I. INTRODUCTION Nonwage labor costs consist of several mandated benefits, health, training, accident, housing plans, as well as several taxes, and are intended to increase workers' welfare and job security. However, these benefits tend to come at the expense of reducing employment and deadweight losses. To quantify these resulting effects, one needs a reliable measure of the employment labor cost elasticity. Most studies conducted on this subject find low estimated values for this elasticity, which contrasts with policy-makers' enthusiasm to reduce labor In this article, using a Peruvian-matched firm-workers data set, we find that nonwage labor costs reduce employment measured in total hours of work by 17% for white collars and by 53% for blue collars with associated deadweight losses of 10% and 35% of total contributions' revenues, respectively. We also compute employment losses of compliance with mandated employers' and workers' contributions of 4% for white collars and 12% for blue collars, with respective associated deadweight losses of 2% and 6% of contribution revenues. These results come from estimating the long-run unconditional firm-level labor demand function by a procedure that corrects for endogeneity of wages. We show that unbiased estimates, even using small units such as firm-level data, require not only that wages are exogenous but also that their unobserved determinants are uncorrelated with the unobserved determinants of labor demand. This requirement is not fulfilled in the likely event, pointed out by Becker (1993), that larger firms are matched with more productive workers. Consequently, an estimation that corrects for endogeneity yields a larger labor cost elasticity of labor demand than one that does not, like ordinary least squares (OLS). In the past two decades, there has been intensive theoretical and empirical research on the effects of labor market frictions on job creation. Western European economies, characterized by large job security provisions, have been the center of attention of this research that has modeled these frictions as adjustment costs in labor demand (Bentolila and Bertola 1990; Hamermesh 1989; Hopenhayn and Rogerson 1993; Nickell 1987; Rendon 2004). This literature finds that the effects of eurosclerosis, that is, labor markets with high firing costs, are ambiguous: in good times, sclerotic labor markets create fewer jobs than free labor markets; however, in bad times, sclerotic labor markets reduce job destruction. Most of the research done in Latin America has been done under these guidelines, obtaining statistically significant negative effects of job security provisions on employment rates. (1) Furthermore, using country-level data for Latin America and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries, Heckman and Pages-Serra (2000) found large effects of job security provisions on employment, (2) which are robust to several specifications, OLS, random, and fixed effects. The authors present their results as a strong evidence against Freeman's (2000) view that job security regulations mostly affect distribution, but not efficiency, and advocate the substitution of job security provisions by other mechanisms that provide income security at lower efficiency and inequality costs. Under a classic labor demand framework and using worker- and firm-level data, this article provides new evidence in the same direction, extending the computation of the effects of job security provisions to deadweight losses. Hamermesh (1993) surveys several studies on the estimation of labor demand and remarks that estimates of the labor cost employment elasticity should be interpreted and compared cautiously depending on the specification adopted. Capital is an explanatory variable in a short-run labor demand estimation; it is not in a long-run labor demand estimation. Similarly, output is included in the estimation of a conditional labor demand but excluded in the estimation of an unconditional labor demand. …