Egocentric Bias Research Articles

The true self in reflections? Visual self‐recognition and the Big Five

AbstractTypically, individuals are motivated to see themselves in a flattering light regarding their physical and personality characteristics. We suggest that visual self‐perception is anchored in the true self which is largely the self‐enhancing self, and may also reflect the privileged access to one's traits and internal states. Here, we examine the impact and limits of self‐enhancement motivation and egocentric bias on individuals’ recognition of variations of their portraits in terms of the Big Five personality dimensions. We predict that individuals recognise themselves better in positively altered portraits, namely, portraits looking more agreeable, conscientious and open. We also predict that self‐enhancement is anchored in reality: Individuals recognise themselves less in strongly altered than in slightly or non‐altered portraits. In Study 1, we measure the directions of self‐recognition distortions by investigating in which random variations of their portraits individuals recognise themselves. In Study 2, relying on a mouse tracking paradigm, we additionally measure the degree of distortion, and the conflict individuals experience during the self‐recognition task. Results of both studies mainly demonstrate self‐recognition distortions towards agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness and neuroticism. Moreover, results from Study 2 reveal that self‐recognition is anchored in reality. Findings of two studies applying different methods convergently show systematic biases in self‐recognition regarding the Big Five dimensions, both enriching understanding of the self‐enhancement processes and demonstrating that the methods applied might be useful for future research focusing on self‐recognition.

Perspective judgment across adulthood: Evidence from bilinguals.

Judging the perspective of others often requires ignoring one's own accessible knowledge. Aging increases reliance on the most available knowledge and may decrease the adjustment of this knowledge to adopt another perspective. Using a dominant language also decreases control demands, while using a nondominant language promotes deliberation. We examined whether aging and language dominance shape the way in which individuals judge someone else's interpretation of ambiguous messages. Russian-Hebrew bilinguals (N = 237, ages 19-80) read 20 ambiguous messages and judged how a recipient would interpret them. Half of the texts contained information that suggested that the message was sincere, and half of the texts contained information that implied that the message was sarcastic. This information was available only to the participant and should not have affected the recipient's interpretation. An egocentric bias emerged in both languages since participants could not ignore their own knowledge when judging the recipient's perspective. Aging was associated with a greater bias, but the results were similar in both languages. A second study included 60 younger (ages 18-39) and 62 older (ages 60-80) Israeli-born participants, who performed the same task as well as a flanker task (i.e., judging the direction of a central arrow flanked by congruent and incongruent distractors). Age interacted with the egocentric bias, but there was no correlation between the flanker effect and perspective judgment. Thus, decreased inhibition, as measured by the flanker task, cannot account for the egocentric bias. We suggest that the findings reflect difficulty in overriding highly accessible information, especially in older age. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The contribution of sensory information asymmetry and bias of attribution to egocentric tendencies in effort comparison tasks.

When comparing themselves with others, people often evaluate their own behaviors more favorably. This egocentric tendency is often categorized as a bias of attribution, with favorable self-evaluation resulting from differing explanations of one's own behavior and that of others. However, studies on information availability in social contexts offer an alternative explanation, ascribing egocentric biases to the inherent informational asymmetries between performing an action and merely observing it. Since biases of attribution and availability often co-exist and interact with each other, it is not known whether they are both necessary for the egocentric biases to emerge. In this study, we used a design that allowed us to directly compare the contribution of these two distinct sources of bias to judgements about the difficulty of an effortful task. Participants exhibited no attribution bias as judgements made for themselves did not differ from those made for others. Importantly, however, participants perceived the tasks they actively performed to be harder than the tasks they observed, and this bias was magnified as the overall task difficulty increased. These findings suggest that information asymmetries inherent to the difference between actively performing a task and observing it can drive egocentric biases in effort evaluations on their own and without a contribution from biases of attribution.

Rethinking egocentric bias: A computer mouse-tracking study of adult belief processing.

Several theories of belief processing assume that processing another's false belief requires overcoming an egocentric bias toward one's current knowledge. The current evidence in support of this claim, however, is limited. In order to investigate the presence of egocentric bias in adult belief processing, computer mouse tracking was used across three experiments to measure attraction toward response options reflecting one's current knowledge while reporting a false belief. Participants viewed scenarios in which an agent either had a true belief or a false belief about the location of a set of keys. Participants used a mouse to answer reality questions "where are the keys currently hidden?" and belief questions "where does she think the keys are?" Mouse-tracking measures indexing attraction toward response options during decision making were measured, along with time taken to make a response and accuracy. Experiment 1 found no evidence, in any measures, that participants showed a bias toward their own knowledge when reporting another's false belief. Experiment 2 investigated whether differences in event timings between true belief and false belief scenarios in Experiment 1 masked an egocentric bias. Experiment 3 investigated whether the lack of egocentric bias could be explained by participants prioritizing encoding the other's beliefs. Neither follow-up experiment found evidence supporting the presence of an egocentric bias. Overall, contrary to many theories of belief processing, our results suggest that adults are readily able to process other people's beliefs without having to overcome a default bias toward their own knowledge. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Mothers are more egocentric towards their own child’s bodily feelings

Our emotional state can influence how we understand other people’s emotions, leading to biases in social understanding. Yet emotional egocentric biases in specific relationships such as parent-child dyads, where not only understanding but also emotional and bodily regulation is key, remain relatively unexplored. To investigate these biases and control for sensory priors, we first conducted two experiments in dyads of adult strangers (total N = 75) using a bodily Emotional Egocentricity Task that enables simultaneous affective tactile stimulation within a dyad. We showed its effectiveness in eliciting both classical and sensory-controlled egocentric biases. We then recruited 68 mother-child dyads and found that mothers exhibit higher classical and sensory-controlled emotional egocentric biases towards their own child compared to an unfamiliar child. Results suggest that mothers tend to rely on their bodily feelings more when judging the states of their own child than those of other children, possibly consistent with their regulatory parental role.

Evidence against implicit belief processing in a blindfold task.

Understanding what other people think is crucial to our everyday interactions. We seem to be affected by the perspective of others even in situations where it is irrelevant to us. This intrusion from others' perspectives has been referred to as altercentric bias and has been suggested to reflect implicit belief processing. There is an ongoing debate about how robust such altercentric effects are and whether they indeed reflect true mentalizing or result from simpler, domain-general processes. As a critical test for true mentalizing, the blindfold manipulation has been proposed. That is, participants are familiarized with a blindfold that is either transparent or opaque. When they then observe a person wearing this blindfold, they can only infer what this person can or cannot see based on their knowledge of the blindfold's transparency. Here, we used this blindfold manipulation to test whether participants' reaction times in detecting an object depended on the agent's belief about the object's location, itself manipulated with a blindfold. As a second task, we asked participants to detect where the agent was going to look for the object. Across two experiments with a large participant pool (N = 234) and different settings (online/lab), we found evidence against altercentric biases in participants' response times in detecting the object. We did, however, replicate a well-documented reality congruency effect. When asked to detect the agent's action, in turn, participants were biased by their own knowledge of where the object should be, in line with egocentric biases previously found in false belief reasoning. These findings suggests that altercentric biases do not reflect belief processing but lower-level processes, or alternatively, that implicit belief processing does not occur when the belief needs to be inferred from one's own experience.

How robust are egocentric and altercentric interference effects in social cognition? a test with explicit and implicit versions of a continuous false belief task.

It has been long assumed that meta-representational theory of mind (ToM) -our ability to ascribe mental states to ourselves and other people- emerges around age four as indicated in performance on explicit verbal false belief tasks. In contrast, newer studies assessing false belief understanding with implicit, non-verbal measures suggest that some form of ToM may be present even in infancy. But these studies now face replication issues, and it remains unclear whether they can provide robust evidence for implicit ToM. One line of research on implicit ToM, however, may remain promising: Studies that tap so-called altercentric biases. Such biases occur when agents in their judgments about the world are influenced (perform slower, more error-prone) in light of another agent's deviating perspective even if that perspective is completely irrelevant to the task; they thus can be seen as indicators of spontaneous and implicit ToM. Altercentric biases are the mirror images of egocentric biases (agents are influenced by their own perspective when evaluating another agent's deviating perspective). In three studies with adults, we aimed to tap both egocentric and altercentric interference effects within the same task format. We used the so-called Sandbox task, a false belief task with continuous locations. In Study 1, we tested an online adaptation of the Sandbox task, which we also used to explore potential cross-cultural differences in these biases. Studies 2 and 3 combined the Sandbox task with mouse-tracking measures. These studies revealed neither egocentric nor altercentric biases. These null results are discussed with regard to the question whether absence of evidence here may present evidence of absence of such spontaneous perspective-taking biases or merely false negatives.

Perspective taking and memory for self- and town-related information in male adolescents and young adults

Adolescence is a sensitive period for categorical self-concept development, which affects the ability to take others’ perspectives, which might differ from one’s own, and how self-related information is memorized. Little is known about whether these two processes are related in adolescence. The current study recruited 97 male participants aged 11–35 years. Using a self-referential memory task, we found that younger participants were less prone to recognize previously seen town-related adjectives, compared to self-related adjectives. However, this age-related reduction in recognition bias was unrelated to accurate memory performance. Using the Director task to assess perspective taking, we found an age-related decrease in egocentric biases in perspective taking from adolescence to early adulthood (i.e., perspective taking abilities improved with age). However, there was no evidence that these two processes were related. Overall, our findings suggest that male adolescents display parallel but independent age-related changes in self-referential biases in memory and perspective taking.

Cognitive mechanisms of perspective-taking across adulthood: An eye-tracking study using the director task.

Perspective-taking plays an important role in daily life, allowing consideration of other people's perspectives and viewpoints. This study used a large sample of 265 community-based participants (aged 20-86 years) to examine changes in perspective-taking abilities-a component of "Theory of Mind"-across adulthood, and how these changes may relate to individual differences in executive functions at different ages. Participants completed a referential-communication task (the "Director" task) while behavioral responses and eye movements were recorded, along with four measures of executive functions (inhibitory control, working memory, cognitive flexibility, and planning). Results revealed a quadratic fit of age in egocentric errors; performance on the task plateaued between 20 to ~37 years old but showed a substantial decline from ~38 years onward (i.e., increased egocentric errors). A similar pattern was established in eye-movement measures, demonstrating that advancing age led to a decrease in efficient attention orientation to a target. In other words, older adults were more distracted by a hidden competitor object (egocentric interference) and were therefore delayed in orienting their attention to the correct target object. Mediation analyses revealed that executive functions partially mediated the effect of age on perspective-taking abilities. Importantly, however, the relationship between age and egocentric bias in task performance remained significant when controlling for changes in executive functions, indicating a decline in social cognition abilities with advancing age that was independent of age-related declines in more domain-general abilities, such as executive functions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Default egocentrism: an MVPA approach to overlap in own and others' socio-political attitudes.

Understanding the socio-political attitudes of other people is a crucial skill, yet the neural mechanisms supporting this capacity remain understudied. This study used multivariate pattern analysis to examine patterns of activity in the default mode network (DMN) while participants assessed their own attitudes and the attitudes of other people. Classification analyses indicated that common patterns in DMN regions encode both own and others' support across a variety of contemporary socio-political issues. Moreover, cross-classification analyses demonstrated that a common coding of attitudes is implemented at a neural level. This shared informational content was associated with a greater perceived overlap between own attitude positions and those of others (i.e.attitudinal projection), such that higher cross-classification accuracy corresponded with greater attitudinal projection. This study thus identifies a possible neural basis for egocentric biases in the social perception of individual and group attitudes and provides additional evidence for self/other overlap in mentalizing.

Studying trait-characteristics and neural correlates of the emotional ego- and altercentric bias using an audiovisual paradigm

ABSTRACT In social interactions, emotional biases can arise when the emotional state of oneself and another person are incongruent. A person’s ability to judge the other’s emotional state can then be biased by their own emotional state, leading to an emotional egocentric bias (EEB). Alternatively, a person’s perception of their own emotional state can be biased by the other’s emotional state leading to an emotional altercentric bias (EAB). Using a modified audiovisual paradigm, we examined in three studies (n = 171; two online & one lab-based study) whether emotional biases can be considered traits by measuring two timepoints within participant and relating empathy trait scores to emotional biases, as well as the electrophysiological correlates of emotional biases. In all studies, we found a congruency effect, reflecting an EEB and EAB of small size. Both biases failed to correlate significantly within participants across timepoints and did not display significant relationships with empathy trait scores. On the electrophysiological level, we did not find any neural emotional bias effects in the time–frequency domain. Our results suggest that EEB and EAB effects are strongly task sensitive. Caution is warranted when studying interindividual differences in emotional biases using this paradigm, as they did not show significant test-retest reliabilities.

Feeling good working with you: Perspective-taking as a strategy to increase team member satisfaction

To deal with evolving customer demands, employees in hospitality organizations are increasingly working in multiple teams (i.e., multiple team membership [MTM]), which can be stressful and demanding, thereby affecting important attitudes, such as team member satisfaction. Yet, little research has focused on understanding theory-based strategies that can enhance positive feelings toward their team members. Drawing from the egocentric bias theory and the positive-negative asymmetry effect, we advance a multilevel model focused on perspective-taking as an intervention to increase team member satisfaction via empathy. Using an experience sampling method approach, 650 daily observations from 65 hospitality interns working in multiple teams were collected over ten consecutive workdays. The results showed that engaging in perspective-taking led to increases in empathy toward team members over time, which led to increases in team member satisfaction. Emotional stability was a moderator that changed the effect of perspective-taking. The current paper offers theoretical and practical contributions.

How ‘good’ or ‘bad’ Others can be: national identity and intercultural encounters in the Iranian protectionist educational policies

ABSTRACT Intercultural communicative competence has been offered as an open-minded replacement for ego-centric biases stemming from dogmatic national prejudice and its associated self-aggrandisement. While being a commendable proposal, its implementation in foreign language education has not been a widespread success story. Recent attempts to theorise intercultural communicative competence seem to emphasise negotiability in communication at the expense of some persistent issues, such as (cultural/national) identity. This article examines the prospects of intercultural communication in Iranian language policy as a country with a history of troubled encounters with foreign powers, culminating in protectionist approaches to nationalism, identity and the treatment of Others.

Self/other distinction in adolescents with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) assessed with a double mirror paradigm.

Self/other distinction (SOD), which refers to the ability to distinguish one's own body, actions, and mental representations from those of others, is an essential skill for effective social interaction. A large body of clinical evidence suggests that disruptions in SOD may be key to social communication deficits in individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). In particular, egocentric biases have been found in cognitive, affective, behavioural, and motor domains. However, research in this area is scarce and consists of recognition paradigms that have used only static images; these methods may be insufficient for assessing SOD, given the increasing role of embodiment in our understanding of the pathophysiology of ASD. A single-centre, prospective pilot study was carried out to investigate, for the first time, self-recognition and SOD in seven adolescents with ASD compared with matched, typically developing controls (TDCs) using the "Alter Ego"TM double mirror paradigm. The participants viewed a double mirror in which their own face was gradually morphed into the face of an unfamiliar other (self-to-other sequence) or vice versa (other-to-self sequence); participants were instructed to indicate at which point the morph looked more like their own face than the other's face. Two judgement criteria were used: 1) M1: the threshold at which subjects started to recognize their own face during the other-to-self morphing sequence; 2) M2: the threshold at which subjects started to recognize the other's face during the self-to-other morphing sequence. Consistent with the predictions, the results showed that the participants with ASD exhibited earlier self-recognition in the other-to-self sequence and delayed other-recognition in the self-to-other sequence, suggesting an egocentric bias. SOD impairments were also marginally correlated with ASD severity, indicating earlier face recognition in more severely affected individuals. Furthermore, in contrast with that of TDCs, the critical threshold for switching between self and other varied with the direction of morphing in ASD participants. Finally, these differences in face recognition and SOD using mirrors, unlike previous research using static images, support the central place of bodily self-consciousness in SOD impairments. Although additional research is needed to replicate the results of this preliminary study, it revealed the first behavioural evidence of altered SOD in ASD individuals on an embodied, semiecological face-recognition paradigm. Implications for understanding ASD are discussed from a developmental perspective, and new research and therapeutic perspectives are presented.

Grammatical Perspective-Taking in Comprehension and Production.

Language use in conversation requires conversation partners to consider each other's points-of-view, or perspectives. A large body of work has explored how conversation partners take into account differences in knowledge states when choosing referring expressions. This paper explores how well findings from perspective-taking in reference generalize to a relatively understudied domain of perspective: the processing of grammatical perspectival expressions like the motion verbs come and go in English. We re-visit findings from perspective-taking in reference that conversation participants are subject to egocentric biases: they are biased towards their own perspectives. Drawing on theoretical proposals for grammatical perspective-taking and prior experimental studies of perspective-taking in reference, we compare two models of grammatical perspective-taking: a serial anchoring-and-adjustment model, and a simultaneous integration model. We test their differing predictions in a series of comprehension and production experiments using the perspectival motion verbs come and go as a case study. While our comprehension studies suggest that listeners reason simultaneously over multiple perspectives, as in the simultaneous integration model, our production findings are more mixed: we find support for only one of the simultaneous integration model's two key predictions. More generally, our findings suggest a role for egocentric bias in production for grammatical perspective-taking as well as when choosing referring expressions.

Social comparison and handedness: Mixed-handers are less susceptible to egocentric biases in judgments about others' performance

Prior research has shown that, relative to mixed/inconsistent-handers, strong/consistent-handers show a stronger Dunning-Kruger effect in social comparison, in which people overestimate their performance on easy tasks and underestimate their performance on difficult tasks. However, this earlier study did not include actual performance measures, leading to the possibility that the effects may have reflected actual handedness differences in performance. In the current study, strong/consistent- and mixed/inconsistent-handers answered a set of either easy or difficult trivia questions and then provided estimates of their own versus others' level of performance. Consistent with the Dunning-Kruger effect in social comparison, strong/consistent-handers overestimated their performance on the easy questions and underestimated their performance on the difficult questions. This effect was significantly attenuated in mixed/inconsistent-handers. Results are interpreted in terms of mixed/inconsistent-handers having greater access to right hemisphere areas involved in perspective taking.

A little good goes an unexpectedly long way: Underestimating the positive impact of kindness on recipients.

Performing random acts of kindness increases happiness in both givers and receivers, but we find that givers systematically undervalue their positive impact on recipients. In both field and laboratory settings (Experiments 1a through 2b), those performing an act of kindness reported how positive they expected recipients would feel and recipients reported how they actually felt. From giving away a cup of hot chocolate in a park to giving away a gift in the lab, those performing a random act of kindness consistently underestimated how positive their recipients would feel, thinking their act was of less value than recipients perceived it to be. Givers' miscalibrated expectations are driven partly by an egocentric bias in evaluations of the act itself (Experiment 3). Whereas recipients' positive reactions are enhanced by the warmth conveyed in a kind act, givers' expectations are relatively insensitive to the warmth conveyed in their action. Underestimating the positive impact of a random act of kindness also leads givers to underestimate the behavioral consequences their prosociality will produce in recipients through indirect reciprocity (Experiment 4). We suggest that givers' miscalibrated expectations matter because they can create a barrier to engaging in prosocial actions more often in everyday life (Experiments 5a and 5b), which may result in people missing out on opportunities to enhance both their own and others' well-being. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

A curse of knowledge or a curse of uncertainty? Bilingualism, embodiment, and egocentric bias.

The ability to adopt others' perspectives-our "Theory of Mind"-underpins social interaction. Nevertheless, adults are imperfect perspective takers, demonstrating egocentric biases. Here, a series of experiments assessed whether (1) embodying an agent's physical perspective (working out whether he held something in his left or right hand) or (2) being bilingual, would benefit perspective taking. Participants were shown a scenario in which an agent puts a ball in one of four boxes. When he returns later, the boxes have been rearranged. Participants, who additionally know that the ball is now in a different box, then judge how likely the agent is to look for the ball in each of the four boxes first. In Experiments 1-3 participants were not more likely to judge the agent would look where he last saw it as a function of either factor. In Experiments 4 and 5, one group of participants were told where the ball had been moved to, the other only that the ball had been moved to a different box. In Experiment 4, participants in the latter condition assigned higher probability to the boxes that were never mentioned. In Experiment 5 this was replicated and was driven by monolinguals and those who had received the embodiment condition. These results suggest that egocentric biases may be more likely to arise when participants are more deliberative, such as when making a judgement under uncertainty, and that extrinsic factors such as bilingualism and embodiment may influence perspective attributions under such conditions.

Egocentric biases are predicted by the precision of self-related predictions

According to predictive processing theories, emotional inference involves simultaneously minimising discrepancies between predictions and sensory evidence relating to both one's own and others' states, achievable by altering either one's own state (empathy) or perception of another's state (egocentric bias) so they are more congruent. We tested a key hypothesis of these accounts, that predictions are weighted in inference according to their precision (inverse variance). If correct, increasingly precise self-related predictions should be associated with increasingly biased perception of another's emotional expression. We manipulated predictions about upcoming own-pain (low or high magnitude) using cues that afforded either precise (a narrow range of possible magnitudes) or imprecise (a wide range) predictions. Participants judged pained facial expressions presented concurrently with own-pain to be more intense when own-pain was greater, and precise cues increased this biasing effect. Implications of conceptualising interpersonal influence in terms of predictive processing are discussed.

Visual perspective taking is not automatic in a simplified Dot task: Evidence from newly sighted children, primary school children and adults

In the Dot task, children and adults involuntarily compute an avatar's visual perspective, which has been interpreted by some as automatic Theory of Mind. This interpretation has been challenged by other researchers arguing that the task reveals automatic attentional orienting. Here we tested a new interpretation of previous findings: the seemingly automatic processes revealed by the Dot task result from the high Executive Control demands of this verification paradigm, which taxes short-term memory and imposes perspective-switching costs. We tested this hypothesis in three experiments conducted in India with newly sighted children (Experiment 1; N = 5; all girls), neurotypical children (Experiment 2; ages 5–10; N = 90; 38 girls) and adults (Experiment 3; N = 30; 18 women) in a highly simplified version of the Dot task. No evidence of automatic perspective-taking was observed, although all groups revealed perspective-taking costs. A newly sighted child and the youngest children in our sample also showed an egocentric bias, which disappeared by age 10, confirming that visual perspective taking develops during the school years. We conclude that the standard Dot task imposes such methodological demands on both children and adults that the alleged evidence of automatic processes (either mindreading or domain general) may simply reveal limitations in Executive Control.