mili- tary junta, or one-party state), historical background (i.e., independence through armed struggle, negotiated transition into nationhood, or absence of colonial rule), and economic development.The volume features eight chapters. Chapter 1 illustrates the literature of military resurgence in Southeast Asia and outlines the book's content. Based on case studies of seven Southeast Asian countries (i.e., Thailand, Myanmar, Vietnam, the Philippines, Timor-Leste, Indonesia, and Singapore), Chapters 2 to 8 reveal the causes of military resurgence - failed civilian governance and the problematic leadership of paramount leaders determine the civil-military rela- tions. In the case of Thailand, the struggle for democracy finally caused a vicious circle, which in turn is used by the military to justify coercive and political role in restoring order (p. 59).At the same time, the militaries show less respect for the citizenry and turn to strengthen corporate identity and coherence (p. 54), that is, fractionaliza- tion. In the case of the Philippines, since the current institutions are unable to handle the security issues and political conflicts, the military withdraws its loy- alty from a popularly elected chief executive (p. 101) and enjoys more autonomy and political status to a large extent. In contrast, the Singaporean military lacks the socio-political significance (p. 164) and there is no obvious change in Sin- gapore's civil-military relations, given that the civilian government in Singapore has remained stable since the 1960sThe contributors also point out that the military dominance has own limits. For example, there is increasing tension between high-ranking ex-officers and the new generation of officers, the newly established units, as well as the military. In the case of Timor-Leste, the rise of specialized paramilitary police units has threatened the advantages of the military.The most significant chapter of this volume might be Chapter 2 entitled The Armed Force of Burma. As Marcus Mietzner suggests, with the exception of Burma, Southeast Asian civil-military relations after 2001 have been shaped by the success- es and failures of civilian governments (p. …

Tung Chee-hwa and His Challenges: A Look at Hong Kong’s Last Colonial Days, December 1996–June 1997

Abstract: This article examines the course of events in Hong Kong from the election of the Chief Executive of the Special Administrative Region (SAR) in December 1996 to the handover on July 1, 1997. It attempts to understand the local perspective, to see how the Hong Kong people viewed their future and the newly elected Chief Executive. It argues that the Hong Kong people were confident of their future, but their trust in the Chief Executive wavered in accordance with different events. There was popular concern for the maintenance of the status quo, as an indicator of the viability of the concept of “one country, two systems.” Chief Executive-designate Tung Chee-hwa needed to pay more attention to the differences between the “two systems,” to preserve the status quo of Hong Kong, while counteracting public anxieties over the dominance by “one country.” Although the SAR administration began on July 1, 1997, Tung Chee-hwa had already become the territory’s shadow head in the months before the handover.

What Right Do Public Managers Have to Lead?

Leadership is not just a right of public managers.(1) It is an obligation. The American system of governance is certainly not perfect, and, by exercising leadership, public managers can help correct some of the imperfections. Leadership from public managers is necessary because without leadership public organizations will never mobilize themselves to accomplish their mandated purposes, let alone figure out how best to do that. Leadership from public managers is necessary because the elected chief executive can provide that leadership for only a few of the many agencies and programs for which he or she is responsible. Leadership from public managers is necessary because the legislative branch of government gives public agencies missions that are vague and conflicting and often fails to provide enough resources to pursue seriously all of these missions. Leadership from public managers is necessary because a narrow interest can easily capture a public agency and redirect government programs for its own gain. Leadership from public managers is necessary because the citizenry often lacks the knowledge and information (or will) necessary to perform its responsibilities. Finally, leadership from public managers is necessary because the judiciary, which is charged with overseeing the constitutionality and legality of the activities of public agencies and public managers, often focuses on narrow issues of process rather than the broader concerns of achieving public purposes. Neither the legislative, the judicial, nor the executive branches of government function perfectly. Nor will they ever do so. That is why the founders created a constitutional system with a network of checks and balances. Public managers can contribute to the working of that system by compensating for some of the failures of the legislature, the judiciary, and their elected chief executive. By leading, public managers can help to improve American governance. Failures of Governance Markets do not work perfectly. An economic system with theoretical markets (each possessing all the characteristics of a perfect market) functions wonderfully and produces all sorts of wonderful benefits. But actual markets, lacking one or several of these characteristics, function less well and generate fewer benefits for society. Only under unusual circumstances do real markets function exactly as predicted for a theoretical market or produce all the benefits as estimated for a theoretical market. Moreover, there are many kinds of market failures. If all those participating in a market lack perfect knowledge of, for example, the relative quality of competing products, some sellers will be able to take advantage of buyers. If capital or labor cannot move freely to its most productive uses, producers will be unable to generate all their potential benefits. If one producer can monopolize the production or distribution of a product, it will be able to charge above-market prices denying some consumers the opportunity to purchase the product and shifting benefits from those consumers who do buy it to the producer. The list of potential market failures is long. In response, we, as a society, devise and experiment with a variety of mechanisms to correct such market failures and thus to capture more (if not all) of the benefits that can be obtained from a perfect market economy. Similarly, governance systems do not work perfectly. Just as it is possible to describe a perfect market system, so it might be possible to conceive of a perfect governance system. When such a system is put into practice, however, the realities of human behavior and the limitations of human judgment will also create failures. For any system of governance to work as the Greeks, the founders, and political theorists suggest and to produce all of its predicted benefits, that system must possess a number of ideal characteristics: The citizenry needs to be informed about the important issues and actively engaged in the policy debate; the legislature needs to give clear instructions to the executive branch; the elected chief executive needs to be effectual in the oversight of all the agencies and programs created by the legislature. …

The Internal Relations of Government: Cautionary Tales from inside the Black Box

Both the structure of the Constitution and elementary civics texts imagine an Executive Branch under the close, unitary control of an elected chief executive, the President. Doubtless from the start, and unmistakably in the administrative state, the reality has been quite different. Those to whom Congress has delegated authority to act, particularly in that domain that we have in mind when invoking a “government of laws,” conduct their business within a web more aptly described as coordination than control. In regulatory matters, the coordinating impulses run through the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and, increasingly, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) of the presidential Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”). Perhaps as strongly, coordination may result from the regulators and their lawyers understanding themselves to be part of a single government. Yet, both within the DOJ and within any given agency, distortions of perspective that are the product of an actor’s task, or perhaps even personal ambition, can complicate its achievement. And institutions for forcing consideration of broader, more inclusive visions are few. What follows is an effort to explore some of these problems, drawing on personal experience as a government attorney often faced by what seemed failures or distortions in attempted coordination. From 1975 to 1977, I was privileged to serve as General Counsel to the spanking new United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”). The NRC was an independent regulatory

Mayors of American Cities: An Analysis of Powers and Responsibilities

Using data from a 1987 nationwide survey of U.S. cities of 25,000 population and above, this research analyzes the formal authority and the informal powers associated with the office of mayor. We divide cities by mayor-council or council-manager form. The findings confirm that elected chief executives in mayoral cities possess considerably more formal authority than their counterparts in manager communities, yet informal mayoral powers are quite comparable among these two forms of government. Using ANOVA (GLS), we also predict variations in mayoral power using five demographic and political variables. Among mayor-council cities, location in a central city and large size are the best explanatory variables. For manager cities, regional location and the presence of partisan ballots and ward elections are the best predictors of mayoral power.

Public Executives: Imperium, Sacerdotium, Collegium? Bicentennial Leadership Challenges

Challenges surrounding public executive leadership as America enters the third century of the Constitution are examined here. The focus is chiefly the presidency but with some comparisons and contrasts with professional local government managers. Since the beginnings of formal study of public administration, these two quite different executive levels have been principal concerns. Space limits prevent dealing with other executives here, and these two levels best highlight bicentennial era developments. Three crucial dimensions of the present environment of presidential and other public executive performance are discussed initially. First, big national expenditures fund many public activities which are performed by private interests and state and local governments; except for such direct entitlements as Social Security, relatively less is spent on functions performed directly by the national government. Second, American political parties-never disciplined in an European parliamentary sense-declined for nearly three decades before the 1980s as vehicles of sustained, national coalition building; special interest groups and political action committees have grown enormously in numbers, expenditures, and influence. Third, mass media largely dominate communication of political and governmental affairs; political image makers encourage a media focus on personality and contrived situations more than on substantive achievement. Factors two and three combine to produce a common result: BIG money is required to finance today's politics. That has major consequences for public administration. Big money in politics is significantly related to the first of two functions of chief executives which are discussed in part two of this assessment: executive staffing and increased reliance by presidents and other partisanly elected chief executives on transient political appointees for positions formerly filled by long-term professional experts. Besides executive staffing, a cluster of substantive functions of the chief executive is discussed in part two: policy leadership, implementation, and institutional/organizational maintenance and development. One thesis here is that achievement by the president and other elected political executives in these substantive responsibilities has been substantially diminished by a combination of high-level spoils and imperial/sacerdotal imagery.

The vice-presidential succession effect: Individual or situational basis?

Simonton (1981) found that “accidental” presidents do not perform as well as duly elected chief executives. Though this vice-presidential succession effect may be due to individual factors, such as some deficiency in personality or political experience, it might be due instead to situational factors, most notably the failure to be perceived as having legitimate power by those already in power positions. Three studies investigated the relative plausibility of individual and situational explanations. Study 1 examined 49 president-vice-president teams to determine the criteria by which running mates are selected. Study 2 looked at 69 leaders who served as either president, vice-president, or both, in order to discover if accidental presidents can be differentiated on biographical and political background variables. Study 3 scrutinized 100 congressional units in a time-series design to gauge the impact of serving an unelected term as president. The results most support a situational interpretation based on the attribution of legitimate power.

The Presidency of Warren G. Harding

In this volume, Eugene P. Trani and David L. Wilson evaluate the presidency of Warren G. Harding by surveying scholarship on the Harding years. Harding generally considered one of the weakest American presidents was elected chief executive in 1920, during a time of uncertainty and frustration for many of the American people. The authors assess the critics and defenders of Harding in light of the administration's accomplishments and failures. Both the strengths and weaknesses of the Harding administration came from the people President Harding selected for high office. Charles G. Dawes accomplished much by implementing sound budgetary practices in the federal government for the first time in history. Herbert Hoover became the dominant figure in the Harding administration, using his influence to advance both domestic and foreign policies. And Charles Evans Hughes proved to be an able, if conservative, secretary of state. Yet the accomplishments of these and other capable men tended to be short-term in nature. Trani and Wilson describe the widespread corruption and malfeasance in the Harding administration, pointing out the Harding's erratic judgment of character caused many of his problems as president. His personal habits philandering, playing poker, and drinking liquor during national prohibition tainted his reputation and appeared to connect him to the activities of his associates. Tragically, Harding sought to avoid controversy, even if it meant ignoring real problems or evading justice, and thus failed to provide moral leadership for the nation. Harding and his advisers demonstrated little understanding of the social and economic forces at work in the country and abroad. In the early 1920s, the United States continued the transition from a rural society to an urbanized and industrialized society. Rather than adjusting the government to meet the needs of all segments of an industrialized society, Harding instituted normalcy, an attempt to maintain the values of a rural society rapidly disintegrating under the impact of social and economic change. The few real accomplishments of the Harding administration were buried under scandal. and in the end, Harding must be rated as an ineffective leader at a time when the nation would have been better served by a different, more imaginative approach to government.

Professional Fiefdoms Appraised: The Case of Social Services

Much of recent discussion in regard to public services has been about which plane of government in the federal system should do what, and what the scale of the units should be. There is a constant quest for the right territorial unit. This essay will address a different question which is no less pertinent to our times and only a little less pertinent to American federalism-one that is often linked to questions of scale or plane but is obviously distinct from it. This is the issue of generalist versus specialist administration of government functions. The choice is not either-or, of course. The issues are ones of proportion and balance: what is the right mix as among the professional specialists who tend to dominate the line agencies in American executive branches and others in executive positions, be they elected chief executives, political appointees at the top levels of departments, or career generalists in staff units such as budgeting or planning and evaluation.

The General Manager Idea for Large Cities

A NEW managerial idea is taking hold in the large cities of the United States. This idea is that the administration of large city governments requires general managerial direction and that this requirement can best be met by establishing under the mayor a general manager who will, in greater or less degree, be the city government's second in administrative command. The general manager plan thus builds upon the strong-mayor tradition as the most widespread form of city government in the United States. By marrying the manager idea with the idea of the elected chief executive, the general manager plan preserves the office of mayor as the center of political leadership and responsibility. In large cities this center is widely regarded as indispensable to effective government. The general manager plan may be regarded either as a competitor of the council manager idea or as a more mature form of the manager idea, reflecting the judgment in the larger cities that the council manager plan represents an unnecessary surrender of the values of leadership and accountability found in the institution of the elected chief executive. The general manager or mayor manager plan, its proponents emphasize, captures the advantages of the council manager plan without the risks of abandoning the elected chief executive. An effective manager, they believe, is no less likely to be chosen by a mayor than by a city council.