Efficient Deniable Authentication Protocol Research Articles

Cryptanalysis of a Deniable Authentication Protocol based on Bilinear Pairing using Single Sender and Group Sender

The aim of an efficient deniable authentication protocol is to enable a receiver to identify the source of a given message but not to prove the identity of the sender. Lu and Cao [7,10] confirmed that the previous protocols had a common weakness in which any third party can impersonate the intended receiver to verify the signature of the given message, and they proposed a new protocol based on bilinear pairing using single sender and sender group. They claimed that their protocol could provide complete security and properties of a deniable authentication protocol based on bilinear pairing using single sender and sender group, we will point out that the protocol in two papers is unable to prove the source of the given message to any third party, even if he/she fully cooperates with the third party.

An efficient non-interactive deniable authentication protocol with anonymous sender protection

Deniable authentication protocols satisfy two basic properties: Deniability and the specifiable receiver properties. However, the deniability also damages the sender right. To protect senders, Hwang and Ma first proposed deniable authentication with anonymous sender protection. The sender’s anonymity is also used to protect the sender’s privacy. To reduce the computation cost, an efficient deniable authentication protocol is proposed. Our new protocol not only achieves the two properties but also provides the protection of sender and receiver to keep the privacy of the sender and receiver. Though the sent message is forgeable by receivers, but the sender can provide evidence to prove the message was really sent by him/her. Due to the efficient performance, our protocol is more practical than the other protocols in the real world.

A novel deniable authentication protocol using generalized ElGamal signature scheme

A deniable authentication protocol enables a receiver to identify the true source of a given message, but not to prove the identity of the sender to a third party. This property is very useful for providing secure negotiation over the Internet. Consequently, many interactive and non-interactive deniable authentication protocols have been proposed. However, the interactive manner makes deniable protocols inefficient. In addition, a security hole is generated in deniable protocols that use the non-interactive manner if a session secret is compromised. Thus, there is no secure and efficient deniable authentication protocol as of now. In this paper, a new protocol based on the non-interactive manner is proposed to efficiently and securely achieve deniable authentication. This protocol can furthermore replace the underlying signature scheme in order to retain a secure status even if the previously used signature method is broken.

An improved deniable authentication protocol

AbstractDeniable authentication, which was introduced to realize secure online negotiation, has been an extensive topic of research. Wang et al. proposed an efficient deniable authentication protocol based on ElGamal cryptography. However, in this article, we show that Wang et al.'s protocol (WLT protocol) is vulnerable to the person‐in‐the‐middle (PIM) attack. An adversary who launches a PIM attack can impersonate a valid user to communicate with the verifier, which will eventually lead to the failure of an online negotiation. To mitigate this security breach, we propose an improved deniable authentication protocol based on Wang et al.'s scheme. Further, a detailed security analysis is conducted to verify the proposed scheme. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. NETWORKS, Vol. 48(4), 179–181 2006

Efficient deniable authentication protocol based on generalized ElGamal signature scheme

An efficient and non-interactive deniable authentication protocol is presented to enable a receiver to identify the source of a given message, but not prove the identity of the sender to a third party. The proposed protocol is based on the generalized ElGamal signature scheme and is more efficient than the previous protocols. We show that if an adversary could forge signatures of this protocol, he would forge signatures of the generalized ElGamal signature scheme. Moreover, the new protocol is more secure than the previous deniable authentication protocols, since anyone can not impersonate the intended receiver.