Watchman Fell Asleep: Surprise of Yom Kippur War and Its Sources, by Uri Bar-Joseph. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. 306 pp. $27.95. great nineteenth-century British historian Thomas Babington Macaulay once commented that English Civil War had been discussed and less understood than any event in history. One wonders what he would have made of debate over responsibility for Israeli failure to predict, and prepare for, Egyptian and Syrian invasion of October 1973, which three and a half decades later is still a highly contentious matter. In this excellent book that focuses on Israel's intelligence failure in 1973 and its causes, Uri Bar-Joseph has gone some way to ending confusion (at least for English language readers, who cannot draw on vast literature available in Hebrew on subject). title is adapted from words of prophet Ezekiel, which include line if watchman sees sword coming and does not blow trump to warn people ... I will hold watchman accountable for his blood. These words, according to author, hang on wall of offices of a number of senior officials of AMAN, Israeli Military Intelligence, organization that had primary responsibility for assessing threat of invasion and warning military and political leadership in good time. But alas, as author shows in relentless and lucid fashion, over whole year prior to outbreak of on Yom Kippur, holiest day in Jewish calendar, the watchman saw sword and did not blow trumpet. And sword took many lives. watchman did not blow trumpet since for almost a year by then, he was asleep (p. 1). author argues that in two years prior to there was a belief across highest ranks of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) that a number of factors including Israeli air superiority and President Sadat's political weakness meant that any military engagement with Egypt would end in a speedy and decisive Israeli victory. This belief led to an institutionalized arrogance that would ultimately have devastating consequences when coupled to The Conception, a thinking framework which in this case proved wholly wrong. At its heart was belief that Egypt, key to any future Arab attack, would avoid a large-scale crossing of Suez Canal, unless Egyptian Air Force could upgrade its capabilities to hit Israeli Air Force (IAF) bases deep inside Israel. As this was not possible in short to medium term, there would be no major military attack by Egypt or Syria (which would only join a led by Egypt). Nowhere was this view more deeply held than in senior ranks of AMAN. Major General Eli Zeira, who had been appointed Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) in October 1972, was not only convinced that a major Egyptian offensive was unlikely and that other factors such as Egyptian frustration over status quo and a desire to regain land lost in 1967 were irrelevant, but he also believed that his role was to communicate this certainty to his military and political masters at opportunity. What compounded this problem was that two other key AMAN officials, Yona Bandman, head of Egypt branch, and Brigadier General Arie Shalev, head of Research department, shared their boss's outlook. As Bar-Joseph points out, there were a number of senior AMAN officers who by beginning of October 1973, at very latest, believed that Egypt and Syria were getting ready to invade. But what author terms Weltanschauung of intellectual megalomania and hubris (p. 172) of Zeira and his followers won day, and in order to prove this Bar-Joseph puts forward case after case where AMAN chose to explain incoming signals in every possible form but for war (p. …